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ABSTRACT
The shipping business is an important element for the life of the trade of 
the different countries of the world. It had a very important role in the past it 
still has and it will always have, as it is the cheapest means of transportation of
goods. However, despite the importance of this element the legal complexities
bom out of this business makes it a broad subject of study and research for the
lawyers. This is because of the different documents used for the execution of the
contract of transport by sea and because of the speed these deals are concluded 
and the different nationalities of the parties to the contract.
Thus, the carriage of goods by sea involves two types of documents,
namely the charterparty and the bill of lading. The charterparty will hold a
great deal of our intention as the it is the document which gives the shipowner a
security or guarantee for the payment of the remuneration due to him, which is
called freight. However, this guarantee in the form of a lien is subject to
differences, as the nature of this lien is not very clear. Therefore, this work will 
focus on the nature of the shipowner's lien for the guarantee of payment of his 
freight, as the nature of this lien is different from one charterparty to another. 
In the case of a voyage or time charterparty, the nature of this lien is considered 
to be a possessory lien as the ship and therefore, the cargo are in the possession 
of the shipowner. However, the situation is different in the case of a demise
charterparty, where the control of the ship and the cargo is in the possession of
the charterer. In this case, the nature of the shipowner's lien is not possessory,
because he has not any possession, whether of the ship or the cargo. Therefore,
it is very difficult if not impossible for him to exercise his lien.
This study will be divided in two parts, the first part will focus on the 
various kinds of liens and defining possession and then the different possessory
liens because the shipowner's lien is considered to be a possessory lien, and in
what category this lien is.
Then, in the second part , the nature of the shipowner's lien on the cargo for 
the guarantee of payment of his freight will focus at along with the charterer's 
lien on the vessel for all the moneys pad and not earned, and that is because the 
clause of the charterparty which gives the shipowner a lien for his freight, gives 
the charterer a lien for the money he paid and which has not been earned, 
moreover, this work will also deal with the shipowner's lien on sub-freight, sub­
sub-freight and against the bill of lading holders. Finally, the exercise and the 
termination of the shipowner's lien on the cargo will be considered in the last 
chapter of the second part.
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INTRODUCTION
The law relating to the contract of affreightment is perhaps one of the most
difficult subjects in the province of shipping law.1 The difficulties arise in the
first place from the use of two entirely different forms of contract, i.e., the 
charterparty and the bill of lading. The use of these two forms of contracts may 
give rise to a certain number of liens which are the subject or the aim of this 
study.
Thus, the express terms of the charterparty give to the shipowner a lien on 
the cargo for the guarantee of payment of freight due to him for the hire of the 
vessel or for the services rendered to the cargo. Usually, charterparties give a 
lien to the shipowners on the cargo for the payment of freight. For instance, The 
"Baltime 1939” Uniform Time Charter reads in clause 18, that: "The Owners to 
have a lien upon all cargoes and sub-freights belonging to the Time-Charterers 
and any bill of lading freight for all claims under this charter, ..." and the "Gencon" 
charter (as revised 1922 and 1976) provides in clause 8 that: "Owners shall have 
a lien on the cargo for freight, dead freight, demurrage and damages for 
detention. Charterers shall remain responsible for dead freight and demurrage 
(including damages for detention), incurred at the port of loading. Charterers
shall also remain responsible for freight and demurrage, (including damages for 
detention), incurred at the port of discharge, but only to such extent as the
Owners have been unable to obtain payment thereof by exercising the lien on 
the cargo", and lastly, the New York Produce Exchange form (NYPE) which 
provides in clause 18, that: "The Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and
upon all sub-freight, for any amounts due to them under this charter; ...". Thus,
all the different forms of charterparties gives the shipowners a lien upon all
cargoes and sub-freights for all amounts due to them under the charterparty, i.e.,
1 Chorley & giles'. Shipping Law. 8 th Edition, at P. 165.
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for the carriage of the goods to their destination under the terms of the charter. 
The French and the Algerian jurisdiction provide the shipowner with a lien on 
cargo for the payment of his freight or hire. Therefore, the French Code of 
Commerce provides in article 1, section 2, that:2 "The shipowner has a lien 
upon all cargoes for the payment of his freight.",3 and the Algerian Maritime 
C ode,4 provides in article 645 that: "The shipowner has a lien upon all cargoes 
for payment of his freight and other charges provided by the charterparty."5 
However, one might notice that the French Code of Commerce and the Algerian 
Maritime Code prescribe the same lien or right of priority or what is called in 
french "le privilege", and they give the same definition in their articles and this 
similar to the lien provided in the different forms of charterparty. However, 
some questions will arise concerning that lien, which is given to the shipowner 
upon the cargo of the charterer and upon the sub-freight which might be earned 
by the charterer.
Therefore, what is the nature of that lien? and how can it be performed or 
exercised? either against the charterer for the freight or hire or, against the sub­
charterer for sub-freight. This is the most important point of this work.
The first question which arises is that of what is the nature of the owners' 
lien on cargo of the charterers? because the case is different from one form of
charterparty to another. In a voyage or a time charterparty, the owners keep
the vessel in their possession and all what the charterers have, is a space in the 
ship for their goods to be carried. Therefore, it seems clear that in a time charter 
or voyage charter or a bill of lading, this a contractual creation of a possessory
2 Loi No. 66-420 du 18 Juin 1966, sur les Contrats d 'Affretem ent e t de Transport
M a ritim e s .
3 " My Own Translation The actual article 1/2 provides in french that: « L e  freteur a 
un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son f r £ t .»
4 Ordonnance No. 76-80 du 23 Octobre 1976, portant Code Maritime.
5 " My Own Translation ". The actual article 645 in french provides that: « L e  freteur a
un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son fret et autres charges pr6vues au
contrat d 'affre tem en t.»
lien on the goods, and that is because the cargo goes out of the charterers' 
possession and goes into the shipowners' possession. However, the situation
would be different in the case of a demise charterparty, where the control and 
possession of the vessel are to pass from the shipowner to the charterer and is 
because of the nature of this kind of charter, and this kind of charterparty is a 
kind of lease of the vessel. Here, because the shipowner does not have 
possession of the vessel, and therefore, of the cargo, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that, if anything, it would be an equitable lien,6 and not a possessory 
lien. This is because, the charterers have the possession and control of the ship, 
i.e., the cargo is under their control, in this way, the shipowner cannot exercise 
his lien on the cargo because, they have no power to prevent the charterers 
from delivering the cargo to the consignees.
The second question is how can the owners exercise their lien on sub­
freights? where the charterers sub-charter the vessel to another charterer. 
Here, the charterparty was originally between the shipowner and the charterer
and the second charterparty was between the first charterer and the second
charterer or what is known as sub-charterer. Thus, the sub-charterer has not
made any contractual agreement with the shipowner, and his contract or 
agreement was only with the first charterer, in this way, one can say that the 
sub-charterer cannot be bound towards the owner for payment of freight
because of the lack of any agreement between them. On the other hand, the
different forms of charterparty, give to the shipowners a lien on the sub-freight 
which the charterer might earn from his sub-chartering of the vessel. Here, the 
question is, what is the nature of this lien and how can it be exercised or 
performed?. From this, might arise another problem as to the lien on sub-sub- 
freight, as it happened in the case of The "C ebu".7 where by a time
charterparty in the New York Produce Exchange form, the shipowners' vessel 
was chartered to charterers, sub-chartered to sub-charterers and sub-sub­
6 Jackson. David, C., Enforcement of Maratime Claims, at P.
7 The "CEBU". [1983] QB .  1005.
chartered to sub-sub-charterers. Clause 18 of the charterparty provided that: 
"The Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes, and all sub-freights for any 
amount due under this charter." After a dispute arose between the owners and 
the charterers regarding the hire payable, it was held that the owners had a lien 
over the hire payments by the sub-sub-charterers. This may give rise to 
difficulties, because the second charterparty was made between the second 
charterer, i.e., the sub-charterer and the sub-sub-charterer and neither the 
charterers nor the shipowners were part of it. So, what is the nature of the 
shipowners' lien in this case, and how can it be exercised?.
The charterers when they charter a vessel, they may have some space left 
in the vessel for additional cargoes, and some shippers might have a small 
quantity of cargo for shipment. So, these shippers do not need to charter a 
whole vessel for their small shipment, and therefore, they will ship their goods 
on the vessel under a bill of lading and they will pay freight to the charterers. 
So, their agreement or contract was made with the charterers and not with the 
owners. But, the shipowners might exercise their lien on the bill of lading 
freigh t.8 So, because the shipper under the bill of lading is not concerned with 
the charterparty, how can the shipowners have a lien on what is due from the 
bill of lading holder to the charterers, i.e., how can this lien be defined, what is its' 
nature and how can the shipowners exercise it?
The charterparty gives liens to the shipowners on the cargo and sub-freight 
for the guarantee of payment of their freight, but in the same time it gives the 
charterers, liens on the vessel in the case of moneys paid in advance and not 
earned. Therefore, the (NYPE) charter form provides in clause 18, that: " ... 
Charterers to have a lien on the ship for all moneys paid in advance and not 
earned, and any overpaid hire or excess deposit to be returned at once ...", and 
clause 18 of the Baltime Uniform Time charter reads: " ... and the charterers to 
have a lien on the vessel for for all money paid in advance and not earned."
8 See, The "CONSTANZA M”. [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505.
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However, the same problem which arose for the shipowner seems to arise here 
again with the charterers liens, because in the case of a voyage or time 
charterparty, the charterer is not in possession of the vessel, the vessel in this 
situation remains in the possession and under the control of the shipowner. 
Therefore, what is the nature of the charterers' lien on the ship? And how can 
they exercise it? On the other hand, in the case of a demise charterparty, 
because of the nature of this charter, the charterers have possession of the ship, 
and are even in charge of the control of the ship including its' master and crew, 
and therefore, they are in such a position as to be able to perform their lien on 
the vessel. Thus, in the context of a time or voyage charterparty, the charterers 
are not in possession, and their lien cannot be a possessory lien.
In The ''L an cas te r '1.9 it was argued that in respect of a time charter, the 
lien was an equitable lien (charge) in the true sense that it gave the charterer the 
right to enforce it against rival claimants to the ship and, in that case, to 
insurance moneys representing the ship. Robert Goff. J., held that, the "lien", 
although not a possessory lien, had a similar effect. It conferred "On time
charterers the right to postpone delivery of the ship to the owners" and not
more. On the other hand, in the case of a demise charter it follows that the lien is 
a "true" possessory lien.
Because this work deals with liens of the shipowners for the guarantee of 
payment of their freight, either on the cargo under the charterparty or, on the 
sub-freight or, on bill of lading freight, therefore, it seems more appropriate to 
give a brief account about liens, charterparties and bills of lading. So, this work 
will first deal in this introduction with the definition and nature of lien, and then
the definition of the charterparty and bill of lading and lastly with the relation
between the charterparty and the bill of lading.
9 The "LANCASTER”. [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 497.
1- Definition of Lien and its Nature:
The Word "Lien":
Before endeavoring to define "lien", it is interesting to consider the 
derivation of the word itself. It is of comparatively recent origin. The right of the 
lien existed in very early times, certainly as early as the reign of Edward IV,
under the name of a right of retainer, but the right was not called that of "lien"
until about the early part of the eighteenth century. The word is derived 
directly from the French "lien", and further back from the Latin "Ligamen",
which signifies "a tie" or "something binding". As it will be seen, the right in its 
fullest and widest application, means a charge upon property, that is to say, 
something which is binding upon it.10 Moreover, the term lien is frequently 
used in Scots law for one of the varieties of retention.11
Definition of "L ien":
Many attempts have been made to define satisfactorily the word "lien".
Some have defined the term "lien" as, "the right of a person to retain another 
person's goods which are in his possession until certain conditions are 
fu lfilled ."12 Some others have defined it as, "a form of real security, normally 
arising by operation of law ... and not by agreement for its creation, giving the 
party entitled to it, some right against property of the other party, to enable the 
former to make good some claim against the latter which may or may not be 
associated with that property."13 Another author defined the term "lien" as, 
"the right to hold property against the satisfaction of a claim."14 Thus, these 
definitions of the word "lien" seem to focus on the same point which is a kind of
10 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 497.
11 Walker. David. M. The Oxford Companion of Law. 1980. at P. 770.
12 Foster. Stephen. Business Law Terms. 1988. at P. 60.
13 Hudson. A. H. Dictionary of Commercial Law. 1983. at P. 166.
14 Stevens. Edward. F. Shipping Practice, at P. 56.
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a claim, charge or security on the property until certain charges or demands
have been satisfied. One of the earliest definitions is that laid down by Grose, J.,
in Hammonds v. Barclay.15 in 1801, namely that the term "lien" means:
"The right in one man to retain that which is in his possession 
belonging to another, till certain demands of him, the person in
possession, are satisfied."
This definition has been adopted by Mr. Joshma Williams Q.C., in his "Law 
Of Personal Property".16 Perhaps the widest, and most satisfactory definition, is 
that adopted by Withaker in his "Treatise of the Law of Lien",17 published in 
1812, namely, "Any charge of a payment of debt or duty upon either real or
personal property." This is the lien in its most extensive sense. As it will be seen 
later in this thesis,18 when the nature of equitable liens is considered, possession 
is not an essential element in the creation of lien, in the widest application of the 
term, and the definition is not enough, though satisfactory as the definition of a 
possessory or common law lien, for the term "lien" is also used to denote rights 
given by equity and maritime law to creditors to have certain specific property 
primarily applied to the satisfaction of their demands, irrespective of possession. 
The definition of Whiteley Stokes, in "Lien of Attorneys and Solicitors",19 
namely, "A right to charge property in another's possession with payment of a 
debt or the performance of a duty", is also unsatisfactory, as it excludes the most 
important section of possessory liens, in respect of which the right and the 
possession are vested in the same person. A lien, therefore, is "any charge of a 
payment of debt or duty upon either real or personal property." Both the 
French and the Algerian Civil Code, give a definition to the word "privilege" or
15 2 East, at P. 227.
16 Williams. Joshua. Q.C., Principles of the Law of Personal Property.
17 W hitaker. Richard. A Treatise on the Law Relative to the Right o f Lien and Stoppage 
in T ransitu .
18 See, Infra, Chapter One, Section Two, at P. 36. V
19 Stokes. Whiteley. A Treatise of Liens of Attornies and Solicitors.
"lien", in article 2095 of the French Civil Code, which provides that: "The privilege 
or lien is a right which the nature of the claim gives to a creditor to be preferred 
to other creditors, even mortgagees.",20 the Algerian Civil Code provides in 
article 982 that the "lien" or "privilege" is: "The lien or privilege is a right of 
preference given by the law for the benefit of a debt because of its quality or 
nature. No debt can be preferred, unless the law makes it as such."21 One may 
notice that from reading these two articles that, both the French and the 
Algerian civil code give quite a similar definition and that is, may be because of 
the historical reasons of the two countries. Moreover, they both require that the 
debt must be preferred to the other debts by a text in the law. Moreover, one 
may notice that there is another common point between them, which is that 
neither of them require any possession for the existence of the lien.
The Nature and Characteristics of Lien:
When it come to the lien in English law, most of the definitions which have 
already been mentioned above, have stated that the lien is a claim, charge, right 
or real security. This claim, charge or right is for the satisfaction of a debt or the 
performance of a duty and no possession of the indebted property is required 
for the satisfaction of the claim, unlike what some lawyers required in their 
definitions of lien and for the satisfaction of this lien.22 So, no possession is 
required for the satisfaction of the claim of lien, because there are some liens 
which do not require the holding of the indebted property or chattel, such as
20 " My Own Translation ", The actual article 2095 in french provides that: « L e  privilege
est un droit que la qualite de la creance donne a un crdancier d 'dtre pr6f£r£ aux autres 
creanciers, meme h y p o te ca ire s .»
21 " My Own Translation The actual article 982 in french provides that: « L e  privelege
est un d ro it de P reference concede par la loi au p ro fit d 'une creance d6tdrmin6 en
consideration de sa qualite - Aucune creance ne peut 6tre privil6giee qu'en v irtu e  d'un tSxte 
d e lo i.»
22 Stevens. Edward. F. Shipping P rac tice , at P. 56; and the definition by Grose. J., in 
Ham m onds V. B arclay (1801) 2 East, at P. 227.
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equitable liens and maritime liens which arise by operation of the law. 
Moreover, neither the French nor the Algerian Civil Code require possession for 
the existence of lien. Some other characteristics may arise from the reading of 
article 2095 of the French civil code and article 982 of the Algerian civil code, 
these characteristics may be summurised as follows:
1- The "Privilege” or "Lien" is a Right of Priority Given bv the Law:
This will lead to the point that the different "privileges" or "liens" cannot 
exist unless formally or expressly given by the law, i.e., there is no lien without a 
text or article (Req. 18 mai 1831, Grands Arrets, No. 192 "French Law").23 
However, that is not the case in all situations, because when it comes to the case 
of the "privilege" of a pledgee of a thing which was given to him as a pledge 
(article 2102 /  2 of the French civil code) and (article 948 of the Algerian civil 
code, concerning the pledge of things). This "privilege" or lien is instituted by the 
law without any doubt, but it is a result of the will of the part of the agreement
before being a "privilege" or a lien given by the law, because the constitution of a
pledge is a voluntary act.
2- To Recognise a "Privilege” or a Lien, the Law Considers the
Nature or Equity of the Claim or the Debt hut not the Person of the
C re d ito r :
When the law gives or creates a lien, it does not give a great importance to 
the one who is the creditor; but it is more concerned about the nature of the 
debt. However, this is not an essential characteristic or feature of the lien. 
Before, the French Decree of the 4 th of January 1955, a group of liens was 
instituted intuitu personae, these liens are those which were established by 
special laws for the benefit of the "Tresor Public" ( the French Treasury) to insure 
the payment of their credits. The article 2098 of the French civil code states this
23 Leon Julliot de la Morandiere. Precis Dalloz. Droit Civil. Tome ID. 1967. P. 312.
exception, and declares that these liens are regulated by special laws. Moreover, 
the pledge of chattels in the civil code, is not justified by the nature or quality of 
the debt; it is that lien of the creditor who is a pledgee of that given given to him 
for pledge (article 2102 /  2 of the French civil Code) and (article 948 of the 
Algerian civil code). In fact, a creditor can ask his debtor for a pledge, whatever 
is the reason of the debt.
3- The Preferred Debts are Paid Before all the O ther Debts even 
the M ortgaged Debts from the Price of the Property Charged with 
the Debt;
This is the most important effect of the "privilege" or lien, it ensures to the 
debt a right of performance against the other creditors of the debtor, even 
mortgagees.
Thus, the lien or "privilege", may be described as a right or claim on an 
indebted property for the payment of a debt or duty upon a real or personal 
property and this lien or "privilege", gives to the holder of it a preferred right 
against the other creditors.
It is well known in the field of shipping law that a transport user will find 
the way to carry his cargo by the use of a contract of affreightment. This 
contract of affreightment, is a contract for the carriage of goods in a ship. In 
practice, such a contract is written and is most frequently expressed either in a 
bill of lading or in a charterparty.
C on tract of A ffreightm ent;
It is well known that a transport user may use different methods when 
utilising vessels in ocean transportation. He may choose to charter the whole or 
a part of a vessel for one voyage: this is what is called a voyage charter. When 
having only a parcel or a limited quantity of cargo he may directly or indirectly, 
through a forwarding agent, send his goods as general cargo with a liner
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operator. If he has large quantities of cargo during a period, he may charter a
whole vessel for a certain time, three months, six months or any period agreed:
this is what is known as a time charter. Under special circumstances, he may 
also charter a vessel without a crew and for an agreed time: this is the bareboat 
charter. Therefore, there are four traditional types of freight or charter contracts.
C haracteristics and Definition of the C ontract of A ffreightm ent!
The newest type of contract for the carriage of goods by sea is what is 
called a "contract of affreightment", shortened to "C.O.A.". The name does not tell 
you what it is about. The special feature is that the contract is not limited to any 
particular vessel.24
Typically, the C.O.A., is recognised as a contract covering a specified, 
homogeneous cargo; large quantities; long periods; certain ports, and several
voyages. None of these features can, however, separately provide a basis for a 
definition of the C 0  A 25 Then what are the characteristics and definition of the 
contract of affreightment?
One important characteristic is that such a contract is mainly linked to a
cargo and an obligation on the owner to transport that cargo, rather than linked 
to a named vessel. It is thus a generic obligation. However, this characteristic is 
doubtful. The(C.O.A) may be so specific in its description of the vessel that only
one or a few vessels may be used and then the contract is in fact linked to a
certain or a few particular vessels. On the other hand, a voyage charterparty 
may include a very broad substitute clause which gives the owners a more or
less unlimited right, and perhaps also an obligation, to choose a vessel for the 
transportation and to nominate another vessel when the intended one cannot 
take the cargo. The conclusion is that it is hard to give a precise and clear
definition of the (C.O.A), nor is it important to have one. The important thing is
24 Per Gram. Chartering Docum ents. 1981. at P. 79.
25 Gorton Lars. A Practical Guide to Contracts of Affreightment and Hybrid C ontracts. 
1986. at P. 3.
that the contract clearly states how different costs, liabilities, risks, etc., are to be 
shared between the parties. As long as the contract is worded clearly it is thus 
less important whether it is defined as a (C.O.A) or a voyage or time charterparty 
or otherwise.26
T e rm in o lo g y :
A contract with the characteristics outlined in the above section is often 
referred to as a "contract of affreightment", a name which does not really say 
anything about its details.27 Other terms have been introduced to replace the 
concept of (C.O.A), such as "Tonnage Contract", "Volume Contract", "Quantity 
Contract", "Cargo Contract" and "Transport Contract". Some of these concepts are 
more logical and in any way better describe the fact that the contract of 
affreightment is closer to the cargo and the obligation to transport than other 
contracts of carriage which are also connected to a certain vessel. The term 
contract of affreightment has been chosen to be used, or the short term C 0  A, 
and the understanding is that a C 0  A is a contract having at least some of the 
features and characteristics described above. The term "contract of carriage" is 
used to cover all kinds of contract for the carriage of goods by sea 
(charterparties, bills of lading and contracts of affreightment). So, the contract of 
affreightment broadly speaking is a contract for the carriage of goods in a ship. 
In practice, such a contract is written and is most frequently expressed either in 
a bill of lading or in a charterparty. Thus, both the bill of lading and charterparty 
will be explained in more details next.
The C h arte ro a rtv :
Most of the definitions about the charterparty seem to focus on the same 
point, which is the hire of a ship for the carriage of goods by sea. Thus, some 
have defined the charterparty as an arrangement by which the owner of a ship
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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either lets his ship to a person, known as the charterer, for the purpose of 
carrying a cargo or undertakes that his ship shall carry a cargo for the charterer. 
If the ship is let, the charterer becomes, for the time being, the owner of the 
sh ip .28 Some others have defined the charterparty as, a contract by which an 
entire ship or some principal part of it is let by her owner to a charterer.29
The word "charterparty" derives from, carta partita (derived document) 
which refers to the ancient practice of writing out the terms of the contract in 
duplicate on one piece of parchment and then dividing it down the middle along 
an indented line as a primitive protection against forgery -carta partita-, thus 
providing each party with a copy. It is therefore, not surprising to observe that 
to this day, despite the absence of a rule requiring the written form,30 most 
negotiations by telephone or telex will eventually lead to the formal drawing up 
of a written charterparty, with standard terms. Whether or not the parties can 
be said to be contractually bound before they sign the charterparty, will depend 
in large part on the intentions of the parties and the circumstances of the case.31 
The actual terms of the contract contained in a charterparty are very varied and 
complicated, and some of them, though naturally couched in different language, 
are common to most charterparties. Others depend very much on the type of 
trade on which the vessel is engaged. Charterparties are usually made on 
common forms known by code names, e.g., "Gencon", "Exxonnvoy", but legislation 
does not impose requirements of content or form as the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1971 does for bills of lading. The civil law jurisdiction, such as the French 
Code Of Commerce ( which includes the French Maritime Law) and the Algerian
28 Foster. Stephen. Business Law Terms, at P. 15.
29 Ivamy. Hardy. E.R. Dictionary of Shipping Law, at P. 19.
30 Cf. a dictum by Slesser. L.J., in Corv V. D orm an Long & Co Ltd (1936) 55 L I. L.R.I, 5. For
instances of charterparties concluded orally, see B iddu lph  V. B ingham  (1874) 2 Asp. M.L.C. 225;
Colvin V. New herrv (1832) I Cl. & F. 283.
31 Sociedade Portuguesa de N.Tanques L . V. H ualfangerselskapet P A/S [1952] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 407.
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Maritime Code, give specific definitions to the contract of affreightment in both 
its1 forms, i.e., the charterparty and the bill of lading. Article 1 of the French Code 
of Commerce,32 gives a definition of the contract of affreightment, thus : "The 
contract of affreightment is a contract by which the shipowner promises to put a 
ship at the disposal of a charterer who pays a remuneration to the 
shipow ner."33 The second paragraph of this article adds that the shipowner has 
a lien or "privilege" on the goods for the payment of freight. A similar definition 
of the contract of affreightment is found in the Algerian Maritime code,34 in 
article 640 which defines the contract of affreightment as follows: "The contract 
of affreightment is a convention between the shipowner and the charterer, 
where the shipowner promises to put a ship at the disposal of the charterer and 
the charterer to pay a remuneration."35 Moreover, this article adds that the 
contract of affreightment can be for a voyage or a period of time or a demise 
charterparty. One can notice that the Algerian Maritime Code and the French
Code of Commerce have added some other dispositions to the definition of the 
contract of affreightment, these additional dispositions can be found in article 
641 and 642 of the Algerian Maritime Code. Article 641 provides that: "The
obligations, the conditions and the effects of the contract of affreightment are 
defined and agreed upon by the parties of the contract who are free to insert 
any clause in their contract. Nevertheless, they cannot insert any clause which 
might disagree with the present and actual law."36
32 Loi No.66-420 du 18 Juin 1966, Sur les Contats d'Affretement et de transport Maritimes.
33 " My Own Translation ". The actual article 1 provides in french that: « P a r  le contrat 
d 'affretem ent, le fr£ teur s'engage, m oyennant rem uneration , a m ettre un nav ire  i  la  
disposition d'un afffeteur . . . » .
34 Ordonnance No. 76-80 du 23 Octobre 1976 Portant Code Maritime.
35 " My Own Translation The actual article 640 provides that : « L e  contrat 
d 'a ffre tem en t s 'en tend  d 'une convention  par laqu611e le fre teu r s 'engage  m oyennant 
remuneration i  mettre le navire i  la disposition d'un a ff re te u r .»
36 " My Own Translation ". The actual article 641 provides that: « L e s  obligations, les 
conditions et les effets de l'affretem ent sont definis par les parties au contra t librem ent 
negocie. Toutefois, les parties ne peuvent inserer au contrat d 'affretem ent des stipulations 
contraires aux principes generaux du droit en vigueur . . . »
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Article 642 of the Algerian Maritime Code provides that: "The contract of 
affreightment must be written and that the charterparty is the act or the
contract which states the obligations of the parties of the contract."37
These dispositions are provided in the French Code of Commerce in articles 
1 and 2.38 Article 1 provides that: "The conditions and the effects of the 
contract of affreightment are defined by the parties of the contract otherwise, 
they are also prescribed by Title 1 st, of the Law of the 18 th of June, 1966 and
of the present title."39 Moreover, article 2 provides that: "The contract of
affreightment is proved in writing. The charterparty is the act or the contract 
which states the obligations of the parties."40
The articles of the Algerian maritime code and in the French code, are
similar. This could be due to the historical link between these two countries, or 
to the fact that they both have a civil law system.
By looking at the French code of commerce and the Algerian maritime 
code, it might be noticed that neither of these two codes defines the
charterparty, but they do define the contract of affreightment which is the 
general form of the contract of carriage of goods by sea, which can be expressed 
either in a charterparty or in a bill of lading.
The D ifferent Types of C harterparty :
There are mainly three types of charterparties, a voyage charterparty, a 
time charterparty and a demise charterparty. If the charterer undertakes the 
management of the ship, appointing and being responsible for the master and
crew, it is known as a charterparty by demise, but in a simple charterparty, the
37 " My Own Translation ". The actual article 642 provides that: «L 'a ffre tem en t doit dtre
prouve par ecrit. La charte-partie est l'acte qui ennonce les engagements des p a r t ie s .»
38 Decret No. 66-1078 du 31 Decembre 1966, sur les contrats d'affrdtement et de transport 
m a ritim e s .
39 " My Own Translation The actual article 1 provides that: « L e s  conditions et les effets 
de l'affretement sont definis par les parties au contrat et, i  defaut, par les dispositions du titre I
dr de la loi susvisee du 18 juin 1966 et celles du present t i t r e .»
40 " My Own Translation The actual article 2 provides that: « L 'a ffre tem en t est prouvd
par ecrit. La charte-partie est l'acte qui enonce les engagements des p a r t ie s .»
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shipowner retains the management of the vessel and the crew. There may be a 
voyage charterparty to run for a voyage or voyages, a time charterparty to run 
for a fixed period or a mixed charterparty to run for a voyage or voyages within 
a fixed period.41 However, beside these three types of charterparty, there are 
others like a charterparty for consecutive voyages or time-trip charterparty. A 
charterer and an owner may agree that the owner may put at the charterer's 
disposal one or several vessels employed for several voyages following
consecutively upon each other. Such contracts for consecutive voyages are 
characterized both by time elements and voyage elements. The vessel or the
vessels load the charterer's cargo, carry and discharge it at the port of discharge 
and thereafter return in ballast to the port of loading for a new cargo. 
Sometimes there is an understanding that the owner has the right to take return 
cargo, something which may affect the schedule, and which then has to be 
covered by the contract. The basic idea is that each particular voyage is 
performed under voyage charterparty terms with freight per voyage, time 
counting in ports, etc. The contract period is sometimes a result of the time the 
vessel needs to perform the agreed number of voyages. The parties can, 
however, also agree that the vessel shall perform as many voyages as possible 
during a certain fixed period. In the latter case the contract contains a typical 
time chartering element.
The time-chartered trip/voyage, is a charter made out on a time 
charterparty basis but in which some basic features are those of a voyage 
charter. Thus, the port of loading and the discharge and the voyage are 
described as the time it will take to perform the agreed voyage.42
C h arte rp a rty  bv Demise;
Because this kind of charterparty has a special importance in this work, it 
will be explained in more detail. Under such a charter, also known as 'net' or
41 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary of Commercial Law, at P. 57.
42 Lars Gorton and Rolf Ihre. A Practical Guide To Contracts O f A ffreightm ent And
Hybrid Contracts. Lloyd's Of London Press LTD. 1986. at P. 8.
16
'bare boat charter', the charterer undertakes full responsibility for control of the 
crew and the management of the vessel. The shipowner is not liable as carrier 
for goods and services supplied to the ship during the charter. It may be a
difficult question of fact whether a charterparty is by demise or not. The 
shipowner's only rights are to payment of the charge freight and return of the 
vessel when the charter has expired. Though a charterparty by demise may be 
for a voyage or voyages, in practice it is always for a period of time. The 
difficulty arises because shipowners anxious about possible depreciation of a
valuable and rather vulnerable type of property very often insist by the terms 
of the contract on retaining a certain control, for example, by the appointment of 
the senior officers. This may give rise to disputes as to whether the 
management has ever passed to the charterer. Thus, the importance of the 
distinction between a charter by demise and a charterparty proper, is that 
under the former the master is the agent of the charterer, not of the shipowner. 
Thus, in Sandem an v. S c u r r .43: a ship was chartered to proceed to Oporto and 
there load a cargo. The charterparty gave the master power to sign bills of 
lading at any rate of freight without prejudice to the charter. Goods were 
shipped at Oporto by persons ignorant of the charterparty, under bills of lading 
signed by the master. It was held that, the charter did amount to a demise 
charterparty. Consequently, the master's signature to the bills of lading bound 
the shipowner. But in the case of, Baumwolll Manufacturer Von Carl Scheibler v. 
F u rn ess .44 the charterparty provided for the hire of ship for four months, the 
charterer to find the ship's stores and pay the master and crew, insurance and 
maintenance of the ship to be paid by the shipowner who reserved the power to 
appoint the chief engineer. It was held that, the charter amounted to a demise 
charter of the ship, because the possession and control of the ship was vested in 
the charterer. Hence the shipowner was not liable to shippers ignorant of the
43 (1866) L.R. 2 Q.B. 86. Chorlev and Tucker's Leading Cases (4 th edn, 1962), at P. 290.
44 [1893] A.C. 8. Chorlev and Tucker's Leading Cases (4 th edn, 1962), at P. 290.
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charter for the loss of goods shipped under bills of lading signed by the master.
Moreover, in the Algerian maritime code, in the case of a demise 
charterparty, the shipowner keeps the nautical management of the ship, and 
therefore, the captain of the ship and the other members of the crew follow his 
instructions about anything concerning the nautical use of the vessel, and that is 
prescribed by article 700.45 However, article 701 provides that the commercial 
or the business management of the ship is for the charterer and therefore, the 
captain must obey all the instructions given to him by the charterer in the limits 
of the charterparty.46 However, in the French code of commerce, there is no 
indication as to who has the control or the management of the ship, but article 
28/2 provides that,47 the charterer chooses the crew for the ship and pay their 
wages and their food and all other expenses. He also pays for additional 
expenses for the exploitation and use of the ship and the insurance of the ship. 
Thus, this is clearly indicating that the charterer is the person in charge in the 
case of a charterparty by demise.
The demise charterer because of the nature of the demise charterparty, can 
limit his liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (limitation of liability
c lau se ).48 Therefore, in cases to which the Act of 1971 applies, unless the
nature and value of the goods have been declared by the shipper before 
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall 
in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with 
the goods.
45 " My Own Translation The actual article 700 provides that: « L e  freteur conserve la 
gdstion nautique du navire et i  ce titre, le capitaine du navires et les autres membres de
l'equipage demeurent les proposes du freteur et sont tenus de se conformer i  ses in s t ru c tio n s »
46 " My Own Translation ". The actual art.701 provides that: « L a  gdstion commercial 
appartient i  l'affreteur et dans ce domaine, le capitaine dtant de plein droit le reprdsentant de 
l'affrdteur, doit se conformer aux instructions de celui-ci dans la lim ite des dispositions de la 
c h a r te - p a r t ie .»
47 Decret No. 66-1078 du 31 ddcembre 1966, sur les contrats d 'affrdtem ents e t de 
transport maritimes. Article 28/2 provides in french that: « . . .  L 'afrdteur recrute l'dquipage,
paie ses gages, sa nourriture et les depenses anndxes. II supporte tous les frais d'dxploitation. II 
assure le n a v ire .» .
48 Carriage Of Goods By Sea Act 1971, Sch, Art IV, r 5 (a).
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Bill of Lading;
The bill of lading as a document for the carriage of goods by sea was given 
a lot of definition, but most of these definitions appear to similar in their content. 
So, some have defined the bill of lading as a document signed by the shipowner 
or the his master or agent, which states that goods have been shipped on a
particular ship or have been received for shipment. The bill of lading sets out 
the terms on which the goods have been delivered to and received by the 
sh ipow ner.49 Another definition was given to the bill of lading where it was 
considered that, the bill of lading is a document acknowledging the shipment of a 
consignor's goods for carriage by sea.50 Moreover, it has been defined as, a
receipt acknowledging that goods have been loaded on a ship or received for 
sh ipm ent.51 The French code of commerce defines the bill of lading in article 
33, as a document which is delivered after the goods have been received and it 
includes the necessary information to identify the parties of the contract, the 
goods to be carried, the elements of the voyage to be effected and the freight 
which has to be paid.52 The Algerian maritime code in article 748 defines the 
bill of lading, as it is delivered after the goods have been received by the carrier
at the demand of the shipper. This bill of lading will contain the information
concerning the identification of the parties of the contract, the goods to be 
carried, the elements of the voyage to be effected and the freight to be paid.53
49 Foster, Stephen. Business Law Terms, at P. 10.
50 The Concise Dictionary of Law. Oxford University. 1986. at P. 37.
51 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary of Commercial Law, at P. 38.
52 Decret No. 66-1078 du 31 Decembre 1966, sur les contrats d'affretement et de transport 
maritimes. Article 33 of this decret provides in french that: « L e  connaissem ent est ddlivrd 
apres reception des marchandises. II porte les inscriptions propres a identifier les parties, les 
marchandises a transporter, les elements du voyage a effegtuer et le fret i  p a y e r .»
53 " My Own Translation ". The actual article 748 provides that: « A p re s  rdcdption des 
marchandises, le transporteur ou son reprdsentant est tenu, sur la demande du chargeur, de 
lui delivrer un connaissem ent portant les inscriptions propres i  identifier les parties, les 
marchandises i  transporter, les elements du voyage i  effectuer et le fret & p a y e r .»
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Types of Bills of Lading;
The bill of lading may be (a) a ‘shipped’ bill of lading, i.e., one showing that 
the goods have actually been shipped on board; (b) a ‘received for shipment' bill 
of lading, i.e., one showing that a carrier has taken the goods into his custody. 
Sometimes the bill of lading is a 'through' bill of lading, i.e., a bill of lading issued 
to a shipper or where the goods have to be carried for a portion of the journey 
by land on a conveyance belonging to some person other than the shipowner. A 
bill of lading may be a (a) 'clean' bill of lading, i.e., one which does not contain a 
clause qualifying the statement in the bill of lading as to the apparent good order 
and condition of the bill; or (b) a 'claused' bill of lading, i.e., a bill of lading which 
contains such a clause.54 Bills of lading are often made out in triplicate, one copy 
being retained by the consignor, one going in the ship's papers and one being 
sent ahead to the consignee.
Relationship Between the C harterparty  and the Bill Of Lading:
The relationship between these two contracts might bring some puzzle to 
the readers or the users of them, especially when both documents are in use at 
once. The co-existence of two apparent equally contractual documents has given 
rise to many technical difficulties. The principal question is, who is liable and
who is entitled under the contract of carriage? In other words, who, can the
shipper and the consignee hold responsible for the safe arrival of their goods? Is 
it the shipowner or the charterer? And who is entitled to the freight, is it the 
shipowner or the charterer? In order to answer these questions, it might be 
useful to set out the various possibilities. There might be about four and they 
follow naturally from what just has been said about the operation of the entire 
contract.55
(i)- The contract of carriage may be between the owner of a general ship 
and the shipper. A charterparty is not then used and the contract is evidenced
54 Ivamy. Hardy. E.R. Dictionary of Shipping Law, at P. 8, 9.
55 Chorley and Giles'. Shipping Law. 8 th Edition, at P. 179.
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in the bill of lading. This happens in almost all cases where goods are shipped by 
a liner.
(ii)- The contract of carriage may be between the shipowner and the 
charterer under an ordinary form of charterparty. Here, a bill of lading will be 
issued when the cargo is loaded, but it will generally take effect as a receipt, not 
as a contract.
(iii)- The contract may be between the charterer by demise and a shipper. 
Here, there is a contract in the nature of a lease, not a contract of carriage,
because the control and possession of the ship have passed to the charterer, 
unless and until one is entered into between the charterer and some other 
shipper, when it falls under (i) or (ii) above, depending on whether the charterer 
puts up the ship as a general ship or not. The contract of carriage is then, of 
course, between the charterer and the shipper.56
(iv )- Where the charterer under an ordinary charterparty does not ship
goods himself, but transfers his right to do so to somebody else, there will
normally be both a charterparty and a bill of lading issued both by the
shipowner or by the charterer, or by agents for either to the shipper, and it is 
when that happens that the chief difficulties arise. The most fruitful cause of 
trouble lies in the differences between the terms of the two documents.
(v)- Finally, it may even happen in exceptional cases that in respect of the 
same voyage the contract of carriage in respect of one parcel of goods is made 
between shipper and charterer. Thus, one bill of lading might be issued by the 
owner and one by the charterer, the master signing them being the agent once
of the owner and once of the charterer.57 This case might bring some difficulty 
of understanding and that is because the master is either the agent of the
shipowner or the agent of the charterer. However, the master as being the agent
56 Samuel & Co. V. West Hartepool Steam Navigation Co. (1966) II Com. Cas. 115.
57 Wilston S.S. Co. V. Weir & Co. (1925) 31 Com. Cas. ID.; The Okehampton [1913] at P. 173,
per Hamilton L.J. at P. 181.
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of the shipowner might issue a bill of lading to the charterer for the parcel of
goods shipped and on the other hand, he might issue a bill of lading to the
charterer who gives it to the shipper because the charterer undertook to carry 
the shipper's parcel of goods and in this case the master acted as agent of the 
charterer.
The difficulties may arise in case (iv) and (v), for it may be uncertain
whether the shipper contracted with the owner or with the charterer. This is a
question of fact to be decided by looking at all the circumstances of the case. A 
common instance of such difficulties is, for example, where a charterer is only a 
broker who guarantees cargo for vessels which he undertakes to load.58
58 Chorley & Giles'. Shipping Law. 8 th Edition, at P. 180.
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PART ONE
LIENS, POSSESSION AND THE POSSESSORY LIENS
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CATEGORIES OF LIENS
Most of the legal systems have similar liens despite some differences,
which can be that one has provided some other liens which the other system
has not forgotten but included them in a different group. Liens in English law 
are of three kinds, the first being the Common Law or Possessory lien, then, the 
Equitable lien and thirdly the Maritime lien. On other hand, in the French and
Algerian legal systems, the classification depends on the nature of the security or
guarantee given, whether it depends on a person or on a property. This work is 
concerned with security guaranteed mainly on property and will focus on debts 
thus secured. Debts secured or chose in action will be considered later.
There are four major securities for debts, first the possessory lien which is a 
legal guarantee, secondly the pledge which is a contractual guarantee, i.e., a 
guarantee which depends on the words of the agreement between the parties to 
the agreement, thirdly, the "privilege" which is a legal security given by the 
different texts of the law, and lastly, the mortgage which is sometimes a legal 
security and sometimes a contractual security. Moreover, in the civil law 
system, the will of the parties is unable of creating other secured debts than 
those expressly given by the law or to modify or change the rules of these 
secured debts which were established by the legislator.
1-1- Common Law Liens or Possessory Liens:
A common law or possessory lien arises where a person is entitled to retain 
possession of property of another until claims concerning works done or services 
rendered to that property. First, will deal with possessory liens in English law
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and secondly with possessory liens in the civil law jurisdictions, namely the 
French and the Algerian law.
One of the classic definitions of the possessory liens is that laid down by 
Grose.J., in Ham m onds v. B arclay.1 where he defined the possessory lien as: "a 
right in one man to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another till 
certain demands of him the person in possession are satisfied." Possessory liens 
have also been defined as, "a form of real security under which the person 
entitled to the lien may retain possession of goods until some debt due to him 
has been paid by the person whose chattels are subject to the lien"2, and as 
"the right of a person in whose possession a ship or her appurtenances is or are 
to retain possession of her or them until payment or discharge of some debt or 
obligation due to that person in respect thereof. Such a right belongs to one who 
repairs, alters or otherwise bestows labour or skill upon a ship, and retains 
possession of her".3 This last definition is more related to possessory liens in 
the maritime law which will be discussed later. Finally, one may quote the 
definition of Lancelot. Edey Hall in his work on possessory liens in English law,4 
here he defined possessory liens as "a right in one man to retain that which is in 
his own possession belonging to another, till certain demands of him, the person 
in possession are satisfied." Therefore, a possessory lien is the right of a person
to retain another person's property which is in his possession until certain claims
concerning works done or services rendered to that property are satisfied.
A common law lien is enforceable under common law and possession
actual or constructive, is essential to a common law lien.5 Thus, possession is 
an essential element for the existence of a possessory lien and the court cannot
1 (1802) 2 East 227 at P. 235,102 E.R. 356, at P. 359.
2 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary of Commercial Law. 1983, at P. 209.
3 H alshurv's Laws o f England. Fourth Edition. Vol 43, on Shipping and Navigation, 
para 1141, at P. 780.
4 Lancelot. Edey.Hall. "possessory Liens in English Law". LIB (London) 1916. at P. 14.
5 Stevens. Edward.F. Shipping Practice. 10 th Edition, at P. 56.
24
declare that the lien may continue even though possession ceases.6 Moreover, 
there will be no lien if the possession is wrongful or the goods have been 
deposited for a particular purpose inconsistent with the lien or of mere storage 
or keeps.7 Normally, a lien is merely a right to retain, not to sell or re-sell, but 
there are many exceptions to this rule under statute, e.g., an unpaid seller, and 
generally an application may be made to the court for an order to sell if the 
goods are perishable or if some other good reason can be shown.8 This lien 
will only give the right to the lien holder to retain possession of the 
incumbranced property, and does not enable the holder of the lien to take 
realise the asset. Thus, by virtue of a possessory lien, a holder of goods may 
retain them until such a time as his charges are settled. He has no right to sell 
the goods, and except where the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (in section 492- 
501) allows them to be landed without loss, a shipowner has no right of lien once 
he has permitted the goods to be taken from the ship,9 it is why possession is 
essential for the existence of a possessory lien. As this work is more concerned 
with the shipowner's lien on the goods, this will be cited here as an example for 
the explanation of the possessory lien. Because possession is an essential 
element for the preservation of a possessory lien, the shipowner must keep 
possession of the goods either in his own hands or in the hands of his agents. 
Under the common law, the possessory only gives the carrier the right to retain 
the goods until the freight is paid, without granting him the power to sell the 
goods so as to recover the amount owing. The shipowner must look after the 
goods and discharge them at destination into a safe place so that the vessel may 
proceed upon its business. On the other hand, giving up possession will lead to 
the loss of the common law possessory lien.10 However, section 494 of the
6 See The Ally [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 427.
7 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary of Commercial Law, at P. 209.
8 Ibid.
9 Stevens. Edward.F. Shipping Practice. 10 Ed. at P. 56.
10 Tetley. William. Maritime Liens and Claims. 1985, at P. 339.
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Merchant Shipping Act 1894, brought a solution to the dilemma by enabling the 
shipowner to retain constructive possession over goods after discharge, thereby 
maintaining the shipowner's possessory lien for freight. This section provides
that, where goods are delivered to a wharfinger accompanied by a written
notice that the goods are subject to a lien even though they are no longer in the 
actual possession of the shipowner. As a general policy, the lien extends only to 
chattels retained.11 Unless provided by contract or statute, the lien does not 
extend to any charge for or expenses in keeping the chattel.12 Thus, the
expenses incurred in preserving a lien (e.g., warehousing) are not themselves
covered by the possessory lien at common law,13 but they are covered by 
statute, i.e., section 498 (iii). However, there may be a contractual agreement,
express or implied, whereby such expenses are subject to a lien.14 In Harlev v. 
G a rd n e r .15 the charterparty gave the shipowner a lien for "freight ... and all 
other charges whatsoever." The Court held that this clause entitled the 
shipowner to claim expenses reasonably incurred in discharging the goods and
placing them in a warehouse until the freight was paid.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted Anglo-Polish Steamship Line 
v. V ickers.16 and it was said that the general law is that when a man is claiming
a lien and holding goods because he has a lien upon them, he cannot charge the
cost of holding these goods in order to maintain his lien.17 Moreover, when it
comes to the enforceability of the lien, the carrier's possessory lien at English
11 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement of Maritime Claims. 1985, at P. 261.
12 Som es V. British Empire Shippin Co. (1860)8 H.L.Cas.338; The Katinaki [1976] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 372. I t was said in the latter case that there is no possessory lien for damages for breach of
contract o f repair but this must be read as referring to a lien unconnected with or incidental 
to the repair.
13 Ibid.
14 Tetley. William. Maritime Liens and Claims. 1985, at P. 340.
15 (1932) 43 LI. Rep. 104 at P. 105. See also Young V. Mfiller (1855) 5 E. & B. 755, 25 L.J. Rep 
(Common Law) 94.
16 (1924) 19 LI. L. Rep. 121 at P. 125.
17 Tetley. William, op cit, at P. 340.
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common law only gives him the right to retain the goods until the freight is 
p a id .18 Giving up possession, actual or constructive, constitutes a waiver of the 
lien. A problem therefore, arises when the cargo is arrested.19 Taking an action 
in rem puts the Admiralty marshal in possession of the res, i.e., the cargo.20 In 
other words, the effect of arresting the cargo is to remove possession from the 
carrier thereby reducing the latter to the status of unsecured creditor. In certain 
situations, however, where the possessory lien holder has lost possession by 
court process (as, for example, when the court has ordered the arrest and sale of 
the res), the court "must hold the proceeds of sale subject to the same rights as 
the possessory lien holders had."21 Thus, the carrier’s lien over the arrested 
cargo will rank high in order of priorities22
The common law divides the right of retention into two categories, general 
liens, and particular liens. The first category, i.e., the general lien, gives the 
claimant the right to any chattel of the person against whom the claim is made 
until the claim is met, there being no necessary connection between claim and 
chattel. On the other hand, the particular lien, can be defined as a right to retain 
a chattel until all claims made in respect of it are met and in this category of 
liens, there is a connection between the claim and the chattel. In the common 
law system, a little difference might be found as between common law 
possessory liens (applying to but not created primarily in maritime law) and 
maritime possessory liens. The only differences between these two, is that they 
are both the same liens but some of them arise in the maritime area. This
18 Som es V. British Empire Shipping (1860) 8 H. L. C. 338, 11 E.R. 459, The Gaunen (1925)
22 LI. L. Rep. 57, The Ally [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 427, The St Merriel [1963] P. 247, [1963] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 63.
19 Tetley. William, op cit, at P. 341.
20 The Gaupen. supra cit, at P. 58.
21 The Ally, suprea cit, at P. 428.
22 The St Merriel [1963] P. 247 at P. 252, [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63 at P. 68, referring to T h e
T e rg e s te  [1903] P. 26 at P. 34; see also The G ustaf (1862) Lush. 506, 167 E.R. 230 and T h e
Immacolata Concezione (1883) 9 P.D. 37.
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difference between common law possessory liens and maritime possessory liens 
is described by Jackson, in terms, "it should be stressed again that all the liens 
established at common law are applicable, where appropriate, in the maritime 
a rea ."23 Thus, most of general liens and particular liens are relevant in the 
maritime field. Their principles do not depend on any particular maritime 
application but there is a danger if their application is considered apart from the 
basic common law framework of which they are part. Any study of liens in 
maritime law must be in the context of the general domestic law as well as the 
sometimes unique characteristics of maritime law.24 Finally, one can say 
something about the termination of the lien, where the possessory lien might be 
brought to an end, either by the loss of possession, the taking of action 
inconsistent with a possessory lien, or the tender of amount due. As it has 
already been mentioned before in this work, possession is considered as an 
essential element for the existence of a possessory lien, and therefore, the loss of 
that possession will lead to the loss or the termination of that possessory lien.
This is most usually brought about by loss of possession and the most 
frequent cause of loss of possession is voluntary re-delivery. Once this has 
occurred, the possessory lien will cease to exist. Thus, where the possession has 
been fraudulently obtained to defeat the lien, the lien is extinguished on loss of 
possession .25 As a general rule, regaining possession after surrender will not 
resurrect the lien unless the surrender was obtained by fraud.26 However, in 
an early case, it was held that an insurance broker's lien on a policy did revive 
on regaining possession.27
The second case which might terminate the possessory lien is the taking of
an action inconsistent with a possessory lien. In this case, a general lien will be
23 Jackson. D.C. The Enforcement of Maritime Claims, at P.
24 See, Jackson. D.C. in his work on The Enforcement o f Maritime Claims, at P. 268.
25 W here there is judicial sale the lien holder's rights are transferred to the proceeds
and subjected to priority rules. See, The Tergeste [1903]P.26.
26 Jackson. D.C. op cit, at P. 263.
27 Levy V. B arnard  (1818) 8 Taunt, 149.
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lost through assertion of a particular lien,28 or the giving of credit terms or the 
taking of security for payment at a future date29 Any lien may be waived by 
contract or conduct. It will be a matter of construction as to whether waiver has 
o ccu rred .30 For instance, the shipowner's possessory lien may be lost, if the 
shipowner causes the goods to be taken in execution and sold at his own suit.31 
The shipowner with by this act has given up possession to the sheriff. Moreover, 
the possessory lien may be waived, and lost, by the shipowner claiming to retain 
the goods upon some different ground, and not under the lien.32
Finally, a common law lien may be lost by the tender of the amount due. 
Thus, if one goes back to the definition of a possessory lien, which is a right of a 
person to retain another's person's property which is in his possession until 
certain conditions are fulfilled, it will be seen that if the claims for which the lien 
holder is holding the incumbranced property are satisfied, the lien holder will 
have no reason to continue holding the incumbranced property. Therefore, the 
lien will be terminated on tender or payment of the amount due.
French and the Algerian law, merely consider the possessory lien under the 
terms "droit de retention", i.e., the right of retention.
The most suitable definition which can be given to this "right of retention", 
is that it is a right given by the law to a creditor to refuse to surrender a thing 
which belongs to the debtor as long as the debt has not been paid. This right will 
operate even though the creditor did not receive the thing by way of contract or 
pledge. From this definition arises the most important characteristic of the right 
of retention which is that this right gives only the right to keep or to preserve 
the thing. However, there is no particular text in the French civil code regulating
28 See, e .g , Morlev V. Hay (1829) 7 L.J.K.B. (O.S.) 104.
29 See, Burston Finance V. Speirw av [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1648.
30 Ibid. See, e.g., (re broker's lien) F isher V. Sm ith (1878) 4 App.Cas. 1.
31 Jacobs V. Latour (1828) 5 Bing. 130; 2 M. & P. 2d.
32 B oardm an V. S till (1809) 1 Camp. 410 n; D irks V. R ichards (1842) car. & M. 626; 4 Man. 
& G. 574. But see W hite V. Gainer (1824) 2 Bing. 23.
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this guarantee of payment of a debt, but it may be considered in the following 
ways.
First, this means of guarantee appears to be a primitive means self help.33 
However, the right of retention is justified by a moral thought of justice and 
equity, but this can be dangerous in some ways that the creditor might abuse or 
misuse this right against the debtor. This might be the reason why the French 
civil code does not contain any regulation governing the right of retention, and it 
limits the application of this right to certain cases. This why the doctrine and the 
jurisprudence had to fill the gap which the French civil code left blank and that 
by precising the conditions for the use of this right and it's effects. On the other 
hand, the Algerian civil code learnt from the absence of regulation or the gap in 
the French civil code, and gave a definition of that right in article 200.34
The right of retention is similar to other securities, where the creditor holds
and keeps the debtor's property until the debt is paid, such as the pledge. The
right of retention (legal security) has with the pledge (contractual security) 
certain common aspects, because the pledge gives the creditor the right to detain 
the thing. On the other hand, the pledge differs in some important aspects from 
the right of retention, as the pledge allows the creditor to sell the thing and to be 
the first to be paid from the proceeds. This security comes from Roman law, 
many different civil law jurisdiction which founded the right of retention in it is 
given to different creditors, whether they have a lien (privilege) like the pledgor
and the seller, or whether they have no right of priority. However, neither the
French nor the Algerian civil code give precise and detailed regulations to this 
right. This gap creates problems within the jurisprudence, and is one of the
33 Marty. Gabriel, et, Raymond Pierre. D roit Civil: Les Suretds La Publicity Foncidre. 
Tome m  Vol I, 1971. P. 13.
34 A rticle 200 of the Algerian civil code provides that: « C e lu i  qui est tenu d une 
prestation peut s'abstenir de l'executer, si le crdancier n'offre pas d'exdcuter une obligation lui 
incombant et ayant un rapport de causalitd et de conndxite avec cdlle du debiteur ou si le 
creancier ne fournit pas . . . »
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areas where the doctrine has achieved much to cover the gap left by the silence 
of the legislator.
This right of retention is regarded as an exemption or derogation to the 
principle of equality between all the creditors or the principle, "no lien without 
an article", i.e., "pas de privilege sans texte", and this is why this exception must 
be limited to the cases cited in the civil code. Aubry and Rau supported this 
interpretation in the extracontractual field,35 by considering the right of 
retention as an application of the exception non adimpleti con trac tus , and they 
proposed to widen its' application to the contractual area and the implied 
contracts. These views have been abandoned today but, the right of retention 
works indirectly as a lien (privilege); but does not constitute a real lien, otherwise 
it would give a right of priority. Thus, the legislator has sought to apply a general 
principle in a precise text and thus, any claimant must comply with the precise 
provisions of the text.36 The right of retention in its wide conception, is a right
which is based only in equity, and this is why the creditor, as long as he is not
paid, may retain the property whatever the reason for which he is holding it, e x  
d isp a r i  causa. The most common opinion takes an intermediary position 
without giving the right of detention ex dispari causa , which will have the effect 
to make the creditors seize or take hold of the debtor's property, and the debtors 
to give their property to an imaginary creditor so as to make their property 
escape being seized. So, this right is given in all the cases where there is a 
connection either between the debt and the res, or between the debt and the 
detention of the res:37
The Connection Between the Debt and the Res;
There is a connection between the debt and the res. There is d e b i t u m  
cum re juntum. It is objective or material relationship. For instance, a 
possessor made expenditures for the conservation of the thing in his possession,
35 Mazeaud, Henri et L6on. Mazeaud, Jean. Par Juglart, M. Leyons de D roit C iv il. Tome 
Troisieme. Premier Vol. Suretes. Publicity Fonci6re. P. 107.
36 Boulanger, J. Le Droit Prive au Milieu du XX& Siecle. Etude en l'Honneur de George
Ripert. Tome I, P. 51.
37 Mazeaud, Henri et Leon. Mazeaud, Jean. Par Juglart, M. at P. 108.
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fir this reason he will claim that he is using the right of retention on the thing as 
long as he has not obtained remuneration for his expenditures.
Connection Between the Debt and the Detention of the res:
The holder received the res in the course of an obligation created between 
himself and the owner. It is the juridical or the mental connection, as in the case
where a litigant gives to his solicitor the documents of his file and the solicitor, to
enforce payment of his fees, will claim the right of retention on the documents of 
the file. Some lawyers,38 refuse to accept the right of retention where there is 
only a juridical connection, and they accept the right of retention only where 
there is an objective connection. For them, the juridical or legal connection 
includes only the exception non adimpleti contrctus. However, in the case of a 
legal connection, the exception and the right of retention can coexist, but without
being mixed up and confused.
The Situation Where There Is An Objective Or Material Connection:
The civil code gives the right of retention in situations where there is no 
juridical or legal relation between the creditor and the owner of that thing, the 
latter found himself debtor because of that thing. The jurisprudence admitted 
that the creditor must be allowed to use the right of retention in every case 
where there exists a material or objective connection between the thing and the 
debt and in every case where, "the debt was born at the occasion of the thing 
de ta ined ."39 Thus, when the debt is about the remuneration for the expenses 
made for the conservation, improvement or the transformation of that thing, or 
for the reparation of the damage done by that thing to the holder of the right of 
retention, this narrow relation between the debt and the thing, which results 
from the fact that the debt was born from that thing, the d e b i tu m  cum
38 C assin , Ren6, De l'E xc6p tion  T ir6e  de r in 6 x 6 c u tio n  dans les R apports 
S vnallagm atiques. L e ^ n s  de Droit Civil, at P. 109.
39 Direct translation from, Civ. 1& civ. 22 mai 1962, Gaz. Pal. 1962. 2. 130.
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r e j e c tu m , justifies the right of retention; the thing itself is in some way debtor. 
When the right of retention is founded on objective connection, the property 
incumbranced with the right of retention is limited to the thing about which the 
debt was born; only this thing can be held.
The Situation where there is a Legal or Mental Connection!
The right of retention exists even in the absence of a relation between the 
debt and the thing itself, when the thing is between the hands of a holder 
because of a pre-existing legal relation between the holder and the owner of the
thing, and which gave birth to the debt of the holder. The right of retention can
exist when the detention of the thing and the debt have their source in the same 
legal relation, i.e., where the holder received the thing because of the legal 
relation which made of him a creditor, so that connection exists between the 
debt and the detention. The form of the contract is not important, what is 
important is that the detention is linked to an agreement or to an implied
contract which gave existence to the debt.40 The legal relation gives to the right
of relation a wide property to hold for guarantee of payment better than that 
given in the case of a simple material relation. In this case, the creditor can
detain all the things which he holds because of the legal relation which is the
origin of his debt, and not only that thing about which the debt exists.
The Existence of the Objective Relation with the Legal Relation 
in the Same Situation:
It has already been said that the right of retention can exist in different 
situations, regarding, whether it is in a situation where there is an objective 
relation or a legal relation. The objective relation does not require any 
connection between the debt and the thing itself. However, it does happen that
the right of retention is founded on both the objective relation and the legal or
juridical relation. This is the case where the creditor receives the thing according
40 Req. 26 Avril 1900. S. 1901.1.193 et note Ferron, D. 1901.1.455; civ. 25 janv. 1904, D. 
1904.1.601 et note GuenSe; cf. 6galement la note du rapporteur de l'arrSt prdcitd de la Chambre 
Civile du 9 mai 1944 i  la semaine juridique, prdcit ...
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to an agreement with the owner of that thing (legal relation), so as to repair or 
improve that thing (objective relation), and that is found in article 1948 of the
French civil code which provides that: " The bailee may retain the bailment until 
complete payment of what is due him by reason of the bailment",41 and in the
Algerian civil code it was provided in article 200/2 that: " This right also belongs
to a possessor or a retainer of a res for which he made necessary or useful
expenses. The res can then be retained until payment of what is due him, unless 
the obligation of reimbursement was bom out of an unlawful act".42
The right of retention is always given by the law, and cannot be given by
the will of the parties. If the right is out of the field of the right of retention
which is assigned to it by the law and in the absence of the conditions required
by the law the will is unable of creating it. Thus, some conditions must be
present so that the holder of this right can pretend exercising it.
The Conditions Concerning the G uaranteed Debt:
(il-  The Necessity of a Debt:
The right of retention comes into existence of a debt, and this debt is always 
a debt of a sum of money.
(ii)- The Debt Must Be an Unquestionable Claim:
There is no question or doubt about this condition, the jurisprudence 
requires the certainty of the debt.43 Moreover, the Criminal Chamber of the
41 Crabb. John H. The French Civil Code, as amended to July 1, 1976. at P. 353. Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. South Hackensack, New Jersey. The actual article 1948 of the French civil code 
provides that: "Le dSpositaire peut retenir le depot jusqu'd l'entier payement de ce qui lui est du 
a raison du depot."
42 "My Own Translation". The actual article 200/2 o f the Algerian civil code provides 
that: "Ce droit appartient nottamment au possesseur ou au detenteur d'une chose sur laquelle il 
a fa it des depenses necessaires ou utiles. La chose peu t alors e tre  retenue jusqu 'au  
rem boursem ent de ce qui est du, i  moins que l'obligation de rdstituer ne rdsulte d'un acte
illic ite ."
43 Civ. 17 juin 1914, S., 1920.1.201, note Naquet; Crim., 30 ddc. 1943, J.C.P., 1944.11. 2621, note
Garraud. Rev trim de droit civil, 1944. 186, observ. Carbonier; civ. n ,  28. Fevr. 1957, D., 1957. 2.
166; Civ., 3 mai 1966, D., 1966, Somm. 98.
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Supreme Court has considered guilty of the crime of breach of trust, those who 
use the right of retention for an uncertain debt.44
(iii)- The Debt Must be a Fixed Debt;
This condition (la creance doit etre liquide) gives existence to some doubts, 
because it appears to be more adequate to compensation, because the right of 
retention is not a means of payment but only a means of pressure on the debtor
to guarantee the payment of the debt. But the jurisprudence reduces the
importance of this condition.45
(iv)- The Debt Must be a Due Debt or a Claimable Debt;
The right of retention being a means of obliging the debtor to pay the debt, 
cannot be worked out where the creditor claims a non-claimable debt.
Conditions Concerning the Detention:
The Necessity of a Detention:
There cannot be retention without detention; for retention there must be 
first holding, and for this reason the right of retention will be lost when the 
detention ceases. This condition must complied with according to the thing being 
held and to the detention itself.
(i)- The Subject or the Object of the Detention:
The detention cannot give rise to a retention unless the thing on which the 
detention is being exercised, presents some characteristics, and these can be 
listed as follows:
44 Crim ., 30 dec. 1943, p r e c is .  Cet arret dont la s£verit£ a etonng certains 
commentateurs s'explique peut etre par l'hostilite  des tribunaux des agents d 'affaires, car il 
s'agissait en l'espece, d'un agent d'affaires qui pretendait retenir le dossier de son client."
45 Trib. Com. Lyon 21 Sept. 1951, D. 1951. 26.
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(a)- The Detention Must be tha t of a Corporeal Thing:
It is of no importance whether this thing is a movable or an immovable 
p roperty ,46 and the right of retention has been applied on different properties, 
such as titles of properties,47 documents like the car licence,48 and it can be
even on a sum of money. However, only corporeal properties can be subject to a
right of retention, because they are the only property which can be subject to 
detention. The rights cannot be subject of an efficient detention only if they are 
incorporated in a title.49
(b)- The P roperty  Detained Must he Able of Being T ransferred  
and Seized, and there is no need or obligation for an economic value.
(c)- The P ro p erty  D etained Must be the D ebtor’s P roperty , but
this condition appears to be dismissed by the jurisprudence. The Court of 
Cassation (Supreme Court) had to resolve the problem of a sequestrator for his 
right of retention of goods which had been deposited with him. It had been
recognised to the sequestrator the right of retention against the one who was
recognised as the owner of that property despite that he was not the debtor for 
the expenses incurred in keeping that property.50
(ii)- The Detention Itself:
The detention itself is not necessarily a real possession animo domini. The 
creditor who detains the debtor's property is supposed to surrender the 
property to the debtor, he is a precarious holder, and might be just a material 
holder. The holder must detain for himself, i.e., the right of retention cannot be 
used against whom he is keeping the thing for. In this case, the driver. cannot
46 En ce sens que le droit de retention peut s'6x£rcer sur un immeuble: civ., 25 janv 
1904, D., 1904.1. 601, S., 1910.1.142.
47 Req., 5 nov. 1923, D., 1924.1.11, S., 1924.1. 215.
48 Com., 16 mars 1965, Bull, civ., 1965. HI, No 200.
49 Gabriel Marty. Pierre Raymond. Droit Civil. Tome ID, Vol l e r, Supra, at P. 20.
50 civ l ere, 22 mai 1962; D., 1965. 58, note Rodi6re.
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use the right of detention against his employer.
Must the Holder of the Right of Retention be in Good Faith ?
The good faith is a condition required by the jurisprudence, so that the 
holder can use his right of detention and despite the silence of the drafters of the 
civil code. The courts rely on the Roman law and the old law, which refused the 
right of retention to the builders and possessors in bad faith. Here, we find the 
idea of equity which is the origin of the right of retention and which appears to 
be absent when the possessor is in bad faith. Moreover, the different courts 
refuse the right of retention to that who took possession of the thing with an 
unlawful means, by fraud or violence, more generally by an illegal act,51 or to 
that who made the mistake in doing the works, improvements or reparations, 
on which he founds his debt.52 Not recognising this restriction will be allowing 
the way to private justice.
1-2- E qu itab le  Liens;
The second type of lien is the equitable lien. In English law this lien is more 
than a right to go against an asset for a claim and it creates an equitable interest 
in the asset and, therefore, security for the claim. This lien may be defined as an 
equitable right, conferred by law upon one man, to a charge upon the real or 
personal property of another, until certain specific claims have been satisfied.53 
It has alternatively been defined as a form of real security created by equity 
giving a right to have specific property allocated to the payment of specific 
liab ilitie s .54 It is founded on a principal of equity, that he who has obtained
51 Req., 25 mai 1852, D., 1852.1.279; civ., 14 mai 1833, D., 1883.1.338, S., 1883.1.204; civ.2e, 28 
Fevr. 1957, D., 1957. 266.
52 Crim., 30 dec. 1943, J.C.P., 1944. H. 2621, Gaz.Pal., 1944.1.88; Civ. I1®, 3 mai 1966, D.S., 1966. 
649, note Jean Mazeaud.
53 Lancelot. Edey. "Possessory Liens in English Law". Hall. Lib (London) 1916. at P. 15.
54 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary of Commercial Law. 1983. at P. 120.
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possession of property under a contract for payment of its value will not be
allowed to keep it without payment. In the case of the equitable lien, the 
claimant has a charge on the property of another, which is not in his possession. 
This charge attaches to the property and gives rise to equitable remedies. 
Moreover, it is similar to the common law lien, in that it may be created by 
contract or recognised as stemming from a legal relationship.55 The term is 
normally used of rights arising by operation of law rather than by specific
agreement, the latter being known as charges. A charge is simply an interest in 
an asset held as security for a claim . usually a monetary claim. A charge simply 
creates an interest in the charge commensurate with the claim in relation to
which the charge exists and apart from land, in English law it is an equitable 
concept.56 "Equitable Lien", is synonymous with "equitable charge" in respect of 
an expressly created security interest, but "lien" is perhaps more frequently 
used than "charge" to describe security interests imposed by law as, for example, 
on the basis of conduct.
As the description "equitable charge" may be used, even in this context, 
there is little difference in substance between the two concepts.57
For the civil law jurisdiction, namely the French and the Algerian
jurisdictions with which this work is mostly concerned, there is a similar lien 
which is known as "privilege". The "privilege" is a legal security which gives a 
right of priority given by the law to some creditors. The French civil code in
article 2095 defines the "privilege" as "a right which the nature or the quality of
the debt gives to a creditor to be preferred on the other creditors even
m ortgagees.58 The Algerian civil code defines it in article 928 as: " The privilege
55 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement o f Maritime Claims, at P. 274.
56 Ibid.
57 Both a charging order made under the Charging Orders Act 1979 in favour o f a
judgm ent creditor and a writ of f i e r i  f a c i a s  (in execution of a judgment) take effect as an
equitable charge. A floating charge over company assets is an equitable charge.
58 "My Own Translation". The actual article 2095 in french provides that: " un droit que
la qualite de la  crSance donne i  un cr6ancier d 'etre prdferS aux autres creanciers meme
h y p o th e c a t e " .
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is a right of priority given by the law to the benefit of a particular or specific debt 
and that by considering its1 nature or quality. No debt can be preferred unless
there is a text of law".6 9 However, the definition of privilege in the French civil 
code, can be criticised,60 as it is given on the ground of the equality of the 
creditors and it aims only for the right of priority, whereas some privileges also 
give the right to follow the res in whosoever hands it may come. It relies on the
quality or the nature of the debt, but the privilege is not always given because of
the quality of the debt. Moreover, it gives to the creditor holder of a privilege
the right to be preferred to the mortgaged creditors, and this is not always the
case. Lastly, it does not say on what property the privilege operates depending 
on whether it is on a special or general privilege. The Algerian civil code cannot 
be criticised to the same extent. All what can be said about the notion of
privilege is that it cannot be expressed or explained precisely.
Creation of the Equitable Lien in English Law:
The equitable lien can be created by contract, from the relationship of the
parties or it may arise from a course of conduct.61
(i)- Bv C ontract:
The right to freely create a lien by contract means that parties can create 
security interests enforceable against third parties.62 Whether a contractual
59 "My Own Translation". The actual article 928 provides in french that: "Le privilege 
est un droit de preference concede par la lo i au p ro fit d 'une crdance d6t6rmin6e en
consideration de sa qualite. Aucune creance ne peut etre privil6gi£e qu'en v irtu e  d'un texte 
de loi".
60 Georges Ripert. Jean Boulanger. Traite De Droit Civil D'apr6s Le Traite DE Planiol. 
Tome ID. Surretes Rdelles. Contrats Civils. 1958. at P.34. para. 95.
61 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement o f Maritime Claims, at P. 275-276.
62 A lien or other charge created by a public company on its own shares is void except 
for a charge (i) for any amount payable in respect o f them, or (ii) arising in the ordinary
course of business o f a money-lending company, or (iii) in existence prior to a statutory
registration period (the Companies Act 1980, S.38).
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"lien” clause creates an equitable lien is a matter of construction. If construed as 
an equitable lien, its enforceability as a lien may be affected by registration 
requirements of either the Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882, or more likely in 
maritime matters, the Companies Act 1948.
Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882:
An instrument creating or evidencing an equitable lien created by contract 
by an individual (i.e., other than a company) is within the framework of the Bills 
of Sale Act 1882.63 Security transactions fall within the Bills of Sale Act 1882 
but many maritime documents are excluded from the operation of the Acts.64
Companies Act 1985. S.396:
An equitable lien created by a company is an "equitable charge" within the 
Companies Act 1985, S.396,65 and if within the terms of the section will require 
registration, for enforceability against a liquidator or other creditors. Such 
charges include a charge on a ship or share in a ship, a charge on calls made but 
not paid, a charge on book debts and any charge created or evidenced by an 
instrument which, if executed by an individual, would require registration as a 
bill of sale 66
(ii)- Arising from the Relationship of the p a r t ie s :6 7
Vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money. This is primarily relevant to the
sale of land and arises on the contract , counter- balancing the purchaser's
63 As to the framework, see the Bills of Sale Act 1878, S4 (adopted by the Bills of Sale Acts 
1882, S.3).
64 Including assignem ents and transfers of ships, bills o f lading, w herehouskeeper's 
certificates and any documents used in the ordinary course of business or proof o f possession 
or control o f goods or documents of title thereto.
65 As amended by section of the Companies Act 1989.
66 See, the Companies Act 1985, S.396 (C). A "floating charge" is also w ithin the 
provision, Section 396 (F). The new Act of 1989 will be discussed later on in this work.
67 An equitable lien is also created in favour o f a partner over partnership assets, a 
trustee over trust property for expenditure, and beneficiaries over land purchased with trust 
m o n e y s .
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equitable interest. But, as with the purchaser's interest, it may be applicable to 
the sale of chattels (including a ship) if equity would decree specific performance 
of the sale of chattel.68 However, its scope may be limited in that unless 
specifically provided otherwise a transaction within the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
may create only the rights (including the liens),69 specified in that Act.70 If, 
however, the Act does not provide an exclusive framework, the equitable lien 
would have a role to play alongside or constructive to the possessory lien 
conferred on the vendor by the Act.
(iii)- Arising from a Course of Conduct:
No equitable lien is created solely by expenditure on another's land, chattel, 
or intangible,71 but if such expenditure is made in reliance on a representation a 
lien based on estoppel in regard to the occupation and improvement of land, a 
lien may be claimed as the principle of "proprietary estoppel". So, it could be a 
transfer of title,72 occupation for a specified period,73 or a lien for any amount 
spent.74 The Court of Appeal, while conceding that proprietary estoppel exists 
in regard to land and could extend to forms of property other than land (such as 
goods), has held that it should not be extended further.75 Even accepting such a 
limitation, an equitable lien could be created in relation to a ship or cargo. While 
therefore, the principle appears most frequently in context of land it may be 
applicable commercially76 and, therefore, to maritime transactions.
68 See, e.g.. Langen V. Bell (Shares) [1972] 1 All E.R. 296.
69 See, S. 41.
70 See, e.g., Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch. 606.
71 As a consequence there is no lien for salvage outside the maritime concept.
72 Pascoe V. Turner [1979] 1 W.L.R. 131.
73 See, e.g., Inw ards V. B aker (life interest) [1965] 2 Q.B. 29.
74 See, e.g., Chalmers V. Pardoe [1963] 3 All E.R. 552.
75 Western Fish Products V. Pentworth D.C. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204, at P.218.
76 See, M oorgate M erchantile Co. V. T w itch ings [1976] Q.B. 225 (reversed [1977] A.C. 870)
and, it is arguable, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, S.21.
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1- C haracteristics of the "priv ilege11 in the French and Algerian 
Civil Code:
The privilege is a right of priority on a specified part of the property or on 
all the property of the debtor, and it is a right given to the creditor by the law 
because of the nature of the debt. The classification of the privileges, as it is in 
the civil code, is as follows:
(a)- General Privileges on Movables and Immovables; these are concerned 
with the movables and immovables of the debtor without the need for 
registration by the creditors, especially for the immovables. There are three 
types of privilege: the privilege for court costs, the privilege for wages, and the 
privilege for copyright.
(b)- General Privileges on Movables.
(c)- special privileges on Movables.
(d)- Special Privileges on Immovables, which are preferred mortgages, i.e., 
which come before simple privileges, but which must be registered as any other 
m ortgage.
2- The Effects of the Privileges:
It is the aim of the privilege to give a right of priority to its' holder, to be 
paid in preference of the other creditors: the right of priority or of preference. 
But, does the privilege give the right to follow the res? The question is asked or 
arise when the privilege does not constitute a mortgage.
The Right of Priority of the Chargee:
The chargee cannot be opposed to the sale of the debtor's property by the 
other creditors, but if he leads the other creditors to the sale, he must follow all 
the steps and formalities which an ordinary creditor follows, i.e., to levy a 
distress and to sell. He is not exempted from seizing the debtor's property to sell 
it, because he has not possession of that property. However, when the sell has
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been done by the other creditors or the chargee, the privilege gives to its' holder 
the right of preference or priority on the price.
Does the Privilege Give a Right to Follow the Res?
The doctrine and the jurisprudence are divided on this point. It is certain 
that in Rome the privilege was on a kind of priority given to the creditor at the
time of the distribution of the price of the property of the debtor, u n
p riv ileg iu m  in ter  p erson a les  a c tio n es ; the privilege in this way reinforced a 
debt, without giving a particular right on a particular property or properties of 
the debtor, and therefore, the creditor could not pretend to be paid on the 
property which went out of the debtor's property, i.e., he did not have the right 
to trace the res which went out of the debtor's property.
However, the privileges have had an evolution which made them become 
like mortgages. The creation of special privileges, not on the debtor's property, 
but on certain of it, movable or immovable, and the affecting of a particular thing 
to the payment of the debt which was the result of that has made the privilege 
close in similarity to the mortgage. Today, it is certain that the special liens on 
immovables, which constitute preferred mortgages, have given rise to the right 
to follow the asset of the debtor in whosoever hands it may come. The question 
does not arise anymore about the legal mortgages which affect on immovables; 
i.e., it is about mortgages, which like any mortgage, give the right to trace the 
immovable assets in whosoever hands they may come.
However, the question arises about general liens on movables and
immovables and special liens on movables, because neither the tradition nor the 
different articles brought a final decision. Nevertheless, it can be said that the 
chattel incumbranced by a privilege, is affected to the debt of the creditor, and 
then he can follow it if it goes out of the debtor's hands, even if it was without 
fraud. The Court Of Cassation (Supreme Court), which had only to look at the 
special liens on movables, refused the right to follow the assets to the creditor.77
77 Legons De Droit Civil., Supra, at P. 125.
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Enforceability of the Equitable Lien in English Law:
(i)- Against Third Party:
Once created, an equitable lien protects the claim to which it attaches by 
enabling the claimant to assert an equitable interest in a particular asset. It does 
not give any right to pre-trial attachment but it confers enforceability against all
interests created subsequently if required with notice of it and against any
equitable interest acquired subsequently whether with or without notice. To 
that extent it gives priority against purchasers and other creditors. But it is not 
enforceable against those who hold interests created prior in time to the "lien". 
The requirement of registration of interests has in some fields affected the 
general equitable rule that purchasers without notice take free of an equitable 
interest. Registration provides the "notice" and where it is available failure to
register an interest may render the interest void as against later purchasers. In
English law registration is relevant to liens other than in land only under the Bills 
of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882 or the Companies Act 1948 and as regard other 
registrable interests vying for priority with a lien.78
(ii)- T racing into o ther Assets:
Through the beneficial interest created by it the equitable lien provides a 
foundation for tracing in equity.79 Tracing is available in relation to assets 
substituted for that in which the lien existed by any party against whom the lien 
is enforceable. It is a remedy which overcomes the problem inherent in the 
concept of "lien" of continued existence of a thing to which the security interest is 
attached;80 but it does not increase the scope of enforceability (i.e., the number
78 Jackson. D.C. Enforcememt of Maritime Liens, at P. 277.
79 For general principals, see Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (C.A.) (affd [1951] A.C. 251). The 
court w ill assist through ancillary orders in discovering the whereabouts of the assets, (see, 
Av.C [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 200).
80 With the exception of the found created through judicial sale in an action in rem. As 
with every other lien if  the asset to which it is attached is destroyed or incorporated into 
another, the lien is extinguished (see, Borden (U.K.l V. Scottish Timber Products [1981] Ch. 25).
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of persons against which it can be enforced). The assets into which the lien may 
be traced must be seen as representing the original asset but equity will allow 
tracing into a bank account of other fund to which money paid for the asset has 
been credited.81
T e rm in a t io n :
In English law the equitable lien would fall with the claim to which it is 
attached, and to that extent is subject to statutory limitation of action provisions. 
It is also subject to the equitable principle of laches . delay will destroy the lien. 
And, naturally, it is subject to the general principles of waiver and loss by 
consent. Most of the reasons which terminate the equitable lien seem to be in 
both the French and Algerian civil code.82 The Algerian Civil Code in article 988 
refers to the means of termination of pledges and hypothecs as being the same 
as for the extinction of the privilege (i.e., lien). These ways of termination are
mostly similar to those in the French civil code, such as the termination of the
debt, or when the creditor gives up his lien or by the loss of the asset
incumbranced with the lien or by the extinction of the right of lien (i.e., by
prescription).
The English, French and the Algerian law, seem to have some similar ways 
for the extinction of the equitable lien, such as the termination of the claim when 
it is not claimed after a certain time, or waiver when the holder of the lien gives 
up his lien and this is the best way to terminate the claim and the lien in the 
same time because the holder of the privilege (lien) is the most appropriate
81 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement of Maritime Claims, at P. 278.
82 The french civ. code in article 2180 prescribes that:
"Les privileges et hypotheques s'eteignent:
1- Par l'extinction de l'obligation principale;
2- Par la renonciation du creancier i  l'hypoth^que;
3- Par l'accomplissement des form alins et conditions pr6scrites aux tiers d&enteurs pour
purger les biens par eux acquis;
4- Par la prescription ... ."
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person to terminate it. So, if he gives up his claim his lien is automatically 
term inated .
The Equitable Lien in Adm iralty;
An equitable lien or equitable charge may be created in relation to ship, 
cargo or freight in the same way as it may be in relation to chattels or choses in 
action generally. A claim based on an equitable charge or lien on a ship is within 
Admiralty jurisdiction as being a claim "in respect of a mortgage or a charge on a 
ship or share therein". It may be enforced by an action in rem against the 
sh ip .83 There is no provision for a claim in Admiralty jurisdiction based on an 
equitable lien on cargo or freight (unless it can be argued that such jurisdiction 
follows from jurisdiction in relation to a ship).84 The French and the Algerian 
jurisdictions recognise liens of a maritime type. The French law of the 3rd of 
January 1967, concerning the regulation for ships and other marine vessels, 
enumerates the preferred debts on the ship and its' accessories, and on the
freight (article 31). The Algerian Maritime Code,85 in article 72 prescribes that 
the lien is a preferred right of priority on all the other creditors, and that is 
because of the nature of the debt.
1-3- M aritim e Liens;
No express definition of the maritime liens is provided neither by the
domestic legislation of the United Kingdom nor by any other source of the
international law.86 Whereas maritime liens are on occasions expressly or
impliedly created by municipal statute,87 or otherwise recognised by statute,88
83 Supreme Court Act 1981, S. 20 (2) (c), S. 20 (7) (c), S. 21 (2).
84 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement of Maritime Claims, at P. 275.
85 The Enactment or Law No- 76-80 of the 23rd o f October 1976 concerning "The 
Algerian M aritime Code".
86 Thomas. Maritime Liens, at P. 11, para. 11.
87 See, e.g., Merchant Shipping Act 1970, 18.
88 See, e.g., Administration of Justice Act 1956, S. 3 (3).
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no further attempt to define a maritime lien has been made. In the opinion of
Sheen. J., this absence of any statutory definition is not surprising for a maritime
lien is "more easily recognised than defined".89 The same is true of the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1926. Beyond specifying certain claims to be in 
the nature of maritime liens, and the recognition that "claims secured by a lien 
follow the vessel into whatever hands it may pass",90 there is no further 
attempt at a distinct and a comprehensive definition.91
Definition of M aritim e Liens;
However, some authors have attempted to give a simple definition to 
maritime liens in their writings about maritime liens. Therefore, they have been 
defined by some authors,92 as a right which attaches to property, usually a ship, 
as a result of some liability incurred in connection with a maritime adventure, 
some others defined it as,93 a claim or privilege on a maritime res in respect of 
service done to it or injury caused by it, such a lien does not import or require 
possession of the res, for it is a claim or privilege on the res to be carried into
effect by process. Some others defined it as,94 a claim or privilege on a
maritime "res", that is to say, a ship, freight or cargo, and it arises either "ex 
contractu", for services rendered to the "res", such for example, as salvage; or "ex 
delictu", as for compensation for damage by collision. This claim is enforced by 
an admiralty action "in rem" (i.e., against the "res") by arrest. The basis of a
maritime lien is the liability of the owner of the "res", when the lien attaches, to
person who have rendered services to it or received injury by it. It is a right
89 The Father Thames [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 364, 368.
90 Art. 8. See also, Art. 7 of the 1967 Convention.
91 I t is nevertheless the case that when the 1926 convention is read in its entirety a 
fairly  com plete "descriptive definition" o f w hat is m eant by a m aritim e lien  under the 
Convention emerges. The same is also the case under the 1967 Convention.
92 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary of Commercial Law. 1983. at P. 170.
93 Halsburv's Laws of England. Fourth Edition. Vol: 43. at P. 774, para. 1131.
94 "Possessory Liens in English Law" , Supra, at P. 16.
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acquired over a thing belonging to another, a nju s  in rea lien a ", and is a 
substraction from the absolute property of the owner of the thing.95 This lien 
arises in cases of damage by collision, in respect of the ship causing the damage; 
for salvage, in respect of the ship saved by means of the assistance rendered, 
and also for the wages and victualling allowance of seamen and the wages and 
disbursements of the master.96 In Scots law maritime liens have been treated 
as hypothecs,97 but this classification is not entirely accurate, since the holder 
does not acquire a right of property or possession in the subject, but only a right 
to a preferential ranking on its proceeds after it has been brought to a judicial 
sale in the event of non-payment of the claim in respect of which the lien arises.
It has been observed,98 that a maritime lien "is not a right to take 
possession or to hold possession of the ship. It is confined to a right to take 
proceedings in a court of law to have the ship seized and if necessary sold. . . The 
right of maritime liens appears, therefore, to be essentially different from a right 
of property, pledge, or hypothec".
In French and Algerian law, no definition is necessary because the 
"privilege" is a term of the civil code. Besides, the civil code and the civil style of 
drafting traditionally avoid definitions, looking instead to ordinary dictionary 
meanings. Only when the civil wishes to depart from the normal meaning is a 
term defined.99 "Maritime lien" is usually translated to "privilege" and, for 
example, neither Rodiere,100 nor Du Pontavice,101 provide a definition, but refer 
to it variously as a "privilege maritime". Nevertheless, the Algerian maritime 
code brought a definition to it in article 72.102 However, this definition seems to
95 The Ripon Citv [1897] P. 226 per Barnes J.
96 "Possessory Liens in English Law" , Supra, at P. 17.
97 M'Millan. A.R.G. Scottish. Maritime Practice. 1926. at P. 46.
98 Ibid.
99 Tetley. William. Maritime Liens and Claims, at P. 40.
100 Rodiere. Droit M aritime. Precis, 1979, at para.118.
101 du Pontavice. Emmanuel. Le Statut Des Navires. 1976, at para. 134 et seq.
102 A rticle 72 provides that: "Le privilege est une suret6 rdelle ldgal qui confdre au 
creancier un droit de preference sur les autres crdanciers, i  raison de la  nature de sa 
c re a n c e " .
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be the same definition as the one given by the Algerian civil code in article 982 
and that by defining the "privilege" as a chattels real which confers to the 
creditor a right of priority on the other creditors, because of the nature of this 
debt.103 The Supreme Court Act 1891 does not define the maritime lien. It does
specify the claims which attract it and, apart from limiting its force to the asset to
which it may attach, ignores its characteristics. There is no specific indication of 
the "property" apart from ships to which it may attach, nor of the conditions of
its attachment and there is no reference to any link with liability in personam.
To discover the effect of S. 21 (3), therefore, recourse must be had judicial 
definition and development.104
Judicial Definition of M aritim e Lien:
The concept of a maritime lien has been the subject of frequent 
consideration by the judiciary and although, inevitably, differences of 
formulation and emphasis exists, there has been unanimous agreement as to the 
essential characteristics of a maritime lien.105
In The "Bold Buccleugh". Sir John Jervis provided the first comprehensive 
and authoritative definition of a maritime lien. In the learned judge's opinion:
" . . .  a maritime lien is well defined . . .  to mean a claim or privilege 
upon a thing to be carried into effect by legal process . . . that process 
to be a proceeding in rem . . . This claim or privilege travels with the 
thing into whosoever possession it may come. It is inchoate from 
the moment the claim or privilege attaches, and, when carried into 
effect by legal process by a proceeding in rem, relates back to the 
period when it first attached.106
Mellish L.J., in The Two Ellens adopted the following formulation in his
103 "My Own Translation".
104 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement of Maritime Claims, at P. 82.
105 Thomas. Maritime Liens. 1980. at P. 10. para. 10.
106 (1851) 7 M00 .P.C. 267, 284. The definition has been cited with approval on numerous 
subsequent occasions. See, for example, The Hallev (1867) L.R. 2 P.C. 193; T h e  Feronia (1868) 
L.R. 2. A. & E.65; The Charles Amelia (1868) L.R. 2 A. & E. 330; The Beldis [1936] P. 51; The Tolten 
[1946] P. 135.
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explanation of a maritime lien:
"A maritime lien must be something which adheres to the ship from 
the time that the fact happens which gave the Maritime lien, and 
then continues binding the ship until it is discharged, either by being 
satisfied or from the laches of the owner, or in any other way by 
which, by law, it may be discharged. It commences and there it 
continues binding on the ship until it comes to an end".107
Gorell Barnes J., in The Ripon City, after the review of the history of the law, 
defined a maritime lien in the following terms:
" . . .  a lien is a privileged claim upon a vessel in respect of service 
done to it, or injury caused by it, or injury caused by it, to be carried
into effect by legal process. It is a right acquired by one over a thing
belonging to another - a jus in re aliena. It is, so to speak, a 
substraction from the absolute property of the owner in the 
thing".108
Atkin L.J., in The Tervaete. defined a maritime lien as consisting:
". . . of the right by legal proceedings in an appropriate form to have 
the ship seized by the officers of the court and made available by 
sale if not released on bail".109
In The Token. Scott L.J., in drawing a correlation between the English 
maritime lien and its continental counterpart, observed:
"The essence of the 'privilege' was and still is, whether in continental 
or English law, that it comes into existence automatically without any 
antecedent formality, and simultaneously with the cause of action, 
and confers a true charge on the ship and freight of a proprietary
107 (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 161, 169. Cited with approval by Lord Macnaghten in The Sara 
(1889) 14 App. Cas. 209, 225.
108 [1897] P. 226, 242. Cited with approval in The Tervaete [1922] P. 259 (C.A.); The Tolten 
[1946] P. 135 (CA .); The Acrux [1965] p. 391.
109 [1922] P.259, 273. This is a highly proceduralistic kind of definition and suffers from 
the defect that if it fails to distinguish clearly a maritime lien and a statutory right o f action in 
r e m .
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kind in favour of the privileged creditor. The charge goes with the 
ship everywhere, even in the hands of a purchaser for value
without notice, and has a certain ranking with other maritime liens, 
all of which take precedence over mortgages".110
N ature of the M aritim e Liens:
The precise nature of the right is uncertain.111 The lien is derived from the 
owner of the ship, and must have its root in his personal liability.112 It need not, 
however, arise directly through him, but may arise through some person
deriving temporary ownership or possession from him.113 Thus, it may arise
while the vessel is in the control of a charterer by demise or of a mortgagee in 
possession, in which case the owner may have his interests subjected to a 
maritime lien, although he is not personally liable for the claim out of which the 
lien arises.114 For similar reasons an innocent purchaser may be subjected to a 
lien existing prior to the date of his purchase.115 It does not, however, arise 
when the vessel is under requisition by the government, since the transfer to
the Government is involuntary.116 The claim or privilege travels with the thing 
into whosoever possession it may come, but it does not follow that it is indelible, 
and may not be lost by negligence or delay or bad faith. It is incohate from the 
moment of attachment, and when carried into effect by legal process it dates 
back to the period of its first attachment."117 The lien covers both the freight
which is due and the cargo in so far as it is liable for the freight, but in both cases
it is subsidiary to that on the ship, and cannot exist independently of it.118 It
110 [1946] P. 135, 150. The word "privilege" as used here is synonymous with "maritime
lie n " .
111 M'Millan. A.R.G. Scottish Maritime Practice. 1926. at P.46.
112 The "Castelgate". 1893 A.C. 38, Lord Watson, at 52.
113 The "Taevaete".1922. P. (C.A.), Scrutton, L.J., at 270.
114 The "ripon Citv". 1897, P. 226, Gorell Barnes, J., at 244.
115 The "Bold Buccleugh". 1851, 7 Moo.P.C.C. 267.
116 The "Svlvan Arrow fNo.2V. 1923, P.220.
117 The "Bold Buccleugh". Supra, Sir John Jervis, at 284.
118 The "Castelgate". Supra.
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covers also the expenses of enforcing it, which may be of importance in
undefended actions where there are competing claims against the ship.119 From
the nature of the right, maritime liens are not transferable, except in the case of
instruments of bottomry or respondentia. In Scotland, however, it has been held 
that the lien for seamen's wages transmits to the payer of the wages without
formal assignation if the payment is made on the credit of the ship and not on 
that of the owner;120 and in England a similar decision has been reached on the 
ground that the claim of the person who pays the wages is itself in the nature of 
a wages claim.121 When it comes to the civil law jurisdiction, namely the French 
and the Algerian law, the maritime lien seems to have the same nature as the 
one in the civil law. However, it is different because it arises in the maritime 
area and is incorporated in a different than that of the civil code. The French law 
includes the maritime liens in the Code of Commerce (this code includes the
French Maritime Code),122 and the Algerian law gives it a separate code proper 
to the maritime law called the Maritime Code.123 The maritime lien in the 
French and Algerian law arises for services done to the ship such as the wages 
and money due to the captain and the other members of the crew (article 73,
(a)) of the Algerian Maritime Code and article 31 (3) of the French Code of
Commerce, and for salvage and assistance services rendered to the ship
(article73 (e), of the Algerian..Martime Code) and article31 (4) of the French
Code of Com. These maritime liens trace the ship into whosoever hands it may 
pass, and that is prescribed by the French Code of Commerce, in article39,124 and
119 The "Margaret". 1835, 3 Hagg. Adm. 238.
120 Clark V. Bowring. 1908 S.C. 1168.
121 The "William S. Safford". 1860, Lush. 69.
122 Loi No. 67-5 du 3 Janvier 1967 portant statut des navires et batiments de mer. Chapitre 
V- Privileges sur les navires. et Decret No. 67-967 du 27 Octobre 1967 portant statut des navires 
et autres batiments de mer.
123 Ordonnance No. 76-80 du 23 Octobre 1976 portant Code Maritime.
124 Art.39 provides in French that:
Les privileges prevus & Particle 31 suivent le navire en quelques mains qu'il passe . . . ".
52
the Algerian Maritime Code in article82.125
What can be added to what has been said about the nature of maritime 
lien, is that the lien is enforceable by means of process of the court.126 "Having 
its origin in this rule of the civil law, a maritime lien is well defined by Lord 
Tenderden to mean a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried into effect by 
legal process; and Mr.Justice Story,127 explains that process to be a proceeding in 
rem, and adds, that whenever a lien or claim is given upon a thing, then the 
Admiralty enforces it by proceeding in rem, and, indeed, is the only court 
competent to enforce it. A maritime lien is the foundation of a proceeding in 
rem, a process to make perfect a right inchoate from the moment the lien 
attaches; and, whilst it must be admitted that where such a lien exists, it may 
found in rem is equally true that in all cases where a proceeding in rem is the 
proper course, there a maritime lien exists which is a privilege or claim upon the 
thing, to be carried into effect by legal process. This claim or privilege travels 
with the thing into whatsoever possession it may come. It is inchoate from the 
moment the claim or privilege attaches, and, when carried into effect by legal
process by a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first attached": 
The Bold Bucclengh". (1851).128
M aritim e  L iens not G enerally  Enforced bv S ta tu te s  G iving 
Remedy "in rem ":
Since the judgement in The Bold Buccleugh.129 was delivered the remedy 
in rem has been extended to a number of new cases; and, as is now well
125 Art. 82 of the Alg.Mart.Code provides in french that: "Sous reserve des dispositions de 
l'a rtic le  87 ci-aprds, les privileges m aritim es dnumerds i  l 'a rtic le  73 su iven t le navire,
nonobstant tout changem ent de propriete ou d 'im m atriculation."
126 Carver. Carriage Bv Sea. Vol.n. para 2080. at P. 1439.
127 The Brig Nestor. (1831) 1 Summer 73.
128 7 Moo.P.C. 267, 284. See now as to the nature of a maritime lien France Fenw ick V.
Procurator General [1924] A.C. 667, 682, 683.
129 Ibid.
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established, it is not a necessary inference from the fact that these statutes have 
given the remedy in rem for a particular class of claims, that it was intended to 
confer a maritime lien, for those claims.130
Thus, in The Pieve Superieure.131 it was decided by the Privy Council that
the Admiralty Court Act 1861 did not give a maritime lien for claims for damage
to the cargo, or breach of duty, or breach of contract, within Section 6 of that 
A ct.132 The view taken was that the jurisdiction given to the court by the section 
depended not on the state of things at the time when the claim arose but upon
the state of things when the suit was instituted, namely, whether there was at
that time an owner of the ship domiciled in England; whereas, a maritime lien 
must attach and be enforced from the time the claim arises.133 In later cases the 
more comprehensive view has been taken, that words conferring the remedy in 
rem do not suffice to create a maritime lien. In The Heinrich Bjorn.134 the 
question was whether a maritime lien given by the Admiralty Court Act 1840 
for necessaries supplied to a foreign ship. The jurisdiction under that Act was 
not conditional. The House of Lords, affirming the Court of Appeal, held that, 
though that jurisdiction was exercisable by proceeding in rem, no maritime lien 
for the claim was conferred. And in The Sara.135 the House of Lords took the
130 Carver. Carriage Bv Sea, op cit. at P. 1439.
131 The Pacific (1864) Br. & L. 243; The Trouhador (1866) L.R. 1 A.& E. 302; The Two Ellens
(1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 161; The Pieve Superieure (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 482; The Heinrich Biom  (1866) 11
App. Cas. 270; 10 P.D. 44; The Sara (1889) 14 App. Cas. 209; 12 P.D. 158. And see The Rio Tinto (1884) 
9 App.Cas. 356.
132 Admiralty Court Act 1861, S.6, now replaced by the Supreme Court A ct 1981, S.20(2) 
(g) and (h) (formerly Administration of Justice Act 1956, S .l (1) (g) and (h) ), gave the high 
Court of Admiralty jurisdiction over claims under Bills of lading in respect of damage to goods 
carried into a home port "unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that at the time of
the institution of the cause any owner or part owner is domiciled in England or Wales". S.35 of
the A ct o f 1861 (now replaced by the provisions o f the A ct o f 1981) provided that the
jurisdiction might be exercised either by proceeding in rem or in personam.
133 Cf. The Two Ellens (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 161, 169.
134 (1866) 11 A.C. 270; 10 P.D. 44.
135 (1889) 14 A.C. 209; reversing 12 P.D. 158. See now Merchant Shipping A ct 1970, S.18.
replacing 1894 Act, S.18. cf. The Castelgate [1893] A.C. 38.
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same view with regard to the claim of a maritime lien for a master's 
disbursements, under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, S.10. The Supreme Court 
Act 1981 makes it clear by section 21 (4) that no maritime lien is given by it in 
the case of a large class of actions in rem ( (e) to (r) listed in section 20 (2) ). By 
section 3 (3): "In any case in which there is a maritime lien or other charge on 
any ship, aircraft or other property for the amount claimed, an action in rem
may be brought in the High Court against that ship, aircraft or property". The 
words "any case in which there is a maritime lien" must refer to the law apart 
from this statute, for it confers none.136
Fundam ental Legal C haracteristics of a M aritim e Lien;
The broad legal characteristics of a maritime lien are today reasonably well 
understood and may be presented in the form of the following structured
propositions.137 A maritime lien may be described as:
(i)- Privileged Claim or Charge:
A maritime lien may be considered as a privileged claim in many regards 
but "privilege" in the sense used here expressly refers to the high priority 
enjoyed by a maritime lien. The same can be said about the French and the 
Algerian law. The French Code of Com., which the contains the French Maritime 
Law, does not give a definition to the maritime lien or maritime privilege, but 
left it to the civil law which describes it according to its nature and priority over 
the other liens even mortgages (article2095 of the French civil code). However, 
the Algerian Maritime Code, gave a definition to the maritime lien, which 
considers it as a preferred right, which has a right of priority over the other
privileges because of its nature (article72 of the Algerian Maritime Code). For
reasons of general public policy, a maritime lien enjoys a priority in ranking over 
mortgages, possessory liens and statutory right of action in rem.138
136 Carver. Carriage Bv Sea. Vol 2. para 2083. at P. 1440.
137 Thomas. Maritime Liens, para 12. at P. 11.
138 Ibid. para 12. at P. 12.
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(ii)- M aritim e P ro p e rty :
A maritime lien is an encumbrance on maritime property. Traditionally, 
maritime property is a phrase which refers, irrespective of nationality, to a ship, 
cargo and freight. Beyond these categories of property, and in the absence of 
further statutory developments, no maritime lien is capable of arising even 
though the property in question may, in a general sense, be regarded as 
maritime property. Thus, no maritime lien is capable of encumbrancing a dock, 
wharf, lighthouse, off-shore oil rig or other similar structure, even though the 
owner or possessor of such a structure may be under a personal legal liability.
(iiP - For Services Rendered to it or Damage Caused bv it:
Maritime liens represent a small cluster of claims which arise either out of
services rendered to a maritime res or from damage done by such a res.139 The
claim currently recognised as giving rise to maritime liens are:
(a)- Damage done by a ship.140
(b)- Salvage.141
(c)- Seamen's wages.142
(d)- Master's wages and disbursements.143
(e)- Bottomry and respondentia.
The categories of maritime liens identified above represent the "principal"
or "proper" maritime liens.
(iv)- Accruing From  The Moment Of The Events Out Of Which 
The M aritim e Lien Arises:
A maritime lien attaches to a res from the moment of the circumstances 
out of which the maritime lien arises. In the words of Dr. Lushington, a maritime
139 See, generally, The Ripon Citv [1897] P. 226; The Tolten [1946] P. 135, per Scott L.J. at P.
146.
140 (Art. 73 (d) of the Alg.Mart.Code and art. 31 (5) of the Fr.Code of Com).
141 Art. 31 (4) of the Fr.Code of Com., and the art. 73 (e) of the AIg.Mart.Code.
142 Art. 73 (a) of the Alg.Mart.Code and art. 31 (4) o f the Fr.Code of Com.
143 Art 73 (g) of the Alg.Mart.Code and art. 31 (6) o f the Fr.Code of Com.
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lien "springs into existence the moment the circumstances give birth to it".144 
Thus, for example, in the case of damage and salvage a maritime lien arises from 
the moment damage or injury is caused by the offending ship, or from the time 
beneficial services are rendered to a distressed vessel.145 The Algerian Maritime 
Code considers that these debts are considered as bom from the moment of the 
date of the accident in the case of injury to a person or a property and the day 
the services have been rendered for the operations of salvage (article81,(a),
(c)).146 The French Code of Com., provides in article 10 of the Decree of October
the 27 th of 1967, a similar provision than that one provided in his counterpart
Algerian one. It considers that the time of prescription cited in article39 of the 
Law of January, the 3 rd of 1967, is to start from the day the services of salvage
has been rendered for the operation of salvage (S.(2) art 10) and from the day
when the damages have been caused for damage (articlelO, S.(2) ).147
(v)- Traveling With The Property Secretively And Unconditionally;
A maritime lien is invariably described as representing an indivisible, 
secret, indelible or inalienable encumbrance. Such epithets, both individually
144 The Marv Ann (1865) L.R. 1 A. & E. 8. See also The Bold Buccleueh (1851) 7 Moo. P. C. 
267; The Two Ellens (1872) L. R. 4 P.C. 161; The Sara (1889) 14 App. Cas. 209, per Lord Watson at P. 
218; The tervaete [1922] P. 259 (C.A.) per Scrutton L. J. at P. 270.
145 See, The Longford (1889) 14 P. D. 34, per Butt J. at P. 36. See also, The Tolten [1946] P.
135, 152; The Father Thames [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 364, per Sheen J. at P. 368.
146 "My Own Translation". The actual art.81 of the Alg.Mart.Code provides in french that: 
" Est considere comme date de naissance des creances garanties par un privilege maritime:
(a)- a titre de lesion corporelle i  une personne ou de perte ou dommage i  un bien, le jour 
ou ils ont eu l ie u ;. . .
(c)- a titre d'assistance, de sauvetage ou de relevem ent d'6pave, le jou r auquel ces
operations ont 6te achevdes; . . . ".
147 "My Own Translation". The actual art. 10 provides in French that:
"Les delais pr6vus i  l'article 39 de la loi No. 67-5 du 3 janvier 1967 portant statut des 
navires e t autres batim ent courent:
(i)- Pour les privileges garantissant les rem unerations d 'assistance e t de sauvetage, i
partir du jour ou les operations sont terminees;
(ii)- Pour les privileges garantissant les indemnites d'abordage et autres accidents et 
pour lesions corporeiles, du jour ou le dommage a ete cause; . . . "
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and correctively, are utilised so as to convey what may be regarded as the most 
striking feature of a maritime lien. Once it attaches to a res a maritime lien 
thereafter "travels with the thing into whosoever's possession it may come."148 
The maritime lien "gives" a right against the ship, which continues 
notwithstanding a change of ownership."149 The same provision is provided in 
the Algerian (article82 of the Algerian Maritime Code) and French law (article39 
of the Law of January the 3 rd of 1967).150 In these two articles, i.e., the 
Algerian and the French articles, it is prescribed that the maritime liens travel 
with the property into whosoever hands it may come.
(vi)- Enforced Bv An Action In Rem:
The inchoate maritime lien is perfected or crystallised by an action in rem. 
Under such a proceeding a maritime lienee may cause the incumbranced res to 
be arrested by an officer of the Admiralty Court and thereafter sold, and with 
the claim satisfied out of the proceeds of sale.151
The right of a maritime lienee to proceed in rem is confirmed in 
Administration of justice Act, 1956, S. 3 (3). T h is  r ig h t is a lso  co n firm ed  in  
the S uprem e C ourt A ct 1981, sec t 21(3).
148 The Bold Buccleugh. Supra, per Sir John Jervis, at P. 284.
149 The Colorado [1923] P. 102, per Atkin L. J. at P. 110.
150 Art.82 of the Alg.Mart.Code provides that: "Sous r£s6rve des dispositions de l'article 87
ci-apres, les privileges maritimes enumdrds i  l'artic le 73 suivent le navire, nonobstant tout
changem ent de propridtd ou d 'im m atriculation."
Art. 39 of the Fr.Code of Com., provides that:"Les privileges i  l'article 31 suivent le navire
en quelque mains qu'il passe . . . ".
151 See, The Celia (1888) 13 P.D. 82, per Lord Esher M.R. at P. 86.
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CHAPTER TWO
POSSESSION, INCLUDING THE RELATION BETWEEN 
ACTUAL AND LEGAL POSSESSION
Definition Of Possession:
This work is concerned with the different liens which arise under the 
contract of carriage of goods by sea, but this view of the subject will bring all the 
different liens into consideration. More accurately, this work is concerned with 
the liens which arise under the charterparty and the bill of lading and this will 
narrow the scope of the study. These nature of liens arising under 
charterparties and bills of lading are the subject of argument, but the general 
opinion is that they are possessory liens. This being so, the first step will be to 
consider the meaning of possession. At first sight the subject of possession does 
not appear to create much difficulty, but closer examination will disclose that 
few theoretical concepts are less easy of exact statement. In the whole range of 
legal theory, there is no concept more difficult than that of possession. The 
Roman lawyers sought to analyse it, and since their day the problem has formed 
the subject of voluminous literature, and it still continues to tax the ingenuity of 
jurists. It is a matter of immense practical, as well as academic importance. The 
legal consequences which flow from the acquisition and loss of possession are 
many and serious. For instance, possession is considered as evidence of 
ownership; the possessor of a thing is presumed to be the owner of it, and may 
put all other claimants to proof of their title. Long possession is a sufficient title 
even to property to which originally belonged to another. The transfer of 
possession is one of the chief methods of transferring ownership. The first 
possession of thing which as yet to no one is a good title of right. Even in respect 
of property already owned, the wrongful possession of it is a good title for the
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wrongdoer, as against all the world except the true owner. These are some,
though only some, of the results which the law attributes to possession, rightful 
of wrongful. They are sufficient to show the importance of this conception, and 
the necessity of an adequate analysis of its essential nature. To look for a 
definition that will summarise the meanings given to the term "possession" in
ordinary language, in all areas of law and in all legal systems, is to seek the 
impossible. We may be tempted, therefore, to inquire instead into the sorts of 
factual criteria according to which each area of a system of law ascribes
possessory rights to people and investigate the nature of these rights. In other 
words, we may prefer to ask "what are the facts on which legal possession is 
based, and what are the legal consequences?". In short, we might feel that the 
term "possession" itself could just as well be omitted: there are facts and there 
are rights, but possession itself is merely a useful but unnecessary stepping _
stone from one to the other.
In French law, possession is the external manifestation of the exercise of 
power as a question of fact over a thing. This exercise of a power of fact must be 
accompanied by the intention of the possessor to use that right. Thus, under
article 2228 of the French civil code : "Possession is the detention or the
enjoyment of a thing or of a right either personally or through another who
detains the thing or exercises the right in his name".1 The Algerian civil code 
does not give any clear definition to the term possession. So, according to the 
definition given above by the article 2228 of the French civil code , possession is 
a relation of fact between one thing and one person, and that relation allows that 
person to exercise over that thing acts which in their external manifestation will 
correspond to the exercise of a right, whether that person exercises that right by 
himself or through a third person, and also, whether that person is or is not the
1 "My Own Translation". The actual art.2228 provides in French that:
"La possession est la detention ou la jouissance d'une chose ou d'un droit que nous tenons 
ou que nous exer$ons par nous meme, ou par un autre qui la tient ou qui l'exdrcice en notre 
n o m " .
regular holder of that right. However, this definition seems to be inadequate in 
two points:2
First, the use of the term detention, which has a technical meaning, and 
which designates a closer situation to that of real possession, is confusing.
Secondly, it is inaccurate to say that possession is the enjoyment of a right, 
because there is no necessary connection between possession and the existence 
of a right. Possession, is the exercise of a right, when the right exists; however, 
we might have possession without having any right to exercise it. For instance, a 
thief has possession; possession is then a mere fact, it consists in having a relation 
with the thing as a holder of right. It exists and give its effects, whether the 
possessor has or has not the right to act as he does.
So, to find out, who is the possessor of a thing, we must look at the situation 
of fact, without trying to understand if this situation of fact corresponds to a 
situation of right.3
If we go back to the common law, we find that the word "possession" is 
used in relation to movable things in three different senses.4
Firstly, it is used to signify mere physical possession, which is rather a state 
of facts than a legal notion. The law does not define modes of events in which it 
may commence or cease. It may perhaps be generally described by stating that 
when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as regards the thing, he 
can assume, exercise or resume manual control of it at pleasure, and so far as 
regards other persons, the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, 
or in a house or on a land occupied by him, or in some receptacle belonging to 
him and under his control, he is in physical possession of the thing.
Secondly, it is used to signify possession in a legal sense, and in this sense, it
2 Ripert.Georges. Jean Boulanger. Traite De Droit Civil. D'Apr6s Le Traitd De Planiol. 
Tome II. Obligations Droits Reels, at P.799.
3 Henri Et Leon Mazeaud Et Jean Mazeaud. Lemons De Droit Civil. Tome Deuxidme. Vol.2.
4 s  Edition par Michel de Juglart. at P. 114.
4 Pollock And Wright. Possession In The Common Law, at P. 118.
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describes a legal relation of a person to a thing with respect to other persons. It 
may exist without physical possession as for instance, when a man is away from 
his home, his household effects do not cease to be in his possession.
Thirdly, it is used, especially in the year-books and by ancient writers, to 
signify right to possession, which may be either of that general kind which is 
synonymous with ownership or of a temporary or otherwise special character.
Thus, the most fruitful approach is first to examine the ordinary or extra- 
legal meaning of possession, and then to discuss the ways in which a legal 
concept of possession may diverge from this on account of the factors which the 
law may take into consideration, remembering that while the factual concept
underlies the legal concept, the latter, may in turn affect our use of the former. 
The way that lawyers use "possession" may well have repercussions on its extra 
legal use.
2-1- The D ifferent Types Of Possession:
2-1-1- Possession In Fact And Possession In Law;
One must make a distinction between possession and detention, whether it
is in the common law or in the civil law. So, in the common law we might make
a difference between possession in fact and possession in law, because 
possession in fact is the same as detention which is known in the civil law, which 
is just a physical relation between a person and a thing. Whereas, possession in 
the real meaning of the word, i.e., possession in law, is the relation between the 
person and the thing, no matter that the person has any physical control over 
the thing. So, the first difficulty with which the student will be assailed is the 
distinction between possession in law and possession in fact or detention. So, it is 
necessary to bear in mind from the outset the distinction between the two kinds 
of possession. Possession, in the popular sense, denotes a state of fact of
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exclusive physical control, which state of fact is not always ascertainable with 
any degree of certainty, and does not always produce the normal legal effect.
Not everything which is recognised as possession by law needs be such in truth 
and in fact. And on the other hand, the law, by reasons good or bad, may be 
moved to exclude from the limits of the conception facts which rightly fall within 
them .
(i)- Possession In Fact And Detention:
One may define possession, as a relationship between a person and a thing.
For example, I possess, roughly speaking, those things which I have under my 
control, such as, the things which I hold in my hand, the clothes which I wear, 
and the objects which I have by me. For instance, if I capture a wild animal, I 
get possession of it; if it escapes from my control, then I lose possession of it. 
Now to say that something is under my control is not to assert that I
continuously exercise control over it, because, I can have a thing in my control
without actually holding or using it at every given moment of time. In the
ordinary sense of the word, I retain possession of my jacket even if I take it off 
and put down beside me; and I continue in possession of it even though I fall
asleep. All is necessary to exercise a physical control over the thing, is that I
should be in such a position as to be able, in the normal course of events, to
resume actual control if I want. At this point we may observe the influence of
law and of the legal concept of possession on the idea of possession in fact. In a
wholly primitive society utterly devoid of law, and of legal protection for
possession, there might well be little hope of resuming actual control over the 
thing once you had momentarily relinquished it. In such a society, men could 
only be said to possess those objects over which they were actually exercising 
control. On the other hand, in a society where possession is respected generally 
and is protected by law, we may expect that temporary relinquishement of 
actual control will not result in complete loss of the ability loss of the ability to
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resume it at will. Thus, by providing protection to possession in a kind of 
remedies against dispossession, the law enlarges the number of cases where a 
man may be said to have possession.
According to the analysis contained in Harris's Concept of Possession, 
whether I can be said to have sufficient control (whether actual or potential) to 
be in possession of an object, will depend on a variety of factors.5
First, there is the extent of my power over the object itself. It is obvious
that complete absence of power will lead to a complete lack of possession, but 
having possession does not involve having absolute power over the subject 
matter; the amount of power that is necessary varies according to the nature of 
the object. The more amenable it is to control, the less likely am I to qualify as 
possessing it without being able to exercise a high degree of control. So, 
possession of small objects may involve holding them or just having them near 
to hand; a large or immovable object, such as a ship or a house, could be 
considered as remaining in my possession even though I am miles away and 
able to exercise very little control, if any.
Another factor relevant to the assessment of control is the power of
excluding other people. Once actual control is abandoned the possibility of 
resumption may well depend on the lack of outside interference; to his having 
kept secret the object’s existence or whereabouts; to his neighbour's 
unwillingness to interfere if the exercise of control has been interrupted; and
finally to the law itself which may penalise any such interruption. Indeed, so 
important is the exclusion of others to the notion of possession that is sometimes 
regarded as an essential part of the concept of possession. To possess anything, it
5 Harris. D.R, in, "The Concept O f Possession In English Law”. In Oxford Essays In 
Jurisprudence (ed.Guest), isolates no less than nine factors which have been held relevant to a 
conclusion that a plaintiff has acquired possession of a chattel for the purposes o f a particular 
rule of law. It is suggested that the reason for the relevance in law of the first seven o f the 
factors listed by Harris is partly their relevance to a conclusion that a person has possesion in 
fac t.
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is said, entails being able or intending to exclude others from it.6
This is not always true, and that can be seen from the fact that "possession" 
is a term apt to describe a situation involving only one person. For instance, if 
the sole inhabitant of a desert island catches a fish, he can quite correctly be 
described as being in possession of it, while keeping it in his possession, or as 
losing possession of it if it escapes. Thus, actual possession differs from
ownership, which consists of rights and which therefore automatically involves 
the existence of persons against whom the owner can have those rights. If I 
possess something, then it is true that if my possession is challenged or attacked 
I shall probably display an intention of excluding such interference. So, the test 
for determining whether a man is in possession of anything is whether he is in 
general control of it. Unless he is actually holding or using it, in which event he 
clearly has possession. We have to ask whether the facts are such that we can 
expect him to be able to enjoy the use of it without any external interference. 
When it comes to the detention, we find that the possessor of a thing acts as a 
master over the thing, but others may exercise this power without being neither 
owners, nor holders of another chattels real; these are those who have the 
detention of the thing. Detention which is sometimes called possession precaire 
in French, i.e., precarious possession, must be distinguished from possession. The 
tenant of a flat, uses the flat he rented, the bailee or carrier, preserves the thing 
which has been entrusted to him. They have the control over that thing. 
However, whether that thing is hired, entrusted or carried, these cases can* never 
make these holders possessors, because possession is in the true owner of the 
thing. Detention is always considered as a result of a juridical situation; it is 
supposed to have a juridical title as its origin. That title, might be, conventional 
(a tenant of a flat, bailee, etc ), legal or judicial (sequestration). Thus, the one who
6 The view that possession in some way involves an exclisive elem ent was held by 
S alm ond . Ju risp ru d e n c e  (7 th ed.), § 97; Pollock, Ju risp rudence And Legal E ssays, (ed. 
Goodhart), 98 et Seq; Holmes, The Common Law. 220 et Seq.
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has detention recognises the right of the owner, and will detain the thing for the 
latter, even if he has a personal interest in that detention. On the other hand, the
possessor considers himself as the owner or the holder of another's property,
whether he is or he is not the holder of that right. If he is not, he repudiates the 
rights of the owner or the holder of the chattels real; it is in defiance of the 
owner's prerogatives that a thief exercises his detention or mastership over the 
stolen thing. The power of the holder, being bom from a judicial situation, is a 
power of right: the tenant or bailee, . . . etc, have a right of debt against the lessor 
who must put the thing under their control or for their use.
The possessor, as such, has neither a property nor a right of debt.
Possession and detention are also differentiated on two points:7
First, the possessor can be holder of the right which corresponds to the 
power he exercises; he is in most of the occasions like this, because it is an 
exceptional situation that a thing escapes the control of the person who has a 
chattels real. Conversely, the two qualities of holder and owner can never be in 
the same person: for instance, I cannot be said to be the tenant of my own farm.
Secondly, when an owner ceases to have possession of a thing as when
someone takes control of that thing, the presence of the holder will not make the 
owner cease to be the possessor of that thing. So, the owner who hired his house 
to a tenant will keep his possession; he will possess through the tenant.
(ii)- Possession In Law:
In any society, providing some protection to possession is essential. This 
being so, the law must provide such protection, which can be done in two 
different ways.
First, the possessor can be given certain legal rights, such as the right to 
continue in possession free from any external interference. This primary right in
7 Mazeaud. Henri Et Leon. Et Mazeaud. Jean. Le9ons De Droit C ivil. Tom e Deuxidme. 
Vol.2. 4 e Edition, par Michel de Juglart. at P. 114.
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rem can then be supported by various sanctioning rights in personam against 
those who violate the possessor's primary right: he then can be given a right to 
recover compensation for interference and for dispossession, he can also be 
given a right to have his possession restored to him.
Secondly, the law can protect possession with criminal sanctions, and that 
by prescribing criminal penalties for wrongful interference and wrongful 
dispossession. By such civil and criminal remedies the law can safeguard a 
man's de facto  possession
Now, it is obvious that whenever such remedies are invoked, it will be 
important to ascertain whether a person invoking them actually has any 
possession to be protected. Therefore, there will be a need for legal criteria to 
determine whether a person is in possession of an object. A legal system could 
of course content itself with providing that in law the existence of possession 
should depend solely on the criteria of common sense. Thus, possession in law 
would be the same as possession in fact; a man would in law possess only those 
things which in ordinary language he would be said to possess. Such system of 
law then, would concern itself only with actual possession. The two concepts 
could quite easily coincide. Such coincidence does not need to restrict legal 
protection to cases of actual possession. For instance, if A wrongfully takes 
possession of B's book, the law can still consider B as the true one who must have 
possession, and therefore, affords all its possessory remedies to B, on the ground 
that B did originally have possession, and therefore ought to have possession. 
Thus, the fact that the law regards as possessors only those who are actually in 
possession, does not prevent it from protecting those who are not in possession, 
but who in the general view of society ought to be. For this reason, the 
protection of possession would be pointless if legal protection ceased he moment 
possession was lost, because the protection of possession entails supporting the 
dispossessed against the dispossessor. Thus, what is meant by possession in law 
is the legal character which is given to possession by law, because one might not
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be said to be in possession (actual possession) of an object, but in the eyes of the 
law he can be considered as possessor of that object. For instance, if a carrier put 
goods in a warehouse, here actual possession has passed to the warehouseman, 
because he has the goods in his custody, but the law considers the carrier as the 
true possessor of the goods, because it is him who originally had possession and 
who put the warehouseman in possession of the goods. Moreover, possession in 
law comes to protect the real possessor, because this possessor might lose his 
possession, as if the thing was stolen from him or as if he lost it, here the thief or 
the finder has actual possession of the thing, but the original possessor is still 
considered as the true and only possessor of the thing. So, possession in law is 
more likely a means of protection of the possession, than a definition of 
possession. Thus, when a system of law provides possessory rights and 
remedies to persons who are not in actual possession, and that can be done not 
by considering them simply as entitled to possession and its attendant rights, but 
by regarding them as being for legal purposes in possession. In this case, we 
may find that one who has not the actual possession is nevertheless the actual 
possessor in the eyes of the law; and on the other hand, one who has the actual 
possession may be considered by law as a non-possessor. For the crime of theft, 
the common law provides numerous examples of this tendency. This offense 
penalises the wrongful taking of possession, and in order to qualify as wrongful, 
such taking must be, firstly, without the true possessor's consent, and secondly, 
accompanied by an intent to deprive the true possessor of the object stolen. The 
same is applied by the French and Algerian civil code ; the French civil code 
prescribes in article 2279 /  2 and the Algerian civil code in article 835, that, the 
person from whom the thing was stolen can claim it back in a period of three 
years, because the possessor was dispossessed against his will, i.e., theft is 
considered as a dispossession against the possessor's will.8
However, there are many cases, where the wrongdoer gets possession with 
the consent of an unsuspecting owner and where accordingly dishonesty would
8 Crim. 18 nov. 1837, S. 1838. 1. 366. (French).
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go scot-free. For instance, where a man asks his companion to hold his luggage, 
or a shopkeeper allows a customer to examine his goods; in all these cases, 
possession might well be said to have been given to the second party by the first 
one, and with his consent. Consequently, if the companion, the customer in the 
shop, absconded with the goods, they would not in ordinary language take 
possession against the rightful possessor's consent, since they would have 
already obtained it earlier with consent. The law, however, provides that in such 
cases possession remains in the first party and does not pass to the second, but 
the second party is said to obtain mere custody of the article. Conversely, the 
French and the Algerian law, consider the possessor still in possession and give 
the right to recover the thing only if it was disposed against his will. But if he is 
dispossessed with his consent, such as if he gives the custody of the thing into 
the hands of an unfaithful holder, and the latter disposes of the thing, here the 
original possessor should be blamed for his bad choice by which he put his 
choice in an unfaithful holder. For instance, if the owner of a bicycle entrusted it 
to a mechanic to repair it but who sells it, there is no theft and the owner has 
been dispossessed with his consent. There is however a breach of trust. Thus, 
the one who brought this bicycle has a good title and will be protected, by the 
article 2279 of the French civil code and 835 of the Algerian civil code, which 
provides that, as regards movables possession is a good title.
It should be noted that there was nothing logically inevitable in this sort of 
development: in order to catch dishonesty which is outside the strict meaning of 
the definition of larceny, the law has extended the meaning of certain terms in 
the definition, it could equally well have extended the definition itself. This 
indeed has been done to cope with case of the dishonest bailee. The bailee is a 
person who acquires possession of the goods in law as well as in fact. So, what 
would happen, if he misappropriates them? having already got possession, he 
cannot, it would seem, be guilty of larceny. First, the courts created a peculiar
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rule that the bailee only got possession of the container and not of its content; if 
he subsequently "broke bulk" by opening the container and misappropriating 
the contents, he was now deemed to take possession of the content for the first 
time, and because such taking was against the original possessor's consent, he 
became guilty of larceny.9 Later, however, legislation provided another rule 
for the case of the bailee who frodulently misappropriated the goods bailed to 
him, which that he would be guilty of stealing, thus providing that a bailee who 
has lawful possession can nevertheless commit larceny of the goods he 
possesses. Here, then the definition of larceny was extended by extending the 
terms in the definition.
The same can be said about the French and the Algerian civil code, which 
provide in their articles (article 1599 of the French civil code and article 397 of 
the Algerian civilcode), which consider that the contract of sale of things which 
do not belong to the seller but to a third person, as a relatively void contract in 
favour of the real owner.10 Another similar case which similar to the problem 
of the bailee, is that posed by the delivery of an object to another, an object 
which, unknown to either of them, contains inside it certain valuable items of 
property. According to common law, however, unless the deliverer intends the 
deliveree to obtain possession of the contents, the latter does not acquire legal 
possession of them until he discovers them and that if at this stage he decides 
dishonestly to misappropriate them, he accordingly becomes guilty of larceny.11
According to the cases cited above, the physical possession of the accused is 
regarded as less than legal possession, because the accused is unaware that he 
has the object. However, yet in common law possession does not always involve 
knowledge of the presence or existence of the subject matter. If for instance, A
9 This curious rule o f law orginated from the carrier's case (1473) Y.B.13 Edw. iv fo. 9 
pasch. pi. 5.
10 Gazete Du Palais. 93 e AnnSe. No-6 bis. 2 e semdstre 1973. cass. 3 e civ. 16 avril 1973. 
Somm., p. 132, Bull. cass. 1973. 3. 218.
11 M errv v. Green (1847) M. & W. 623.
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unknowingly takes something which is in B's possession, he nevertheless takes 
possession and commits trespass against B.
So, in the famous case of IL  v. .R ilev:12 the accused was held to have taken 
possession of a sheep which belonged to the prosecutor and which he 
unknowingly drove with his own flock to the market.
Normally, lost articles are deemed in law to remain in possession of the 
loser. So, if I lose my wallet, in law I retain possession of it, even though in fact I 
might well be said to have lost possession. This view is accepted by the French 
and Algerian law. The French civil code in article 2279 /  2 and the Algerian 
civilcode in article 836, provide that the one who lost a movable has the right to 
claim it back from the finder in a period of time of three years starting from the 
day of the loss.
Finally, outside the law, possession is used in an absolute sense whereas 
within the law it is employed in a relative sense. Outside the law, we do not 
speak of a person having possession as against someone else; we say that he 
either has or has not got possession. In law on the other hand, we talk rather of 
possession of something which one person has against another.
2-1-2- C orporeal And Incorporeal Possession:
Corporeal possession is the possession of a material object, a house, a farm, a 
piece of money. Incorporeal possession is the possession of anything other than 
a material object- for example, a way over another man's land, the access of light 
to the windows of a house, a title of rank, an office of profit, and such like.
Corporeal possession is termed in Roman law p o s s e s s i o  c o r p o r i s .  
Incorporeal possession is distinguished as p o ssess io  ju r is ,  the possession of a 
right, just as incorporeal ownership is the ownership of a right.
It is a question much debated whether incorporeal is in reality true 
possession at all. Some are of opinion that all genuine possession is corporeal,
12 (1853) Dears. C.C. 149.
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and that the other is related to it by way of analogy merely. The Roman lawyers 
speak with hesitation and even inconsistency on the point. They sometimes 
include both forms under the title of p o s s e s s i o , while at other times they are 
careful to qualify incorporeal possession as quasi p o ssess io -something which is 
not true possession, but is analogous to it. The question is one of no little 
difficulty, but the opinion here accepted is that the two forms do in truth belong 
to a single genus. The true idea of possession is wider than that of corporeal 
possession. For purpose of this work, we are not concerned with incorporeal 
possession, for liens can only exist in respect of a material object. Possession for 
our purpose is therefore, corporeal possession, which is a continuing relation 
between a person and some material object. Nevertheless, we will try to give a 
brief account about incorporeal possession.
(i)- C orporeal Possession:
Corporeal possession can clearly be defined as some form of continuing 
relation between a person and a material object. It is equally clear that it is a 
relation of fact and not one of right. It may be, and commonly is, a title of right; 
but it is not right itself. A man may possess a thing in defiance of the law, no less 
than in accordance with it. For instance, a thief has possession in law, although 
he has acquired it contrary to the law. The law condemns his possession as 
wrongful, but at the same time recognises that it exists, and attributes to it most, 
if not all, of the ordinary consequences of possession. What, then, is the exact 
nature of that continuing de facto relation between a person and a thing, which 
is known as a possession? The answer is apparently this: the possession of a 
material object is the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of it. It 
involves, therefore, two distinct elements, one of which is mental or subjective, 
the other physical or objective. The one consists in the intention of the possessor 
with respect to the thing possessed, while the other consists in the external facts
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in which this intention has realised, embodied, or fulfilled itself. These two 
constituent elements of possession were distinguished by the roman lawyers as
a n im u s  and c o r p u s , and the expressions are conveniently retained by modern 
writers. Neither of these is sufficient by itself. Possession begins only with their 
union, and lasts only until one or other of them disappears. No claim or animus, 
however strenuous or however rightful, will enable a man to acquire or retain 
possession, unless it is effectually realised or exercised in fact. Conversely, the 
corpus without the animus is equally ineffective.
(ii)- Inco rpo rea l Possession:
Incorporeal possession is the possession of anything other than a material
object. For example, I may possess not the land itself, but a way over it, or the 
access of light from it, or the support afforded by it to my land which adjoins it. 
So, also I may possess powers, privileges, immunities, liberties, offices, dignities, 
services, monopolies. All these things may be possessed as well as owned. They 
may be possessed by one man, and owned by another. They may owned and 
not possessed, or possessed and not owned. Corporeal possession as we have 
already seen above, is the exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material 
object. Incorporeal possession, is on the other hand, the continuing exercise of a 
claim to anything else. The thing so claimed, may be either the non-exclusive 
use of a material object (for example, a way or other servitude over a piece of 
land) or some interest os advantage unconnected with the use of material 
objects (for example, a trade mark, a patent, or an office of profit). In each kind 
of possession there are the same two elements required, namely the animus and 
the corpus.
In the case of incorporeal possession, actual continuous use and enjoyment
is essential, as being the only possible mode of exercise. I can acquire and retain
possession of a right of way only through actual and repeated use of it. In the 
case of incorporeal things continuing non-use is inconsistent with possession,
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though in the case of corporeal things it is consistent with it.
Incorporeal possession is commonly called the possession of a right, and 
corporeal possession is distinguished from it as the possession of a thing. The 
Roman lawyers distinguished between p o ssess io  ju r is  and p o s s e s s io  corpis .
Adopting this nomenclature, we may define incorporeal possession as the
continuing exercise of a right, rather than as the continuing exercise de facto .  
Thus, the French civil code defines possession in article 2228, in the following 
way, "possession is the detention or the enjoyment of a thing or of a right either 
personally or through another who detains the thing or exercises the right in his 
n a m e " .13 We shall deal with possession in the French law later on in this 
chapter, in more detail.
To exercise a de facto  possession means to exercise the claim to possess, as 
if it were a right . There may be no right in reality; and where there is a right it
may be vested in some other person, and not in the de facto  claim ant.
2-1-3- Im m ediate And M ediate Possession:
If one person possesses a thing, it does not necessarily mean that he 
possesses it for himself, but that person may possess a thing for and on account 
of someone else. In such a case the latter is in possession by the agency of him 
who so holds the thing on his behalf. Thus, the possession held by one man 
through another may be termed mediate, while that which is acquired or 
retained directly or personally may be distinguished as immediate or direct. Of 
mediate possession there are three kinds:
The first is that which I acquire through an agent or a servant; that is to say, 
through someone who holds solely on my account and claims no interest of his
13 "My Own Translation". The actual art.2228 provides in french that:
"La possession est la detention ou la jouissance d'une chose ou d'un droit que nous tenons 
ou que nous exergons par nous meme, ou par un autre qui la tient ou qui l'exdrcice en notre 
n o m " .
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own. In such a case I undoubtedly acquire or retain possession; as, for example, 
when I deposit goods with a warehouseman who holds them on my account. In 
such a case, though the immediate possession is in the warehouseman, the 
mediate possession is in me; for the immediate possession is held on my account, 
an my animus domini is therefore sufficiently realised in the facts.
The second kind of mediate possession is that in which the direct 
possession is in one who holds both on my account and on his own, but who
recognises my superior right to obtain from him the direct possession whenever
I choose to demand it. That is to say, it is the case of a borrower or tenant at will. 
I do not lose possession of a thing because I have lent it to someone who
acknowledges my title to it and is prepared to return it to me on demand, and 
who in the mean time holds it and looks after it on my behalf. There is no 
difference in this respect between entrusting a thing to a servant or agent and 
entrusting it to a borrower. In Ancona v. R ogers.14 it is said in the judgment of 
the Exchequer Chamber that:
"There is no doubt that a bailor, may still treat the goods as being in 
his own possession, and can maintain trespass against a wrongdoer 
who interfers with them. It was argued, however, that this was a
mere legal or constructive possession of the goods . . . ".
Salmond in his book on jurisprudence,15 does not seem to agree with this 
argument. It seems to him that goods which have been delivered to a bailee to 
keep for the bailor, such as a gentleman's plate delivered to his banker, or his 
furniture warehoused at the Pantechnicon, would in a popular sense as well as 
in a legal sense be said to be still in his possession. There is yet a third form of 
mediate possession, in respect of which more doubt may exist, but theoretically 
which must be recognised as true possession. It is the case in which the 
immediate possession is vested in a person who claims it for himself until some 
time has elapsed or some condition has been fulfilled, but who acknowledges the
14 (1876), 1 EX. D at P. 292.
15 Salmond On Jurisprudence.. 1957. at P. 333.
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title of another for whom he holds the res, and to whom he is prepared to
deliver it when his own temporary claim has come to an end: as for example
when I lend a chattel to another for a fixed time, or deliver it as a pledge to be 
returned on the payment of a debt. Even in such a case I retain possession of 
the thing, so far as third persons are concerned. In all these cases, I get the 
benefit of the immediate possession of another person, who, subject to his own 
claim, if any, holds and guards the thing on my account.
The extent to which the above ideas are recognised in English law may be
briefly considered. An instance of mediate legal possession is to be found in the
law of prescription. Title by prescription is based on long and continuous 
possession. But he who desires to acquire ownership in this way need not retain 
the immediate possession of the thing. For all the purposes of the law of 
prescription mediate possession in all its forms is as good as immediate.
In Haig v. W est.16 it is said by Lindley, L.J., that:
"The vestry by their tenants occupied and enjoyed the lanes as land 
belonging to the parish. . . . That parish have in our opinion gained a 
title to those parish lanes by the statute of limitations. The vestry 
have by their tenants occupied and enjoyed the lanes for more than 
a century".
In the case of chattels a further test of the legal recognition of mediate 
possession in all its forms is to be found in the law as to delivery by attornment. 
In E lm ore v. S to n e .17 A bought a horse from B, a livery stable keeper, and at 
the same time agreed that it should remain at livery with B. It was held that by 
this agreement the horse had been effectually delivered by B to A, though it had 
remained continuously in the physical custody of B. That is to say, A had 
acquired mediate possession through the direct possession which B held on his 
behalf.
16 [1893] 2. Q.B. 30,31.
17 (1809), 1 Taunt. 458; 10 R.R. 578.
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In larceny, where a chattel is stolen from a bailee, the "property", i.e., the 
possession that has been violated, may be laid either in the bailor or in the 
bailee, at any rate where the bailment is recoverable by the bailor at his
pleasure either unconditionally or upon a condition that he may satisfy at will.
In all cases of mediate possession, two persons are in possession of the 
same thing at the same time. Every mediate possessor stands in relation to a 
direct possessor through who he holds. There is, however, an important
distinction to be noticed. For some purposes, mediate possession exists as against 
third persons only, and not as against the immediate possessor. Immediate
possession, on the other hand, is valid as against all the world, including the 
mediate possessor himself. Thus, if I deposit goods with a warehouseman, I 
retain possession as against all the other persons, because as against them I have 
the benefit of the warehouseman's custody. But as between the warehouseman 
and myself, he is in possession and not me. For as against him, I have in no way 
realised my animus p o s s id e n d i  no in any way obtained a security of use and
enjoym ent.
2-1-4- C o n c u rre n t P ossession :
One might ask himself, if two persons could possess the same thing? It was 
a maxim in civil law that two persons could not be in possession of the same 
thing at the same time. Plures eandem rem in solidum  p o s s id e r e  non 
p o s s u n t ,18 As a general proposition this is true; for exclusiveness is of the
essence of possession. Two adverse claim of exclusive use cannot both be 
effectually realised at the same time. Claims, however, which are not adverse, 
and which are not therefore, mutually destructive, admit of concurrent
realisation. Hence, there are several possible cases of duplicate possession.
(i)- Mediate and immediate possession coexist in respect of the same thing 
as already explained before.
18 D. 41. 2. 3. 5; cf. for English Law Holdsworth, H. E. L., IE. p. 96.
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(ii)- Two or more persons may possess the same thing in common, just as 
they may own it in common. This is called "compossessio" by the civilians.
(iii)- Corporeal and incorporeal possession may coexist in respect of the 
same material object. Thus, A may possess the land, while B possesses a right of 
way over it. For it is necessary, that A's claim of exclusive use should be 
absolute; it is sufficient that it is general.
2-2- THE ELEMENTS OF POSSESSION:
According to a traditional doctrine which we inherited from the Roman law, 
possession involves two distinct elements, one which is mental or subjective, the 
other physical or objective. The one of these two elements, consists in the 
intention of the possessor with respect to the thing possessed, while the other 
consists in the external facts in which this intention has realised, embodied or 
fulfilled itself. These two constituent elements of possession were distinguished 
by the roman lawyers as animus and corpus, and the expressions are
conveniently retained by modern writers. Now, we shall consider these two 
elements separately.
2-2-1- The " Animus Possidendi":
The "animus possidendi" is the intent to appropriate the exclusive use of
the thing possessed, that is to say, whilst intending to use it personally, to exclude 
all other persons whatsoever. So, the intent necessary to constitute possession is
the intent to exclude others from interfering with a material object. Whether or
not the possessor intends to use the thing himself, he must intend to exclude the 
interference of other persons. As to this necessary mental attitude of the 
possessor, there are the following observations to be made:
(i)- The animus sibi habendi, is not necessarily a claim of right. It may be 
consciously wrongful. The thief has a possession no less real than that of a true
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owner. The possessor of a thing is not he who has, or believes that he has, a right
to it, but he who intends to act as if he had such a right.
(ii)- The claim of the possessor must be exclusive. Possession involves an 
intent to exclude other persons from the use of the thing possessed. A mere 
intent or claim of unexclusive use cannot amount to possession of the material 
thing itself, though it may and often does amount to some form of incorporeal 
possession.
The exclusion however, need not be absolute. I may possess my land, but 
in the mean time someone else, or the public at large may have or more 
accurately possesses a right of way over it. For, subject to this right of way, my 
animus possidendi is still a claim of exclusive use.
(iii)- The animus possidendi does not need to be a claim or intent to use 
the thing as owner. Any degree or form of intended use, however limited in 
extent or in duration, may, if exclusive for the time being, be sufficient to 
constitute possession. Indeed, the animus possidendi need not to be a claim to 
use the thing at all. Thus, a pledgee, or a bailee with a lien, has possession,
though he means merely to obtain the thing until he is paid.
(iv)- The animus possidendi need not to be a claim on one's own behalf.
Thus, I may possess a thing either on my account or on account of another. A
servant, agent or trustee may have true possession, though he claims the
exclusive use of the thing on behalf of another than him.
(v)- The animus possidendi need not be specific, but may be merely a 
general intent with reference to a class of things, and this is sufficient. That is to 
say, it does not necessarily involve any continuous or present knowledge of the 
particular thing possessed or of the possessor's relation to it. A general intent 
with respect to a class of things is sufficient (if coupled with the necessary 
physical relation) to confer possession of the individual objects belonging to that 
class, even though their individual existence is unknown. Thus, I possess all the
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books in my library, even though I may have forgotten the existence of many of 
them .
During the second half of the XIX century, Ihering had strongly criticised 
the position adopted by the german doctrine after Savigny. The controversy is 
fam ous,19 and the account of the two thesis will help in precising the notions of 
animus and of possession. After that, we look at the critical valuation of this 
controversy.
The Theory Of Savignv:
Savigny in his publication, Treaty Of Possession in 1803, maintained the 
idea that the intention animating the possessor must be the animus domini, in
other words, the intention of acting as an owner. So, we not confuse between the 
animus domini and the good faith, because a possessor of bad faith, such as a 
thief, has the animus domini, because he intends to act as a master of the thing. 
So, who has the animus domini? All the other persons who have the corpus for 
another person do not have the animus domini. In fact, they recognise, the 
rights of the owner; they do not have the intention of acting as owners, so they 
are not possessors. In this way, Savigny refuses to consider the holders who 
have detention as being possessors; they cannot profit by the effects of 
possession. It is the lessor, bailor, ... etc, who is the possessor (he possesses 
corpore alieno)\ and not the holder (tenant, bailee . . . etc). Because the element 
of intention is an important part of this work, we will give it the name of 
subjective theory.
The Theory Of Ihering:
Ihering strongly attacked the subjective theory in his book, ”Le Fondement 
Des Interdits Possessoires". which appeared in 1867. He pretended that no 
distinction can be or should be made between the possessors and the holders, on 
the basis of their animus, because the ones and the others have the same
19 Mazeaud. Henri Et Leon. Lepons De Droit Civil. Tome n . Volume 2. at P. 122.
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intention: to hold, and to retain the thing, the animus tenendi. Even if it is 
possible to make a distinction, it is not on the real will of the occupant or holder 
that the law must be grounded on so as to give effects to possession. Besides the 
questions of contracts and judicial acts, the will of a person is unable of creating 
any judicial effects: it cannot bind the legislator. It is objective that a distinction 
between the two categories of occupants must be drawn: possessors and non­
possessors. In principle, the law gives the effects of possession to every 
occupant; it refuses to do so only on the basis of an exceptional title for the
reason of a causa deten tion is , i.e., for the reason taken from the contract which
binds the holder to the owner. The legislator, in order to give the effects of 
possession, will not be grounded on the intention of the possessor, but on the 
interests which appear to him that they must be protected. The problem is to
know who of the two, the holder and the person from whom he detains his
right, must profit from the effects of possession; we must decide according to the
interests which appear more important to protect than the others.
The Critical Valuation Of This Controversy:
The way with which Ihering justified his theory, made everyone think that 
there is a great controversy between the two theories of the two german 
lawyers. However, the appearance of this controversy is more apparent than 
real. Ihering, as Savigny, recognises that we cannot give all the advantages of 
possession to a simple holder; the latter, for example a tenant or trustee, cannot 
pretend to have any presumption of ownership, nor acquisition of ownership by
mere long occupation. In practice, the controversy is limited to refusing the
possessory remedies to the holder for theoretical reasons taken from the nature 
of possession which was found in Rome, makes of the animus domini, a 
condition, Ihering asks that this protection (possessory remedies) must be 
extended to the simple holders. In theory, this controversy is no more than
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being radical. It is certain that no conciliation can be reached if the animus, as it 
is required by Savigny, in concreto is indeed a pre-condition to recovery, in other 
words, according to the real will of the holder, by analysis of his state of mind.
Finally, the French civil code was not influenced by these two theories, 
because in article 2229 it is required that the possessor possesses as an owner, 
so that he acquires ownership of the thing by prescription. So, the "a n im u s  
d o m in i" is a condition so as to obtain possession of the thing. Moreover, the 
draftsman of the French civil code did not give any effect to mere detention nor 
the possessory remedies. Conversely, the Algerian civil code in article 827, does 
not require from the possessor to possess as an owner to obtain ownership by 
prescription. So, the Algerian civil code does require the Uanim us dom in i" to 
benefit from the prescription. Moreover, the Algerian civil code gives to the one 
who has possession of a thing the right for possessory remedies, which is not the 
case for the French civil code.
2-2-2- The Corpus Of Possession:
To constitute possession, the physical and mental element is not by itself 
sufficient to give possession, but it must embodied in a corpus. The corpus is the 
physical control over the thing we claim its' possession. The Tubantia.20 is an 
instructive case on the corpus of possession. The corpus consists in acting as the 
owner of the thing, i.e., to use what the right of the ownership gives: usus, 
fructus, abusus. The corpus in then considered as the material element of 
possession, the corpus is a condition in the acquisition of possession.
The corpus can be acquired by the material acquisition of the thing, 
whether with or without the consent of the former possessor.
Possession can be acquired "corpore alieno". In the classical time, the 
possibility of possessing through the intermediary of another person, was 
accepted, and this rule was then taken by the French law. The possessor is then
20 [1924] P. 78.
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not obliged to exercise the corpus by himself. We therefore, say that he 
possesses corpore alieno. For instance, a person who gives a thing for a lease, this 
person possesses through the intermediary of its tenant. This tenant is 
considered as having mere detention of the thing, it does have the corpus itself, 
but for the lessor. As the possessor can acquire possession corpore alieno, he can 
also acquire the corpus by the intermediary of another person. For instance, if 
we give mandate to a person in order to take possession of a thing, we acquire 
the corpus by the intermediary of the mandator. Also, the purchaser, before he 
takes possession himself, this purchaser possesses by the intermediary of the 
vendor who keeps the thing until the delivery. So, mere intention to possess, as 
stated before, without corpus, i.e., effectual realisation by power to use and 
exclude others, is insufficient.
The claim involved in the animus must be actually and continuously 
exercised. So, what does the corpus involve? One might say that: "it must amount 
to the actual exclusion of all alien interference with the thing possessed, together 
with a reasonably sufficient security for the exclusive use of it in future". Since 
the corpus includes the power to exclude others and power to use, it involves a
relationship of the possessor to other persons and a relationship to the thing
possessed. Thus, we shall consider the corpus of possession under two headings:
(i)- The relation of the possessor to other persons, and,
(ii)- The relation of the possessor to the thing possessed.
(1) - The Relation Of The Possessor To O ther Persons:
So far as other persons are concerned, I am in possession of a thing when
the facts of the case are such as to create a reasonable expectation that I will not
be interfered with in the use of it. I must have some sort of security for their 
acquiescence and non-interference. A thing is possessed, when it stands with 
respect to other persons in such a position that the possessor, having a
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reasonable confidence that his claim to it will be respected, is content to leave it 
where it is. Such a measure of security may be derived from many sources, of 
which the following are the most important.21
( i l - The Physical Power Of The Possessor:
The physical power to exclude all alien interference (accompanied of course 
by the needful intent) certainly confers possession; for it constitutes an effective 
guarantee of enjoyment. If I own a purse of money, and lock it up in a burglar
proof safe in my house, I certainly have possession of it. Possession, thus based
on physical power may be looked on as the physical and perfect form. Many 
writers, however, go so far as to consider it the only form, defining possession as 
the intention, coupled with the physical power, of excluding all other persons 
from the use of a material object.22 This is far too narrow a view of matter. 
What physical power of preventing trespass does a man acquire by making an 
entry upon an estate which may be some square miles in extent? Is it not clear 
that he may have full possession of land that is absolutely unfenced and 
unprotected, lying open to every trespasser? There is to prevent even a child
from acquiring effective possession as against strong men, nor is possession 
impossible on the part of him who lies in his bed at the point of death. If I set 
traps in the forest, I possess the animals which I catch in them, though there is 
neither physical presence nor physical power. In all such cases, the assumption 
of physical power to exclude alien interference is no better than a fiction. The 
true test is not the physical power of preventing interference, but the
improbability of any interference, from whatever source this improbability 
arises.
21 Pollock and Wright. Possession In The Common Law. 13: " that possession is effective 
which is sufficient as a rule and for practical purposes to exclude strangers from interfering 
with the occupier's use and enjoyment".
22 The theory here considered is that which has been made fam iliar by Savigny's 
celebrated treatise on possession (Recht des Besitzes, 1803).
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( ii) - The Personal Presence Of The Possessor;
This source of security must be distinguished from that which has just been
mentioned, the two sources of security may coincide, indeed, but not necessarily, 
because in the security of personal presence, the possessor may be personally
present without any real power of exclusion. Such is the case of a little child who 
has no physical power to retain possession against a strong man. Also, a dying 
man, may retain or acquire possession by his personal presence, but certainly
not by any physical power left in him. The respect which is shown to a man's 
person will commonly extend to all things, claimed by him that are in his 
immediate presence.
( in ) - Secrecv:
A man can keep a thing safe from others, and that by hiding it; and 
consequently, he will gain a reasonable guarantee of enjoyment and is just as 
effectively in possession of the thing, as is the strong man armed who keeps his 
goods in peace.
(iv )- Custom:
Here, we have an important source of de facto security and possession, and 
this is the tendency of mankind to acquiesce in established usage. If I plough 
and sow and reap the harvest of a field continuously, I am considered as in 
possession of that field.
(v )- Resnect For Rightful Claims:
Possession is a matter of fact and not a matter of right. A claim may realise 
itself in the facts whether it is rightful or wrongful. Yet its rightfulness, or rather 
a public conviction of its rightfulness, is an important element in the acquisition 
of possession. A rightful claim will readily obtain that general acquiescence 
which is essential to de facto security, but a wrongful claim will have to make 
itself good without any assistance from the law abiding spirit of the
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com m unity.23
(v i l - The M anifestation Of The Animus Domini;
The visibility of the claim is an important element in the de facto security of
a claim. The realisation of the animus is more important for possession than the
manifestation of the animus. Nevertheless, a manifested intent is much more 
likely to obtain the security of general acquiescence than one which has never 
assumed a visible form.
(vii)- The Protection Afforded Bv The Possession Of Other Things:
The possession of a thing tends to confer possession of any other thing that
is connected with the first or accessory to it. The possession of land confers a
measure of security, which may amount to possession, upon all chattels situated 
upon it. The possession of a box or a packet may bring with it the possession of 
its content. However, whether the possession of one thing will bring with it the 
possession of another that is thus connected with it, depends upon the 
circumstances of the particular case. A chattel may be upon my land, and yet I 
shall have no possession of it unless the animus and corpus possessionis both 
exist.
(2) - Relation Of The Possessor To The Thing Possessed:
The second element which constitutes the corpus possessionis, i.e., the 
physical control over the thing, is the relation of the possessor to the thing 
possessed, the first being the relation of the possessor to other persons, which we 
have just considered above. To constitute possession, the animus domini must
23 Pollock and Wright. Possession In The Common law , at P. 14.15:
"Occupation or control is a matter of fact, and cannot of itself be dependent on m atter of 
law. But it may depend on the opinion of certain persons for the time being, or the current 
opinion o f a multitude or neighbourhood, concerning that which is ultimately matter o f law. 
Though law cannot alter facts, or directly confer physical power, the reputation o f legal right 
may make a great difference to the extent of a man's power in fact".
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realise itself in both of those relations. The necessary relation between the 
possessor and the thing possessed is such as to admit of his making such use of it 
as accords with the nature of the thing and of his claim to it. There must be no 
barrier between him and it, inconsistent with the nature of the claim he makes 
to it. If I desire to catch fish, I have no possession of them till I have them 
securely in my net or on my line. Till then, my animus domini has not been 
effectively embodied in the facts.
The case of an article irrevocably lost should, however, be distinguished 
from a temporary loss of the thing, in a place where it can more or less easily be 
found. The loss of my watch in a public place, which also involves loss of 
possession, differs from the loss of my book temporarily mislaid in my own 
house.
2-3- THE COMMENCEMENT AND CONTINUANCE OF POSSESSION:
2-3-1- Modes Of Commencement Or Acquisition Of Possession:
In every acquisition of possession there is a physical act (corpus), 
accompanied by an act of the will (animus). The corpus must be such as to place 
the person who desires to obtain possession in a position which shall enable him, 
and him only, to deal with the subject at pleasure; that is to exercise ownership 
over it. The act of the will must contemplate a dealing with the subject as one's 
own property: though if the possession, by operation of law, is derived from the 
previous possession of another, it is sufficient for the will to have in view this 
transference, so that in this way possession may be acquired, although the 
property is recognised in another. The acquisition of possession can be in two 
ways, either voluntary or involuntary on the part of the former who had 
possession. Voluntary dispossession in favour of another is commonly regarded 
from the side of the former possessor, and called delivery. Involuntary change 
of possession is commonly regarded from the side of the new possessor, and
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spoken of as occupation or taking. Thus, the the modes of acquisition are two in 
number, namely "taking" and "delivery".
First, "Taking" is the acquisition of possession without the consent of 
previous possessor. The thing taken may or may not have been already in the 
possession of someone else, and in either case the taking of it may be either 
rightful or wrongful, and this might be either by occupation, theft or taking of
something lost.
Secondly, "Delivery". Delivery on the other hand, is the acquisition of 
possession with the consent and co-operation of the previous possessor. It is of 
two kinds, distinguished by English lawyers as actual and constructive and the 
same can be said about the French and Algerian lawyers as to their view on 
delivery, and that what we will explain in more details later on.
Actual delivery is the transfer of immediate possession; it is such a physical 
dealing with the thing as transfers it from the hands of one person to those of 
another. It is of two kinds, according as the mediate possession is or is not
retained by the transferor. The delivery of a chattel by way of sale is an 
example of delivery without any reservation of mediate possession. The French 
civil code cited the actual delivery in contract of sale in article 1582, where it 
was provided that: "The sale is an agreement, by which, one agrees to deliver 
something and the other to pay for it.24 The same idea is found in the Algerian 
civil code in article 351 which provides that, "The sale is a contract by which the
seller is obliged to transfer the ownership of a thing . . . to the buyer who must
pay him the price".25
The delivery of a chattel by ways of loan or deposit is an instance of 
reservation of mediate possession on the transfer of immediate possession. For
24 The actual article 1582 of the French civil code provides in french that:
"La vente est une convention par laqudlle l'un s'oblige i  livrer une chose, et l'autre i  la
p ay e r . . .
25 The actual art.351 of the Algerian civil code provides that:
"La vente est un contrat par lequdle le vendeur s'oblige i  transferer la propri6td d'une
chose . . . i  l'acheteur qui doit lui en payer le prix".
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instance, the Algerian civil code in article 502 about hire prescribes that the one 
who hires something must give the possession back to the owner when the time 
of hire comes to its end. Moreover, in the case of loan, the Algerian civil code in
article 538 provides that, the contract of loan, the owner lent his thing to the
borrower for a fixed period of time on the condition that the borrower will give 
the possession of the thing back to the owner. The French civil code provides the
same idea in article 1875. So, in both the Algerian and the French civil code, the
case of hire and loan provide good examples of the reservation of mediate
possession on the transfer of immediate, because in both cases the possession 
will be handed back to the owner.
Actual delivery may be either to the deliveree himself or to a servant or 
agent for him,26 the same can be said about the Algerian civil code in article 
571 or the French civil code in art 1984, which provides the same solution, 
where a person can mandate another person to do things for him as if he acts 
from the mandated person were the acts of the original person who mandated 
that person. Moreover, the delivery of the key of a warehouse is regarded in 
law as actual delivery of the goods in the warehouse, because it gives access to 
the goods.27 In the Algerian law, there is another situation where the seller in 
the contract of sale is considered as having delivered the thing to the purchaser. 
This situation, is that after the contract of sale is made the seller put the thing 
sold at the puchaser's disposal and that is provided by article 367/1, which
provides that, "The delivery consists in putting the thing sold at the purchaser's 
disposal, in a way that he can take possession of it and enjoys it without any 
obstacle, even if he has not taken any effective delivery. This will be done
26 By the Sale o f Goods Act, 1893, S.32 (1), delivery to a carrier is prima facie deemed to 
be delivery to the buyer.
27 I t  seems that the only circum stance in which the English lawyers adm its that 
symbolic delivery is sufficient in the endorsement and delivery o f a b ill o f lading, which is
regarded as a delivery of the cargo represented by it: per brown, L.J., in S a n d e rs  v. M a c le a n
(1883), 11 Q.B.D. 327, at P. 341.
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according to the nature of the thing sold ... ".28 On the other hand, the French 
civil law, in article 1604 of the civil code provides that, "The delivery is the
carrying of the thing sold into the power and possession of the buyer".29 So, 
possession must really fall between the hands of the buyer, putting the thing at 
his disposal is not enough.
Constructive delivery, on the other hand, is all which is not actual, and it is
of three kinds. The first is that which the Roman lawyers termed traditio brevi
manu, but which has no recognised name in the language of English law. It
consists in the surrender of the mediate possession of a thing to him who is 
already in immediate possession of it. If, for example, I lend a book to someone, 
and afterwards, while he still retains it, I agree with him to sell it to him, or make 
him a present of it, I can effectually deliver it to him in fulfillment of this sale or
gift, by telling him that he may keep it. It is not necessary for him to go through
the form of handing it back to me and receiving it a second time from my hands. 
This traditio brevi manu can be found in the Algerian law, where article 367/2 
of the civil code, provides that, "The delivery can be done by a mere agreement 
between the contracting parties, if the thing sold was before the sale hold by the 
buyer or the seller continued to hold the thing sold under another title than that
of an owner".30 A similar section is provided in article 1606/3 of the French
civil code.
The second form of constructive delivery is that which the commentators
28 "My Own TRanslation'M he actual art.367/1 provides that:
"La delivrance consiste dans la mise de la chose vendu a la disposition de l'acheteur de 
fafon d ce qu'il puisse en prendre possession et en jouir sans obstacle alors meme q 'il n'en a 
pas pris livraison effective, pourvu que le vendeur lui fait connaitre que l'object es t d sa
disposition. Elle s'opere de la maniere d laquelle se prete la nature de l'object vendu . . .
29 "My Own TRanslation'M he actual art. 1604 in french provides that:
"La ddlivrance est le transport de la chose vendue en la puissance et possession de 
l 'a c h e te u r" .
30 "My Own Translation'M he actual art.367/2 provides that:
"La ddlivrance peut avoir lieu par le simple consentem ent des contractants si l'object 
vendu dtait, des avant la vente, detenu par l'acheteur ou si le vendeur avait continue d garder
l'object vendu d un autre titre que celui de proprietaire".
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of the civil law have termed constitutum possessorium (that is to say an 
agreement touching possession). It is the transfer of mediate possession, while 
the immediate possession remains in the transferor. Anything may be 
effectually delivered by means of an agreement that the possessor of it shall for 
the future hold it no longer on his own account but on the account of someone 
else, and no physical dealing with the thing is requisite. Therefore, if I buy goods 
from a warehouseman, they are delivered to me as soon as he has agreed with 
me that he will hold them as warehouseman on my account. This kind of 
constructive delivery can be found in the Algerian civil law and this was
provided by the article 367 sub-s.2 which provides that the seller continuous to 
have possession of the thing not as an owner but under another title other than 
that of owner.
The third form of constructive delivery is that which is known to English 
lawyers as attornment. This is the transfer of mediate possession, while the 
immediate possession remains outstanding in some third person. The mediate 
possessor of a thing may deliver it by procuring the immediate possessor to 
agree with the transferee to hold it for the future on his account, instead of on 
account of the transferor. Thus, if I have goods in the warehouse of A and sell 
them to B, I have effectually delivered them to B so soon as A has agreed with B 
to hold them for him, and no longer for me.31
2-3-2- The C ontinuance Of Possession;
The rules hitherto have been principally concerned with the 
commencement of possession. We have seen that the acquisition of legal
possession normally involves the occurrence of some event whereby the 
subject-matter falls under the control of the possessor. This can consist in the
31 Delivery by attornment is providd by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, S.29 (3):
"Where the goods at the time of sale are in the possession of a third peson, there is no
delivery by seller to buyer unless and until such third person acknowledges to the buyer that 
he holds the goods on his behalf'.
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possessor's taking the thing or having it delivered to him. Such acquisition will 
also normally involve some intention on the part of the possessor to exercise 
control over the subject-matter and to exclude others from it.
It is now to be noticed that the continuance of possession, at any rate as a 
matter of English law, does not seem to be governed by the same strict rules as 
its commencement. Assuming that English law requires both animus and
corpus in order to initiate possession, the possession once acquired may continue 
even though animus or corpus, or even both, disappear. For example the
furniture in my house remain in my legal possession even during the my
absence from my house, even though such absence may prevent me from
exercising control over the furniture. Or again, if I lose my wallet in the street, I 
have now lost control over it together with my actual likelihood that other will
not interfere with the wallet. Nevertheless, unless I have actually abandoned
possession, the legal possession of the wallet remains in me.32
The continuance of legal possession does not depend on the continuance of 
the intention on the part of the possessor. For even if I forget that I have the 
object, and so have no specific intention of still possessing it. I may have
forgotten that I even had the wallet, which I lost in the street, but in law this
need not prevent me from still being in possession. But if I lose control of the
subject-matter and give up all intention of resuming control, then I shall lose 
possession of it in law. For example, in Tickner v. H earn.33 a statutory tenant of 
a protected dwelling under the Rent Acts left the premises on temporary visit,
became insane and remained continuously in hospital. In order to retain 
possession within the Acts, the court found it necessary that she should be able 
to show the existence of an intention to return. On the evidence the court held
that the existence of this intention has just about been proved.
32 R v. T hurborn (1849) 1 Den. 387.
33 [1961] 1 All E.R. 65.
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2-4- THE TRANSFER AND LOSS OF POSSESSION:
2-4-1- The T ransfer Of Possession:
One may say that there is no fundamental division of the ways in which an 
existing possession can be changed. As the new comer gains possession, the 
outgoing possessor must lose it, and this loss must be either with or without his 
own will. Voluntary dispossession in favour of another is commonly regarded
from the side of the former possessor, and called delivery. In the case of a
person quitting possession without any specific intention of putting another 
person in his place, it is called abandonment. Involuntary change of possession 
is commonly regarded from the side of the new possessor, and spoken of as 
occupation or taking. In adopting this division, we must say that there is a great 
difference in the legal treatment of the facts, and it will be natural and just that 
the difference should be made. The lawful intention of the parties is favored, 
and moreover the consent of the outgoing possessor is, a real element in the 
incomer's de facto power of enjoyment and control. Hence, the voluntary 
transfer of possession is made easy in many ways. Indeed it constantly takes 
place without any physical transfer at all, or by means of physical acts which in 
themselves would be manifestly not enough. When possession is changed
without consent, the presumption is reserved. Not only must the newcomer 
have at least as much actual control as would be evidence of possession if there 
were nothing to the contrary, but he must effectually exclude the former
possessor. There are great differences of detail, as might be expected, in the
application of these principles to immovable and movable property. With
regard to land the doctrine of possession has been exceedingly perplexed by the
peculiar history of the common law. Possession as to land, does not need a great
deal of explanation, because this work has to give a great deal of explanation to 
possession as regard goods.
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Delivery As To Goods;
One way of transferring possession, as we have already seen, is delivery 
which is a voluntary dispossession. Possession of goods may be delivered in 
several ways according to the circumstances. Delivery may be made either to
the person who is to acquire possession, or to a servant on his behalf. And it
may be made in either case, either by an actual and apparent change in the 
custody of the goods, or by a change in the character of a continuing custody, i.e., 
the transferor will have custody of the thing for the new transferee. The 
simplest case is the handing over of a movable object with intent to transfer 
ownership or a more limited right, including the right to use or have control of 
that object. Such a delivery, whether the transaction be gift, sale, or bailment, 
always transfers possession to the deliveree. Conversely, a question may be 
asked, how far the ownership and right to possession of personal chattels can in 
the absence of valuable consideration pass by parol declarations of intention
without delivery. Except in the case where the donee is already in possession,
the law cannot be said to be clear. On the other hand, a servant in charge of his
master's property, or a person having the use of anything by the mere licence of 
the owner, as a guest has the use of the furniture and plate at an inn, generally 
has not possession. There may be cases of handing over for a limited purpose 
which are on the face them not obviously within either of these classes. It must 
then depend on the true intent of the transaction, as ascertained from all the
circumstances, whether there is a bailment or a mere authority or licence to deal 
with the thing in a certain way.
( i) - Partial Delivery And So-Called Symbolic Delivery:
The transfer of bulky goods or collection of goods cannot be made obvious 
to the senses with the same readiness as in the case of a simple object which can 
be passed from hand to hand. But it may be effected without physical
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translation of the whole of the goods, or without any physical translation at all. 
There may be an indirect dealing with the custody of the goods through some 
instruments of access to them; or a part may be delivered on account and in the 
name of the whole; or there may, without any change of custody, be a holding on 
behalf of a new possessor.
First, we will deal with the symbolical delivery, as it is sometimes called,
but, Pollock and Wright in their work, possession in the common law, do not
agree with terminology.34 There is some show of authority for saying that 
goods under lock and key, for example, may be delivered by delivering the key 
as a symbol of possession. This key may indeed be called symbolic in another 
sense, for it is not understood that Englishmen of business commonly deliver a 
key in the name of goods contained in the warehouse which it opens. Dealing 
with bills of lading and other documents of title are much more common, and 
these cases differ from that of the key in the material fact that the custody of the 
goods is with a skipper, wharfinger, or other third person. It is a question, in the 
first instance, of transferring right to possess.
The key is not a symbol in the sense of representing the goods, but the
delivery of the key gives the transferee a power over the goods which he had
not before, and at the same time is an emphatic declaration (which being by 
normal act, instead of word, may be called symbolic) that the transferor intends 
no longer to meddle with the goods.
( ii)- Delivery Of Goods Bv Attornm ent:
The transfer of possession in goods, as distinguished from property, is an 
incident in the performance of the contract of sale which is of special importance 
in two ways; by reasons of the Statute of Frauds, as regards the proof of the
contract in certain cases; and under the rules of the common law derived from
the law merchant as regards an unpaid vendor's rights. By the Statute of Frauds,
34 Pollock and Wright. Possession In The Common Law, op cit. at P. 61.
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one of the alternative conditions on which a contract for sale of goods is allowed 
to be good is the acceptance and actual receipt of some part of the goods. Some 
decisions have settled that there is acceptance as well as receipt when the buyer 
begins to possess the part of the goods in question with reference to the contract 
of sale and as part of the goods designated by or appropriated to it, whether he 
intends to accept them absolutely or to reserve whatever rights the contract 
may give him of rejecting them according to sample, or the like.35
This is at first sight anomalous. The courts have looked more at the seller's
parting with possession than to the buyer's acquisition of it. In fact the test is
whether he has lost his lien.36 Thus, under the contract of sale, acceptance and 
actual receipt mean a delivery of possession, not necessarily, however, delivery 
to the buyer or his servant. Moreover, an unpaid vendor's lien is a right to 
possess founded on the possessio which he has not yet parted with, while the
kindred but distinct right of stoppage in transitu can be exercised 'only whilst 
the goods are in an intermediate state _ out of the possession of the vendor, and 
not yet in that of the purchaser'. So, the necessary condition for the vendor's lien 
is that the goods have not ceased to be in his possession; that of stoppage in 
transitu is that the goods are in the possession of someone who holds them
neither at the will of the vendor nor at the will of the purchaser, but has
possession for the purpose of transmitting them from the vendor to the
purchaser. It is therefore of capital importance to establish whether possession 
has been delivered, and if so in what character it has been received.
The authorities on acceptance and actual receipt both within the Statute of
Frauds and on the rights of unpaid vendors show that in several ways there 
may be a change of possession without any change of the actual custody. Such a 
change of possession is commonly spoken of a constructive delivery.
(i)- A seller in possession may assent to hold the thing sold on account of
35 Page v. M organ (1885), 15 Q.B.Div. 228.
36 Cusack v. Robinson. 1861, 1 B. & S. 229, 30 L.J.Q.B. 261.
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the buyer. When he begins so to hold it, this has the same effect as a physical 
delivery to the buyer, or his servant and is an actual receipt by the buyer.37
(ii)- When goods are in the custody of a third party, goods or more
accurately, possession may be delivered, and that can be done by the agreement
of the seller and buyer, with the assent of that person, that they shall be held in 
the name or on account of the buyer. This is described by the modern
authorities as an "agreement of attornment".38 When goods are in the hands of 
a warehouse- keeper for the seller, the mere giving of a transfer order by the 
seller is not sufficient to change the possession, but when the delivery order is 
lodged with the warehouse-keeper and accepted by him, he then, holds in 
future for the buyer.
(iii)- Even if the last case is not very common, however, it can be possible, 
here the buyer is in possession of the goods as the seller's bailee. Therefore, 
there may be, upon an oral contract of sale, a sufficient acceptance and receipt of 
the goods by the attribution of the continuing custody to the holder's new
character of owner.39 It is a question of fact whether such was the effect of the 
acts of the parties. Here there is no change of possession, only a change in the 
character of the possession.
2-4-2- Loss Of Possession;
The acquisition of possession depends on two facts or two elements as we 
have already seen above. One physical, called the "corpus", and the other 
mental, called "animus". These two elements are essential for the continuance of 
possession and their loss will lead to the loss of possession. So, the termination of 
possession is evidently the same question as the continuance of it, because 
possession can only continue up to the time of it being lost.
37 Elm ore v. S tone. 1808 ,1 Taunt. 458.
38 Godts v. Rose, 1855,17 C.B. 229,25 LJ.C.P. 61.
39 Edan v. Dudfield. 1841,1 Q.B. 302. Benjamin On Sale, § 173.
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For, as possession has been seen to consist in physical power, associated 
with consciousness, it follows that in every case of acquisition two things are
necessary, a corporeal relation, and animus. The same must also concur for 
continuance; and this, therefore, must depend upon the same association as the
acquisition of possession; should such association cease ; i.e., should either the
corporeal act alone, or the animus alone, or both together terminate, the
continuance of possession also ceases. What is stated here, may be expressed in 
the following propositions:
(i)- For the continuance of possession, two element must be present,
namely, the corpus, i.e., a corporeal relation and animus.
(ii)- If either one or the other, or both together, cease, the possession is lost.
(iii)- This rule stands in immediate logical connection with the rule which 
defines the acquisition of possession.
The loss is evidently compared with acquisition; now for acquisition, both a 
physical act and animus must be present, so also, it would appear, for loss. 
"Corpus and animus" together are required for possession, and that means that 
possession is founded on the conjunction of "corpus and animus", and therefore, 
the acquisition can only be compared to loss, when the loss results from his
conjunction ceasing. But this conjunction not only ceases when both the 
elements of it fail, but also when either one of them ceases to exist.
It has therefore, now been proved,40 by interpretation also, that the 
continuance of possession, as well as its acquisition, depends upon corpus and 
animus together, or (which is the same thing) that possession can only be lost 
either by corpus or by animus.
In this work, it will be dealt mostly with movable things and not with the 
loss of immovable things, such as land.
1- Loss Of Possession By The Loss Of The "Corpus” ;
The continuance of possession has a strong connection with the loss of 
possession, because if the possession stops to continue the possession will cease
40 Savigny. Treatise On Possession, at P. 253.
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to exist. Therefore, the first condition for the continuance of possession is a 
physical relation to the thing possessed which enables us to deal with it. This 
power however, need not be, as in the acquisition of possession, a present 
immediate power, but it is sufficient if the relation of immediate dominion over 
the thing can be reproduced at will, and the possession is only then lost, when 
the power to deal with it at will is altogether gone. Such a rule should now be 
applied both to movables and immoveables. But several examples of it are so 
clear in themselves, that they do not require further elucidation. To such cases 
belong the death of the possessor, or the annihilation of the thing possessed, and 
this can be either physical or juridical (where the thing becomes extra 
commercium). Some further examples on this point must be examined in more 
detail. For instance, the possession of a movable becomes lost, when another 
person makes himself master of it, either secretly or by force; and here the 
exclusion of the original possessor over the subject is very decided. Whether the 
other party actually acquires the possession is altogether immaterial; because 
the physical power of disposing of the subject is nevertheless, withdrawn from 
the other, although no one else may have the right of possession. His power may 
also be excluded without the interference of any other party, namely, when the 
spot where the subject is kept is either inapprochable by him or unknown. 
When it comes to the loss of possession of immoveables, the rule is exactly the 
same. Here also possession is lost whenever the power of dealing with the 
subject ceases; it is continued, so long as this power lasts, except that the notion of 
this power must be somewhat differently expressed in degree as to continuance, 
than as to acquisition.41
41 The French civil code gives the definition o f possession in art.2228 which provides 
that possession is the detention or the enjoyment of a thing. So, it is necessary to have the 
"corpus" for possessing, and that means that the loss o f the "corpus" w ill lead to the loss of 
possession. However, the loss of the "corpus" will not lead to the loss of possession in all the 
cases, because the situation can be different from one situation to another. So, we can possess 
w ithout having the "corpus" and that what is called possessing solo animo, i.e., through 
another person .
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2- Loss Of Possession By L oss of " Animus":
We have already seen that there is a strong connection between the
continuance and the loss of possession, because if possession stops to continue 
than possession will cease to exist or will be lost. Possession continues to exist, 
only if the two elements of possession namely the "corpus" and "animus" 
continue to exist. So, if either the animus or corpus or both of them cease to exist, 
that will bring an end to possession. Therefore, the second condition for the 
continuance of possession, is the will of the possessor (i.e., the animus); and the 
same relation exists in this case as with the physical condition, which has been 
already pointed out as the first condition. Thus, to the continuance of possession, 
it is only necessary for the animus, just as for the corporeal relation, that the
power to reproduce the original volition should always be at hand: it is neither 
necessary, not indeed possible, that the consciousness of possession should exist 
at every moment. It follows, therefore, that possession is not lost by the 
possessor not calling to mind the subject matter, or consequently, his possession 
for any period long or short; indeed, the same way be affirmed if the possessor 
falls into a condition in which no exertion of will is possible: for instance, if he 
becomes a lunatic. In this case, the impossibility to exercise any distinct volition 
as to the position, is coincidental, so, in relation to the thing possessed, there is no 
essential difference, whether this possession should have been forgotten for a
long period, or whether the possessor himself should have become lunatic.
Therefore, possession is lost by mere a n im u s , whenever the possessor at 
any moment intends to give it up; for, at that moment, the reproduction of the 
original intention is rendered impossible by the contrary determination of the
will, and it is upon this impossibility, as upon the physical impossibility, that the 
loss of possession arises. It is clear that whoever is incapable of exercising a will 
cannot lose in this way, any more than he could acquire possession. Thus, the 
possession may be lost * by a simple act of volition, it still remains to add 
something as to its application. Now it is just as clear, that an application of the
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rule arises beyond all doubt on the express declaration of the possessor, as that 
such declaration can very seldom decide the point, because, in every case in 
which it usually occurs- for instance, in delivery, the loss of possession is 
generally terminated in another manner, namely, corpore. We must, therefore, 
in this case, as in many others, examine what is the proper construction of the 
whole conduct of the possessor, from which his intention may be inferred: 
several proofs of such construction have come down to us in the writings of the 
Roman Jurists, and they tend to throw much light upon the whole subject. The 
first case of this sort, lies at the bottom of the so-called constitutum. If somebody
sells a subject, and, at the same time, hires it, does not in the least alter his
physical relation in regard to it; but, as he nevertheless ceases to possess, the 
ground of this loss can only be sought for in an act of his will.
A second construction of this sort lies in the rei vindication, which is an
established rule that this action lies against the possessor. If then, the possessor 
himself vindicates the subject, he appears by this to disclaim the possession, so 
that the interdictum uti possidetis must be refused to him, if he should 
subsequently desire to resort to it. For, whoever vindicates a subject, shows by 
the very act that he wishes to have it, and there is no doubt that he would desire 
to have the possession immediately, which the form of action is to secure to him 
for ever, if such possession were compatible with his character of plaintiff in a 
vindication - suit. Now it is true this compatibility is impossible, but still it is not 
necessary to assume a voluntary disclaimer of possession because the possessor 
may be either unaware of his possession, or of the legal principle, upon which 
this incompatibility is founded. As now, is these two possible cases, the 
possessor undoubtedly had not the intention of giving up his possession, so, 
generally, nothing has taken place from which this intention can be ascertained 
with certainty, consequently the possession is not lost, and consequently the 
interdictum uti possidetis  still lies.
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The third case, in which a similar construction is made use of, occurs with 
negligence. So, the intention to give up possession may be inferred from mere 
negligence. With land, the user of it generally occurs at definite periods of the 
year, if then, for instance, a possessor allows his land to be unused for a series of 
years, we may fairly assume that he intended to give up possession; for it is 
highly improbable that this should be a mere act of forgetfulness, and whether 
his intention was generally not to keep it, or that he gave it up from mere 
negligence, or that a journey elsewhere was of more importance to him, is 
altogether immaterial here, as all this only applies to the motive of his 
determination itself; not to the determination itself; but as in all these cases, the 
determination, was freely, and with full consciousness, directed on something 
which made the exercise of possession wholly impossible, a disclaimer of 
possession is necessarily involved in it.
Thus, the loss of one of the two elements which constitute possession will 
make it cease to exist. If for instance, the possessor loses the physical element, 
"corpus", as if the thief steals the thing possessed. Here, possession will pass to 
the new possessor, although, the act with which he acquired possession was an 
lawful act, nevertheless, he has the physical power over the thing. Also, if the 
possessor loses the mental element, "animus", he will lose possession, although 
he still keep the physical element, i.e., he still have the custody of the thing. As 
for instance, if the possessor agrees to give up the ownership of the thing 
possessed to somebody else, but in the meantime agrees to keep that thing in his 
custody on behalf of the new owner. There are some other cases, where the 
possessor loses the physical element, "corpus", but does not lose possession, this 
is the case where the custody of the goods is transferred to a warehouseman. 
Here, the warehouseman detains the goods for the true possessor who put him 
in control of the goods. Here, the true possessor did not lose possession, although 
he gave the custody of the goods to the warehouseman, i.e., he lost the "corpus",
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but he did not lose the mental element, the "animus", which is the intention to 
possess the goods through the warehouseman. Thus, the warehouseman 
acquires the physical element, but he does not acquire the mental element, 
which is to possess for himself, because he knows that he has the mere custody 
of the goods, and that the true possession is in the true possessor for whom he 
holds those goods in his custody.
2-5- POSSESSORY REMEDIES:
Possession being considered a good title of right, has a special consideration 
by law for its protection and so that no rightful possessor uses violence to 
preserve and protect his possession. So, we shall examine those possessory 
remedies through their nature, their objects and their exclusion from English law 
and the possessory actions in the French and Algerian law.
2-5-1- The Nature. The Object Of Possessory Remedies And Their 
Exclusion From English Law:
( i) - The Nature Of Possessory Remedies:
In English law possession is considered as a good title of right against 
anyone who cannot show a better title. Thus, a wrongful possessor has the 
rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and 
except the true owner himself,42 as long as that wrongful possessor still detain 
possession of the article. Some other legal systems go much further than this, 
and consider possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true 
owner himself.43
So, if a wrongdoer is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any 
person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession, and the true owner
42 A rm onv v. D elam irie (1722) 1 Strange 505; A sher v. W ithlock (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1.
43 See, for example, the German Civ.code, Sects.858,861,864, and the Italian civil code, 
Sects. 694-697.
who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and 
will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it, unless he sets up the 
fact that he was previously dispossessed of the property.
Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against 
ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of
ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and 
medieval civil law, the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms 
petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit). The 
beginnings of this duplication of remedies, with the resulting provisional
protection of possession, may be found in Roman law. It was taken up into the 
cannon law, where it received, considerable extensions, and through the cannon 
law it became a prominent feature of medieval jurisprudence. It is still received 
in modern continental systems; but although well known to the earlier English 
law, it has long been rejected by us as incumbrous and unnecessary.
( ii) - The Objects Of Possessory Remedies:
One may ask the question as to the reasons on which this provisional
protection of possession is based. It would seem probable that the
considerations of greatest weight are the three following.
(a )-  To avoid and prevent the evils of violent self help, its advantages 
which derives from it and that will discourage the use of violence for self-help. 
He who helps himself by force even to that which is his own, must restore it 
even to a thief. The law gives him a remedy, and with it he must be content. It 
has been found abundantly sufficient to punish violence in the ordinary way as 
a criminal offense, without compelling a rightful owner to deliver up to a 
trespasser property to which he has no manner of right, and which can be
forthwith recovered from him by due course of law. In the case of chattels,
indeed, English law has not found it needful to protect possession even to this
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extent. It seems that an owner who retakes a chattel by force acts within his 
legal rights. Forcible entry upon land, however, is a criminal offense.
( b ) - One may find a second reason for the institution of possessory 
remedies, is to be found in the serious imperfections of the early proprietary 
remedies. The procedure by which an owner recovered his property was 
cumbrous, dilatory, and inefficient. No man, could be suffered to procure for 
himself by violence the advantageous position of defendant, and to force his 
adversary by such means to assume the dangerous and difficult post of plaintiff. 
The original position of affairs must first be restored; possession must first be 
given to him who had it first; then, and not till then, would the law consent to
discuss the titles of disputants to the property in question.44
(c)- A third reason for possessory remedies, closely connected with the 
second, is the difficulty of the proof of ownership. In the absence of any system 
of registration of title, it is easy to prove that one has been in possession of a 
thing, but difficult to prove that one is the owner of it. For this reason, it was 
considered unjust that a man should be allowed by violence to transfer the 
heavy burden of proof from his own shoulders to those of his opponent. Every 
man should bear his own burden. He who takes a thing by force must restore it 
to him from whom he has taken it; let him then prove, if he can, that he is the 
owner of it; and the law will then give to him what it will not suffer him to take 
for himself.
(iiO- Their Exclusion From English Law:
The English law, since it has discovered that it was possible to look after the 
right of possession in a better way than that we have seen before. It adjusts the 
burden of proof of ownership with perfect equity,45 without recourse to any
such anomaly as the protection of the possessor against the owner. This it does
by the operation of the three following rules:
44 Salmond On Jurisprudence. At P. 346. (Eleventh Edition, 1957).
45 Ibid, at P. 347.
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(a )- Prior possession is prima facie proof of title. Even in the ordinary 
proprietary action all what a claimant need to do is nothing more than prove 
that he had an older possession than that of the defendant, and the law will 
presume from this prior possession a better title. Qui p r io r  est tem pore p o tio r  
est jure.
(b)- On the part of the defendant, he can always rebut this presumption by
proving that the better title is in himself.
(c)- A defendant who has violated the possession of the plaintiff is not
allowed to set up the defense of ju s ter tii, as it is called; that is to say, he will not
be heard to allege, as against the plaintiffs claim, that neither the plaintiff nor he 
himself, but some third person, is the true owner. Let every man come and 
defend his own title. As between A and B the right of C is irrelevant. The only 
exceptions are, firstly, when the defendant defends the action on behalf and by 
the authority of the true owner; secondly, when he committed the act 
complained of by the authority of the true owner; and thirdly, when he has 
already made satisfaction to the true owner by returning the property to him.
If we join these rules, i.e., the three rules shown above, the same purpose is
effected as was sought in more cumbrous fashion by the early duplication of
proprietary and possessory remedies.
2-5-2- The Possessory Actions In The French And Algerian Law:
The foundation of the possessory protection is complex. Possession is in 
most cases in the hands of the real owner; the protection of possession is useful 
to the owner himself, because it allows him to defend himself against any 
trespass or any usurpation in a quick and simple manner, and also exempts him 
from bringing the proof of his right of ownership which can be difficult. So, the 
possessory action provides the owner with a means of defense without being
obliged to use any act of violence. These reasons are so strong that they justify
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the use of the possessory action even against the real holder of the right.
(11- The Common Rules To The Three Possessory Actions:
( i l - The Aim And The Field Of The Possessory Actions:
The possessor whether he is in good or bad faith, is protected by the
possessory actions against any disturbance against his possession. The only aim 
of these actions is to protect possession; they do not protect the right itself; they 
provide the possessor with an order from the judge to suspend all disturbances 
and the judge is not obliged to search if the plaintiff is the owner or not. As in 
the ancient law, the possessory actions protect only the possession of
immovables. But, according to article 2279 of the French civil code and 835
Algerian civil code, the possessor in good faith of a movable becomes
instantaneously owner, whereas the owner is protected enough by the action for
declaration of title (faction en revendication) which allows to take the movable 
back. Moreover, the criminal law, protects the possession of movables by giving 
heavy sanctions to the crimes of theft, receiving and concealing of stolen goods, 
swindle or the breach of trust, and other crimes concerning movables.
( ii) - Effect Of The Possessory Actions:
When the judge notices that the possessor has met all the necessary 
conditions, he must order the ceasing of the disturbance to possession and that 
the things go back to the state in which the were before the trouble. The aim of 
these actions is only to allow the possessor, either to recover or to maintain a 
former state.
(21- P articu lar Rules To Each Possessory Action:
(0 - "la Complainte":
This means a possessory action which may be instituted by a person after 
one year of adverse possession of real estate or rights. So, "la complainte", the
107
general possessory action which is open in all the cases of present trouble. Any 
act which involve contradiction to possession. There can be action under 
pretence of having rights on someone's property, or taking the law in one's own 
hands. The former results from any pretending against possession which can be 
involved in any declaration or any juridical act. The latter consists in all material 
aggression against possession.
(ii)- "La Denonciation De Nouvel Oeuvre” :
This is the action for disturbance of possession, especially, against erecting
structures forbidden by law (easement, etc.). This action became a kind of action 
called "la complainte". Moreover, this action follows all the rules of "la 
complainte", and is different from that latter just by the two following 
differences:
Firstly, whereas "la complainte" supposes that a trouble has already 
happened, the "denonciation de nouvel oeuvre", is open for future trouble, such 
as works which if they are finished might harm the possession.
Secondly, the effect of the action of "la denonciation de nouvel oeuvre" can 
only be stopped or suspended but not the suppression of these works.
(n il- "L 'action En R eintegrande":
Action for reinstatement, or restoration. The fact or the act which will give
rise to the action for restoration must involve the general features of the 
possessory trouble, it must be a voluntary act which involves contradiction to 
possession. It must involve particular characteristics which make it different 
from the simple trouble. The action for restoration is given against any 
dispossession obtained by the means of violence or an act of violence which can 
be on the possessor himself or the thing possessed. This possession involves two 
elements, a dispossession and a violence or an act of violence.
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(3 )- Persons Protected Bv The Possessory Actions:
As regards the persons protected by the possessory actions, there is an 
opposition between possessors and precarious holders. Normally, it is the
possessors whose possession presents certain qualities who are protected by the 
possessory actions; in principle, these actions are refused to the precarious
holders.
( i l - Possessors:
Even if the article 23 of the Fr.code.civil procedure seems to require only a 
quiet and non-precarious possession, the jurisprudence and the doctrine agree 
that the required possession for the exercise of the action of "la complainte" and 
of "la denonciation de nouvel oeuvre" must prevent all the features of a real
possession. This also required by article 413 of the Alg.code.civil procedure.
Moreover, the possessor must prove that he possesses the thing for at least a 
year. These conditions do not apply on the action for restoration, this action 
requires only one condition, which is that the possession must be quiet and 
continuous. This is required by article 414 of the Alg.code.civil procedure.
( ii) - P recarious Holders:
In general the possessory protection is refused to them, but as regards 
applying this rule, a distinction must be drawn as between, the relationship of 
the holder with the person from whom he detains the thing and the relationship 
between the holder and third persons.
(i)- The relationship between the holder and the person from whom he 
detains the thing: here as to the relationship of the tenant or farmer with the 
lessor, it has been already settled that the holder does not use the possessory 
actions.
(ii)- The relationship between the holder and third persons: here the
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situation is different from the first one. If the holder, especially the tenant or 
farmer, is perturbed in his enjoyment by third persons, he has to report this 
trouble to the lessor, and this required by article 497 of the Algerian civil code. 
The lessor, will have the quality and the ability to take action and use a 
possessory action in order to bring an end to the trouble, and this is provided 
article 1726 of the Fr.code.civil procedure.
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CHAPTER THREE
POSSESSORY LIENS
3-1- The Nature. The Characteristics And Effects Of Possessory 
Liens And The Comparison Of Possessory Liens With The Other
Kinds Of Liens:
3-1-1- The Nature. The Characteristics And Effects Of The 
Possessory Liens:
The nature, characteristics and effects of a possessory lien may be 
summarised in the following way:
(i)- Nature Of A Possessory Lien:
It is a common law right conferring by contract, usage or statute a right of 
retention of a chattel already in the lien holder's possession.1 The possession 
must be lawfully acquired, and apart from surrender for a particular limited 
purpose (e.g., deposit) be continuous. Because of the requirement of rightful 
acquisition possession transferred by a person who has a right to do so cannot 
found a lien. But a person obliged to receive goods (such as a common carrier) is 
not affected by the defect in transfer unless he knows of it.2 There is no ability 
to acquire possession to create it and no right to enforce the right through action 
unless the possession is wrongly terminated, i.e., there is no right of sale (see, e.g., 
M ulliner v. Florence (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 484). But such a right may be provided by 
contract or statute, see, e.g., the Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss.39 and 48; and the 
Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, ss.12 and 13. The Sale of Goods Act 
1977 provides in S.39:
"(i)- Subject to this and any other Act, notwithstanding that the property in
1 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement Of Maritime Claims, at P. 261.
2 See, e.g., Johnson v. H ill (1822) 3 Stark. 172.
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the goods may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller of the goods, as such, 
has by implication of law : . . .
(c)- a right of re-sale as limited by this Act and in section 48 (3)- Where the
goods are of a perishable nature, or where the unpaid seller gives notice to the
buyer of his intention to re-sell, and the buyer does not within a reasonable time 
pay or tender the price, the unpaid seller may re-sell the goods and recover 
from the original buyer damages for any loss occasioned by his breach of
contract.
Moreover, it is provided in section 13 of the Torts (Interference With 
Goods) Act 1977:
13 (1)- If a bailee of the goods to which section 12 applies satisfies the court
that he is entitled to sell the goods under section 12, or that he would be so
entitled if he had given any notice required in accordance with schedule 1 to this 
Act, the court: _
(a)- may authorise the sale of the goods subject to such terms and
conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, and...
Moreover, the possession is an essential element for the exercise of the lien 
and without it the creditor cannot pretend having any possessory lien as long as 
he does not have possession and the holder of a possessory lien cannot enfeorce 
it by sale, but may only continue to hold the property until his claims are
satisfied. Thus, the possessory lien may be described as a negative lien, because
it is only a means of pressure on the owner of the thing held to oblige him to pay 
his debts.
(ii)- Characteristics Of A Possessory Lien:
According to the diferent definitions given to the possessory lien, one may 
find that the possessory lien has the following chararcteristics:
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(a)- Possession is an essential element for the constitution of a possessory 
lien and without possession of the incumbranced thing, the creditor cannot claim 
having any lien on the res. Thus, the absence of possession or the loss of it for 
whatever reason (except wrongful despossession) the lien holder loses his lien.
(b)- There will be no lien if the possession is wrongful, or the goods have 
been deposited for a particular purpose inconsistent with the lien or for mere
storage or keep.3 So, possession must be a rightful one and consistent with the 
right exercised.
(c)- Liens may arise by contract, by statute or by custom.4 Examples are 
those of the innkeeper (Hotel Proprietors" Act 1956), the carrier, the repairer of 
goods and the unpaid seller of goods. The law does not favour general liens but 
some professions have established customs entailing such liens. They include 
bankers, solicitors and stockbrokers. A lien arising from custom may be
excluded by contract.
(d)- The holder of a possessory lien cannot enforce it by sale, but may only 
continue to hold the property until his claims are paid.
(e)- A lien is lost by surrender or abandonment of possession (but not by 
re-delivery for a limited purpose to the owner), on payment or tender of the 
debt, by the making of an excessive demand by the holder and by the taking of 
some other security inconsistent with the lien.
( ii i) - Effects Of Possessory Liens:
Ther is only one important effect to the possessory lien which is that it only 
gives a mere right to retain, not to sell or re-sell, but there are many exceptions 
by statute, e.g., the unpaid seller, and generally an application may be made to 
the court for an order to sell if the goods are perishable or if some other god 
reason can be shown. Thus, a possessory lien is a quite and negative right
3 Ibid.
4 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary Of Commercial Law. 1983. at P. 209,
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because it only gives to the lien holder the right to retain the thing until his
claims are paid even though to do so entails expense.5 Moreover, it can also be
said that if the lien holder is dispossessed by a court having Admiralty
jurisdiction, then out of the proceeds of the ship he will paid his claim according 
to the rules as to priorities.^ The other effect which may result from the 
possessory lien is that the possessory lien is lost by the loss of possession.
In the field of carriage by sea, many claims may arise against the ship as
against the cargo carried in that ship. Those claims, might be maritime liens,
sttutory liens, possessory liens or some other charges, such as equitable liens and 
mortgages, but each of these categories can be different from the other
categories. Thus, all these categories can be different in point view legal 
characteristics or legal nature. Because this work is more concerned with
possessory liens, this kind of liens will be compared with each of these
categories.
3-1-2- Com parison Of Possessory And M aritim e Liens:
Before coming to the distinction between the possessory liens and maritime 
liens, it would better to give a brief definition to both of those categories.
Therefore, a possessory lien is a right to detain possession of a res which had 
been rendered services to, until those services are paid for and it confers a right 
of retention of a chattel already in the lien holder's possession. When it comes to 
maritime liens, Sir John Jervis provided the first comprehensive and
authoritative definition of a maritime lien in The Bold Buccleugh.7
5 Thames Iron W orks Co v. Patent Derrick Co (1860) 1 John & H 93; S o m e s  v. B r it is h
Em pire Shipping Co (1860) 8 HL Cas 338; M u llin e r v. F lo ren ce  (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 484, C A; T h e  
G uaupen (1925) 22 L1L. Rep 57; The Ally [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427; Smith's Dock Ltd v. St Meriel
(Owners!. The St Merriel H9631 P 247, [1963] 1 All E R 537, [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 63.
6 The Gustaf (1862) Lush 506; The Immacolata Concezione (1883) 9 PD 37, 5 A. S P. MLC 
208: The Tergeste r 19031 P 26. 9 Asp MLC 356.
7 The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 MOO. P.C. 267, 284. For more details about maritime liens,
see Thomas on M aritime Liens. British Shipping Laws, Vol 14.
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From these definitions, one may find the disctinction between these two 
kinds of liens. First, a possessory lien depends on possession of the res, i.e., 
possession is very essential for the existence of a possessory lien, whilst a 
maritime lien does not depend on that possession. Therefore, in The 
"Tarveate".8 Lord Justice Bankes stated that:
"the so called maritime lien has nothing to do with possession, but is
a priority in claim over the proceeds of sale of the ship in preference
to other claimants . . .  ."
The possessory lien is lost by loss or surrender of possession of the res.9
So, if an incumbranced res by a possessory lien, falls into the hands of the owner
of the res or the hands of a third party by a lawful surrender, the possessory 
lienee will lose his lien upon the res. Secondly, the right of a maritime lienee is to 
be carried ionto effect by a legal process, that process is to be a proceeding in 
rem. So, the right of a maritime lienee is perfected or crystallised by an action in 
rem. Under such a proceeding, a maritime lienee may cause the incumbranced 
res to be arrested and sold, and the maritime lienee will satisfy his claim from 
the proceeds of sale.10
In contrast with that, a possessory lien takes effect by the fact of taking 
possession of the res not by taking any legal action, all what a possessory lienee 
needs to do is to confirm his lien upon the res, and that by taking possession of 
the incumbranced res. So, all what a possessory lienee can do is to retain the res 
until all his claims are satisfied.
Moreover, the right of a possessory lienee is just to detain or hold 
possession of the res without having authority or right to sell the incumbranced 
res, his right is confined just by detaining possession, whereas the maritime 
lienee after taking an action in rem and causing the arrest of the incumbranced
8 The Tarveate . Lloyd's Law Reports. Vol 12. 1922. at P. 252.
9 Trustee Of The Property O f F. Lord v. Great Eastern Railway Co (1908) K.B.54.
10 The Celia (1888) 13. P.D. 82. per Lord Esher M U. at P. 86.
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res, the res is sold, and the claim will be satisfied out of the proceeds of sale.11
The other difference which can be found between a maritime lien and a 
possessory lien, is that a maritime lien may categorised as voluntary or
involuntary lien. So, the maritime liens for services rendered to the res, are 
considered to be voluntary liens, whereas, the maritime liens for damages are 
seen as all involuntary in character. On the other hand, most of or all of the 
possessory liens are voluntary liens for services rendered to the res. Moreover, 
a maritime lien follows the res into whosoever hands it may come, even if it is a 
bona fide purchaser. In The Bold Buccleugh. Sir John Jervis said that:
" . . .  a maritime lien . . . This claim or privilege travels with the thing
into whosoever possession it may come . . . ".12
Thus, the maritime lien is a lien which travels with the property secrtively 
and unconditionally, i.e., there is exists neither a system of registration and public 
notice by which charges in the nature of maritime liens may be rendered overt 
and visible, nor does the maritime lienee detain possession of the res. So, a 
purchaser of a res will find the res he bought incumbranced with a maritime 
l ie n .13 However, there are situations where the "droit de suite" does not 
operate, e.g., where the incumbranced ship is purchased or requisitioned by the 
Crown or in certain cases by a foreign sovereign, thereby making the seizure 
impossible and the lien inoperable; see Five Steel Barges (1880) 15 P.D. 142.
Judicial sale too expunges the maritime lien. On the contrary, this cannot happen 
in the case of a possessory lien, because a possessory lienee must detain the 
possession, otherwise, his lien will be terminated.
After having brought the differences between possessory liens and 
maritime liens, one can say that there is a point of similarity between these two 
categories of lien. That similarity is that both of the maritime and possessory
11 Ibid.
12 The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 MOO . P.C. 287, 284.
13 Ibid, per Sir John Jervis, at P. 284.
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liens, include some liens which are maritime and possessory liens in the same
time. For instance, in salvage, the salvor has a possessory lien as well as a
maritime lien, but this right may not be abused.14
3-1-3- Com parison Of Possessory And Equitable Liens:
A possessory lien is essentially a right to detain possession of a chattel 
pending the discharge of an outstanding obligation incurred in respect of 
services rendered to the chattel.15 This right to retain is firmly founded on
possession, and the loss or surrender of that possession, will make the 
possessory lienee lose his right of lien. So, the principal difference between 
possessory and equitable liens lies in the fact that, to enable anyone, to claim the 
former, he must be in actual possession of the thing in respect of which the claim 
arises, whilst the latter arises quite independently of possession. So, an equitable 
lien is a species of equitable charge, which arises by implication of law, and by 
virtue of which a right in equity may be arrested against property.
The French and the Algerian law, consider the lien as given by law, and 
therefore, the French civil code defines it in art.2095, that the privilege is a right
which the quality of the debt gives to the creditor to be preferred on the other
creditors, even mortgagees. But some criticism was brought to this definition.16 
However, The Algerian civil code seems to have learnt from the French civil code 
and brought a definition about the privilege in art.982 which considers the 
privilege as a right of priority given by law for a specific debt because of its 
quality, and it adds that no debt can be preferred without a text of law. 
Furthermore, an equitable lien differs from a possessory lien in that, an 
equitable lien does depend upon the possession of the chattel, whereas, a 
possessory lien does. This is because an equitable lien is given by law and
14 Tetley. William. Maritime Liens and Claims, op-cit, at P. 147.
15 Thomas. Maritime Liens, op cit. at P. 3. para 2.
16 Remarks made about that article in Sect.!, Sub-S (2) about Equitable Liens.
117
whether there is possession or not is of no importance for the equitable lien, 
whereas possession is an essential element for the existence of a possessory lien. 
There are some other important differences, as for example, the common law or 
possessory lien is a merely passive one,17 and gives the person entitled no other 
remedy but mere detention until payment, and, in the ordinary way, a right of 
sale accrues even by leave of the court. In respect of an equitable lien, however, 
the only remedy is the right to enforce it by a judicial sale.
Moreover, since a possessory lien is, in its nature, a right of defence only,
and not a right of action, there is nothing to prevent its being claimed in respect
of a statute barred debt,18 but no assistance can be given for the enforcement of 
an equitable lien when the remedy has benn barred by lapse of time under the 
Statutes of Limitation.19
Lastly, an equitable lien may be lost by sale to a bona fide purchaser, but a
possessory lien which incumbrances a res is also lost by sale, because the
possessory lien holder will possession of it, and if the thing goes outb of his
possession whether by sale or any other lawful way, that will terminate his lien.
3-1-4- Possessory Liens And M ortgages:
Before looking at the differences and similarities between these two 
categories, it is worthwile giving a definition to mortgages. A mortgage is a form 
of real security where the borrower (mortgagor) normally retains possession of
the property mortgaged but grants a proprietary interest to the lender 
(m ortgagee).20 Where the mortgage is granted by a company formalities and 
rules prescribed by the Companies Acts must be observed, especially in regard
to registration, in addition to whatever precedures are necessary for the type of 
property being mortgaged. A mortgage may make his ownership absolute by
17 Lancelot. Edey. Hull. Possessory Liens In English Law, at P. 16.
18 Higgins v. S co t. 2 B. and Ad. 413. 414; Spears v. Hartley (1800) 3 ESP. 81.
19 Lancelot, op cit. at P. 16.
20 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary Of Commercial Law. 1983. at P. 180-181.
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foreclosure, by bringing an action for foreclosure under which a further date is 
appointed for payment and, if the money is not then paid, the property belongs 
to the mortgage absolutely. Alternatively, a sale may be rendered to enable the 
mortgagee to be paid out of the proceeds.21 Moreover, the French and Algerian 
civil code brought a definition to the mortgage, and that was by art.2114 of the 
French civil code, which defines it as, a chattels real on the immovables which 
are transmitted for the discharge of an obligation. It is because of its nature 
existing on the whole of the immovables transmitted. It traces them in 
whosoever hands they may come.22
The Algerian civil code defined it in art.882, which defines it as, "the 
contract of mortgage is acontract which makes the creditor get chattels real on 
the immovable transmitted for payment of the debt, which makes him 
preferred to get his refunding against the other creditors who are lower than 
him in priority, on the price of the immovable in whosoever hands it may 
come".23
So, from these definitions, a comparison can be drawn between between 
the possessory liens and the mortgages.
The concept ofa possessory lien and a mortgage are quite different, in that 
the possessory lien arises when there there is possession of the res for services 
rendered to it. On the other hand, a mortgage arises according to the mortgage
21 Walker. David. M. The Oxford Companion To Law. 1980. at P. 857.
22 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french provides that:
"L 'hpothgque est un d ro it r£el sur les im m eubles affdctds i  I 'acquittem ent d ’une 
obligation. Elle est, de sa nature, indivisible, et subsiste en entier sur tous les immeubles 
affect6s, sur chacun et sur chaque portion de ces immeubles. Elies les suit dans quelques 
mains qu'ils passent".
23 "My Own Translation". The actual art.882 of the Algerian civil Code provides in 
french that:
"Le contra t d 'hypothgque est le contrat par lequel le c h a n c ie r  acquiert su r un 
im m euble affectd au paiem ent de sa crdance, un droit r£el qui lui p£rm6t de se faire 
rembourser par preference aux creanciers inf£rieurs en rang, sur le prix de cet imm euble en 
quelque main qu'il passe".
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agreement between the mortgagee and the mortgagor as it was described in the 
Algerian civil code, in art.882, as a contract between the two parties. Moreover, 
a possessory lien does not require any form of agreement between the parties, 
but a mortgage agreement must be in a form prescribed by statute.24 The right 
of a mortgagee to pursue his security in the hands of a third party is founded on 
notice which is secured by a public sheme of registration.25 In contrast, a 
possessory lien does not need any form of registration, because the right of a 
possessory lienee depends on the possession of the res. Another difference can 
be found, which is that the mortgage does not depend on possession, as long as 
there is an agreement and registration, whereas, the possession is an important 
and vital element for the possessory lien. Lastly, if the mortgagor does not pay 
his debt at the agreed time, the mortgagee might take legal action so that the res 
be sold and so that he gets paid from the proceeds of sale. On the other hand, a 
possessory lien cannot be enforced by sale, the only remedy of it is to retain the 
chattel as a means of obligation against the debtor.
3-1-5- Possessory Liens And S ta tu to ry  Liens:
Possessory liens which arise in a contract of carriage of goods by sea, 
namely in a charteparty between the carriers and the charterer, depend on the 
wording of the charterparty. Whereas, statutory liens are expressed and 
recognised by statutes, such as, seamen’s and master's lien for wages, in the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956 Sect. 1 (1) (e), and the Supreme Court Act
1981, sect 20(2), their lien is expressly recognised. In the French and Algerian
*
law, some liens are recognised by statutes, such as, the French code of commerce, 
(which includes the French Maritime Law) or the Algerian Maritime code. The 
French code of commerce, gives a list of liens which incumbrance the ship and 
the freight in art. 31 of the Law of January the 3 rd of 1967, these liens are
24 Merchant Shipping Act 1894. S. 31, and art. 883 of the Algerian civil Code and art. 
2127 of the French civil Code.
25 Merchant Shipping Act, Ibid.
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statutory liens. The Algarian Martime code has in the same way given a list of 
liens in art. 73,26 and these liens are also considered as statutory liens. Another 
question may arise as to statutory possessory liens.27 If the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in The "Emilie Millon". continuous to represent an accurate 
statement of the English Law on the nature of the statutory right to detain and 
sell then it appears that the law draws a distinction between a statutory 
possessory lien,28 and a common law possessory lien,29 which is difficult to 
su p p o rt.30 Moreover, it represent unbusinesslike approach which is full of 
d iff icu ltie s .31 For instance, unlike a sale by order of the Admiralty Court, a 
statutory claimant cannot sell free from liens or charges.32 In many instances 
therefore, to effect a sale will either be impossible or at least difficult, and even if 
possible the sale is unlikely to realise the true value of the res. The 
impracticalities are avoided if, as in The Sierra Nevada, the the statutory 
claimant is treated in the same manner as a possessory lienee.
3-2- The Possessory Liens And The Essentials For Their Existence:
As was stated before, the definition of Grose J.,33 of possessory liens seems 
to be he most satisfactory definition, namely, "the right in one man to retain that 
which is in his possession belonging to another till certain demands of him, the 
person in possession, are satisfied".
26 Ordonnance No- 76-80 du 23 Octobre 1976, portant Code Maritime Alg6rien.
27 Thomas. Maritime Liens. A t P. 233, para 416.
28 The statutory to detain and sell was considered as a "statutory possessory lien" in T h e  
C ountess [1923] A.C. 345. See, in particular the judgment o f Lord Burkenhead at P. 349 et seq.
29 A common law posessory lienee is required to surrender his possessory right to the 
Admiralty Marshall and the withe Court undertaking to protect his claim and priority  against 
the proceds of sale or alternative security.
30 Thomas. Maritime Liens, at P. 223, para 416.
31 The Spermina [1923] 17 L1.L.R. 17, and the comments of Hill J.
32 [1968] P. 449, per Brandon J. at P. 457 et seq., The Spermina [1923] 17 Ll.L.R. 17, per Hii 
J., at P. 18.
33 H am m onds v. B arc lay , supra.
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3-2-1- Definition OF General And P articu la r Liens:
The possessory liens may be devided into two categories, namely, a general 
lien or a particular lien, differentiated by the extent of the demands in respect of 
which the liens arises. A general lien gives a claimant the right to retain any 
chattel of the person against whom the claim is made until that claim is satisfied, 
there being no necessary connection between claim and chattel, i.e., where an 
individual is permitted to retain the goods of another, which are in his 
possession, until all claims against the owner of the chattels in respect of a 
general balance of account are satisfied, whether such claims arise in respect of 
the particular goods detained or not, the person in possession is said to have a 
general lien.34 v
On the contrary, a particular lien is a right to retain a chattel until all claims 
made in respect of it are met, i.e., a particular lien, is a right to retain a specific 
property as security for demands which have arisen in respect of such property 
only. The examples of particular liens are those of the unpaid price for work 
done, or materials furnished in repairing or constructing a specific chattel.35 
Thus, a solicitor is entitled to retain the papers of a lient, whether they became 
due in respect of the matters to which the papers relate or not, and his lien is a 
general lien. On the other hand, the unpaid vendor of goods, has a right to detain 
the goods sold until the purchase price is paid, and this lien is given by statutes 
(the Sale of Goods Act 1979, SS. 39 and 48), but he has only a particular lien and 
could not retain the goods in respect of the unpaid purchase parice of other 
goods sold at another time.
3-2-2- The Essentials For A Valid Possessory Lien. Whether Of A 
General Or Particular Nature:
So that the possessory lien holder has a valid one, his lien must present 
some conditions which are necessary to make it valid. Those conditions are, 
nam ely:36
34 Lancelot. E.H. op cit. at P. 18.
35 Ibid.
36 Lancelot. E.H. op cit. at P. 19.
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(i)- Actual possession of the goods in respect of which the lien is claimed.
(ii)- Lawful possession.
(iii)- That the goods must be the goods of the debtor.
( i) - Actual Possession:
Possession is an essential element for a possessory lien and without 
possession, the lien holder cannot pretend to have any possessory lien. The 
property must be in the actual possession of the party claiming the lien,37 and if 
possession is lost, the right of detention is also lost. Even in the civil law 
jurisdiction, such as the French and the Algerian civil code, possession is vital, 
because there cannot be any retention, if there is no detention; for keeping there 
must be first holding. The possession must be actual, and for example, a mere 
equitable right to possession is insufficient to give rise to the right.38 Thus, if a 
consignemt of cargo is made to "A", with a direction to pay "B" a sum out of the 
proceeds, no lien will thereby be created in favour of "B". Moreover, not only 
must the possession be actual, but it must also be of a continuous and 
uninterrupted nature. In general a bailee can have no lien where, by the 
essence of te contract, he has no right to the uninterrupted possession of the 
property .39
In H atton v. Car Maintenance Co. Ltd..40 it was held that party who takes 
care of a car, and agrees to maintain and keep it in order, has no lien for repairs. 
The main reason for this is, that in repairing the car he does not improve it, but 
quite apart from this he would have no lien if the owner was entitled to take the 
car out whenever he pleased, for the possession would not be for a continuous 
nature; query, indeed,41 whether there is possession at all in such a case.42
Moreover, a livery stable keeper, who merely feeds an animal, has, for
37 Shaw v. Neale 6 H. L. Cas. 581.
38 H evw ood v. W aring 4 Camp. 291.
39 Jackson v. C um m ins. 5. M. & W. 342.
40 110 L.T.R. 765.
41 Lancelot. E.H. op cit. at P. 20.
42 See, Judson v. Etheridge (1833) 1 C. & M. 743;
O rchard v. Rackstraw  (1850) 9 C.B. at P. 98.
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much the same reason, no lien, for he has not possession, but a mere custody. 
However, it should be noted that if possession must be actual, it needs not to be 
direct, and therefore, the possession of an agent, servant or warehouse-keeper of 
the creditor, acting under his authority, is sufficient. Thus, in respect of 
possessory lien for the payment of freight due to the shipowner, he latter can 
land and warehouse the goods without losing possession and that by possessing 
through the warehouseman. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894,43 resolves the 
dilemma by enabling the shipowners to retain constructive possession over 
goods after discharge, thereby maintaining the shipowner's possessory lien for
freight. Section 494 of the Merchant Shipping Act, provides that goods delivered 
to a wharfinger accompanied by written notice that the goods are subject to a 
lien for freioght will continue to be subject to that lien even though they no 
longer in the actual possession of the shipowner. When it comes to the French 
and the Algerian civil code, they require that an actual possession must be
present. So, the French jurisprudence requires that the debtor loses his
possession and that the creditor acquires it, because to detain you must hold
(pour « re te n ir »  il faut « te n ir » ) .  The right of detention means taking possession
of the thing by the one who is exercising the right of retention and therefore the
thing becomes detained.
Moreover, the creditor or the possessory lien holder is not obliged to 
exercise the detention himself but can confer it to someone else, who holds it for 
the lien holder himself, or if the court gives the thing to a sequestrator.4 4
However, the possessory lien holder loses possession, if he voluntarily surrender
possession to the debtor. The Algerian civil code considers the right of retention 
as existing if there is possession of te debtor's property by the possessory lien 
holder. So, in art.201/2 it is provided that, the one who exercises the right of 
retention must keep the thing in the same manner and according to the same
43 (1894) 57 & 58 Viet. c. 60.
44 Req. 19 juill. 1904, D. 1906.1.9 et note Glasson; Req. 5 nov. 1923, D. 1924.1.11.
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rules provided to the pledge,45 and in art.201/1 it is provided that, the right of 
retention is extinguished by the loss of the possession or the detention46 Thus, 
in both the French and the Algerian law, possession is essential for the existence 
of a possessory lien whether a general or a particular lien.
( i i ) - Lawful Possession:
Even actual possession is insufficient unless it was lawfully acquired in due 
course of business. Mere possession of a debtor's goods will not alone give the 
creditor a right of lien over them. A lien cannot be acquired by a wrongful act, 
and possession obtained by misrepresentation, fraud, or violence, will never give 
rise to the right, even though every other essential element is present. In this 
case, we find that the civil law jurisdiction (i.e., the French and the Algerian law),
it requires that the possessory lien holder or the one who exercises the right of
retention must be in good faith, and the good faith here means that there was no 
fraud in exercising the right retention and this condition is required by the 
jurisprudence. Moreover, the German Civil Code in its' art. 273/2, provides that
there is no retention where the creditor used fraud or where the despossession
of the debtor was by an illegal act and the articles 895 and 896/2 of the Swiss 
Civil Code refuse the right of detention when the possession was acquired 
without the consent of the debtor.
In L em priere  v. P a s lev .47 a lien claimed for certain freight duty paid in 
respect of goods, possession of which had been wrongfully obtained, but it was 
held that the wrongfull acquisition of possession was fatal to any such claim.
45 "My Own Translation". The art.201/2 of the Algerian civil Code provides in french
th a t:
"Celui qui exerce le droit de retention doit concerver la chose , conformgment aux rdgles
gtablis en matiere de gage . . .
46 The actual art.201/1 provides in french that:
"Le droit de retention s'eteint par la p6rte de la possession ou de la detention".
47 (1788) 2 Term. Per. 485.
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Furthermore, possession obtained for some particular purpose only, will not give 
rise to a general lien.48 In K inloch v. C ra ig .49 a factor received goods for the 
purpose of sale and under an agreement to apply the proceeds in an agreed 
manner. As possession was acquired for this particular purpose only, it was held 
that there was no lien. Also in H um phries v. W ilso n .50 a bill for £100 was
given to a creditor of £47 to be discounted, the creditor being promised payment
out of the proceeds. Before the bill was discounted the creditor became 
bankrupt, and a claim of lien was negatived for this reason. The reason for these 
cases is that there was a failure of the special purposes for which the goods were 
deposited with creditor, and the property in the goods reverted to the debtor, 
the possession of the creditor ceassing to be lawful. If goods are, however, left in 
the possession of a creditor for a considerable time after the failure of the
particular purpose for which they were originally deposited, a deposit for 
general puroses will be presumed and a lien will attach.
(iii)- The Goods Must Be The Goods Of The Debtor:
In the general way, a creditor cannot obtain a lien over goods of a third 
party, and no right will attach unless the goods actually belong to the debtor 
because the debt arose between the debtor and the creditor and not between
the creditor and the third party, and therefore, the creditor can only obtain a lien 
over goods of his debtor. Thus, it was held in The Ex Parte Nesbitt.51 that a 
valid lien cannot attach as against a remainderman for a debt due from the 
tenent for life, and in H artop v. H o are .52 where a person with whom jewels 
were lodged for safe custody in a sealed box, broke the seals and lodged the 
jewels as security with his bankers, it was held no lien was created. In the more
48 See, W alker v. B irch (1795) 6 Term. Rep. 258.
49 3 Term. Rep. 119.
50 2 Stark. Rep. 566.
51 (1865) 2 Sch. & Lef. 279.
52 3 Atkyns 43.
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recent case of The "In Re Llewellyn11.53 a mortgagee's solicitor, after payment off 
of the mortgage, principal, interest, and coasts, unsuccessfully endeavoured to 
retain the mortgage deeds in respect of coasts for work done, relating to the 
mortgaged property, during the continuance of the mortgage. In the civil law 
jurisdiction, as a general rule, the creditor can only detain the property of his 
debtor or the person against whom he is claiming payment of his debt, but,54 
the creditor can use the right of detention against the property of a third party 
when the latter has agreed to garantee the payment of the debt from the debtor 
or where the debtor has transferred ownership of the property to a third party.
The Exceptions:
There are exceptions to the above rule, which may be grouped under the 
following main headings:
( i l - W here The Person Receiving The Goods Is Bv Law 
Compelled To Receive Them:
In the case of carriers who are under a legal obligation to carry goods, they 
acquire a lien over the goods delivered to them for carriage, until the charge for 
carriage is paid, whether the ggods are the property of the property of the 
persons delivering them for carriage or not. Inn-keepers who are under legal 
obligation to receive anyone who offers himself or herself as a guest, and to keep 
the goods of the guest safely, in the same way will acquire a lien over the goods 
of the guest until charges for food and lodging have been paid.55 To enable a 
lien to be claimed on goods not the property of the debtor, they must, however, 
have been received in good faith, for a lien will not arise where the person 
receiving knew the person from whom he received was a wrongdoer.56
53 1891. 3 Ch. 145.
54 D a l lo z . E ncvclop6die Ju r id ia u c . 2^ Edition. R6p6rtoire De D roit Civil. Tome VII. 
Retention, at P. 3. S. 25.
55 Yorke v. Crenaugh (1702) Ld. Ray 866. Robins & Co. v. Gray (1895) 2 Q.B. 501 (C.A.).
56 See, Johnson v. HU! (1822) 3 Stark 172.
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( i i l - W here The Dehtor Is Invested Bv The Owner W ith The 
Right Or Authority Of Disposing Of The Property In That Wav:
If a person delivers the goods of another, with the owner's authority, to a 
trdesman for the execution of the purposes of his trade upon it, the tradesman 
shall have a lien upon it, to the same extent as if the goods were actually the 
property of the person who delivered them to him.57 Moreover, in the French 
and the Algerian civil codes, where the agent is representing the principal, the 
above provisions provided for the case of representation are applied. Thus, the 
French civil code provides in art.1998 regarding the obligations of the mandator, 
that: "the mandator is obliged to execute all the agreements which his agent has 
made with the party, and that according to the limits of the contract between the 
mandator and his agent".58 The Alg civil code provides in art.74 that: "The 
contract made by the representative or the agent in the limits of his power, will 
include the rights and obligations for the benefit of the mandator and against 
him ".59 So, according to these provisions, if the agent acted in good faith and in 
the limits of the power conferred to him, the obligations of his act will bind the 
mandator, and the contract or the deal between the agent and the third party 
will have the same effect as if the contract was made between the mandator 
and the party.
( i iO - W here Monies O r N egociable Securities Are D eposited  
With A Person Who Takes Them In Good Faith:
Under these circumstances the depositee will acquire the same right of lien 
as if the depositor were the true owner, but it is essential that, at the time of
57 See, Hussev v. Christie 9 East 433.
Richardson v. Goss. 3 Bos. & Pul. 119.
58 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french provides that
"Le m andant es t tenu d 'executer les engagem ents contractus par le  m andataire, 
conformSment au pouvoir qui lui a StS donnS".
59 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french provides that:
"Le contrat conclu par le reprSsentant dans les lim ites de ses pouvoirs au nom du 
represent^, engendre les droits et obligations directem ent au p rofit du reprSsentS e t contre 
lu i" .
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receipt, he should have no notice of any defect in the title of the person 
sepositing the goods.60
( iv ) - Under the Sale of Goods Act. 1979:
The 1893 Sale of Goods Act in its section 25, provides that:
"Where a person having sold goods, the delivery or transfer by that 
person, or by a merchantile agent acting for him, of the goods or
documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition 
thereof, to any person receiving the same in good faith without
notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person 
making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised by the 
owner of the goods to make the same". ,
Moreover, the 1979 Act provides an identical provision in sect.24:
"Where a person having sold goods continues or is in possession of 
the goods, or of the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or 
transfer by that person, or by a merchantile agent acting for him, of 
the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge, or other
disposition thereof, to ay person receiving the same in good faith and
without notice of the previous sale, has the same effect as if the
person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised 
by the owner of the goods to make the same."
Moreover, the Sale of the Goods Act 1979, at sect.25 gives a title, where it 
provides that:
"Where a person having bought or agreed to buy goods obtains, with 
the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of 
title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a 
merchantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title, 
under any sale, pledge, or other disposiotion thereof, to any person 
receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or 
other right of the original seller in respect of the goods, has the same 
effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a 
merchantile agent in possession of the goods or documents of title 
with the consent of the owner".
60 See, Jones v. P eppercorne (1858) John 430. B randao  v. B arne tt (1846) 12 Cl & Fin. 787.
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Thus, Section 25 of the 1893 Sale of Goods Act and Section 25 of the 1979
Act provide the same provisions. Thus, liens arising under any such dispositions
within the provisions of this section will be effectual, although the goods are not 
the property of the debtor.
(v l - Under The Factors Act, 1889:
Dealings by a mercantile agent, in the ordinary course of business, in
respect of goods of which he is in possession with consent of the owner, are valid 
as if expressly authorised by the owner of the goods, providing the person 
taking under the disposition acts in good faith, and this is provided by section 2 
(1) of the Factors Act 1889, which provides that:
"Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in
possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, any sale, 
pledge, or other disposition of the goods, made by him even when 
acting in the ordinary course of business of a merchantile agent,
shall, subject to the provisions of this act, be as valid as if he were 
expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same;
provided that the person taking under the disposition acts in good 
faith, and has not at the time of the disposition notice that the person 
making the disposition has not authority to make the same".
Pledge includes any contract pledging or giving a lien or security on goods, 
whether in consideration of an original advance, or of any further or continuing 
advance, or of any pecuniary liability.61 A pledge of the documents of title to 
goods is deemed to be a pledge of the goods. The Act thus applies to pledges for 
antecedent debts: but where the goods are pledged,62 without authority, for an
antecedent debt or liability of the pledgor, the pledgee acquires no further right 
to the goods than could have been enforced by the pledgor at the time of the 
pledge. Where the goods are pledged without authority in consideration of the
61 S .l (5).
62 Bowstead on Agency. 15 th Ed, By Reynolds. F.M.B. London Sweet & Maxwell, 1985. At
P. 369.
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delivery or transfer of the goods or documents of title to goods, or of a negotiable 
security, the pledgee acquires no right or interest in the goods so pledged in 
excess of the value of the goods, documents or security when so delivered or 
transferred in exchange.63
The French and the Algerian civil code provide the same provisions. The 
French civil code in art.2280 and the Algerian civil code in art.836/2, they both 
provide that if the person in possession of the thing stolen or lost, has bought 
that thing from a faire or a market, or from a public sale, or a public auction or
from a person who deals in the same kind of things, than that sale is considered
as valid, because the real owner cannot get it back unless he pays its1 price to the 
one who is possession of it and who bought it in good faith.
(v i) - W here An Agent W ith Lim ited A uthority  Deposits Goods 
With A Trades man For Execution Of Purposes Of His T rade, The 
Tradesman Not Knowing He Is Not The True Owner;
In W eldon v. G o u ld .64 it was decided by Lord Kenyon. C. J., that were 
goods were entrusted by the owner to another person in order to have them 
printed, and that person delivered them to a calico printer as his own for that 
purpose, the calico printer might retain them aginst the owner for a general 
balance due from the person who delivered them, but knowledge that the goods 
do not belong to the depositor will prevent any general lien from arising.65 The
63 S.5. which provides:
"The consideration necessary for the valid ity  o f  a sale, p ledge, or other 
disposition, of goods, in pursuance of this Act, may be either a payment in cash,
or the delivery or transfer of other goods, or of a document of title to goods, or of
a negotiable security, or any other valuable consideration; but where goods are 
pledged by a merchantile agent in consideration o f the delivery or transfer o f 
other goods, or o f a document of title to goods, or o f negotiable security, the 
pledgee shall acquire no right or interest in the goods so pledged in excess of the 
value of the goods, documents, or security when so delivered or transferred in 
e x c h a n g e ."
64 3 Esp. R. 268.
65 See, M aans v. H enderson 1 East 335 & Snook v. D avidson 1809 Camp. 218.
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basic idea of this exception is that, where a third party, obtains goods from the 
agent for the purpose of his trade, but not knowing that the one who delivered 
them was just an agent, that third party will acquire a general lien on the goods 
against the true owner for any services rendered or work done to those goods, 
and that because the act of the agent in the limits of his authority will bind the 
true owner. This provision is provided in the French and the Algerian civil code, 
where art. 1998 of the French civil code and art.74 of the Algerian civil code 
provide that, the mandator is bound by all the acts which the agent did in the 
limits of his mandate.
3-2-3- General Liens. And How They Arise:
The general lien may be defined as, the lien which gives a claimant the 
right of retention or the right to retain any chattel of the person against whom 
the claim is made, there being no necessary connection between claim and 
chattel. Unless, created by express or necessarily implied contract, general liens 
can be established by custom only.
(i)- Liens Created Bv "C ontract":
A general lien can be created by contract. The contract can provide for the 
assets to which the lien is to attach, for the claims for which it is to exist and for 
its enforceability against third parties. Thus, liens arising by contract are really 
agreements for pledges, and are governed strictly by the terms of the 
agreement giving rise to them. Such liens may arise between individuals by 
express agreement, or by application from usage or the course of dealing 
between the parties. In the case of Aspinal v. P ickford.66 a carrier, who has not, 
in the ordinary way, a general lien, was held to have such a lien in the particular 
facts of that case from the course of dealing. However, it is possible for a creditor 
to reserve a general lien by notice. When contractors give notice that they will
66 3 Bos. & Pul. 44 n.
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only do work upon terms of having a general lien, persons dealing with them
will be held to have contracted with reference to this notice.67 Such notice will 
always be construed most unfavourably to the person claiming the lien.6 8 
Mere notice is, in the ordinary way, sufficient without actual proof of assent by 
the customer, but where the person claiming a lien is compelled to accept
employment under legal liability, mere notice without assent will be insufficient 
to give rise to a general lien.69
This is mainly applicable in the case of carriers and innkeepers.70 It 
should be noted that where a merchantile transaction which might involve a 
general lien by custom, is created by a written contract, and security is given for 
the result of the dealings in that relation, the express stipulations and 
agreements of the party for security excludes lien and limits rights of the parties
by the extent of the express contract that they have made.71 Thus, whether a
contractual provision creates a general or particular lien is a matter of 
construction. A contractual term simply creating "a general lien" without more 
will import the general uncertainty as to its enforceability against present 
owners. The term ought to include specific provision for enforceability of the 
lien against the holder of a prior interest. In Chellaram  v. Butlers Warehousing 
And Distribution Ltd.72 it was held that a general lien created by a contract 
between a corporation "consolidating" goods into containers and an air transport 
undertaking could be enforced against the owner of the goods in respect of a 
claim against the undertaking provided certain criteria were met. It had to be 
proved that the owner knew that the goods would be handled by the 
"consolidating" company on the contractual terms (including the lien) under
67 See, K irkm an v. Shaw cross (1794) 6 T. R. 14.
68 See, Cum oston v. Haigh . 2 Scott 684.
69 Oppenheim v. Russell. 1802. 3 BOS. & Pul. 42.
70 Lancelot. E.H. op cit. at P. 25.26.
71 In Re Leith. Chambers v. Davidson (1866) L.R. 1 P.C. 305, 36 L.J., P.C. 17.
72 [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 412.
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which it acted in regard to the transport undertaking.7 3
(ii)- Liens Created Bv "Custom ” :
General liens have been established by "usage" or "custom", but a general 
lien by custom can only be established by strict proof by ancient, numerous, and 
important instances.74 It must be shown as a matter of law:75
(a)- That the usage for a general lien was certain.
(b)- That it was a reasonable usage not inconsistent with the law.
(c)- That as a matter of evidence, the custom was universally acquiesced
in, that everybody in the trade knew it, or that it could have been ascertained if
he had taken pains to enquire.
It will not be sufficient to give evidence of members of the trade that it 
exists or a few isolated cases of a general lien being claimed. The question of 
whether there is a lien is a question of fact.76 When it comes to reasonableness, 
the decision in the case of L euckhart v. C ooper.77 must be examined. In this 
case, warehousemen wished to establish a general lien on all goods put by a 
merchant in his name into the hands of the warehouseman whether the goods 
were the property of the merchant or not. This was held to be unreasonable, 
and thereofer, could not be upheld. The general principal as laid down in Rex v. 
H um phrey 78 is that the usage of trade constitutes a recognised principal of law, 
and the law adapts it upon this plain understanding. The usage is presumed to 
have been founded on contracts repeated so frequently, and which are so 
notorious, that everybody must be considered as bound to take notice of it.79
When once established, the right of lien becomes part of the common law, and is
73 The court followed Cassils And Sassoon v. Holdenwood Bleaching Co. Ltd. (1914) 84 L. J.
K. B. 834, a case concerning the bleaching o f calico on the instructions o f the printers not 
expressly authorised by the owners to act as they did.
74 Lancelot. E.H. op cit. 1916. at P. 26. 27
75 See, In Re Spotten. Ex Parte Provincial Bank II. In Rep. Eq. 412.
76 Bleaden v. Hancock (1829). 4 C. & P. 152.
77 (1836) 3 Bing (N.C.) 99.
78 1 Me Clel. & Y. 191.
79 Per Rooke J., in O ppenheim  v. Russell 3 Bos. & Pul. 50.
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accepted by the courts without further evidence.80 The Courts have laways
discouraged claims for general liens, and the very srictest proof has always been 
required. The reasons for this are given by Le Blanc J., in R u sh fo r th  v. 
H ad fie ld .81 as "That general liens are a great inconvenience to the bulk of the 
generality of traders, because they give a particular advantage to certain 
undividuals who claim to themselves a special privilege against the body of the 
creditors at large, instead of coming in with them for an equal share of the
insolvent estate". Lord Ellenborough C.J., in the same case stated that growing
liens were an encroachment upon the common law, and Rooke J., in R ichardson 
v. G o ss .82 said, "I think the doctrine of general liens is not to be favoured, 
because all persons who claim under them must have been guilty of neglect in 
suffering goods upon which the law has given them a special lien to go out of
their hands wihout indemnifying themselves by setting up a claim for general 
lien". For these reasons a general lien, can only be claimed as arising from 
dealings in a particular trade or line of business, such as wharfingers, factors and 
bankers, in which the existence of a general lien has been judicially 
aknowledged, or in other trades where there is express evidence of custom.88 
It has always been held that no claim to a general lien can be maintained where 
it would contravene or interfere with the prior common law right of another, not 
claiming under the debtor.
Thus, general liens have been established "by usage" in favour of bankers, 
factors, insurance brokers (by city of London custom), stockbrokers and 
solicitors.84 There are examples of such liens being upheld for other trades, the
80 See, N av lo r v. M an g les  1 Esp. 109 and S p ears  v. H artle y . 3 Esp. 81, in reference to a 
w harfinger's general lien.
81 (1805) 6 East. 519 at P. 528.
82 3 Bos. & Pul. 126.
83 Bock v. Gorrissen. 30. L. J. Ch. 39. Leuckhart v. C ooper. 3 Bing (N.C.) 29. 6 L.J.C.P. 131.
84 Normally a solicitor must hand over papers on which he has a lien to a person other
than the debtor if they are required for an action provided suitable undertakings are given;
he does not thereby lose his lien (see, H u g h es v. H ughes [1958] P. 221). However, it is a matter
of balancing the hardship to be suffered and a court may refuse to order that the papers be
handed over. See A.v.B [1984] 1 All. E. R. 265.
135
most relevant to maritime law being packers and wharfingers.85 It appears 
that wharfingers would have to rely on local usage. There is no general lien by 
usage in favour of warehousekeepers.86 It is not necessary to consider 
undividally the various classes of persons who have been held to possess a 
general lien, and that is mainly because this work deos not deal with all these 
liens holders.
In the civil law jurisdiction, a right of detention arises everytime there an
objective - or material relationship between the debt and the thing detained or
everytime that there is a legal relationship between the creditor and the debtor 
and whenere the thing was in the hands of the creditor before the debt was 
bom. However, the legal relationship gives a right of retention of a wider assets 
of the debtor than the material relationship. In fact, when the creditor claims 
the legal relationship between the debt and the detention of the thing , the lien 
holder can detain all the assets in his hands in regard to the legal relationship 
whih gave birth to his debt, and not only that one which gave rise to that debt 
but the previous and original legal relationship is the one which gives him the
right to detain all the assets which are in his possession and not only that which
was given to him for that specific debt.
However, this solution about giving a general lien on most of the debtor's 
property to be detained for the purpose of satisfying a possessory lien, is positive 
if it is just for the possessory lien holder, but if there are other creditors, they
might suffer from that general lien, because although they might have a better
or a more privileged lien, they cannot exercise it because the possessory lien 
holder is detaining the thing and he has the right to do so. Therefore, the 
possessory lien holder should be lmited to exercise his lien just on th asset which 
mainly and directly concerned with that lien or debt and should not be 
expanded to the other assets of the debtor, so that, all the other creditors can
85 Others being calico printers and dyers.
86 Chellaram & Sons (London! Ltd. v. Butlers W arehousing & D istribution Ltd. [1978] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 412 (C.A.).
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claim and exercise their lien and be easily satisfied from the other assets of the 
debtor. The courts have always discouraged claims for general liens, and the 
very stirctest proof have always been required. The reasons for this are given 
by Le Blanc J., in R ushfo rth  v. H ad fie ld .87 as "That general lens are a great 
inconvinience to the bulk of the generality of traders, because they give a 
particular advantage to certain individuals who calim to themselves a special
privilege against the body of the creditors at large, instead of coming in with 
them for an equal share of the insolvent estate".
3-2-4- P articu la r Liens And How They Arise:
A particular lien is a right to retain a chattel until all claims made in respect
of it are met. Thus, the particular or specific lien, that is to say, the right to retain 
possession of specific chattels until claims arising solely in respect of those 
chattels have been satisfied, has always been favourably regarded by the law as 
consonant with every principle of equity and justice. Chief Justice Best said, in 
the case of Jacobs v. L a to u r .88 that, "As between debtor and creditor, the 
doctrine of lien is so equitable that it cannot be favoured too much". This type of 
lien may arise,89 either by an express contract between the parties, by contract 
implied from the circumstances of any particular case, or the general course of
dealing between the debtor and creditor,or by operation of law.
(i)- Express Contract:
The creation of a particular lien by contract raises the same issues as the 
creation of a general lien by contract. Any contractual creation of a "lien", simply 
by the use of the term, it may be argued, adapts the rules discussed under 
"usage". It would follow that for enforceability against an owner it is enough if 
surrender of possession to the lien holder by a hirer can be seen as fitting with 
the nature of the transaction between owner and hirer. Actual knowledge by
87 (1805) 6 East. 519 at P. 528.
88 5 Bing. 130.
89 See, K irchner v. V enus. 12 Moore P.C. 361. 5 Jur. (N.S.) 395.
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the owner of the terms of the arrangement under which possession is given up 
is not necessary.90 The right of lien is created in any case where the parties of 
the contract choose expressly to stipulate for it.91 Therefore, to constitute a lien 
in this way, however, there must be a clear agreement for the specific
appropriation of the particular property.92 Most of the cases where particular 
liens are expressly stipulated usually resolve themeselves under one or other of 
two main headings.
(a ) - Execution Of P articu lar Purpose:
This first headings comprises cases where goods are placed in the hands of 
a person for the execution of some particular purpose, with an express contract 
that they shall be considered as a pledge for the labour or the expense which 
such execution may occasion.
(bl- In The Second Group Of Cases. The P roperty  Is Merely
Pawned Or Pledged To Another For Bare Security:
For the sole purpose of being a security for a loan made to the owner on the 
cerdit of it. In such cases, the right of lien is governed strictly by the contract 
under which it arises. This latter group comprises cases of pawn, under which 
the pawnee acquires a special property in the thing pledged to detain for his 
security until it is redeemed, the general property remaining in the pawnor. In 
this way a pawn differs from an ordinary case of lien, where the creditor has 
only a right of detention, and not a special property, and it also differs from a 
mortgage, as, in the case of the latter, the property is actually conveyed or
transferred to the mortgagee. It should be stressed that a pawn of goods,
without authority of the owner, will note create a lien,93 and a lien of a pawnee
90 Jackson. D.C. Enforcement Of Maritime Claims, op cit. at P. 268.
91 Chaom an v. A llen . Cro. Car. 271.
92 Jones v. S tarkev . 16 Jur. 510.
93 M eans v. H enderson . 1 East 337.
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differs from a lien arising by custom, in that it is transferable,94 but it appears
that a pawnee cannot create a greater interest in it than he himself had. In the
French and Algerian civil code, there is case similar to the pawn, where the 
debtor gives the possession of his property to the creditor as a garantee for the 
payment of the debt, this case is known as "Le Nantissement". The French civil 
code provides in art.2071, that, the pawn is a contract by which a debtor gives 
something to his creditor for security of the debt.95 The Algerian civil code 
provides in art.948, that, the pawn is a contract by which a person pbliges 
himself for the garantee of his debt or of someone else debt, to give to the 
creditor or to a third party chosen by the parties, a thing for the benefit of the 
creditor which gives him a chattels real with which he can retain the thing until 
the debt is paid and he can get paid from the price of the thing in whosoever
hands it may pass, and by preferencing him over the other simple contract
creditor and the other inferior creditors in the rank96 So, the Algerian civil code 
seems to have given a wider definition and that by including a lot of provisions, 
such as, that the debtor might create a pawn to garantee the payment of a third
party and that the cerditor is preferred over the other creditors and that he has
the right to trace the incumbranced estate into whatever hands it may pass, and
finally, that he can get paid from the price or the proceed of sale.97 Moreover, 
one can notice that the French and Algerian civil code provide that the thing
94 D em ainbrav v. M etca lf. 2 Vem. 691, 698. (S.C.).
95 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french provides that:
"Le nantissement est un contrat par lequdl un d£biteur remdt une chose i  son crdancier 
pur surete de la dette".
96 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french provides that:
"Le nantissement est un contrat par lequdl une pesonne s'oblige, pour la garantee de sa 
d 'te  ou de cdlle d'untiers, a remettre au crdancier, ou i  une ti6rce p6rsonne choisi par les 
parties, un objet sur lequel dlle constitue au profit du crdancier, un droit rdel en vdrtu duquel 
celui-ci peut retenir l'objet jusqu'au paiement de sa crdance et peut se faire payer sur le prix de 
cdt objet, en quelque main qu'il passe, par prdfdrence aux crdanciers chirographaires e t aux 
creanciers infdrieurs en rang".
97 The French civil code provides some of these provisions when it gets to the pawn in 
the case of movable and immovable property, in art.2071 and 2073.
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pawned passes to the possession of the creditor until the debt is paid as a 
garantee of payment of that debt.
(ii)- Im plied C ontract:
Secondly, a lien may be created by implied contract. Such a contract may 
implied from the conduct of the parties in their dealings with one another, or 
from custom or usage. As a particular lien is favoured by the law, it is much
more readily implied than a general lien. In Sim ond v. H ibbert.98 a particular
lien was implied from the general course of dealing, against produce of the West 
Indian Estates. It should be noted that a lien will not be implied solely from the
existence of an equitable right, and that a mere distinction of "B" to whom goods
are consigned to pay "C" a sum of money out of the proceeds, will not give "C" a 
lien on those proceeds.99
(iii)- Operation Of Law:
The operation of law is the remaining way in which a particular lien may 
be created. Many of the cases under this heading might be referred to implied 
contract, as, very often, the lien has arisen by custom, and the right exists 
because parties who do not expressly agree to the contrary must be held to 
contract with reference to such custom, it would be best, however, as a matter of 
convenience, to group them together under this description:
(a)- When C red ito r Is Legally Liable To Perform  Services To
Owners Of Goods:
The first category under which this right arises is where the creditor is
compellable by law to receive goods or to perform certain services to the owners
of such goods. The law imposes the duty, and, as a sort of compensation, it gives 
a particular lien or power of retaining the goods for the indemnity of the party
98 Russ. & M. 719.
99 Ex Parte Hevwood. 2 Rose 355.
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receiv ing .100 This is probably the earliest form of lien, which was known as the 
right of retainer in early English law. The principal cases coming under this 
heading are the liens of carriers and inn-keepers.101 It has little relevance in the 
maritime area even as regards carriers. A common carrier is a person who
holds himself out as a carrier of goods for hire and does not reserve the rigfht to
deal only with those who he chooses - "he will carry for hire so long as he has 
room the goods of all persons indifferently who send goods to be carried".102
This rarely applies to sea carriers. Apart from Acts of God or the Queen's
Enemies, inherent vice or fault of the consignor, a common carrier is responsible 
for the loss of or damage to the goods. Because of his inability to refuse to act as 
a carrier he is given a lien on the goods carried for the payment of the hire. It 
has been held that in general a private carrier has no such lien,103 but,
conversely, it well established that a shipowner has a possessory lien for freight 
and contributions to general average. The carries' lien only extends to the 
charges for carriage apart from express or implied contract.104 Thus, the lien 
arising under this heading is peculiar, in that it attaches to property although not 
belonging to the debtor, and it is in fact immaterial to who the property 
belongs.105 The lien will even arise in respect of the goods delivered to a carrier 
against the owner's will, as, for example, by a thief.106 The person receiving 
must however, receive in good faith, and if he knows that the person from 
whom he receives is a wrongdoer, the lien will not attach.107 The civil law
jurisdiction prescribe a lien on the cargo for the garantee of payment of freight
100 See, Y orke v. Grenaugh. Ld. Ray 866 & N avlor v. M angles (Esp. R.109).
101 The innkeeper's lien does not extend to motor vehicles or live animals (the Hotel 
Proprietors Act 1956, S.2).
102 Nugent v. Smith (1875) 1 C.P.D. 19, at P. 27; decision reversed (1876) 1 C.P.D. 423.
103 Electrice Supply Stores v. Gavwood [1909] 100 L.T. 855.
104 See, Robins & Co. v. Gray (1895) 22 Q.B. 501. C.A. orke v. Grenaugh. Ld. Ray 866, and 
Exeter Carriers' Case cited by Holt C.J., in the latter case.
105 Ibid.
106 M ulliner v. Florence (1878) 32 Q.B.D. 484 C.A.
107 See, Johnson v. H ill (18221 3 Stark 172.
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and that is provided in art. 1/2 of the Law of June the 18 th of 1966 of the 
French code of commerce, and in art.645 of the Algarian maritime code. Art. 
1/2 of the French code of commerce, provides that,"the shipowner has a 
privilege or lien on the cargo for the payment of his freight".108 The Algerian
maritime code provides almost the same provision as the one in the French code
of com m erce109 Here, it is presumed that the shipowner has a kind of 
possessory lien over the cargo which he can only detain until the freight is paid 
and this lien is a particular lien because of a material relationship between the 
cargo and the debt and because the shipowner rendered services to that specific 
cargo. In this case the shipowner has a kind of particular lien over the cargo as a 
garantee for the payment of the freight.
(h)- W here C reditor Claims Lien On The Property In Respect Of 
Which He Had Spent Money. Skill Or Labour;
This is an extension of the first rule, under which persons compellable by 
law to receive goods obtain a particular lien on them, like where goods are 
delivered to a tradesman for the execution of purposes of his trade upon them 
he is entitled to a particular lien.110 However, there is here no liability on the 
creditor to receive the goods, yet it is legally recognised that it would be unfair 
on him, after he has expended his money, or skill, on the property, to allow the
debtor to take the goods away without recompensing him. The rule is, therefore,
the expenditure of money, skill or labour, and where such expenditure exists, a 
lien follows, and without it the creditor is left to his usual remedy by action. 
However, the owner must authorise the expenditure to give rise to a lien, and 
therefore, the work in respect of which the charges arose giving rise to the lien 
must have been done by the order or at the request of the owner or of some
108 "My Own Translation". The actual art. 1/2 provides in french that:
"Le frdteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son frdt".
109 The actual art.645 of the Algerian Maritime Code provides in french that:
"Le frdteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son frdt e t autres 
charges prdvues au contrat d 'affretem ent".
110 Ex Parte Deeze. 1 Ath. 228. Ex Parte Ockenden. 1 Atk. 236.
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person authorised by him. A voluntary unauthorised payment by the person in 
possession is unsufficient. By looking at art.645 of the Algarian maritime code, 
one can notice that the Algerian legislator has added another provision which 
provides that the shipowner will have a lien for other charges or expenditures 
provided in the contract of affreightment. Therefore, one can say that the
shipowner has a kind of particular lien on the cargo for payment of the costs or 
expenditures concerning that particular cargo.
(c l- Particular Lien In Respect Of Money Due For Sale Of Goodsi
Statute can create a particular lien, in favour of an unpaid vendor of goods 
in respect of purchase money. This is now governed by the Sale of Goods Act, 
1979, but many years before this statute, it was decided in the case of M ills v. 
G o rto n .111 that where there is a sale of goods, and nothing is specified as to
delivery or payment, although everything may have been done to transfer
property from the seller to the buyer, the seller retains the original contract a 
right to retain the goods until the payment of the price. Under the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979, an unpaid vendor of goods has a right of retention of those goods.112 
Thus, section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides that:
" (1) Subject to this and any other Act, notwithstanding that the 
property in the goods may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid 
seller of goods, as such, has by implication of law_
(a) a lien on the goods or right to retain them for the price while he 
is in possession of them; . . . "
( d ) - Salvage:
While ther is no lien for salvage in general at common law, common law 
will recognise a possessory lien of a salvor in Admiralty.113 There is little 
authority presumably because of the maritime lien conferred on salvors. Once
111 3 C. and M. 504. 571.
112 See, ss. 39 and 48. The lien originated at common law. See, e.g., Sw an v. B a rb e r (1879)
5 Ex. D. 130.
113 H artfo rt v. Jones (1698) 1 Ld. Ray. 393 recognised in e.g., T he Fulham [1899] P. 251 
(C.A.); Hingston v. W endt (18761 1. Q.B.D. 367, at P. 373.
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Admiralty and common law jurisdictions ceased to be in opposition to each other 
the inherently more powerful lien took over. It is uncertain to what extent, if at 
all, the Lloyd's Open Form has, by providing for security inconsistent with a 
possessory lien, superseded that lien in respect of salvage. Nevertheless, salvage 
is another case of lien by operation of law, in respect of which a lien was
extended by common law to persons who, at the risk of personal safety, effected 
recovery of property on ships at sea.114 The essentials for the lien appears to be 
as follows:
(i)- That there should be risk of personal safety.
(ii)- That, as a result of the services, the property should be recovered.
(iii)- That property should be saved. There is no salvage of saving of life
only.
(iv)- That the property should be saved at sea.
The subject of salvage is now dealt with under the provisions of the
Merchant Shippin Acts, and it gives rise to a maritime lien which does not
include or require possession. Thus, the maritime lien for salvage in the United
Kingdom is to be found in the general maritime law. The maritime lien is
reinforced by Sect.20 (2) (J) of the Supreme Court Act 1981,115 which gives 
jurisdiction to the Admiralty Court over "any claim in the nature of salvage . . . ".
Section 21 (3) confirms the right against ship, aircraft or property:116
"In any case in which there is a maritime lien or other charge on any 
ship, aircraft or other property for the amount claimed, an action in 
rem may be brought in the High Court against that ship, aircraft or 
property."
It is noteworthy that the Salvor has a possessory lien as well, under certain
114 H artfort v. Jones (1698) 1 Ld. Ray. 393, and Baring And Another v. D av . 8 East 57.
115 1981 U.K. c. 54. See also, The Eshersheim [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, at P. 8, Where the 
House of Lords held that Sect. 1 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, "any claim arising out 
o f any agreement relating . . .  to the use or the hire of a ship" covered a salvage agreement.
116 Ibid.
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circumstances, which dates from the earliest times but which is rarely 
in v o k e d .117 A lien is created for the benefit of the salvor and that is may be 
because of the theory of agency of necessity.118 Therefore, the salvor whose 
services had been completed in respect of the goods in question is under a duty 
to their owner to care for them, and has a correlative right to charge the owner 
of the goods with the expenses reasonably incurred.119 Therefore, the salvor 
acted as an agent for the woner to save the ship and the cargo and that was 
necessary to save the property of the owner. This situation is what is called the 
case of agency of necessity. This is a relationship created by operation of law 
where there is in existence an emergency making it necessary for the agent to 
act in a particular way in relation to the principal's property, and where it is 
impossible to receive instructions from the principal.120 The holder may then, as 
agent of necessity, sell, raise money on the security of the property or incur 
expenses of preservation on behalf of the owner.121 The possesory lien is used 
frequently because the salvor is protected by a maritime lien which permits the 
ship to proceed on its way, enabling the ship to earn the freight and hire 
necessary to paying the salvor's claim. Possessory liens, on other hand, are often 
counter productive, hence the need for the maritime lien. In France, the law of 
january the 3 rd of 1967,122 at art.31-4 gives salvage the status of maritime lien 
ranking after, (i)- the costs of justice, (ii)- custodia legis, and (iii)- the wages of the 
master and crew. The Algerian maritime code provides in art.73 almost the 
same provisions as his French conterpart in art.31-4. The Algarian maritime
117 Hartford v. Jones. (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 393, 91 E.R. 1161.
118 Bowstead on Agency. 15 th Ed, By Reynolds. F.M.B. London Sweet & Maxwell, 1985. At
P. 88.
119 China Pacific S.A. v. Food Corp Of India. (The W insonl [1982] A.C. 939, 960, per Lord 
Diplock.
120 Foster. Stephen. Business Law Terms. W & R Chambers Ltd, Edinburgh, 1988. at P. 3.
121 Hudson. A.H. op cit. at P .l l .
122 Law No-67-5 of Janary 3, 1967, Portant Statut Des Navires Et Autres B&timents De Mer 
( J.O. 4 Janvier 1967).
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code gives salvage the status of maritime lien ranking after, (i)- the sums due to 
the master and seamen, (ii)- harbour and shipping dues, (iii)- remunerations to 
accidents which give rise to injuries or death, (iv)- remuneration for damage 
done to another property for ex delicto  debts and quasi ex delictu  debts and,
(v)- remuneration for help and salvage... .
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PART TWO
The Guarantee of Payment of the Freight
In all kinds of transports,the carrier undertakes to carry goods and the 
cargo owner agrees to pay a remuneration to the carrier and in the field of 
carriage of goods by sea,the shipowner carries goods of the charterer or shipper 
depending on the case if the carriage is undertaken under a charterparty or a 
bill of lading, and in this case the shipowner receives what is called freight or 
hire.
But how can the shipowner guarantee that the remuneration will be paid? 
The goods or the cargo constitute the guarantee which the shipowner has for the 
payment of the freight .
Thus, saying that there is a carriage of goods by sea without remuneration 
for the services rendered is denying an evidence, because the freight is the 
essential element in the contracts of carriage of goods by sea and it is the 
principal obligation of the charterers and shippers.
Therefore, the guarantee of its payment is very important for the maritime 
trade, because the slowness of the carriage, the perils of the sea and the
international context in which this trade in performed, some means of credit has 
developped in a way proper to this law, and by taking into consideration the
particular ways of garanty of the debts in relation to the use of ships. In this 
manner the ship and the cargo became a guarantee for the execution of the
reciprocal obligations of the parties of the contract, and this is confirmed by the
old maritime saying : " De par la coutume le bastel est oblige a la marchandise et 
la marchandise au bastel" , i.e., "By the custum the ship is bound towards the 
cargo and the cargo towards the ship."
The purpose of the present study is to define the nature of the guarantee
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for the debt of freight according to the proper traditions of the sea, and the 
exclusion of the mechanisms of the general commercial law.
Until now, the different attempts to unify the rules which governs the 
rights of the creditors of the freight on the cargo, when unifying most of the rules 
which concern the international conventions for the maritime liens and 
mortgages, have all failed. This failure is due to the existence of two 
fondamental and opposed systems, namely the system of the "privilege" which 
is found in the French law , and the system of lien which is found in the English 
and American system .
It is therefore, very important to study the ways of guarantees of the 
carriers according to these two different legislations, so as to have a general view 
of the institution.
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CHAPTER ONE
Freight, Hire and the Distinction between the Two
G E N E R A L : This chapter will examine those aspects of freight or voyage-
freight and hire or time-freight under both the common law and the civil law, 
namely the French and Algerian law. This examination will include, the 
different definitions which have been given to freight and hire, when do they 
become payable? and the distinction between the two .
1-1- The f re ig h t”and "Hire" or Vovage-Freight and Time Freight
1- Meaning of Freight and Hire: Freight is the money which is paid to
the shipowner for the carriage of goods by sea, or in the ordinary merchantile
sense, it is the payment made to the carrier for the carriage of goods ready to be 
delivered in a merchantable condition. Some,1 have defined freight as the 
consideration payable to the carrier for the safe carriage and delivery of goods in 
a merchantable condition, or is the remuneration payable to the carrier for the 
carriage of goods by sea.2 Sometimes a shipowner or charterer may use the 
ship as a general ship to carry goods of a number of persons under different bills 
of lading. Then, it is necessary to distinguish between bills of lading freight and 
charter-party freight. The former is normally due on safe carriage and delivery 
of the goods. However, it is also very common to find it made due and payable 
"in exchange for bills of lading", "on shipment of the goods" or depending on the 
happening of certain events, such as "sailing" or "final sailing of the vessel".
In the French law, the freight is considered as the price for the hire of the
1 Stevens. Edward F . Shipping Practice . 10 th edition . p 51 .
2 Payne & Ivamy . Carriage of Goods bv Sea . 12 th Edition . p243.
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ship or the price for the carriage of goods by sea.3 However, according to the 
Decree of 1966, there is no specific definition of the freight, but it is an obligation 
to mention the freight in the contract of affreightment.4 The Algerian 
Maritime Code,5 has not given a specific definition to the term "freight", but like 
the French Code of Commerce, the Algerian legislator requires that the 
remuneration or "freight" must be mentioned in the contract of affreightment, 
and that is provided by the article 643/c.
Moreover, it is not every sum which is paid to the shipowner is called 
freight, because other sums which perhaps are paid to the shipowner usually in 
advance for fulfilment of his contract, such as loans, but they are not 
remuneration for the carriage of goods; they are not freight, though often called 
freight. For this reason the lien which is given for the freight on the goods does 
not apply to those sums. There was a custom in the olden days, that the shipper 
of the cargo should pay a special sum to the master of the ship for the care and 
attention of his goods.6 This sum was called "primage" and it was not 
contained in the meaning of freight. At the present time, usally by agreement 
between master and shipowner, "primage"belongs to the latter. It is a 
percentage on the freight which is paid to the shipowner by the shipper and it is 
covered by the use in the term freight .
After giving a good deal to the meaning of freight, it is worth-while to give 
an explanation about the term"Hire", which is sometimes used to mean the 
freight but only when the contract of carriage is a species of contract of hire. 
Thus, when the contractual obligation of the shipowner is only to give to the 
charterer the mere use of the vessel, without keeping the control of the ship, the
3 Dalloz . Encyclopedic . Juridique . Rdpdrtoire de Droit Commercial et des Sociltes. 
Tomel. p 59 .
4 Dalloz . Encyclopedie Juridique . 26m Edition . Repertoire de Droit Commercial . Tome 1 
. p2. ss 18.
5 Ordonnance N 76-80du 23 Octobre 1976 . portant Code Maritime Alg6rien .
6 Mavromatis (D). Freight in English Law with Comparison of the Greek Law. Thesis . 
Diploma in Law .1963 . p 23.
150
master and the crew are in the charterer's service, as it happens in
charterparties by demise. The money which is paid, in this case, to the 
shipowner for the mere use of the ship is called "hire". In this case, "Time- 
Freight"or"Hire"is the money paid to the shipowner in those cases where the
vessel is chartered for a period of time, rather than on a voyage basis. Here the
freight is in the nature of a payment for the use and hire of the ship, and the
question when it is payable depends entirely upon the intention of the parties
according to the contract. A contract of hire of the ship, is a contract by which an 
entire ship or some principal part of her is let to a merchant, called "the 
charterer", until the expiration of a specified period. Such a contract may operate 
as a demise of the ship herself, to which the services of the master and crew 
may or may not be added, and this is called "a demise charterparty", or it may 
confer on the charterer nothing more than the right to his goods conveyed by a
particular ship,and,as subsidiary to it,to have the use of the ship and the services
of the master and crew, and this is called "a time chaterparty".
Usually, hire is paid at regular intervals during the currency of the 
charterparty, and it is normal to find stipulations providing for the payment to 
be made monthly or semi-monthly in advance. There is also provision in most 
of the charters giving the shipowner the right to withdraw the vessel in event of 
non payment or late payment of hire. This right must be exercised in a way 
leading to a final withdrawal of the vessel, and it cannot be exercised 
temporarily. Today if the charterer is late in paying the hire, then unless the 
shipowner is demeed to have waived the breach, the shipowner may exercise 
the right to withdraw upon notifying the charterer. After having seen the
meaning of the term "hire", it appears that it is a little difficult now to say how 
can the payment to the shipowner be called under time charterparties?.
In theory, this payment is called hire, but in fact the terms are often 
confused and the term "freight" is used as well. Indeed it is thought 7 that it is
7 Ibid. at P. 2.
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better to call this payment "freight" and not "hire", because in the case of time 
charterparty the shipowner undertakes the whole task of carrying the goods in 
good condition and safe to the port of destination and also keeps the whole 
control of his ship. He gives to the time charterer not only the mere use of his 
ship, but also his services which are necessary for the carriage of the goods. On 
the other hand, the Algerian Maritime Code, in its definition of the contract of 
affreightment in article 640, prescribes that the contract of affreightment is a 
contract by which the shipowner puts a ship at the disposal of the charterer and 
that the charterer pays a remuneration; the remuneration in this case means 
both freight and hire. However, the French Code of Commerce in the Decree 
n.66-1078 of December 31 st 1966 did not give a specific definition of the 
contract of affreightment. But in its definitions about the voyage charterparty 
(art 5) and time charterparty(art 18) the remuneration is called freight, and so 
did the Algerian legislator in defining the voyage charterparty (art 650) and 
time charterparty (art 695), and this means that neither the French nor the
Algerian legislator did make a difference between the term "freight" and the 
term "hire". However, both the Algerian Maritime Code (article 724) which 
defines the demise charterparty and the French Code of Commerce (articles 
26,30) about the charterparty by demise, they both used the term "hire" to 
identify the remuneration of the shipowner.
Thus, the remuneration payable for the carriage of goods in a ship is
usually called freight. Also, the same word is often used to denote a payment
made for the use of a ship.8 It is applied in both senses, though objection has
frequently been made to its use in the latter sense.9 When a ship has been 
chartered to go on a specific voyage for a lump sum, or to be at the disposal of
8 Carver's . Carriage bv Sea. Vol 2. 13 th edition,by Raoul Colnvaux.para 1661.
9 See per Lord Denning M.R. in F edera l C om m erce v. M o le n a . (The N an fril. [1978] 
Q .B .927, 973, who there sought to ju stify  rig id  distinction: "The change o f language 
corresponds, I believe, to a recognition that the two things are different."
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the charterer at so much a month, it is perhaps more accurate to call the 
payment the hire of the ship; but sometimes the "freight" is used, and the hire of 
a chartered ship is very commonly paid by freight in proportion to the goods 
carried under the charterparty, it would be difficult to say distincly whenthe one 
word should be used, and when the other.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the word "freight" does not 
always relate to the same sort of payment. For propositions of law relating to 
freight in one sense does not always apply to it in the other. The remuneration 
for carriying the goods may be made payable either in advance, or upon 
delivery of the goods; and another objection used frequently to be raised,that the 
word "freight" ought only to be applied to the remunertion when it is payable 
for the safe carriage of the goods,upon their delivery.10 Thus, because of the 
confusion between the terms, a distinction must be drawn between the two 
concepts of the remeneration for the carriage of goods by sea, and that what will 
be dealt with in the next sub-section.
2- Origin of the Term Freight :
The word freight has its origin from the Dutch and it was called "vrecht" 
and that means originally the burden or cargo of a ship. Hence it came to mean 
the rate paid for the carriage of goods by sea, it is now used in this sense. 
Freight, therefore, is the payment to a shipowner for the carriage of cargo.11 It 
is used in the United States of America for the carriage of goods by land and
railway freight is a common expression while a freight train is the equivalent of
the goods train of Great Britain.12
3- The Different Types of Freight:
Charterparty freight is fixed normally at an agreed rate for so much per 
ton, and there used to be no stipulation for weight or measurement of the cargo.
10 K irchner v. Venus (1859). 12 Moo.P.C.361; Blakev v. Dixon (1800) 2 B. & P. 321.
11 Hudson. A.H. Dictionary Of Commercial Law, at P. 141.
12 Hornby. A.S. O xford A dvanced L earner's D ictionary of Current E nglish . O xford 
University Press. 1974. at P. 344.
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When there is no special agreement,or where the special agreement has been 
abrogated by a deviation, or where the bill of lading is silent as to the moment 
for payment of the freight, the common law implies that it is to be paid o n
delivery of the goods at the port of discharge. Then no freight is due if the goods
are not carried to the port of discharge, but once they have arrived, even though 
they may be in a damaged condition, full freight is payable, irrespective of the
separate action for damages that the cargo-owner may have against the carrier
in those cases where the loss was due to the negligence of the carrier or a non
excepted peril.
However, sometimes freight is to be payable at some time other than the 
time of delivery as it may be provided in the bill of lading or charterparty. Then 
if the parties agree that freight is to be paid in advance, once the set time for
payment has passed, the loss of the goods or the fact that it has become
impossible to deliver them does not alter the position in relation to it. The right 
to such freight vests at the moment when it becomes due. If it has not been 
paid, the shipowner may claim it in action;if it has been paid, then the cargo- 
owner may recover only damages from the shipowner in those cases where the 
loss was due to the fault of the shipowner, and it was not covered by an
excepted peril.
The freight can also be stipulated to be paid in a lump sum. This means
that the charterer of a ship binds himself to pay a fixed sum for the whole
voyage or series of voyages covered by the chaterparty, irrespective of the
amount of goods carried. Generally, this type of freight is payable in full,even 
though the whole of the cargo is not delivered,provided that some of it is.
Here the cargo-owner's right to claim damages will depend on the
charterparty and the the nature of the clauses.
Pro-rata freight, is the freight which may become payable proportionately 
to the part of the voyage accomplished or of the cargo delivered. In order to
claim it, there must be an express agreement or one that can be clearly implied 
from the circumstances of each case.
When the voyage has been completed and the cargo cannot be discharged 
owing to the failure of the consignee to take delivery or to some other 
circumstance beyond the control of the master, the master must deal with cargo 
in the manner most beneficial for the cargo-owners. This may involve 
warehousing of the goods, transhipping to another vessel or even to take them 
back to the port of lading. The shipowner may in those cases charge the cargo- 
owners with back freight to cover the expenses thus incurred in their interest.
Dead freight is the name given to the damages payable in certain 
circumstances when the charterer is in breach of his contract by failing to load a 
full and complete cargo.
4- Bv Whom Freight is Payable: The shipowner can make his claim
for payment of his freight from the following persons:13
1- the shipper of the goods;
2- the consignee or indorsee of the bill of lading;
3- a seller who stops the goods in transit ;
4- the charterer;
1- The shipper of the goods: The liability to pay freight reserved in a
bill of lading is primarily on the shipper of the goods, unless he was merely 
acting as agent and made this clear at the time. By shipping goods, the shipper 
impliedly agrees to pay the freight on them. He can be relieved of this 
obligation:
(1)- by the shipowner giving credit to the consignee. Thus, if the master 
for his own convenience takes a bill of exchange from a consignee who was 
willing to pay cash,the shipper is discharged;14 or
(2)- by delivery of a bill of lading indorsed with a clause freeing the
13 Payne and Ivamy's. Carriage of Goods bv Sea . 12 th edition, p 253.
14 Strong v H art (1827) 6 B&C 160.
155
shipper from liability,the shipowner or his agent knowing,at the time,of the 
existence of such a clause.15 The Bills of Lading Act 1855, s2, expressly 
preserves the shipowner's right to claim freight from the original shipper, so that 
the shipowner can elect to sue the holder of the bill of lading or the shipper.
(2) The consignee or indorsee of the bill of lading: The bill of
lading usually contains a clause making delivery conditional on the consignee or 
his assigns paying freight. The master of the ship is entitled to refuse delivery 
unless the freight is paid. The mere delivery of the goods does not give rise to a 
legal liability to pay the freight on them,16 but is an evidence of an implied 
promise to do so..17 A custom of the trade,and even former transactions of the
same parties are admissible as evidence of an implied contract. Moreover, the
Bills of Lading Act 1855, si, imposes on all consignees or indorsees of a bill of 
lading,to whom property in goods passes,the liability to pay freight.
(3) A seller who stops goods in transit: An unpaid seller has the
right of stoppage in transit,this right is provided in sect 44 of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 which provides that :
"Subject to this act, when the buyer of goods becomes insolvent, the 
unpaid seller who has parted with the possession of the goods has 
the right of stopping them in transit, that is to say,he may resume 
possession of the goods as long as they are in course of transit,and 
may retain them untill payment or tender of the price."
However, this seller becomes liable to pay freight on the cargo being 
delivered to the buyer; if the seller refuses, he is liable in damages to the
shipowner for the amount of the freight..18 But he does not, by stopping in
15 See, W atkins v Rvmill (18831 10 QBD 178.
16 Sanders v Vanzeller (1843) 4 QB 260.
17 C ock v T alo r (1811) 13 East 399; see alsoper Parke B, in M oller v Y oung (1855) 25 U Q B  
94 at 96 .
18 Booth SS Co Ltd v Cargo Fleet Iron Co Ltd. [1961] 2 KB 570 .
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transit, become a party to the contract of affreightment.
(4) The charterer: In the case of a charterparty, the charterer is the first 
person to be liable for payment of the freight to the shipowner,19 and the fact 
that he has sublet the servises of the ship to persons who have put goods on 
board under bills of lading reserving the freight does not release him. Even if 
the shipowner delivers goods to such shippers without insisting on payment of 
freight, he can still recover it from the charterer-20 Where the charterer is 
merely an agent or broker to fill the ship with the goods of other persons, his 
liability is made to cease when the goods are shipped. This is effected by means 
of a "cesser clause" inserted in the charterparty and giving the shipowner a lien 
on the cargo for freight and other claims under the charterparty. It seems, 
however, that a "cesser clause" in the charterparty will not free a charterer, who 
is also the shipper and is sued as such, from liability to pay freight arising on the 
bill of lading.
5- To Whom Freight is Payable: To whom freight is payable depends
upon the terms of the contract of affreightment, subject to any subsequent 
dealings, e g, the assignement of the freight or the mortgage of the ship. Thus, 
freight may be payable to :
(1)-The Shipowner: In the case of an ordinary charterparty the shipowner 
is the first person to be entitled to the freight. Thus, under an ordinary 
charterparty or bill of lading the shipowner is prima facie entitled to the freight.
(2)-The Master: The master being the agent of the shipowner, in charge of 
the management of the ship is entitled to the freight for the benefit of the
19 For a case w here the shipow ners were unable to recover fre igh t from the
charterers and alleged that the brokers had negligently m is-stated the financial standing and 
re liab ility  o f the charterers and shipow ners claim ed dam ages from  the brokers, See
M arkappa Inc v N W Spratt & Son Ltd. The Arta [1983]2 Lloyd's Rep 405, QBD (Commercial 
C ourt).
20 Shepard v De Bernales (1811) 13 East 565.
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shipowner. Thus, even when the contract was not made between the master
and the consignee, "it has been held that [the master] may maintain an action 
against the consignee upon an implied promise to pay the freight, in
consideration of his letting the goods out of his hands before payment."21 The 
master cannot, however, sue for freight where he signed the bill of lading 
merely as the shipowner's agent.-22
(3)-The Broker: A chartering broker may be described as an intermediary 
between the shipowner and the merchant or the cargo-owner. He acts between 
a shipowner who has tonnage idle, and a cargo-owner who has a cargo which he 
wishes to be transported. He engages space for the cargo and arranges the 
whole of the business details between the principals, receiving for his services 
the commission agreed under such arrangement. Because he deals for the 
benefit of the shipowner and the charterer or shipper, against a commission paid 
to him, he is entitled to claim freight from the shipper or the charterer because 
his commission is paid from the freight which the shipowner earns.-23
(4 )-A Third Person: It may be that under the contract,freight was made
payable to a third person. Payment of freight to such a person will protect the
shipper from an action for freight.
(5 )-The Charterer: Where the charterparty is a demise charterparty, the 
charterer can sue for freight, for the shipowner was not a party to the contract 
evidenced by the bill of lading,because in a demise charterparty the control of 
the ship passes to the charterer. However, it is otherwise if the charterparty is 
only one of hiring,and the bills of lading covering goods shipped by third persons 
are signed by the master.24
21 Per Lord Mansfield C J, in B rouncker v S cott (1811) 4 Taunt 1 at 4 .
22 R epetto  v Millar's Karri and Jarrah Forests Ltd. [1901] 2 KB 306.
23 See, Dunlop v. M urietta (1886) 3 T.L.R. 166 (C.A.).
24 A Coker & Co Ltd v. Limerick SS Co Ltd. (1918) 34 TLR 296.
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(6 ) -An Assignee of the freight (or the ship): The right to freight is 
incidental to the ownership of the ship which earns it, and therefore, a transfer 
of a share in a ship passes the corresponding share in the freight, under an 
existing charterparty, without the mention of the word "freight". Further, in 
equity an assignement of freight to be earned is valid.25
(7 )-A Mortgagee of the ship: A mortgagee does not acquire a right to the 
freight unless he has taken actual or constructive possession of the ship. He then 
becomes entitled to all the freight which the ship is in the course of earning, and 
which she proceeds to earn after such possession comes into being..26 T h is 
position is to be contrasted with that resulting from the sale of the ship or a 
share in her; for "the purchaser of a ship takes a right to all accruing freight, to all 
profits of the ship,from the time of the assignement to him and the transfer of 
the ship to him".27
1-2- Distiction Between Freight and Hire :
It has been mentioned before, that freight is generally understood to mean 
the money paid to the shipowner for the carriage of goods by sea,and it also can 
be seen that the same word is used to denote a payment for the use of the ship, 
what then is the difference between "freight" and "hire"? and therefore, it is
worth-while to find a distinction between the two.
%
Until recent times, no rigid distinction was established between "freight" 
and "hire". The word freight was normally used at the time of discussing an 
issue arising out of a time charter.28 However today, and in view of the
25 Lindsav v Gibbs (1856) 22 Beav 522 .
26 See, however, Shillito v B iggart [1903] 1 KB 683 .
27 Per Mellish L J , Burrows (1877) 46 L J Q B 452 at 457 .
28 See, In m an  v. B is c h o f f . (1882) 7 App Cas. 670 where it was held that "freight" may 
cover monthly hire under a time charter .
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growing importance of time charters, it seems that the principles applying to one 
cannot be automatically applied to the other.
Donaldson, J., stated some of the basic differences between freight and hire 
in reserved judgment in "The Berge Tastafl.when he said:2 9
"... typical voyage and time charterparties have certain basic 
features. Thus under a voyage charterparty, the shipowner 
undertakes to carry cargo from A to B in consideration of the receipt
of freight. If the vessel is not ready at A, his is the obligation and the
expense of getting her there. Similarly, his is the obligation of getting
her from A to B. Ships of course, are expensive to run and delay 
mens substantial loss for someone. Delay in getting to the loading 
port and on passage is for account of the shipowner or charterer in 
accordance with the lay-time provisions. Once the voyage has been 
completed and the cargo discharged, the vessel is once again at the 
disposal of the s/o. Under a time charterparty, not being a charter 
by way of demise, the s/o undertakes to make the vessel available 
to the chaterer for the purposes of undertaking ballast and loaded 
voyages as required by the charterer within a specified area over a 
stated period. The shipowner's remuneration known as "time 
chartered freight" or "hire" at a fixed rate for unit of time regardless 
of how the vessel is used by the charterer. The shipowner meets 
the cost of maintaining the vessel and paying the crew's wages, but 
the cost of fuel and port charges fall on the charterer."
However, the above description of what each concept is understood to 
mean, seems to be insufficient because because there is no mention of those 
time charters of which the duration is measured by the time occupied by a 
particular voyage or voyages.
Perhaps the law relating to freight and hire can be better understood if one 
takes into consideration that sometimes a charterparty may have been 
construed as to have some features usually reffered to voyage charters. This 
happens in the so called "round vovage charters", where the method of 
employment of the ship is comparable with both voyage chartering (in that a 
ship represents a single voyage or a round trip) and with time chartering, since
29 (1975) 1 Ll.Rep.422.
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the contracting parties assume the usual obligations and responsabilities 
associated with period of employment. In these cases the rate of hire applicable 
is generally related to current "spot market" voyage freight-rates levels and not 
the somewhat lower freight rate levels that are normally associated with period 
time-charters,which lower rates result from the security obtained by owners 
and their reduction of risk expectancy provided by such longer period of 
employment. An example of this kind of charter can be found in"T h e
Eugenia".30 where the charter was for a "trip" from Genoa out of "India via Black 
Sea" in a time charter form, clause 6 providing (inter alia), "charterers to pay 
owner's hire...per calendar month from the time of vessel's delivery untill her 
redelivery." During the currency of it, the vessel was trapped by military
operations on the Suez Canal. The charterers argued that although the 
charterparty was on a Baltime form, the "paramount feature" of it was voyage, 
and they contended that the vessel entered the channel by reason of the 
contract and not by reason of any orders from the charterers.
Lord Denning, M.R., in the Court of Appeal, said:
"I cannot accept this argument. This is a time charterparty, the 
essence of which is that the shipowner place the ship at the disposal 
of the charterers for a time-the charterers paying hire for that time.
In some time-charters the time is fixed before-hand,such as six 
months or twelve months. In other time-charters the time is 
uncertain,and is to be measured by the time occupied by a 
particular voyage. But in either case the charterparty is a time 
charterparty and the ship is under the charterer's oeders 
throughout."
However, there is a charterparty which may look like a voyage 
charterparty without being a voyage charterparty itself. This is the case when a 
vessel is chartered for a whole series of voyages, such voyage being considered a 
separate venture with its own freight settlement and individual establishement
30 Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v. v/o Sovfracht. (The Eugenia)fl9641 2 Q.B. 226.
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of laytime used. These type of chaters are known as consecutive vovage 
charterparties . Earlier forms were made by just attaching a clause to a single 
voyage charterparty; later the major oil companies made a complete new form 
for such contracts,as for example, the "Interconsel.76". It is usually provided in 
them that the rate will be calculated according to a standard scale determined 
by a 3rd party, such as "the international tanker nominal freight scale" and then 
care has to be taken because the parties will bound by the changes.
In Agenor Shipping v. M iroline.31 a vessel was chartered by a consecutive 
voyage chaterparty under which freight was payable in London in dollars at 
intascale rate plus 10%. In the published schedule of intascale rate, rate was 
given in sterling and, in the right-hand column, in dollars (at rate of $2.80 to £). 
One day after the charterparty was entered into,sterling was devalued to $2.40
to £. The shipowner claimed that freight was payable as expressed in scale in
dollars. The charterer claimed tha sterling was the accounting currency. It was
held that freight was payable as expressed in the scale in U.S. dollars, and also 
that if a charterparty incorporates a scale determined by a third party, the
charterer and the shipowner will be bound by the changes. Donaldson, J., said:
"Where parties to a charterparty incorporate a scale which is
determined by a third party,as these parties have done, it is entirely
open to the third party to publish a quite different scale or scales 
from time to time and the charterers and the owners in those 
circumstances have agreed to abide by the new published scale."
Therefore, from the exposition cited above, one may see that sometimes
problems may arise when determining whether a vessel has been chartered on 
a voyage or a time basis because of the existence of some of these "hybrid" 
charterparties.32 However,it is also clear that once the nature of the contract has 
been determined, the tendency is to use the term "hire" or "time freight" when
the vessel is chartered under a time charterparty form,and freight when the
31 Agenor Shipping Company Ltd.v. Societe des Petroles Miroline. [1968]2 Ll.R. 359.
32 See also. The Democritos [1975] 2 Ll.R. 149.
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vessel is chartered on a voyage basis.
However, apart from the judicial opinion about making a difference
between freight and hire,the doctrine has some opinion about the convenience 
of establishing or not a more rigid distinction between the two concepts.
Therefore, Carver,may be quoted when he said: 33
"It would be unfortunate were a rigid distinction-such as that
(unjustifiable etymologically, or logically) between "demurrage" and 
damages for detention to be drawn between "freight" and "hire".
He is also of the opinion that when a ship has been chartered to go on a 
specific voyage for a lump sum,or to be at the disposal of the charterer at so 
much a month: it is perhaps more accurate to call the payment the hire of the 
ship; but sometimes the word freight is used,and as the hire of a chartered ship 
is very commonly paid in proportion to the goods carried under the
charterparty, it would be difficult to say distinctly when the one word should be 
used and when the other.34
However, Lord Denning was of a different opinion which he expressed in 
"The Nanfri". when he said:35
"At one time it was common to describe the sums payable under a 
time charterparty as "freight". Such description is to be found used 
by judges and text-book writers of great distinction,but in modern 
times a change has come about. The payments due under a time­
charter are usually now described as "hire" and those under voyage 
charter as "freight". This change of language corresponds, I believe 
to a recognition that the two things are different. "Freight"is payable 
for carrying a quantity of cargo from one place to another. "Hire is 
payable for the right to use a vessel for a specified period of time, 
irrespective of whether the charterer chooses to use it for carrying a 
cargo or lays it up, out of use. Everytime charter contains clauses 
which are quite innapropriate to a voyage charter, such as the off 
hire clause and the withdrawal clause. So different are the two 
concepts that I do not think the law as to freight can be applied
33 Carver, Carriage bv Sea. 13 th Edition, at para. 1661,footnote 2.
34 Ibid. at para. 1661.
35 Federal Commerce v. M o len a . (The Nanfrilf 19781 2 L1.R.132.
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indiscriminately to hire."
The convenience of making such distinction arose mainly in relation to the 
question of whether deductions from hire and freight should be permissible, 
while the law in respect of ordinary freight was clear;the question arose whether 
such principles should be applicable to time freight or hire.
Thus, under voyage charterparty, it is not possible for the charterer to set­
off any claim he has versus the shipowner against the freight, i.e., .full freight is 
always payable.36 There has always been a doubt whether this rule applies to a 
time charterparty regarding hire. However, there are still some doubts about 
applying the same rule to "hire"or "time freight".
Thus, in "The Nanfri".37 Lord Denning stated that :
"I do not think the law as to freight can be applied indiscriminately 
to "hire" in particular, the special rule of English law whereby 
"freight" must be paid in full (without deductions for short delivery 
or cargo damage) cannot be applied automatically to time charter 
"hire". Nor is there any authority which says that it must ...".
However, the case was treated differently, in "The Lutetian".38 where it 
was held that the charterers were entitled to deduct from expected off-hire, and 
in "The Chrvsovalandou Dvo" ,39 a breach of the charter speed warranty has 
been held to do so;as has the failure by the owners to load a full cargo, "T h e  
Teno".40
In the French and Algerian law, the situation is quite settled, the difference 
has been made between "freight" and "hire" only in the case of demise charter 
where the remuneration is called "loyer" , i.e., "hire", to distinguish it from freight
36 See. Daxin v. O xlev.(18641 10 L.T.268; and T h e  A ries" (1977)1 LI.R. at page 341.
37 Federal Commerce v. Molena. (The Nanfril [1978] 2 L1.R. 132.
38 (1982) 2 L1.R. 140.
39 Santiren Shipping L td. v. Unimarine S A. The "C h rv so v a la n d o u -D v o " . (1981) 1 LI.R.
159.
40 (1977) 2 LI.R. 289.
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in the voyage and time charterparty. The French Code of Commerce in article 
10 ,41 defines the charterparty by demise as "Par affretementccoque nue, le
freteur s'engage, contre paiement d'un loyer, a mettre, pour un temps defini." i.e., 
"By a demise chaterparty,the shipowner is obliged to present a ship...against the 
payment of hire ...", and the Algerian Maritime Code in article 724 defines the 
contract of demise charterparty as: "Par le cotrat d'affretement coque nue, le
freteur s'engage a mettre un navire sans armement ni equipement a la 
disposition de l'affreteur pour un temps defini et l'affreteur a en payer le loyer." 
i.e., "By a demise charterperty, the shipowner is obliged to provide a ship 
without shipowning or equipment at the disposal of the charterer for a definite
time and the charterer is obliged to pay the hire.42
Thus, it would have been suitable, if the common law had adopted the 
same solution about freight and hire, because in the case of voyage or time 
charterperty, the remuneration which the shipowner receives is freight and not 
hire. Although, the charterer hires the services of the shipowner, it would be
preferable if it is called freight, and moreover, in the case of time charterparty 
the charterer hires the ship for a certain time, this case is not a case of hire but it 
is still freight, because the charterer still hires the services of the shipowner and 
not the ship in itself. However,in the case of a demise charterparty, it should be 
called hire and not freight because the charterer hires the ship without the 
services of the shipowner. Here the charterer has to choose the crew,the master 
and has to look after the management of the ship as it was his own, and 
therefore, the remuneration given to the shipowner in this case ought to be 
called hire. So, the remuneration of the shipowner should be called "freight" in 
all the other kinds of charterparty, exept in the case of demise charterparty and 
that what the French and Algerian legislators did.
41 Loi n 66-420 du 18 juin 1966.
42 HMy Own Translation".
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CHAPTER TW O
The Charterers' Lien On The Vessel
2-1- The Nature of the Charterers's Lien on the Vessel:
In most of the charterparties, liens are given to both, the shipowners and
the charterers, but many problems arise because of these liens as to the nature 
and ways in which they can be enforced.
Thus, the shipowners have a lien on the cargo for garantee of payment of 
the freight and hire and the charterers have a lien on the vessel for all money 
paid in avance and not earned because of the failure of the ship, i.e., the
shipowner's failure to perform his uties under the charterparty.
Thus, the "Baltime 1939" Uniform Time-Charter in its' clause 18 gives a lien 
to the charterer, where it provides that: " ... and the charterers to have a lien on 
the vessel for all moneys paid an not earned".
Moreover, the New York Produce Exchange time charterparty in its clause
18 provides that: "charterers to have a lien on the ship for all monies paid in
)
advance and not earned, and any overpaid hire or excess deposit to be returned 
at once ...".
So, when a shipowner undertakes to carry goods for a charterer under a 
charterparty, he undertakes to carry these goods for a cetain sum of money 
depending on the type of the charterparty and on the agreement with the
charterers. But in the same time, the shipowner undertakes to give the
charterers a lien on his ship, in the case where the money has been paid in 
advance and where he fails to perfom his duty, which is to carry the goods to 
their destination. Here, the charterers have a lien on the vessel given to them by
the charterparty, but what is the nature of this lien and how can it be 
performed? Because the nature of this lien can be different, dipending on the
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nature of the charterparty, and even the performance of this lien can be 
different, depending on the nature of each lien and each charterparty.
So, how can this lien be defined? Can it be defineed as a true possessory 
lien or as an equitable lien? Because where the charterparty is a demise
charterparty, the charterer by the nature of this charter has possession of the
ship, and hee can exercise his lien against the owner of the ship by detaining the
ship, but in the case of a voyage or time charterparty, the possession of the ship
does not pass to the charterer, and the latter has only the right to have his goods 
carried from one place to another and, the possession and the control of the ship 
stay in the hands of the shipowner.
Thus, in the former situation, the charterer has some kind of a possessory
lien against the shipowner, but in the latter situation, the lien of the charterer
appears to be a kind of equitable lien, because the only thing the charterer can 
do, is to postpone the redelivery of the ship to the owner and nothing more.
Thus, in order to understand the nature of the charterers' liens on the ship, 
it would be best to examine some cases in details. In, The "Lancaster".1 by a 
time charter, the first defendants let their vessel Lancaster to the plaintiffs, for
one round voyage. Payment of hire by clause 4 was to commence on and from
the date of delivery and continue until the hour of redelivery, and by clause 5
was to paid monthly in advance. The charter, which was in the (NYPE), i.e., the
New York Produce Exchange form, further provided, by cl.18:
"That Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and all sub-freights 
for any amounts due under this charter, including general average
contributions, and the Charterers to have a lien on the ship for all 
monies paid in advance and not earned ... Charterers will not suffer
nor permit to be continued any lien or encumbrance incurred by
them ... which might have priority over the title and interest of the 
owners in the vessel."
1 Ellerman Lines LTD. v. Lancaster M aritime Co. LTD. And O thers. (The "Lancaster"! 
Q.B.D (Commercial Court) May 22 and June 16, 1980.
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The second and third defendants were banks which had let substancial 
sums to the first defendants, such sums being secured by mortgages and 
assignments and notices of the assignments in all three cases were duly given. 
Following, a collision, the vessel a constructive total loss and the brokers began 
collecting the insurance moneys and paying it to the second defendants as first 
mortgagees of the vessel. The plaintiffs halted this procedure by obtaining a 
Mareva injuction restraining the distribution of the assets on the ground that 
they were entitled to recover a certain sum in respect of hire which had been 
paid in advance but had not been earned at the time of the collision. Moreover, 
the plaitiffs claimed that they had by virtue of cl. 18 of the charterparty an 
equitable lien on the vessel in respect of their claim which enured against the 
insurance proceeds and took priority over the claims of the second and third 
defendants.
It was held, that the expression "lien" in cl. 18 was not being used 
consistently and that the effect of the charterers' lien on the vessel under cl.18 of 
the charter, was that it simply conferred on the charterers the right to postpone 
delivery of the vessel to the owners.
Moreover, it was held that the charterers' lien could not have priority over
the assignments to either defendants and that there was no grounds upon which
the plaintiffs here could trace into the proceeds of the insurance policy.
Here, some questions arise as about, what is the meaning of the term "lien" 
in cl.18 of the charterparty? and what is the extent of this lien? and what is the 
object or the assets of the lien and what is the priority between the different 
claims?
Firstly, the cl.18 of the charterparty gives the charterers a lien on the ship 
for all moneys paid in advance and not earned and Mr. Justice Robert Goff, hel
that the expression "lien" in cl.18 was not being use consistently in that clause an
that clause an that the charterers's lien on the ship cannot be a possessory lien. 
So, a lien generally means a charge upon a res, but here the nature of this charge
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is not clear, it is why the nature of this lien arises.
Councel for the charterers submitted that it must be an equitable lien and 
in the case of T o n n e lie r  v. S m ith .2 Lord Justice Rigby, in delivering the 
judgment of himself and Lord Esher, M.R., said that:3
"The owners were to have a lien upon all cargoes and all sub­
freights for any amounts due to them under the charter, and the 
charterer was to have a lien on the ship for all moneys pai in 
advance and not earned.
The last provision, that the charterer was to have a lien on the ship 
for all moneys paid in advance an not earned, makes it plain, if it 
were otherwise doubtful, that the payments in advance were to be 
provisional only and not final, and would entitle the charterer to 
postpone delivery of the ship until the unearned payments were 
repaid - a right which effectually secure prompt repayment of those 
amounts."
Thus, Lord Justice Rigby recognized that the charterers' lien on the ship 
could not be a possessory lien; but he gave it a very similar effect, simply by 
conferring on the time charterers the right to postpone delivery of the ship to 
the owners.
Moreover, the charterers' lien on the vessel was considered as an equitable 
charge in the case of The "Panglobal Frienship".4
This case was an appeal by the plaintiffs, Citibank N.A. (formerly First 
National City Bank) from the decision of Mr. Justice Donaldson granting the 
application of the charterers, A/S seaheron to intervene in the action between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants, Hobbs Savill & Co Ltd., insurance brokers, and 
Dray Shipping Co. Ltd., the owners of the vessel Panglobal Frienship. The vessel, 
which had been chartered to the charterers an mortgaged to the plaitiffs, had 
sunk and the plaintiffs had claimed the insurance moneys which had been paid
2 (1897) 2 Com. Cas. 258.
3 Ibid, at P. 265.
4 [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 368.
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to the insurance brokers. The charterers also claimed an equitable charge on the 
moneys by virtue of cl.14 which provided that:
"the charterers were to have a lien on the vessel for all moneys paid
in advance and not earned and for the value of fuel in bankers and
for all claims for damages arising from any breach by the owners of 
the charter."
and they applied to intervene, so, it was held by Donaldson, J., that the 
charterers would be allowed to do so.
Thus, the charter contained an important clause, which gave the charterers 
a lien on the vessel for all moneys paid in advance an not earned and for the 
value of fuel in bankers and for all claims for damages arising from any breach 
by the owners of the charter. The basis of the charterers' claim was that they
had a lien under cl.14 of the charter and this gave them an equitable charge on
the moneys. Therefore, Lord Denning, M.R., said:5
"Then another argument was raised. It was said that cl.14 gives 
what is called an equitable charge to the time charterers. Clause 14 
provides:
... The charterers shall have a lien on the vessel for ... the value of fuel 
in bankers, and for all claims for damages arising from any breach 
by Owner of this Charter.
The word "lien" is obviously not used accurately there. Mr. Hobhouse 
in effect tol us that that clause ha no meaning, it is an oldd clause, 
and so forth. But I must say, having heard all the arguments, that it 
seems to me it is obvious that this does give something in the nature 
of an equitable charge to the time charterers in respect of the 
amages which they claim. Otherwise it is very difficult to see what 
meaning the clause has at all. So it seems to me, to give it any 
meaning at all, it must give something in the nature of an equitable 
charge."
Moreover, Lord Justice Roskill, gave the charterers an equitable charge 
when he said, that:6
5 Ibid, at P. 371.
6 Ibid, at P. 372.
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"So far as cl.14 argument is concerned, it has never yet been
suggested, so far as I am aware, that, whatever the true effect of that 
clause, it can in the case of the purported lien given to the time 
charterer create in him any right to the possession of the time 
chartered ship. It is however sought to say that some sort of 
equitable charge arises in his favour."
Thus, according to most charterparties, the charterers have a lien on the
vessel for the money paid andd not earned. However, this lien cannot be
considered as a possessory lien, because a possessory lien requires the 
possession of the chattel, and in those cases which were cited above, the charters 
are time charterparties and therefore, the shipowner keeps the possession and
the management of his ship.
Thus, in those cases cited above, the charterers did not have a possessory
lien and Mr. Justice Robert Goff stated that:7
"But it is obvious that neither the owners1 lien for sub-freights, nor 
the charterers’ lien on the ship, can be a possessory lien. Of course, if 
the same clause had appeared in a demise charter, the charterers'
lien on the ship could be construed as a possessory lien, but the 
owners' lien on cargo could not."
In Tonnelier v. Sm ith .8 Lord Justice Rigby recognised that the charterers’ 
lien on the ship could not be a possessory lien. Moreover, in The Panglobal 
F r ie n d s h ip . Lord Justice Ruskill9 took the same point of view about the
charterers' lien, that their lien is not a possessory lien, where he stated, that:
"So far as cl.14 (the clause which gave the charterers a lien on the 
ship for all moneys paid in advance and not earned) argument is 
concerned, it has never yet been suggested, so far as I am aware, 
that, whatever the true effect of that clause, it can in the case of the 
purported lien given to the time charterer create in him any right to 
the possession of the time chartered ship."
7 The "Lancaster", op cit, at P. 501.
8 (1897) 2 Com. Cas. 258. at P. 265.
9 [1978] 1 Lloyd's. Rep. 308, at P. 372.
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Thus, in most of the cases where the lien of the charterers has been 
considered, that lien has never been considered a possessory lien, apart from the 
case where the charterparty is a demise charterparty, and in this case the
charterer has possession of the ship, and therefore, can exercise his lien as a true
possessory lien and that by detainning the possession of the ship. However, if 
the charterers' lien on the ship cannot be defined as a possessory lien, then what 
is the true nature of the charterers' lien on the ship for the freight or hire which 
was paid but not earned by the shipowner?
Most of the opinions deny the nature of possessory lien to the charterers'
lien, but they recognise that the true nature of that lien is that it is an equitable
charge on the ship, Lord Denning, M.R., shared this opinion, when he said that:10
"The word "lien" is obviously not used accurately there. Mr.
Hobhouse in effect told us that that clause had no meaning, it is an 
old clause, and so forth. But I must say, having heard all the
arguments, that it seems to me it is obvious that this does give
something in the nature of an equitable charge to the time
charterers in respect of the damages which they claim. Otherwise it 
is very difficult to see what meaning the clause has at all."
However, if this lien has the nature of an equitable charge, i.e., an equitable 
lien, what protection or garaantee does it give to the charterer to have his money
paid back to him, i.e., the money he paid for freight, and which was not earned
for a reason or another?
Thus, it was considered in some cases, that the charterers are entitled to
postpone delivery of the ship to the owners.
It was held in The "Lancaster".H that:
"the effect of the charterers' lien on the vessel under cl.18 of the
charter was that it simply conferred on the charterers the right to
postpone delivery of the vessel to the owners."
10 [1980] 2 Lloyd's. Rep. 497. by Mr. Justice Robert Goff, at P. 499, 497.
11 [1980] 2 Lloyd's. Rep. 497. by Mr. Justice Robert Goff, at P. 499, 497.
172
Moreover, the most relevant case is probably, Tonnelier v. Sm ith .I2 where 
Lord Justice Rigby, in delivering the judgment of himself and Lord Esher, M.R.,13 
said that:
" ..., and the charterer was to have a lien on the ship for all moneys 
paid in advance and not earned. ... , and would entitle the charterer 
to postpone delivery of the ship until the unearned payments were
repaid ... ."
In that passage, therefore, Lord Justice Rigby recognised that the charterers'
lien on the ship could not be a possessory lien; but he gave it a very similar
effect, simply by conferring on the charterers the right to postpone delivery of
the ship to the owners.
The nature of the lien given by cl.18 was next considered by the House of 
Lords in French Marine v. Compagnie Napolitaine.14 where viscount Finley cited 
the decision with approval,15 quoting in full a section of the judgment of Lord 
Justice Rigby,16 where he recognised that the charterers' lien on the ship could 
not be a possessory lien; but he gave it a very similar effect, simply the right to 
postpone delivery of the ship to the owners.
However, if most of the opinions cited above give the charterer a charge in
the nature of an equitable lien, this lien cannot make the charterers able to stop 
or postpone the redelivery of the ship back to the shipowner, because the ship
has never been out of the shipowners' possession, who were always in
possession of the ship, through their master and crew. Mr. Justice Robert Goff 
held,17 that:
12 (1897) 2 Com. Cas. 258.
13 Ibid, at P. 265.
14 (1921) 8 LI. L. Rep. 345; [1921] 2 A.C. 494.
15 Ibid, at P. 350 and 507-509.
16 Tonnelier v. Sm ith. (1897) T.L.R. at P. 560. Lord Justice Rigby, at P. 561.
17 The "Lancaster". [1980] 2 Lloyd's. Rep. at P. 497.
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"the effect of charterers' lien on the vessel under cl.18 of the charter 
was that it simply conferred on the charterers the right to postpone 
delivery of the vessel to the owners but since the charterers had not 
got possession of the vessel this mean no more than that they could 
prevent the owners from resuming the use and the control of the 
vessel for their own purposes."
Thus, in the different cases cited above, the charterers' lien could not confer 
to them the right to retain the ship and prevent the owners from the use of their 
ship, because the owners are always in possession of the chattel through their 
servants. However, the case would have been different, if the charter was a 
demise charterparty, where the charterers choose their own crew, and 
therefore, the ship would be in their possession, and then, the exercise of their 
lien would be possible.
When it comes to the asset on which the charterers would exercise their 
lien, this is another situation, because in the cases cited above, the charterers try 
to exercise their lien in a situation where the ship is lost or destroyed. However, 
most of the opinions agreed that the lien can only be exercised on the ship and 
nothing else which might replace the ship. Thus, Mr. Justice Robert Goff, held 
that:18
"the proceeds of insurance upon a chattel neither represented the 
chattel nor constituted the product or fruits of that chattel for the 
purpose of tracing." And he added : "even if the lien clause could 
have created an equitable lien and assuming that such a lien would 
create a sufficient interest to enable the lien holder to trace at all, 
there was no grounds upon which the plaintiffs here could trace into 
the proceeds of the insurance policy."
Lord Denning, M.R., added that:19
"Then it is said it is only a lien on the vessel: it is not a lien on the 
policy moneys. There again it seems to me it is arguable that the 
moneys take the place of the vessel." Moreover, Lord Justice Roskill,
18 The "Lancaster", op cit, at P. 497.
19 The "Panglobal Friendship". [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at P. 371.
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added at P.372, that: ’’Without pre-judging the determination of this 
issue at the trial, it seems to me as at present advised that even if 
the clauses could be construed as creating some form of equitable 
charge in favour of the time charterer it was never suggested in 
Tagart Beaton & Co. v. James Fisher & Sons.20 that a comparable 
clause created an equitable charge in favour of the owners of the 
vessel- it can at the most only be a charge upon the vessel. For my 
part I am at present unable to see how the clause can create any 
equitable charge upon the insurance policies."
Thus, the nature of this lien given by most clauses of the different 
charterparties, is that it is an equitable charge and which can at the most only be 
a charge upon the vessel and nothig else which might replace the vessel.
However, one might find a different interpretaion to the nature of the 
charterers’ lien on the ship, in the French and the Algerian Civil Code.
Thus, there is a legal nature which can be applied on the charterers' lien on 
the ship for all moneys paid in advance and not earned, and therefore, it would 
best to examine it and to find out if it is appropriate to this case. This situation is 
namely "le paiement de I’indu" or "the payment not due", which is defined in 
both the French and the Algerian Civil Code. The French Civil Code defines it in 
its’ articles 1235 and 1376 where it provides in article 1235 that, "Every 
payment supposes a debt: that which has been paid without being due, is 
subject to recovery ...”,21 and article 1376 provides that: "That who receives by 
mistake or knowingly what is not due to him, is obliged to hand it back to that 
one from whom he received that what was not due."22 The Algerian Civil Code
20 [1903] 1 K.B. 391.
21 " My Own Translation M, the actual article 1235 of the French civil law provides in 
French that: « T o u t  payment suppose une dette: ce qui a ete paye sans etre due , est sujet i  
repetition . . . »
22 " My Own Translation ", the actual aricle 1376 in French provides that: « C e lu i  qui 
re?oit par erreur ou sciemment ce qui ne lui est pas du s’oblige i  le restituer i  celui de qui il l’a 
indum ent r e ? u .»
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in its' articles 143 and 144 gives almost the same provisions, where it defines 
the payment not due in article 143, by providing that:
"The one, who received, as payment, an allowance which was not due to 
him, is obliged to hand it back ...",23 and it is further provided in article 144 that: 
"There is a recovery of the not due, when the payment was made in execution of 
an obligation which the cause of it was not realised or which cause stopped to 
exist."24
Thus, in both the French and the Algerian civil law, when moneys are paid 
but not earned, the one who received that money without being due to him, is 
obliged to hand it back. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to examine this legal 
situation in more details and see if it can be applied on the charterers' lien on the 
ship for moneys paid in advance and not earned. So, what is this "payement de 
l'indu", i.e., the payment not due? What are its' conditions and what action might 
be brought by the one who paid something which was not due or, which he was 
not bound to pay, i.e., which was not due?
The French civil code, provides that the payment not due exists, if there is 
not debt. So, the ground on which this theory stands in the French civil law is 
the debt,25 and with the absence of a debt, the payment is not due and allows 
that one who paid something which was not due to recover it.
However, proving the payment is not enough, it must also be proved why
the payment was made,26 and therefore, one is obliged to make a distinction
23 " My Own Translation ", the actual article 143 of the Algerian civil code provides in
french, that: « C e lu i  qui a re?u, a titre de paiement, une prestation qui ne lui dtait pas due, est
oblige de la re s titu e r .»
24 " My Own Translation ", the actual article 144 orf the Algerian civil code provides
that: « I 1  y'a lien i  la restitution de l'indu, lorsque le paiement a et6 fait en dxecution d'une
obligation dont la cause ne s 'est pas realisee ou d'une obligation dont la cause a cess6e
d 'e x is te r .»
25 Encvclopedie DALLOZ. CIVIL VI. 26 Edition, 1978. R6p6tition de l'indu. P .l.
26 RIPERT, George et BOULANGER, Jean. T raite de Droit Civil. D'Aprfo le Traitd de Planiol. 
Tome H. 1957. P. 475.
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between two theories. The first one, is the case where is no obligation between
the one who paid and the one who received and the second one is, the case
where an obligation exists but it is either invalid or canceled.
This work is more interested with the second theory, where the payment
was made and there was an obligation but it stopped to exist. Thus, the cases of
the invalidity or cancelation of the obligation are the case where the roman law 
gave the condoctio  sine cause or la condictio  causa d a ta , causa non secuta. 
The obligation has existed and the payment could have been done before, but 
the debt disappeared after the invalidity or the cancelationof the obligation. The 
payment which was made was not due. The condition for this theory to be 
applied is that, the one who claims the recovery of what was not due must
prove that this debt has already been invalid or canceled, or that the future debt
has been formed. Moreover, thare is another fact than that of payment, a fact 
which might be the cancelation, the resolution or a defaulting condition, which
will change the situation to the state where it was before the convention or the
contract.
In the Algerian civil law, it is required that the payment is not due where 
the payment has been made for the execution of an obligation which cause has 
not been performed or for an obligation which has stopped to exist (article 144 
of the Algerian civil code).
The action for the recovery of what has been paid and not earned, is vested 
in the one who made the payment, and the one who received what was not due 
is obliged to hand it back. So, if the subject of the claim is money, the one who 
received is obliged to hand back the same amount and if it was something else, 
he is obliged to hand back the same quantity and quality of the thing or of what 
he received. What about the interests?
The law makes a distinction between two situations according to the good 
faith of the one who received what was not due. The first situation is the one
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where the one who received was in good faith, in this case he is only obliged to 
hand back what he received without any interests (article 1378 of the French 
civil code and article 147 of the Algerian civil code), but if the one who received 
was of a bad faith, he is obliged to hand back the profits or interests of what he 
received, starting from the day he received or the day he became of bad faith in 
the Algerian civil law.
Thus, after having examined this situation or more accurately this theory, 
on ecan say that the charterers' lien for moneys paid in advance and not earned 
can be resolved according to this theory, i.e., the theory of the "payement de 
l'indu", because the charterers paid a sum of money called the freight to the 
shipowner, so that the latter performs his part of the duty, which was to carry 
the cargo to its final destination, but if the ship is lost, that will make the 
shipowner's obligation impossible like in the case of The "Lancaster".27 This will 
make the payment of the freight paid by the charterers in advance not due, 
because they paid for the performance a future obligation which will not exist in 
the future and that because of the disappearance of the shipowner's obligation. 
Therefore, this entitles them to recover all the money they paid for the part of 
the obligation which has not been performed (article 1235 and 1376 of the 
French civil code, and article 143 and 144 of the Algerian civil code). One must 
point out the benefit of the civil law jurisdiction, that which is that every time 
that the private law like the maritime law does not have a provision about a 
certain situation, it has to return to the general law which is the civil code as
being the origine, to find the solution required for that particular situation.
2-2- Deductions from Freight and Hire:
The claim of the charterers for the execrise of lien for freight paid in
advance and not earned is founded on the idea that once the obligation of the
shipowners cannot be performed any-more, the shipowners are not entitled to 
that freight any longer. Therefore, the impossibility of the shipowners to
27 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 497.
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perform their obligation can be either for the loss of the ship or for the damage 
or loss of the cargo, because that will make the payment of the freight worthless 
or without reason, because the purpose of paying freight is for the carriage of 
goods to their destination in the quantity and quality, and their damage will 
make them worthless, and therefore, the charterers will have no reason to pay 
the freight. However, there have been different opinions as to whether the
charterers are allowed to deduct sums from freight or hire and in what
circum stances.
1 - Deductions from Freight;
The contract of carriage of goods by sea may provide that freight calculated 
to its terms is payable in full without deductions. However, it may be stipulated 
that it clearly permit one or more deductions to be made in specified
circumstances from freight as calculated and earned under the contract. For 
instance, an example of an agreed deduction was cited in the case of T h e  
Olympic Brilliance.28 where the charterparty contained the following clause: "If 
there is a difference of more than 0.50% between the bill of lading figures and 
the cargo delivered ... charterers have the right to deduct from freight." It was 
held that this was a plain clause, with a simple straight forward meaning that 
once the charterer had established the difference between the bill of lading
figures and the customs authorities ascertained figures and had proved the C.I.F 
value for the short delivered cargo, he was entitled to deduct that value from the 
freight finally and completely and the umpires award would be upheld. But 
otherwise, the person from whom the freight is due, is not entitled to deduct 
from the amount of freight which is in fact earned, any amount which he alleges 
is owed to him by the carrier as damages for loss which, not through expected 
perils or inherent vice, he has suffered because of damage to the cargo, loss of 
part of the cargo shipped or in the case of lump sum freight failure to load a full
28 The Olympic Brilliance (1982) 2 LI. R. 205.
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cargo, or for alleged failure to prosecute the voyage with reasonable dispatch.29
An attempt was made to prove that a general custom among merchants to 
make some deduction in paying the freight exists, but the court held that such a 
custom was inconsistent with the settled rule of law. Thus, in M ev e r v. 
Dresser.30 Willes, J., stated, that:
"With respect to the evidence or alleged usage in this case, it appears 
to me nothing more than that, in ordinary cases, as between the 
shipowner and the consignee of the goods, where the shipowner has 
an admitted claim against the owner for loss or of damage to goods 
actually put on board, it is usual to agree to set off the one claim 
against the other.
It does not deal with cases of dispute, or cases in which it is 
necessary to have recourse to the law to settle the rights of either of 
the parties: it is a mere mode of payment or adjustment of an 
admitted claim, which is often resorted to because it is convenient 
mode of arranging such a claim."
Moreover, even the case cited above, in Dixin v. Oxlev. 31 it was settled rule 
forbidding deduction of damages. The same principle has been recently
affirmed by the House of Lords in the case of The "Aries".32 where a cargo of
gasoline was short delivered under a voyage charterparty subject to the Hague 
Rules, and the charterers made a deduction from freight. It was held that they 
were not entitled to do so. Lord Salmon stated the principle of English law 
applicable in clear terms:
"This rule of law which was fathered by such masters of the law as 
Parke,B., Alderson,B., Erle,CJ., Willes and Byles,J.J., has been generally 
accepted for well over 10 years and never judicially questioned. It 
has been confirmed in the original and every succeeding edition of 
Scrutton on Charterparties and Carver, Carriage of Goods bv Sea. It
29 Rose, F.D., D ed u c tio n s  from Freight and Hire Under English Law. Lloyd's M aritime
and Commercial Law Quarterly, February 1982, Part 1.
30 (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) 646.
31 (1864) 10 L.T. 268.
32 (1977) 1 LI. R. at P. 341.
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was adopted in Lord Atkinson’s speech, with which Lord 
Macnaghten and Earl Loreburn,L.C., concured in Kish v. T av lo r.33 
and recently by the Court of Appeal in The "Brede".34 A rule of law, 
particularly a rule of commercial law which has stood so long and 
upon the faith of which many thousands of contracts of carriage 
have been made and are daily being made containing a provision 
that the contract shall be governed by the law of England, cannot 
now be succesfully challenged in our courts."
On the contrary, where the freight rule is not clearly applicable, the Courts 
have shown a preference to adhere to the general principle in favour of 
equitable set-off. Thus, in T he Ionian Skipper.35 charterers could have 
deducted from dead-freight benefits accruing to shipowners by way of 
increased demurrage and saving in despatch money occasioned by the 
diminution of laytime allowed to the charterers, there being less cargo to load. 
The charterers were entitled to set-off against the owner's claim fr demurrage 
the overpayment under mistake of law.
2 - Deductions from Hire:
Conversly t what it had been seen abve as t full freight is always payable. 
There has always been a doubt whether this rule applies to a time charteparty 
regarding hire. Michael Wilford says that the balance f authrity is nw in favour 
of the view that the charterer may deduct frm hire a claim for damages in 
respect of a period during which the owners have in breach of the charter 
deprived the charterers of the use of the ship, but it is not yet clear exactly 
which types of claim fall within concept.36
The following cases give more explanation to the situation; in the case of
33 (1912) A.C. 604, H.L.
34 (1973) 2 LI. R. 333; (1974) 1 Q.B. 233. CA .
35 Bedford S.S. Co. Ltd. v. Navico A.C.. The "Ionian Skipper". (1977) 2 LI. R. 273.
36 W ilfrod, Cohlin, Healy, Kimbal, "Time C harters". II Ed., Llyd's o f London Press Ltd.,
1982.
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Naxos Shipping v. Thegra Shipping (The Corfu Island).37 it was held that the 
charterers were entitled to deduct from hire a claim for damages in respect of an 
alleged breach of speed warranty. However, in the Seven Seas Transportation 
Ltd. v. Atlantic Shipping Co..38 it was decided that there was no right of set-off in 
respect of claims for damages, there being no reason to treat hire differently 
from freight. Therefore, Donaldson,J., said that:
"I have come to the cobclusion that hire must be treated in the same 
way as freight and that to do so is not an extension of the established 
exception."
In The "Theno".39 it was held that there was a right to set-off against hire 
under a charter on the Baltime form, but only for damages in respect of a period 
when the use of the ship was wholly or partially withheld. In this case the 
vessel while loading bulk cargo of soya beans suffered a breakage in its ballast 
pipe system. The charterers raised a claim against the owners for hire, arising 
out of the failure of the ship to load a full cargo. It was left undecided whether 
the right of set-off extended to other claims. Parker, J., after having examined 
some of the cases cited above, said:
"The foregoing cases show a continuous recognition since 1941 of a 
right to set-off against a claim for time charter hire damages for 
breach of contract where, at any rate, the breach consists in 
wrongful withdrawal of the vessel for a certain time."
He also considered the nature of the equitable right of set-off, and 
concluded that it should cover not only total but also partial withdrawal of the 
use of the ship:40
"The next question is whether the equitable set-off is limited to cases 
where there is a total withdrawal for a specified time. I can see no
37 (1973) unreported, cited in The HThenow (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 289-293.
38 (1975) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 188.
39 (1977) 2 LI. R. 289.
40 Ibid, at P. 297.
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reason in principle why it should be so limited ..."
Recently the question was considered again in The "Nanfri".4! at first 
instance under Justice Kerr. He said that it was not possible to deduct from hire
unless there were special provisions in the charter. He said:
"If a claim or cross-claim did not fall within them [the special 
provisions], then the general view was that hire was payable 
continuously and in full; it could only be raised by way of a separate 
cross-claim in debt or damages."
In the Court of Appeal, 1 dissented, 2 affirmed, Kerr, J., view. The House of 
Lords did not consider this point. Then it was held by a mojority that deductions 
could be made where the shipowners had wrongly deprived the charterers of 
the use of the vessel or had prejudiced them in the use of her. Such a right could 
not be extended to other breaches or default of the shipowners, e.g., damage to 
cargo arising from the negligence of the crew.
Lord Denning concluded from his review of authorities that:42
"The line of cases is so convincing that I would hold that, when the 
shipowner is guilty of a breach of contract which deprives the time 
charterer of part of the consideration for which hire has been paid in 
advance, the charterer can deduct an equivalent amount out of the 
hire falling due for the next month.
I would as at present advised limit the right to deduct to cases when 
the shipowner has wrongfully deprived the charterer of the use of 
the vessel or has prejudiced him in the use of it. I would not extend 
it to other breaches or default of the shipowner, even as damage to 
the cargo arising from the negligence of the crew."
As an overall conclusion about this point, one finds that the views from 
Carver and Scrutton as opposed to Lord Denning are quite different. Lord
41 Federal Commerce and Navigation L td. v. M o le n a  Alpha Inc. The "Nanfri" (1978) 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 132.
42 Ibid, at P. 139.
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Denning's basis is that the law as to freight cannot be applied indiscriminately to 
"hire" in a time charter:43
"I do not think the law as to freight can be applied indiscriminately 
to "hire". In particular, the special rule of English law whereby 
"freight" must be paid in full (without deductions for short delivery 
or cargo damage) cannot be applied automatically to time charter 
"hire". Nor is there any authority which says that it must . ... Many 
of us, I know, in the past have assumed that the rule as to "freight" 
does apply: and some Judges have said so. But now, after full 
argument, I am satisfied that the "freight" rule does not apply 
automatically to "time charter" hire.
As a conclusion to this chapter, one might say that the charterer has some 
sort of a lien on the ship for all moneys paid in advance and not earned. 
However, this lien cannot be a possessory lien in the case of voyage or time 
charterparty, because in these two situations the shiowners keeps the ship in his 
possession, but the situation is different in the case of a demise charterparty, 
where the control of the ship and the crew pass to the charterer. This lien has 
been defined as an equitable charge,44 which gives to the charterer no more
than the right to postpone redelivery of the ship to the owner. In the French
and Algerian civil law, the charterer might use the rule applying to the
"payement de l'indu", i.e., the "payment not due, to recover the freight he paid in 
advance and which was not earned by the shipowner. Moreover, there is a 
difference of opinion in the case of deductions from freight and hire, where the 
general opinion agreed that the full freight must be paid in the case of voyage 
freight and the opinions have not agrred about, if the charterers are entitled to 
deduct from hire in the case of damage to cargo or for any other reason.
However, one might say that the charterer should be allowed to deduct
from hire or freight, in the case when the voyage is not completed or in the case 
where the cargo is damaged, because the reason for paying freight or hire is to
43 Ibid.
44 See, Sect. 1 of this chapter, Supra.
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have the cargo carried to its' destination in the same quantity and the same 
quality when it left the port of loading. Therefore, if the shipowner fails to 
perform his obligation, which is to carry the goods to their destination in the 
manner it was supposed to be, here, there is no reason why the charterer should 
not be allowed to refuse to perform his duty or to perform part of, as long as the 
other part of the contract has failed to perform his obligation or part of it.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE NATURE OF THE GUARANTEE FOR PAYMENT OF 
FREIGHT AND THE DEBTS GUARANTEED .
3-1- The Nature of the Guarantee for Payment of Freight.
Freight is the payment under the terms of the contract of affreightment for
the carriage of goods and therefore the person who makes the contract is liable
for this payment.
In the English law, the shipowner has what is called a "lien" on the cargo for 
the garantee of payment of his freight, and this "lien" is given either by the
express terms of the charterparty or in the absence of any stipulation in the
charterparty, this "lien" is given by the common law to the shipowner.
However, in the civil law jurisdictions, namely the French and Algerian
law, these last jurisdictions give to the shipowner a "privilege" on the cargo for
garantee of payment of freight. Therefore, it would be best to consider the 
nature of these two charges on the cargo, separatly, so that they will be better 
explained and understood.
3-1-1- The Nature of the "Lien” on the Cargo for Payment of Freight
in the English Law:
Charterparties and bills of lading usally contain a clause giving the 
shipowner a right to retain the cargo for payment of any freight or other charges
due to him. In the absence of such a clause, the common law, under certain
circumstances, entitle the shipowner to withhold delivery of the cargo until the 
money due for the carriage of the cargo is discharged. Thus, the right of lien 
arises either:
1- At Common Law,or by
2- Express terms of chaterparty.
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1- At Common Law :
Thus, where there is a charterparty the charterer is liable for freight. But, 
where is not a charterparty the shipper of the goods has an implied obligation to 
pay the freight.1 Therefore, at common law the shipowner has a lien on cargo 
for freight. This lien exists independently of the contract and gives to the
shipowner the right to keep the goods against payment of freight. It is a 
possessory lien depending entirely on the possession of the goods. This lien can 
be defined as, "A claim by the person in possession of the property of another 
who has the right to keep possession until the owner pays the debt in respect of 
which the possessor is entitled to the lien."2 It is not in strictness, "either a jus 
in re, or jus ad rem, but simply a right to possess and retain property, until some 
charges attaching to it are paid or discharged."3
As security for payment of freight, every shipowner or master, as his agent, 
being in possession of the goods, has the right to keep them until the freight due 
in respect of their carriage is paid according to the terms of the contract of 
affreightment. This right is in the nature of a mere passive lien. It is not
founded upon any stipulation in the contract but arises simply from the usage of 
trade.4 However, if the shipowner or the master as his agent, have the right to 
keep the possession of the goods, until the freight in respect of their carraige is 
paid, this right does not give the shipowner any absolute right in the
p ro p e rty ,5 nor does it authorise him to sell the goods in order to realise the
freight in respect of their carriage,6 although the retaining of the goods may
1 See D om ett v. B eck fo rd  (1833) 5B . & Ad . 521; and also S hepard  v. B e rn a le ss  (1811) 
13 East 565.
2 See per Greer,J. in Molthes Rederi Akt. v. E llerm an.W ilson Line (1927) 1 K.B.710-716; 
and per Bramwell,L.J. in M ulliner v. F lorence (1878) 3 Q.B.D.484-489. ______________
3 Cross. (L), The Law of Lien & Stopaee in Transitu. (1840 ) P. 2.
4 T ham es Iron Works Co. v. Patent Derrick (1860) 1J. & H.93,per Sir W. Page Wood at P.
97.
5 Oppenheim  v. Russell (1802) 3B. & P.42-45.
6 As to the shipowner's statutory right of sale, See M erchant Shipping Act, 1894,SS.492-
501.
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involve a considerable expense.7 However, the right being dependent upon
possession, it is, therefore destroyed by loss of possession of the goods.
Origin and Basis of the Lien:
The shipowner's lien on the goods carried, for his freight, is well established 
and has never been disputed either by the courts or the text book writers. As
early as 1701 Chief Justice Holt, in The Anonymous Case.8 ruled that:
"Every master of a ship may detain goods till he be paid for them,
that is for their freight."
The ruling has been followed ever since.9 Among the text book writers
the same unanimity has always existed. Wyndham Beawes in his Lex
Mercatoria, states:10
"The freight must be paid in preference to all depts for whose
payment the goods stand engaged, but as those goods are
responsible to the ship for her hire, so is the ship to the owner of the
goods..."11
7 M u ll in e r  v. F lo re n c e (1878) 3 Q.B.D.484; T h a m e s  Iron Works Co.v. Patent Derrick 
(1866)lJ.&h.93,where Sir W.Page Wood decided that the right of sale could not be raised on the 
mere ground o f the expense of retaining the chattel which is subject of the lien. He added 
that,"a person who chooses to insist on the right o f retainer which the law gives,and is willing 
to put up with any inconvenience which may be the consequence,is at liberty to do so,but has 
no further right. Even though such an arrangem ent should be most inconvenient for both
parties,it does not follow that this is not the law." At P.98.
8 (1701)12 Mod.447; See also R e x  v. S im s  (1701)12 Mod. 511; S k in n e r  v . Upshaw
(1701)2Ld. Raym.752, in which Chief Justice Holt gave judgment to the same effect
9 A rtaz e  v. S m a llp iec e  (1793) 1 Esp.23; S o d e rg re e n  v. F lig h t (1796) cited in 6East 622; 
W ilson  v. K ym er (1813) 1 M.& S. 157; M itche ll v. Scaife (1815) 4 Camp. 298; Faith  v. The East 
India CO.(1821) 4 B.& Aid. 630; Christie v. Lewis (182112 Br. & B. 410.
10 Beawes, W vndham. Lex M ercatoria. (17921 5th ed. at P. 133. The fifth edition was 
considerably enlarged and improved, by Mortimer, thomas. London, Printed for R. Baldwin.
11 See also Maude & Pollock.(1881)4th ed., P. 389; Lees, Laws of British Shipping & Mar.
In s.. (1896) 11th ed.,P. 277; Maclachlan,(1932) 7th ed., P. 426; Abbott, (1901) 14th ed .,P. 346;
Parsons, Law of Shipping. (1869) vol. 1 P.174n.; Foard, Law of Merchant Shipping And Freight 
, (1880) P. 313.
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As to the origin of the lien no such definite view has been expressed. In the 
English courts the subject does not seem to have been a matter for judicial
comment and from the early English text book writers no final conclusion is
advanced. It has been suggested,!2 however, that the rule of common law has 
been derived from a rule of the general maritime law,!3 as was pointed out in
an American case:14
"The general right of the master and owner to retain merchandise 
for the freight due upon it, has not been denied. It is too weel 
established to admit of doubt. It is a principle of the general 
maritime law, the common law of the commercial world, sanctioned 
by all the maritime codes, ancient and modern, and confined by 
numerous decisions of the highest courts both in this country and
England. Nor does there appear to be any difference in principle, nor 
an any recognized in law, whether the merchant takes the whole
vessel by a charterparty, or sends his goods in a general ship. The 
lien of the owners is as perfect for the hire of the vessel stipulated in 
the charter party, as it is for the freight stipulated in the bill of lading.
In both cases the claim is privileged in the same degree and to the
same extent."
Whether it is, in fact, derived from the maritime law or not, it is indeed not 
in the nature of a maritime lien, properly so called. That is to say, it is not a 
privileged claim upon the goods following them wherever they go and in the
hands of whoever they may be. It is only a right to detain goods until payment 
of freight, and the right is lost the moment the owner or the master, as his agent,
12 Parsons, (1869) vol 1 pp. 174-177 n.
13 The Laws of Wisbuy, A rt.L V ll provides that : "The merchandise being put aboard
lighters,in order to be landed,if the master had any jealousy of the m erchant's ability  of 
honesty to pay him,he may stop it at his ship's side,and refuse to let it go,till the merchant has 
paid him in full for his freight and charges."
"Cleriac, in his comentary on the laws of Oleron, says that, the same power is given by 
the ordinance Df Phillips the second and by the Consolato del Mare,and that the latter allows
him to detain goods equal in value to four times the amount of the freight. The Ordinance of
Rotterdam allows the master to detain the goods for his freight,but requires him to unload and 
take care of them,they may not be diminished or spoiled." Abbott, 14th ed., pp.563-564; see also 
Parsons,(1869)P . 176 n.
14 D rinkw ater v. The Brig Spartan, cited in Parsons,(1869) vo l.l, pp.l74-177n.
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parts with the possession of the goods.
The shipowner's lien may be justified upon application of the general
principal that, "where a bailee has expanded his labour and skill in the 
improvement of a chattel delivered to him, he has a lien for his charge in that 
re sp ec t."15 Thus, as goods are improved in value by their carriage, therefore, 
the carrier may detain them for the charge of such carriage. This is also the 
ground suggested in the United States, by Mr.Justice Jhonson in the case of Gracie 
v. Palm er.16 where he says:
"On what principle rests the general lien of the ship on the goods for 
freight?
The master is the agent of the shipowner to receive and transport;
the goods are improved in value by the cost and care of
transportation. As the bailee of the shipper, the goods are in the
custody and possession of the master and the shipowner, and the
law will not suffer that possession to be violated until the labourer 
had received his hire."
Conditions Required to Constitute a Right of Lien:
The shipowner's lien on cargo for payment of his freight in the common
law, is a possessory lien and therefore, possession is the essensial element for the
existence of this lien. Therefore, to constitue a right of lien at common law it is 
necessary:
A- To have possession of the ship and therefore, possession of the cargo.
B- For freight to be due on delivery of the cargo.
A- Possession:
 A lien given by the common law to a carrier being a possessory lien is
exclusively associated with the possession and is dependent upon it. To have
possession of the cargo and consequently a lien upon it, the carrier must have, at
15 Scarfe v. M organ (1838) 4 M. & W. 270-283.
16 (1823) 8 Wheat . 605-635.
the time of the exercise of it, the possession of the ship, and therefore, the
possession of the cargo. Therefore, the shipowner can have no possession of the
cargo without first having possession of the ship.
(i)-Possession of the ship;
Where a ship is employed under a charterparty, the principal question to
be considered is the effect of the chaterparty in divesting or continuing the
owner's possession of the ship. It should be first to determine whether it was
the intention of the parties that the charterer should part with the possession of 
the ship for a certain period of time or that the charterparty was one under 
which the constructive possession of the vessel remained with the shipowner. If 
the possession of the ship is transferred to the charterer, the shipowner having 
no possession, actual or constructive, can have no right of lien over the cargo for 
fre ig h t.17 But if the charterparty is one for the carriage of goods only and does 
not amount to demise of the ship, then the shipowner having actual possession 
of the ship and the goods may retain them until the freight for their carriage is 
p a id .1** The terms and clauses of each charterpaty, therefore, must be 
examined carefully in order to determine the exact nature of the contract. For 
the right of lien follows the nature of the contract between the shipowner and
the charterer.
The shipowner right of lien being both legal and equitable, the courts have 
been very reluctant to put a consturction upon the contract which would
deprive the shipowner of his lien, unless the intention of the parties to the 
contrary appears from the terms of the charterparty.19
In H utton v. B ragg .20 the Court of Common Pleas laid down the above
17 Hutton v. Bragg (1816) 7 Taunt. 14; B elcher v. Capper (18421 4 Man. & G. 502.
18 T ate v. M eek (1818) 8 Taunt.280; Y ate v. R ailston  (1818) 8 Taunt.293; Y ates v. M ev n ell 
(1818) 8 Taunt.302; Savill v. C am pion  (1819) 2 B. & Aid. 503; C am pion v. C olv in  (1836) 3 Bing . 
N.C.17.
19 See Holt, (1842) 2nd ed ., pp.461-470; Maude & Pollock, (1881) 4th ed., p. 391.
20 (1816) 7 Taunt 14 .
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mentioned pricinple on the subject, correctness of which has not been 
doubted,21 but its application caused a great deal of confusion and controversy 
where it was assumed by the Court that the terms of the charterparty 
amounted to an absolute demise of the ship, and therefore the possession of the 
ship having been passed to the charterer, the shipowner had no lien for his 
charterparty freight. The facts of the case were as follows:
The defendant, shipowner, chartered his ship for a voyage from London to 
the Cape of Good Hope, and back to London. The charterparty expressed that 
the ship was let out to freight for the above mentioned voyage, that the master 
should reserve the cabin for his sole use, and the usual accomodation for his 
crew and ship's store; and that the freight being a specific sum was to be paid by 
bills during the vayage, or upon the return of the vessel home. The return cargo 
consisted of goods shipped on the charterer's account and goods of various 
persons for which the master signed the bills of lading, making the goods 
deliverable to them on paying freight to the chartere's order. The ship 
performed the voyage but upon her arrival in London, several of the bills drawn 
during the voyage had been dishonoured. The shipowners landed the 
charterer's goods and entered them in his own name in the London dock, 
claiming a lien upon them for his freight. The charterer having become 
bankrupt, his assignee brought an action to recover the goods, alleging that the 
ship was let for the whole voyage, and was under the control of the charterer 
and that the shipowner not having the possession of the cargo, could not exercise 
a lien.
The court held that under the charterparty, the charterer was the owner of 
the ship for the voyage, and therefore the original owner not having the 
possession of the ship or goods could have no lien. Gibbs, C. J. commented that 
the charterer :
21 See per Richardson,J. in C hristie v. Lewis (1821) 2 B.& B. 410 at P. 443.
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"was to have the whole use of the ship for the voyage out to go to
Cape of the Good Hope,and home to London. It is clear that he might
have put this ship as a general ship, have filled her with the goods of
other persons, and when they came home, the defendant could not 
have touched those goods by way of detaining them till his freight 
was paid by the charterer. But here, it is contended, in as much as 
these are the goods of the charterer put on board by himself, the 
defendant might detain these goods till those dishonoured bills were 
paid by the charterer. He could not have had a lien on the goods 
unless he had in some sort of possession of the goods: here, he had
no possession of the goods whatever."22
Thus, the lien of the shipowner on the cargo is dependent on the contract 
between him and the charterer, i.e, the nature of the charterparty.
The decision in this case turned on the assumption that the shipowner, by
the terms of the charterparty, had parted with the possession of his vessel, the
Court relying on the words of demise in the charterparty. But in the later cases
the shipowner's lien has been supporetd notwithstanding the terms of express 
demise, if other stipulation is found, sufficient to rebut the inference that the
shipowner meant to part with the possession of the ship.23
In Saville v. Cam pion.24 the shipowner was to receive on board, the goods 
of the charterer in London, and proceed to Madras, and there after delivery of 
her outward cargo, to receive from the charterer's agent a homeward cargo, and 
deliver it in London, and that all the cabin but one, which was reserved for the 
use of the master, were to be at the disposal of the charterer, who was to appoint 
a super cargo, to superintend the stowage of the goods. Freight was to be paid at 
so much per ton on the register tonnage of the ship. The charterer having 
become bankrupt and the freight not being paid upon the return of the ship, the 
shipowner detained the cargo claiming a lien upon it for his freight.----------------------
22 Ibid. at P. 25, see also per Dallas and Parke,JJ. at P. 27.
23 See T a te  v. M eek  (1818) 8 Taun. 280; Y a tes  v. R a ils to n  (1818) 8 Taun. 293; Y a te s  v. 
M evnell (1818) 8 Taun. 302; Christie v. Lewis (1821) 2 B. & B. 419; Faith v. East India Co. (1821) 4 B. 
& Aid. 630.
24 (1819) 2 B. & Aid. 503.
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In an action by the assignees of the charterer, it was contended that the 
charterer was to be considered as the owner for the voyage, and consequently, 
being the person in possession of the ship, was also the person in possession of 
the goods on board the ship; the shipowner who had parted with the possession 
of the ship, could not by law have a lien upon the goods, of which he never in 
law had the possession. The court held that the charterparty did not amount to 
a demise of the ship. The shipowner had the possession of the ship and goods 
for the voyage, and a lien on the goods for the stipulated hire of the ship.
Again in Cam pion v. C olvin .25 the Court was of the opinion that this was 
the ordinary case of an owner in possession of the ship, who contracted to carry 
the goods to their destination, and to bring a cargo home, and was the case in 
which the shipowner had a lien for the hire of his ship. The delivery of the bills 
for payment of the hire of the ship, being held to precede the delivery of the 
goods, the shipowner was entitled to exercise a lien against the defendants who 
were the charterer's agents and stood in his place.
The courts will not hold a shipowner as having parted with the possession 
of his ship unless such intention is clear from the whole contents of the 
charterparty. In B elcher v. C apper.26 by a charterparty, the ship was chartered 
for six months, to the charterer who was to have the entire and exclusive use 
and disposal of the whole vessel. The chaterparty gave the charterer the power 
of appointing his own master and requiring him to be responsible for his 
conduct. The freight on the goods was to be paid, according to bill of lading, to 
the master appointed by the charterer for his use, without any stipulation that it 
should be applied in payment of the hire of the vessel. The charterer becoming 
bankrupt, the shipowner detained the cargo for the hire due to him under the 
charterparty. In such circumstances, the Court held that possession of the vessel 
was given up to the charterer and the master was in possession of the cargo as
25 (1836) 3 Bing. N.C. 17.
26 (1842) 4 Man. & G. 502.
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agent of the charterer and that no lien was intended to be reserved to the 
shipowner as security for the payment of the charterparty hire.
Although a shipowner can have at common law no right of lien upon the
cargo without actual possession of the ship, he may expressly stipulate in the
charterparty for a lien, in his favour, upon the cargo loaded on board the ship. 
Such an express contract renders it unnecessary to require as to relationship in 
which the parties place themselves by the other provisions of the charterparty. 
It amounts to an undertaking on the part of the charterer that whatever may be 
the legal operation of the charterparty, as between themselves, the charterer's
possession of the ship shall be the possession of the shipowner, as far as the right 
of the latter to a lien on the cargo is concerned.27
However, if the charterparty is in the nature of Time or Voyage
charterparty, the possession of the ship remains in the hands of the shipowner, 
and consequently it is immaterial to try to find out if the shipowner has a lien on 
the cargo, because he already has the possession of his ship and consequently 
has possession of the cargo. Therfore, it would be easier to the shipowner to 
exercise a lien on the cargo for his freight in the of a time or voyage charterparty.
( ii) - Possession of the Cargo;
The shipowner having the possession of the ship should also be in 
possession of the cargo, but it must be an authorised and continued possession, 
in order to require a legal right to a lien over the cargo.
a- A uthorised Possession:
Unauthorised possession does not give rise to a right of lien, since no lien 
can be aquired by the wrongful act of the person claiming it. The doctrine of 
possessory lien being governed by equitable principles, the law will not construe 
any act to vest possession which in itself amounts to fraud.28 There must be a
27 Small v. M oates (1833) 5 Bing. 579, see per Tindal.C.J. at P. 590.
28 See Cross, The Law of Lien & Stoppage in Transitu. (T8401 P. 32.
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bona fide and rightful possession and carriage of the cargo, if the shipowner is to 
rely on a right of lien.29 It therefore, follows that a shipowner can have no 
right of lien for freight against the owner of the goods, if he, knowingly, receives 
them from a wrongdoer, and carries them for him.30 In such a case the 
shipowner would make himself a party to the wrongful act and may not claim
to have the advantage of the rule.31
b- Continuance of Possession;
Continuance of possession is indispensable to the exercise of the right of
lien. Giving up the custody of the goods over which the right extends, 
necessarily frustrates any power to retain them, and operates as an absolute 
waiver of the lien. Therefore, the relinquishement of possession may be as 
follows:
1- Actual: such as the delivery of the cargo to the consignees before
receiving the freight, or voluntary abandonment of the vessel and the cargo on
the voyage.32
2- Constructive: where a party having a lien on goods, caused them to 
be taken in execution, it was held that the lien was destroyed although the goods 
were sold to himself and never removed off his premises, for possession must 
have been vested in the Sheriff in order to enable him to sell the goods.33
29 Bernal v. Pim (1835) 1 Gale. 17.
30 Paesons, L aw  of Shipping. (1869) Vol. 1, P. 180; and see per Pigot,C.J. in W a u g h  v. 
D enham  (1865) 16 Ir.C.L.R. 405-410; Johnson  v. H ill (1822) 3 Stark. 172. But see Exeter Carrier 
cited by Mr. Justice Holt in Y orke v. G reenaueh (1701) 2 Ld. Raym. 866-867..
31 Johnson v. H ill (1822^ 3 Stark. 172.
32 N elson v. Association for Protection of Commercial Interests (1874) 43 L.J.C.P. 218.
33 Jacobs v. L a to u r (1828) 5 Bing. 130, per Best,C.J. at P. 132: "A lien is destroyed if the
party entitled to it gives up his right to the possession of the goods. If another person had sued 
out execution,the defendant might have insisted on his lien. But Messer him self called on the 
sheriff to sell;ha set up no lien against that sale;on the contrary,he thought his best title was
by virtue of sale. Now,in order to sell,the sheriff must have had possession;but after he had
possession from M esser,and with his assent,M esser's subsequent possession m ust have been 
aquired under the sale,and not by virtue of his lien."
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A lien, however, is not lost if the shipowner agrees to hold the goods on
behalf of the consignee by depositing them in his own warehouse for the
convenience of the consignee, to be delivered out as he should want them.34
B- Freight to be Due on Delivery:
It is an established rule that the common law lien for freight only arises if 
the agreed time for payment of freight is contemporaneous with the time of
delivery of the cargo.35 Freight being treated, at common law, as the reward
for the carriage and delivery of the goods, it only became due and payable if the 
goods were carried to the place of destination according to the terms of the 
contract, and for recovery of such freight a shipowner was entitled to detain the 
cargo, even though the contract between the parties contained no express
stipulation as to the time and the manner of the payment.36
Where a charterparty provides that the whole or part of the freight is to be 
paid in advance and before the goods have been carried, or independently of
delivery, "ship lost or not lost", the question which arises is that if such a freight, 
becoming due, remains unpaid, then can a shipowner having carried the goods 
to the port of destination detain them until the freight for their carriage is paid?
The law on the subject is now considered to have been laid down by Privy 
Coucil in the cases of How v. K irc h n e r37 and K irchner v. V e n u s .38 which 
dissented from the decision in Gilkison v. M iddleton39 and Neish v. G raham .40 
on this point.
The facts of the cases of How v. K irchner and Kirchner v. Venus are almost
34 Allan v. G ripper (1832) 2 C. & J. 218.
35 See per Brett,J. in A llison v. Bristol Mar. Ins. (1876) 1 A.C. 209-225; K irch n e r v. V en u s 
(1857) 12 Moor. P.C. 361; How v. Kirchner (1856) 11 Moore. P. C. 21.
36 Black v. Rqs£  (1864) 2 Moo. P. C. (N.S.) 277.
37 (1856) 11 Moore. P. C. 21.
38 (1857) 12 Moore . P. C. 361.
39 (1857) 2 C. B. (N.S.) 134.
40 (1857) 8 E. & B. 505.
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identical. In both cases the goods being shipped under bills of lading, the freight 
was to be paid at the port of loading "one mounth after sailing, ship lost or not 
lost." The only distinction was that in How v. Kirchner. the freight was to be paid 
by "the shipper" while in Kirchner v. Venus the bill of lading did not so expressly 
provide, but it was stipulated that it should be paid to a third person at the port 
of loading. The freight not having been paid, the shipowners refused to deliver 
the goods to the assignees of the bill of lading claiming a lien on the goods for the 
unpaid freight.
In both cases the Privy Council held that the shipowners had no lien on the 
goods, as the sum claimed was not freight properly so called. The payment 
having been stipulated, by the contract, to be made at a fixed period having no 
preference to the delivery of the goods, the word "freight" was held not to have 
been used in the sense that would give a right of lien.41 Lord Kingsdown, in 
delivering the judgement of Privy Council in Kirchner v. V enus, and adhering to 
the opinion of Lord Wensleydale in How v. Kirchner. said:42
"A sum of money payable before the arrival of the ship at her port 
of discharge, and payable by the shippers of the goods at the port of 
shipment, does not aquire the legal character of freight, because it is 
described under that name in a bill of lading, nor does it aquire the 
legal incidents of freight. It is in effect money to be paid for taking 
goods on board and undertaking to carry, and not for carrying 
them."
He finally came to the conclusion that: "where parties, instead of trusting to 
the general rule of law with respect to freight, have made a special contract for 
themselves for a payment which is not freight, it must depend upon the terms 
of that contract whether a lien does or does not exist, and that when the contract 
made no lien the law will not supply one by implication."43
41 See per Lord Wensleydale in How v. K irchm er (1856) 11 Moore. P. C. 21-35.
42 (1857) 12 Moore. P. C. 361, at P. 390.
43 Ibid. at P. 398.
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No lien , therefore, was recognised for the money which was to be paid in 
advance and independently of the delivery of the cargo, the sum not being 
treated as freight in strict sense.
In N e l s o n  v. The Association For The Protection of Commercial 
In te re s ts .44 the freight by the bill of lading was to be paid at the port of 
discharge, "ship lost or not lost" . The vessel being totally wrecked on the voyage, 
the shipowner abandoned the adventure and took no step to save either ship or 
cargo. The defendants, employed by the underwriters, saved a portion of the 
goods and forwarded it to the port of destination. It was held that the
shipowners were not entitled to a lien for the freight mentioned in the bill of
lading. In the view of Brett, J. :
"If the shippers were bound to pay the freight, whether the ship
was lost or not lost, there was no lien at all, for the right to lien does
not arise unless the payment of the freight is to be on delivery of the 
cargo; if the freight is payable without delivery of the cargo lien does 
not accrue."45
Even an express lien clause in a charterparty was thaught not to give the 
shipowner a right of lien in respect of the freight which was payable in advance. 
In Ex Parte Nvholm: Re Child.46 a portion of the freight being made payable on
signing the bill of lading gave the shipowner an absolute lien for "all freight, dead
freight, and demurrage and other charges." Lord Justice James held that the 
money not being freight did not come within the express lien clause:
"It was contended that the lien was created by the express clause of 
lien. The express clause is, however, for freight, dead freight, 
demurrage and other charges. It is not dead freight nor demurrage 
nor other charges, and it is not freight in the ordinary sense of the 
word. But the contention was that the word "freight" here was not
to be read in the ordinary sense, but that the clause was to be read
44 (1874) 34 L.J.C.P. 218.
45 Ibid. at P. 221.
46 (1873) 29 L. T. 634.
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in connection with previous clause as to the payment of freight. The 
£250, it is said, is there expressly stated to be payable as part of 
freight. Thre is some ingenuity, but, in our judgment, no substance, 
in this connection. It would be an unwarranted thing to lay hold of a 
particular form of expression in one part of a charterparty or other 
instrument, in order to give to plain unequivocal language in another
part of the instrument a meaning different from its ordinary
• ti 47meaning.
Before the decision of K irchner v. Venus, however, the cases of G ilkison v. 
M iddleton .48 and Neish v. G raham .49 were decided, bt the Courts of Common 
Pleas and Queen's Bench respectively, apparently upon a different principle.
In G ilkinson v. M iddleton the ship being chartered for a round voyage, the 
freight was to be paid partly in advance by a bill for £900. The charterparty 
provided that the master should sign bills of lading at any rate of freight without 
prejudice to the charterparty, and that the shipowners should have an absolute 
lien upon the cargo for the recovery of all freight, dead freight, demurage due 
under the charterparty. The ship was loaded at Liverpool by the charterers as a 
general ship, but they themselves shipped on their own account goods for which 
the master signed three bills of lading at acertain rate of freight amounting 
altoghether to £196, being made payable in Liverpool one mouth after sailing of 
the vessel, "lost or not lost". The bills of lading were indorsed over, for an 
advance of money, to the defendants. On the arrival of the vessel at the port of 
destination (Singapore), the bill of lading freight not being paid and the 
charterer’s bill given for £900 being dishonoured, the master claimed a lien on 
the goods for the amount. The Court of Common Pleas decided that the 
shipowner had, as against the consignees, a lien upon the goods shipped by the 
charterer for the amount of the bill of lading freight but not for £900.
47 Ibid. at P. 635.
48 (1857) 2 C.B. (N.S.) 134.
49 (1857) 8 E. & B. 505.
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Cockbum, C.J. said:
"The cargo being expressly made liable for all freight due under the 
charterparty, it follows, that, on the arrival of the ship at Singapore, 
there was £900 due for freight, for which the cargo was liable. If 
matters had so remained, the owners clearly would have had a lien 
for that £900. But they have by their master become parties to the 
bills of lading making the goods deliverable to the cosignees on 
payment of certain specified freight; and the defendants have made 
advances upon the faith of those bills of lading. The owners, 
therefore, have, by their own act, placed third parties in a situation 
in which they would sustain prejudice by their insisting on the full 
right to which they would otherwise have been entitled. That being 
so, it seems to me that the utmost the plaintiffs can be entitled to 
recover as against the consignees, is the freight mentioned in the 
three bills of lading; and for that sum, and that sum only, they are
entitled to the judgment of the court."50
Crowder, J. also was of the opinion that as between the shipowners and the 
charterer, the former would be entitled to a lien for the unpaid advance freight. 
It formed, he said, a portion of the freight for which by express agreement the 
lien was to attach.51
The case of N eish v. G raham .52 proceeded entirely upon this authority, 
while there was no express clause giving the shiponer a lien. The goods being 
shipped at Glasgow, under the bill of lading, were consigned to the defendants 
abroad. Freight for the goods was to be paid by the "shipper" , one mounth after 
sailing, "ship lost or not lost" . The bill of lading was handed over to the 
defendants at Glasgow, who made an advance to the shipper. The shipper not 
paying the freight, the master refused to deliver the cargo without payment of 
the freight. The Court of Queen's Bench considered the case of G ilk inson  v. 
Middleton to be exactly in point. Lord Campbell, C.J. said:
"It might have been argued that though there is always a lien where
it is not waived, yet there is such a waiver when the freight is to be
paid at the port of shipment within a mounth from the sailing of the
50 (1857) 2 C.B. (N.S.) 134-153.
51 Ibid., see P. 154, see also perCresswell and Willes,JJ. at P. 154.
52 (1857) 8 E. & B. 505.
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ship. But we find that the Court of Common Pleas, in a case quite in
point, has decided otherwise: and I am not at all prepared to
disagree with them."53
The cases of G ilkinson v. M iddleton and N eish v. G raham , have not been 
overruled by any English case, but they have not been regarded as authority.54 
On the other hand, the principle laid down by the Privy Coucil has been 
supported by both text book writers,55 and by subsequent cases.56
The rule as to lien, laid down by the Privy Coucil in Kirchner v. V enus, may 
have been correct at the time, when it was thought that the freight and advance 
freight were different.
But there are a number of cases disapproving the dicta of Lord Kingsdown 
in that case, as to the meaning put upon the term "freight". It is now clear that 
the view was incorrect and that the "freight" whether used in respect of advance 
freight or otherwise, always has the same meaning.57 As freight payable in 
advance is still a remuneration for the carrige of the goods and not, as was 
thought, for taking the goods on board and undertaking to carry them, therefore 
the mere fact that by an express agreement of the parties it was to be paid in 
advance should not deprive the shipowner from his security for its payment. It
is a freight due and unpaid atthe time delivery of the cargo, and it seems most
unfair for the shipowner who has fulfilled his obligation under the contract by
carrying the goods to the port of destination, not to be allowed to have the
53 Ibid.at P.511, Coleridge and Wightman and Erle,JJJ. agreed with him.
54 See Abbott,(1901) 14th ed., P. 345; Maclachlan,(1932) 7th ed., P. 426; Scrutton,(1974)
8th ed., P. 381.
55 See Maclachlan,7th ed., P. 426; Maude &Pollock, (1881) 4th ed., P. 394; Stephens, T h e  
Law Relating To Freight .(19071 P. 188; Scrutton,18th ed., P. 381 ;Abbott, 14th ed., P. 356,where it 
states that "K irc h n e r  v. Venus mav be regarded as a decision of unquestionable authority so 
far as it deals with lien for freight." But see Carver,12th ed., P. 1335,where he doubts the 
correctness of the rule.
56 See Ex P. Nvholm, re Child (1873) 29 L.T.634: Nelson v.Association for Protection of 
Commercial Interests (1874) 43 L.J.C.P.218; Tam vaco v. Simpson ( 1866) L.R. 1C.P. 363; G ardner v. 
Trechm ann (1884) 15 Q.B.D. 154.
57 See Allison v. Bristol Mar. Ins. (1876) 1 A.C.209; W eir v. G irvin (1900) 1 Q.B. 45-52.
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advantage of the common law lien for remuneration for their carriage;
considering the principle that such a lie always exists in favour of the shipowner 
unless it waived either expressly, or impliedly, by entering into an agreement 
inconsistent with the right of lien.
The question remains as to whether the cases of G ilkison v. M iddleton and
Neish v. Graham may be treated, at the present, as authoroties? The former case
may be supported, since as between the charterer and the shipowner, the
charterparty expressly gave a lien for all freight due under the charterparty. As 
against the charterer, the shipowner would have been entitled to a lien for 
unpaid freight. It seeme that it was upon this distinction that in T am vaco  v. 
S im pson.58 Mr Justice Willes, who was the member of the Court which decided 
Gilkinson v. M iddelton. said that although in Kirchner v. V enus, the Privy Coucil 
thought that they were acting in opposition to G ilkinson v. M iddelton . in truth 
they were not.59
As against the bill of lading holders, the lien could be enforced, since they 
were also the consignees named in the bill of lading who were, by the terms of 
the bill of lading, to take delivery of the goods paying freight for them "one 
mounth after sailing of the vessel". There seem to be no inconsistency in
exercising a lien against a person who was to the freight in advance but has
failed to do so.
As regards the case of N eish v. G rah am .60 the case does not seem to be 
supportable as an authority on the subject. The freight by the bill of lading being
made payable by the shipper, one month after saling, the bills of lading were
indorsed to the defendants, abroad who made advances to the shipper, upon the 
faith of the statement in the bill of lading. The arrangements as to the payment 
of freight and the dealing with the bills of lading do not seem to be consistent
58 (1865) 19 C.B. (N.S.) 453.
59 Ibid., see P. 466.
60 (1858) 8 E. & B. 505.
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with the right to exercise a lien against such indorsees.
Extent of Lien at Common Law:
The right of lien which arises from the common law is cinfined to the
shipowner’s charges payable for the carriage of the particular cargo.61 That is to 
say the lien recognised in favour of the shipowner by common law is a 
particular or specific lien, as opposed to general lien, which is a right to detain the 
goods, not only for the freight of the particular cargo,but for other freights due 
upon other transactions.62 The latter, as pointed out by Lord Ellenborough, C.J. 
in Rushforth v. H adfie ld .63 being an encroachment upon the common law right 
of the subject, and therefore not encouraged by the courts.
In the absence of an express contract between the parties, or some usage of 
trade, or evidence showing that such was their common mode of previous 
dealings, the courts dicourage further extension of such general privilege and 
any right beyond the specific lien to which parties are entitled at common 
law.64
The specific lien of a shipowner extends to all goods of a particular
shipment, consigned to same person on the same voyage, for the freight due on 
some or all of them. It is immaterial that the goods are carried under different 
bills of lading, as long as they have not been indorsed to different persons.
The principle was established as far back as i796 by the unreported case
of Sodergren v. Flight, which was cited in the argument in H anson v. M ever.65
There a cargo of tar and iron was loaded on the plaintiffs ship and was 
consigned to H, who held two bills of lading for it. The defendants, before arrival
61 See per Lord Buckmaster,L.C. in U.S. Steel Products Co. v. Great Western Rv. (1916) A.C. 
189-196.
62 Ibid., see P. 196.
63 (1805) 6 East 519-526.
64 See Cross (J.), The Law of Lien. P.15; Rushforth v. Hadfield (18051 6 East 519.
65 (1805) 6 East 622.
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of the ship, purchased all the tar from H, and gave him their acceptance for the
value, including freight which was to be paid by H., who indorsed the two bills of
lading to the defendants or their order, one of which was for tar alone, and the
other for certain barrels of tar and a quantity of iron. H, sold the iron to C, and for
this purpose obtained from the defendants the possession of the bill of lading 
which included the iron, and delivered it to C. Upon the arrival of the ship and 
after delivery of part of the cargo of tar ,H, stopped payment; the master refused 
to deliver the remaining tar to the defendants unless the would pay the freight 
not only for what remained but of what have been already delivered.
Lord Kenyon decided that the master was entitled to recover the whole 
amount of the freight for the tar. His Lordship being of the opinion that the
master had a lien on the tar remaining on board for the whole freight, as well as 
the freight of the goods delivered as of those remaining on board, belonging all to 
the same person and under one consignment. But he pointed out that if H, had 
sold the tar to different persons, the master could not have made one pay for the 
freight of what have been delivered to another.
Threfore, as delivery of part of the cargo will not defeat the lien the
remainder for the whole freight, then a shipowner will not be bound to retain 
the whole cargo until he is paid for its carriage, but if he delivers part of the 
goods without receiving the freight in respect of them, then he will still be 
entitled to retain the remaining cargo until he is paid for the whole freight,66 
unless the bills of lading in respect of such goods are in the hands of different 
persons, or the goods have different destinations.67
As a conclusion to the lien of the shipowner in the common law, one might 
that the common law does recognise a lien for the carrier on the cargo for the
66 See Black v. R o se  (1864) 11 More. N.S. 277, see also P e rez  v. A lso p  (1862) 3 F.&F. 
188,where it was held that the lien of a shipownerfor freight,being entire,is not lost or waived
by allowing part o f the cargo to be taken away on paym ent of a portion only o f the
freight,without some contract with the authority of the shipowner.
67 Bernal v. Pirn (1835) 1 Gale. 17.
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payment of his freight. This lien is in the nature of a possessory lien. Thus,
Blackburn, J. held in, Hingston v. W endt:68
"... The case is very analogous to general average and to salvage, in 
both of which there is a lien. It is just and convenient that there 
should be such a lien, and what scanty authority we can find all
points in the direction of there being a lien, and we think that we 
must hold that there is one ... ."
Therefore, where the shipowner performs his obligation by carrying the 
cargo, he is entiled to a lien because he rendered a service to the cargo and
which increased its value by carrying it to its destination. Moreover, Lord
Kingsdom, in Kirchner v. Venus.69 stated that :
"... The right of lien may arise either by implication of law, or by 
express contract between the parties. Freight is the reward payable 
to the carrier for the safe carriage and delivery of the goods; it is only 
payable on the safe carriage and delivery; if the goods are lost on the
voyage, nothing is payable. On the other hand, if the goods are
safely carried, the Master of ship has a lien on the goods for the
amount of the freight due for such carriage,and cannot be compelled 
to part with the goods till such freight be paid. These incidents to 
freight exist by rule of law, without reference to any bill of lading, or
other written contract between the parties."
2- Express Terms of C harterparty :
Where there is an express agreement between the parties, the shipowner 
has a lien on the cargo, given to him by the express contract for the carriage of 
goods. Thus, the right of lien, by express contract of the parties, may be
extended so as to apply to claims which are not covered by the common law
lien.70 So there is no lien at common law for any charges than those mentioned
previously. The shipowner has therefore at common law no lien for freight not
68 (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 367. at P. 373.
69 (1859) 12 M 10 PC 361. at P. 959.
70 Clauses are frequently inserted in charters which expressly give a lien on the cargo 
for freight, and also for dead freight, and for demurrage.
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payable on delivery, for deadfreight, for demurrage or damages for detention, 
for pilotage or any other charges which the shipper has agreed to pay, for freight 
due on previous voyages or for any other debts due to the shipowner. Any such 
lien must be created by special contract,71 and is then valid and enforceable. 
Thus, there may be a lien by agreement for advance freight, dead freight or 
demurrage at the port of loading or discharge, including unpaid freight due in 
respect of previous voyages and strike expenses.72 Therefore, most of the
charterparties give to the shipowners a lien on the cargo for the garantee of 
payment of freight. For instance, the New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) form 
of time charterparty, provides in its1 clause 18, that:
"That the owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and sub-freights 
for amounts due under this charter...,"
and the Baltime Uniform Time Charter reads in its clause 18 as follows:
" 18. Lien .
The owners to have a lien upon all cargoes and sub-freights 
belonging to the Time-Charterers and any Bill of Lading freight for 
all claims under this charter, ..."
For the nature of this lien, it depends on the situation of every case. Thus, it 
seems clear that in a time or voyage charterparty or bill of lading, this is a 
contractual creation of a possessory lien. In the case of a demise charter it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that, if anything, it would be an equitable lien. 
It would not be a lien amounting to a possessory lien as the owner would have 
no power to prevent delivery and it is only as an equitable lien that such a 
clause makes sense in the context of a demise charterparty. However, to better 
understand the nature of the shipowner's lien on the cargo for guarrantee of 
payment of freight, it would be best to have a look at most of the cases which
71 Birlv v. G ladstone (1814) 3 M & S 205 ; G ladstone v. Birlv (1817 ) 2 Mer 401.
72 See, Halsburv's Laws o f England. 4 th ed, vol 43; para 691 at p. 479; also Scrotton on 
C harterparties , 17 th ed , at p. 376, and Carver on Carriage bv Sea. 13 th ed, at para 2010.
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were laid down about this point.
Thus, in English law liens may be granted by the common law, by equity,
by statute or by contract. The liens of the owners over the cargoes, given by cl.
18 of the New York Produce Exchange form in line 110 or line 126 of the
Baltime form cl. 18 as well, is a contractual lien only. It has not independent root 
in common law, equity or statute.73 Consequently, it creates a right only as 
between the parties to the contract in which it is contained.
By looking at the different contracts which are drawn between charterers
and shipowners in the form of charterparties, and by looking at the different 
clauses which give a lien to the shipowners on the charterers' cargoes, one might
say that the lien given by clause 18 of the New York Produce Exchange form and
cl. 18 of the Baltime form is a possessory lien, the owners' right being to retain 
possession of the cargo until monies owed to them by the charterers have been 
paid. In Hammonds v. Barclay.74 Grose, J., said:
" A lien is a right in one man to retain that which is in his possession 
belonging to another, till certain demands of him the person in
possession are satisfied."
This accurately describes the nature of the owners' lien upon cargo, which 
is in their possession by being on their ship. However, one must notice that the 
situation is different in the case of demise charterparty, which is the only 
exception where the cargo is not in the owners' possession. Therefore, in the 
case of voyage or time charterparty the shipowner has possession of the ship 
and therefore, of the cargo and he can exercise his lien by detainaing the cargo 
until his claims are satisfied, which are mainly and in most of the cases the 
payment of his freight.
In the "C eb u " .75 it was held that the owners had a lien for their freight,
73 Michael Wilford. Terence Coghlin. Nicholas J. Healy, Jr. John K im ball. T i m e  
C harters. 2 nd edition. 1982. at p. 332.
74 ( 1802) 2 East 227.
75 [1983 ] QB. 1005.
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where by a time charterparty in the form of the " NYPE " form, the shipowners' 
vessel was chartered to charterers, sub-chartered to sub-charterers, and sub­
sub-chartered to sub-sub-charterers. Clause 18 of the charterparty provided 
that: "the Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes, and all sub-freights for any 
amounts due under this charter."
After a dispute arose between the owners and the charterers regarding the 
hire payable, the owners sent a telex to the sub-sub-charterers purporting to 
exercise their right to a lien and requiring the sub-sub-charterers to pay to the 
owners direct any hire payable by them to the sub-charterers under the sub- 
sub-charter. The sub-sub-charterer issued a summon seeking the court's
determination of the question whether the hire due from them should be paid 
to the owners or to the sub-charterers. The sub-charterers contended (i) that 
cl. 18 was only intended to give a lien on sub-freights earned by a voyage 
charter and did not apply to sub-hire earned under a time charter...
It was held by Lloyd. J. , that the owners had a lien for their remuneration 
for the use of their vessel, for the following reason that:
"On its true construction cl. 18 of the charterparty gave the owners a 
lien on any remuneration earned by the charterers from their 
employment of the vessel, whether by way of voyage freight or 
time charter."
Thus, in the common law the shipowner has a lien for the carriage of goods 
on his ship, then at common law a lien for freight if payable contemporaneously 
with the delivery of the goods. However, the parties to the contract of carriage of 
goods by sea which is usally mentioned in a charterparty, the parties agree that 
the shipowner will have a lien on the goods for the payment of his freight.
Thus, in the "A egnoussiotis"76. the owners let their vessel Aegnoussiotis to 
the charterers for a St.Lawrence round voyage, and that agreement was by a
time charter in the " NYPE " form, where by cl.5. , the payment of the said hire
76 [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268.
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was to be made in London in cash ... monthly in advance, and for the last month 
or part of the same the approximate amount of hire, and should the same not
cover the actual time, hire is to be paid for the balance day by day as it becomes
due, if so required by Owners... otherwise failing the punctual and regular
payment of hire ... or any breach of this charter-party the Owners shall be at 
liberty to withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers... .
Moreover, the charter provided in clause 18, that ' the owners shall have a
lien upon all cargoes and all sub-freights for any amounts due under this
charter...1
While the vessel was discharging, a dispute arose as to whether any if so 
how much hire was due. Hire had been paid until a certain period but not after. 
So, the owners told the charterers that the master would be instructed to stop
discharging unless the hire was paid in full. Hire was not paid and consequently 
discharging stopped. The owners contended that they were entitled to take this 
course since they were (a) cancelling the charter or (b) temporarily withdrawing 
the vessel or (c) exercising a lien on the cargo in accordance with the provision of 
the charter.
It was held by Donaldson, J. , that: the owners had a lien upon all cargoes
and hire continued to be payable during the discharging period. Moreover, he
said about cl.18: that :
" I have come to a different conclusion. In my judgement, cl.18 is to
be construed as meaning what it says, namely, that the time
charterers agree that the owners shall have a lien upon all
cargoes."77
So, every time that a charterparty cleary gives the shipowner a lien on the 
cargo for the garantee of payment of his freight, the shipowner has a lien, i.e., the 
right to detain the cargo until the freight is paid, and the freight does not have to
77 The H Aegnoussiotis T 19771 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268 at p. 276.
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be contemporaneously with the delivery of the goods like the common law lien
for freight. However, if the parties agree that the payment of freight has to be 
made after delivery of the cargo to the consignee, here, the shipowners lose their 
lien on the cargo for freight because, the cargo is no more in their possession, and 
because the only way to exercise that lien is by detaining the cargo in their 
possession. Nevertheless, everytime that the parties agree to give the shipowner 
a lien on the cargo, the latter is entitled to retain the cargo until his freight is paid.
Therefore, in the N anfri.78 Lord Russell of Killowen,79 defines the nature 
of this lien as:
"The lien operates as an equitable charge on what is due from the 
shippers to the charterers, and in order to be effective requires an 
abilitiy to intercept the sub-freight (by notice of claim) before it is 
paid by shipper to charterer" ...
Moreover, in the "M ira m a r" .80 it was held that the shipowners were
entitled to exercise a lien on the cargo for the sums they were claiming.
By a charterparty dated May 19, 1980, the plaintiffs let their vessel 
Miramar to the charterers, S.E.A. Petrochem Pte. Ltd. (Petrochem) for a voyage 
from Singapore to one safe berth, Haldia or Calcuta. The charter was on the 
Exxonvoy form. The charter was subsequently amended so as to give the 
charterers the options of discharging at one safe port in Sri Lanka. Among the 
different clauses of the charterparty, there was cl.21 which gave the owners a 
lien on the cargo by providing that:
"The owners shall have an absolute lien on the cargo for all freight, 
dead freight, demmurage and costs, including attorney fees, of 
recovering the same, which lien shall continue after delivery of the 
cargo into the possession of the charterer or of holders of any bills of 
lading covering the same or of any storageman."
78 Federal Commerce and Navigation Ltd v. Molena Alpha Inc and O thers.
The Nanfri. The Benfri. The Lorfri. [1979] 1 All E R 307.
79 Ibid, at p. 318.
80 The "Miramar" [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 319.
211
The vessel arrived at Trincomalee but was kept wating for a time and was 
then diverted to Madras in consideration of additional freight. The vessel was
however kept waiting at Madras and was then sent back to Trincomalee. On the 
second occasion the vessel entered Trincomalee and began to discharge, and 
then a substantial sum was due by way of demurrage under the charter. The
plaintiff made repeated demands that this should be paid by Petrochem or by 
the defendants. The defendants denied liability, and therefore, the plaitiffs 
purported to exercise a lien by witholding d elivery to shore tanks. The 
deadlock was ultimately resolved by an agreement between the plaitiffs and the
defendants recorded in a letter dated July 11, 1980, and upon the execution of 
the agreement the lien was lifted and discharge was completed. Among the 
different issues which arose for decision are the following: ... (b) - if the plaitiffs 
had no contractual claim against the defendants, were they nevertheless entitled 
to exercise a lien on the cargo in respect of the demmurage under the charter? 
(c)- were the plaitiffs entitled to recover either by virtue of a direct contractual 
right or through the medium of cl.21 (the lien clause) and the agreement of July
11, in respect of certain expenses incurred during the second call at
Trincom alee?
It was held by Mustill, J. , that, the plaitiffs were entitled to exercise a lien
against the defendants in respects of sums accrued due by way of demurrage,
and he said:
"Here, at least, there is in my view no room for doubt. Looking first 
at the presumed intention of the draftsman, one sees that the clause 
is designed to create a lien over the 'cargo' ."81
Thus, in most of the cases the shipowner who had the cargo in his
possession was allowed to detain the cargo until his claim is satisfied. Therefore, 
it seems clear that in a time or voyage charterparty or bill of lading this is a 
contractual creation of a possessory lien. In the case of a demise charter it is
81 Ibid, at p. 324.
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difficult to escape the conclusion that, if anything, it would be an equitable lien 
akin to a possessory lien (as held in the case of a time charterer’s lien on the 
chartered ship) as the owner would have no power to prevent delivery because 
the possession of the vessel and therefore the possession of the cargo passed to
the charterer's possession. So, it is only an equitable lien that such a clause
makes sense in the context of a demise charterparty.
However, one might ask himself about the basis of the nature of this lien,
and therefore, one might say that this lien can be described as an equitable lien
given to the shipowner for the services he rendered to the cargo, because these 
services have increased the value of the cargo and that by carrying it from one 
place to another, therefore, its's merchantable value has increased. Here, the
case is treated in the French and Algerian Civil Codes,82 under the heading of
the unlawful enrichment. However, English law does not consider the theory of 
unlawful enrichment to justify the case of recompense and therefore the lien, 
but, on the contrary, Scots law does recognise that theory.
The theory of "unjustified  enrichm ent1':
In 1951 Lord Porter observed in an English appeal:83
"The exact status of the law of unjust enrichment is not yet assured.
It holds a predominant place in the law of Scotland and, I think of 
the United States, but I am content ... to accept the view that it forms 
no part of the law of England.”84
The priciple of recompense is defined in Bell's Principle,85 as follows:
"Where one has gained by the lawful act of another, done without 
any intention of donation, he is bound to recompense or indemnify 
that other to the extent of the gain."
82 French Civil Code, Article 1375, and the Algerian Civil Code, Article 141.
83 Reading v. Att. Gen. [1951) A.C. 507. at pp. 513-514.
84 Smith.T.B. A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland.(1962). p. 623.
85 § 588;
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This is, however, not an adequate definition, as has been pointed out by 
Lord President Dunedin in Edinburgh Tramways v. C o u rtn ey .86 Not every 
consequential benefit which accrues to A by reason of B's efforts or misfortunes 
will entitle B to a claim against A in recompense.87 For instance, if a proprietor 
or tenant heats his house in such a way that his neighbour enjoys the benefit, 
the fact that he does will not found a claim for recompense.88 Moreover, 
Erskine describes recompense as an obligation " by which a person who is made 
richer through the occasion, or by the act of another, without any purpose of 
donation, is bound to indemnify that other."89 The case of unlawful enrichment 
or recompense is a question of circumstances according to the circumstances of 
each case as to whether equity does or does not found the claim. The obligation 
is "founded on the consideration that the party making the demand has been 
put to some expense or some disadvantage there has been a benefit created to 
the party from whom he makes demand of such a kind that it cannot be 
undone."90
The opinion has been expressed,91 that the expense or disadvantage to the 
claimant is one which must have been incurred under or in consequence of 
some misconception as to his legal position or rights. "The second rule is that 
where a party in error but in bona fide has expended money, and another steps 
in and takes the benefit, equity requires not that he shall be reinbursed, but that 
the other shall pay him in quantum lucratus."92
So, in most of the cases, where a person has rendered services or expended 
money without any intention of donation and then another person gets the 
benefit. The one who benefitted from the act of the person who expended
86 1909 S.C. 99 at p. 105.
87 Karnes, Equity. 4 th e d . , p. 101 et seq.
88 Edinburgh and District Tramways Co v. Courtnev. per Lord Pre Dun (supra 86).
89 Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland . vol. 12. 1931. p. 342.
90 Per Lord Pres. Inglis in S tew art v. S tew art. 1878, 6R. 145.
91 Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland . vol. 12. 1931. at p. 343.
92 B uchanan  v. S tew art. 1874, 2R. 78, per Lord Neaves at p. 81.
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money or rendered services, must reimburse the latter to the extent of the 
expense or service which the claimant has made and, this theory is supported 
by the principles of justice and equity.
However, the application of this principle to this case is quite difficult and 
the different lawyers and authors might not agree with the application of this
theory in this case, that is because, it is general principle that where parties'
relations are regulated by contract a claim founded on recompense is 
in c o m p e te n t ,93 unless the contract has been frustrated, reduced, or so
completely departed from as to make it inapplicable as the basis of 
rem uneration.94
However, if one looks back to the case of the shipowner whose ship was 
used to carry goods under a contract of carriage of goods by sea in the form of a 
demise charterparty, in this case the shipowner has not got the possession of his 
ship, and therefore not the possession of the cargo. Therefore, it is very difficult
or almost impossible for him to exercise his lien, in this case, it would best for the 
interest of the shipping trade to give the shipowner an equitable lien on the 
basis of unlawful or unjust enrichment.
In H ingston v. W endt.95 a "lien" was given for work done affecting goods 
by a person lawfully in possession of them.
A vessel having gone ashore with a cargo on board, the plaintiff, a ship 
agent, was put in possession of the ship and cargo by the captain, with authority 
from the captain to do, as his agent, what was for the benefit of all concerned. 
The plaintiff did work and expended money in discharging the cargo, and 
brought it to a place of safety, where he took possession of it. The hull broke up,
93 Walker. David M. The Law of Contracts, and related obligations in Scotland.. London 
Butterworths 1979. at p. 544.
94 Sm all v. M i  (1847) 9 D 1043; A/S Heimdale v. Noble 1907 SC 249;
M ackenzie v. Baird's Trustees 1907 SC 838; Mackav v. Lord Advocate 1914 1 SLT 33;
Bovd and Forrest v. Glasgow and South Western Rlv Co. 1915 SC (HL) 20.
95 Hingston v. W endt. (1876). 1. Q. B. D. p. 367. see p e r .
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and became a wreck.
It was held, that the plaintiff had a lien on the cargo for his charges as
against the owner, though such charges were incurred without authority from
the owner, the claim being analogous to that for general average or salvage.
This case was not a case of general average nor of salvage, but the ship
agent was given a lien on the cargo for the expenses he made to save the cargo, 
because saving the cargo means saving its* value and, because the ship's agent
saved the value of that cargo he must be entitled to a lien for his own expenses, 
and that because according to the principles of justice and equity, no one is 
entitled to benefit from the work of another without compensating the latter. 
This is what is called the "unlawful enrichment" .
Therefore, where there is general average or salvage, there is always a lien 
for saving the cargo. So, on the basis of this argument, everytime that work has 
been done affecting goods by a person lawfully in possession of them, he is
entitled to a lien, and it is immaterial whether it is for general average or
salvage.96
However, the case of the shipowner in the case of a demise charterparty is 
different from that of the one who rendered services to the cargo like in the case 
of salvage or general average, bechause the shipowner in the first case did not 
render any services, he has merely offered his ship to be used against the 
payment of a remuneration. Moreover, even if he is given a lien on the cargo it 
is quite difficult or almost impossible for this shipowner to exercise his lien on 
the cargo, because it is a well known fact that the possession and control of the 
vessel and therefore of the cargo pass altogether to the possession of the demise 
charterer. Therefore, the shipowner stays without any garantee for the
payment of his freight and, this is not accepted neither by the principles of 
justice nor those of equity. Thus, it would be in the interest of the shipping trade
96 See, N icholson v. C hapm an. 2 H. Bl. 254. and, Castellain v. T hom pson. 13 C.B. (N.S.) 105 ; 
32 L J. (C.P.) 79.
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and in the interest of the shipowner, to give the shipowner whose vessel has 
been demise chartered a prefered claim or right over the goods of the charterer, 
and that by enabling him to have the cargo arrested into a third party's hands 
until his freight is paid, and a right to trace the goods into whosever hands they 
might fall, and that in the case where the charterer tries to defraud the 
shipowner by passing the goods into a third party's possession. However, this 
right must not be absolute, otherwise the shipowner might abuse of his right 
and that will cause an inconvenience to the demise charterer. This can be
possible if the right of the shipowner is only exercised by the court everytime 
that the shipowner claims the payment of his freight.
3-1-2- The Nature of the “Privilege" on the Cargo for Payment of 
Freight in Civil Law Jurisdictions.
After having discussed the nature of the shipowner's lien on the cargo for 
the guarantee of payment of his freight, it is worthwhile looking at the opinion of 
the civil law jurisdictions, namely the French and the Algerian law, so that we 
can compare the common law opinion with that of the civil law jurisdictions.
In the common law the nature of the shipowner's lien on the cargo, is 
considered as a type of possessory lien, because the shipowner can retain the 
possession of the goods while they are in his possession or in the possession of 
the captain who acts as an agent of the shipowner in the case of a voyage or time 
charterparty. However, the situation is different in the case of a demise 
charterparty, where by the nature of this charter the possession and control of 
the ship have passed to the charterer.
Therefore, the shipowner cannot retain the goods, that is because they are 
not in his possession, but are in the possession of the charterer who has the 
possession of the ship. In this case, one might say that the shipowner has an 
equitable lien, because equity does not allow anyone to benefit from the loss of
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another without compensating that one who rendered services or whose thing 
has been used without any intention of donation.
Because this work is intended to be comparative, we shall compare the 
view of the common law with that of the civil law. First, we must look at the
nature which the civil law accords to the shipowner’s lien or "privilege" on the
cargo for the guarantee of payment of freight.
The civil law jurisdictions know what is known as "privilege" and the 
common law jurisdictions know what is called "lien", and therefore, it would be 
worth to define the "privilege" of the civil law jurisdictions before trying to 
define its' nature.
Definition and Content:
In the French and Algerian maritime law, the guarantee for payment of 
freight is guaranteed by a privilege. This privilege or lien, or right of priority is 
accompanied by a right of consignation and a right of sale; these last two rights 
guarantee the first. It is therefore, this privilege or right of priority which 
characterises the civil law system. What the French legislator means by 
"privilege" is defined in article 2095 of the civil code as follows : "Le privilege est 
un droit que la qualite de la creance donne a un creancier d'etre prefere aux 
autres creanciers, meme hpothecaires.ae , i.e., " The right of priority is a right 
given by the quality of the debt to a creditor to preferred to the other creditors, 
even mortgagees."
The Algerian civil code gives to the term "pivilege" quite a similar definition, 
where it defines it in its' article 982 as : " Le privilege est un droit de preference 
concede par la loi au profit d'une creance determinee en consideration de sa 
qualite. " , i.e., " The right of priority is a right to be preferred given by the law to 
the benefit of a well determined debt and that in consideration of its’ quality." . 
This general definition which aims all the right of priority in the French and 
Algerian law, cannot be applied to the maritime law. In fact, Ripert said that: " it
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is not the quality of the debt which gives to the creditor a right to be preferred, 
but the relationship between the debt and the maritime venture".97
Since then, if one wants to apply the definition of the article 2095 of the 
French civil code and 982 of the Algerian civil code to the maritime law, it must 
be precised that: "The maritime right of priority is a right that the relationship 
between the debt and the maritime venture gives to the creditor to be preferred 
on the other creditors."98
This is a wide and very general definition. The legislator in giving the 
conditions of exercise of the "privilege" or the right of priority on the goods, 
forgot to define this institution. Even the enactment or order of Colbert, the code 
of commerce and the French law of 1966 were all silent about this point. This is 
however, not astonishing, if we consider that the legislator only uses this term to 
define a group of rights which are very different in their nature and existing, 
either on the vessel, or the cargo, or even on the freight.
Therefore, we will not be surprised by the use of the term "privilege" which 
in itself is not enough to define a particular legal institution, and which aim and 
meaning are different from one case to another. We must therefore, focus on 
the "privilege" of the shipowner and the carrier, as being in principle and in a 
general way, the right to be preferred for the payment of his freight on the 
goods. Therefore, from this principle comes the right of depositing the goods and
therefore, their sale. The jurisprudence uses very often the terms « d ro i t  de 
sequestration», i.e., " the right of sequestration " . "  Thus, it is a matter of a
97 Ripert Georges, Droit Maritime. 4em ed. , Vol. Paris, 1952, p. 67.
«  ce n 'est pas la qualite de la creance qui lui donne (au creancier) un droit
preferentiel, mais bien plutot le rapport entre la creance et l'expedition maritime » .
98 «  Le privilege maritime est un droit que le rapport entre la creance e t l'expedition 
maritime donne a un creancier d'etre prefere aux a u tre s .» .  I t is this "relatioship"that Cleirac 
was stating in the old saying : «  le bastel est affecte a la marchandise et la marchandise au 
bastel. »  , i.e., " the ship is obliged or bound towards the cargo and the cargo towards the ship. 
Francis Schertenleib. Le Fret, la Garantie de son Paiement. Geneve 1971. at p. 60.
99 See, the judgment or the decision of the court of appeal of Rouen, 3 novembre 1950, 
Le Droit Maritime Francais, Paris, 1951, . 124.
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special « p ro c e d u re »  which has for aim to insure the exercise of the privilege. 
Here, it is very interesting to state the observation of Ripert,100 who writes the 
com m entary:
"quand on declare que le droit fran^ais refuse au capitaine le droit de 
retention, il faut bien preciser le sens de la disposition legale. Le capitaine n'est 
pas oblige de se fier a la promesse du destinataire; il peut, s'il le veut, demander 
la consignation; or, la consignation n'est pas autre chose que la retention exercee 
par l'intermediaire d'un tiers", i.e., " when we declare that the French law refuses 
to the captain the right of retention, we must precise the meaning of the legal 
provision. The captain is not obliged to trust the promise of the consignee; he 
can, if he wants to, order for the consignation or the deposit; because, the 
consignation or the deposit is nothing else that the retention which exercised 
through a third party. "
However, the right to deposit the goods has for consequence the right to ask 
for the sale of the goods by authority of the law. This right however, has never 
been absolute. The sale cannot take place, unless it is judged necessary, and the 
presiding judge will have to consider the interests of both parties of the 
litigation.101 Therefore, just as the deposit or the consignation, the right to ask for 
the sale is considered as a special means for the recovery of the freight.102
However, we must consider that these two means from which the 
"privilege" or right of priority of the shipowner is born, have essentially a 
procedural character.
The Legal Nature of this " Privilege
Many writers tried to define the legal definition of this "privilege", i.e., the 
right of priority which guarantee the payment of the freight. It is necessary to 
remember that the French amendment of !966 makes a distinction between
100 Ripert G . , op. c i t . , note 1, p. 554.
101 Bleinc Pierre, De la consignation en main tierces des merchandises arrivant par 
m er. Marseille, 1933, p. 19.
102 Denisse Leon, Du fret considere avec ses rapports avec l'abandon. l'affretem ent. la 
contribution aux avaries communes et les assurances maritimes. Paris, 1891, p. 308.
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contracts of affreightment and contracts of carriage. However, the institution 
which guarantees the payment of freight has remained the same in its1 
principles, whether it is concerned with the guarantee of the dept of the 
shipowner or the dept of the carrier. Therefore, the different comments made 
by the commentators of the code of commerce keep all their value under the 
new law. The guarantee for payment of freight under a charterparty is defined 
in article 2 of the code of commerce (which includes the maritime law),103 : "Le 
freteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son fret", i.e., " 
The shipowner has a right of priority over the goods for the payment of his 
freight " , and we must remember that this provision concerns all the different 
types of affreightment including the hire of the ship.104
On the other hand, the Algerian Maritime Code,105 defines it in its' article 
645 as follows : "Le freteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement 
de son fret et autres charges prevues au contrat d'affretement", i.e., " The 
shipowner has a right of priority over the goods for the payment of his freigh 
and other charges provided by the contract of affreightment ". However, one 
might notice that the Algerian legislator brought quite a similar definition to that 
one of the French legislator, and that may be because of historical reasons. 
When it comes to the carrier, his right of priority is defined by article 23 of the 
same French law,106 which provides that : "Le capitaine est prefere, pour son fret 
sur les marchandises de son chargement, pendant la quinzaine apres leur 
delivrance si elles n'ont passe en mains tierces", i.e., " The captain is preferred for 
his freight on the goods of his cargo, during the fifteen days after their delivery,
unless they have passed to the hands of a third party." Moreover, his right of
priority is stated in article 24 which provides that : "En cas de faillite ou
103 Loi No 66-420 du 18 juin 1966, sur les contrats d 'affretem ent et de transport 
m a ritim e s .
104 Francis Schertenleib. Le Fret. La Garantie de son Paiement. Geneve. 1971, at p. 62.
105 Ordonnance No 76-80 du 23 Octobre 1976 , Portant Code Maritime.
106 See . Supra, n 103.
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d'admission au reglement judiciaire des chargeurs ou reclamateurs, avant 
l'expiration de la quinzaine, le capitaine est privilegie sur tous les creanciers pour 
le paiement de son fret et des avaries qui lui sont dues" i.e., " In the case of 
bankruptcy or the admission into liquidation of the shippers or claimants and 
before the expiration of the fifteen days, the captain is preferred over all the
creditors for the payment of his freight and the damages which are due to him."
When it comes to the Algerian Maritime Code,107 the Algerian legislator like 
the French legislator gave to the carrier a "privilege" or a right of priority, and 
that might be the result of some historical reasons. Thus, the Algerian Maritime 
Code in its' article 792 in the section for the execution of the contract of transport 
of goods, provides that : "Le transporter peut refuser de livrer les marchandises 
et les faire consigner jusqu'a ce que le destinataire ait paye ou qu'il ait foumi 
caution de tout ce qui est due pour le transport de ces marchandises ainsi qu’a 
titre de contribution d'avarie communes et de remuneration d'assistance" i.e.,
The carrier can refuse to deliver the goods and to have them deposited until the 
consignee has paid or given a security or a deposit for all what is due for the 
carriage of these goods, for general average and for the remuneration of 
salvage."
However, as unfortunate as it might appear, the legislator who makes a 
distinction between the " the chartering of the ship " (art 1 to 14 inclus of the 
French law) and "the carriage of goods" (art 15 to 32 inclus), does not apply to 
the first category of contracts certain rules which he applies to the second
category; and the drafters of the decree of december 31 st 1966, did not correct
this mistake.108 Therefore, it is very important to distinguish here, two kinds of 
preferred creditors, 109 preferred creditors for what is called " the hire of the
107 See, Supra, n 105.
108 Michel de Juglart. Le Privilege du Transporteur Maritime. Droit Maritime Francais. 
1975. p. 579,580.
109 Ibid, at p. 580.
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ship " and, for what is called "the price of transport .”110
Here, it is worthwhile taking the French code of commerce first and then, 
the Algerian maritime code, because although they provide a quite similar " 
privilege " or right of priority for the guarantee of payment of freight, they differ 
about some provisions.
Therefore, the carrier in the French law, cannot keep his right of priority 
over the goods of his cargo, unless, he exercises it " in fifteen days after their 
delivery, and providing they have not passed to the hands of a third party " 
(article 23) , or in the case of bankruptcy or liquidation, the carrier is preferred 
for his freight and the damages which are due to him (article 24) . Therefore, 
this right of priority which is conferred to the maritime carrier must be 
distinguished from that which is given to the carrier by land. In fact, when the 
article 2102/6 of the civil code made a notice about the right of priority over 
certain moveable, "the expenses of the transport of the thing" , the code civil here 
did nothing but to aim a precise situation, which that of a creditor who has in his 
possession something which belongs to his debtor, something which he can hold 
its' possession and about which, he is not obliged to give up its1 possession, and 
that is because it constitutes the object or the subject of his pledge, in its' classical 
definition. Moreover, after some hesitation about the nature of the carrier’s right 
of priority, the different authors finally agreed on the idea of implied pledge 
(nantissement tacite),111 rather than the idea of betterment (plus-valus).112
When it comes to the carrier by sea, this idea about an implicit pledge must 
be forgotten, although it was adopted by several learned authors in the field.113
110 Conversely, du Pontavice. Transports maritimes et affretements , ed. Delmas 1970, 56. 
This author notices however, that the code of commerce applied more «  judiciously »  all these 
provisions to the contract by charterparty and to the contract o f transport.
111 Planiol, Ripert et Becque, T ra ite  Pratique de Droit Civil Francais. tome XII, S u re te s  
Reeles. 2e E d .. 1955. No 171.
112 Mazeaud et de Jugart, Lecons de Droit Civil, t  HI, Vol. 1, 4e E d . , 1974, No 179.
113 G. Rippert, Traite de Droit Maritime. 4e Ed. , t. II, No 1675; Chauveau, Traite de Droit 
M aritim e. No 650; Rodiere, Traite General de Droit Maritime. T. II, No 563.
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In fact, in following the opinion of Cleirac, the drafters of the enactment of 1681 
have precised that, the master can never retain the goods inboard his vessel for 
non payment of freight, "le maitre ne pourra retenir la marchandise dans son 
vesseau faute de paiement de son fret", (Livre III, titre III, article 23.). 
Moreover, an author pointed out that if the notion of implicit pledge is applied 
here, the right of priority will not survive in the case of delivery of the goods,114 
and this is certainly true. Once again, we notice that the shipowner and the 
carrier by sea are not in the situation of the carrier by land. Here, it is not 
possible for the shipowner or the carrier to have an implied pledge which the 
general law gives to the creditors to be preferred on the things of their debtor,
i.e., neither the shipowner nor the carrier have in the reach of their hands, in any
way, the "moveable" or the "chattels" of their debtor, because they have to give 
up its' possession once the ship arrives, and because they cannot retain the 
possession of the goods on the ship (article 3). Moreover, if we examine the legal 
situation of the creditors of the civil code very carefully, we might find that the 
carrier by land is far to be considered the same as the shipowner or the carrier 
by sea, because the right of priority of the carrier by land is really based on the 
notion of pledge, and even the debtor gives up the possession of the thing to the 
creditor and that is according to the rules of pledge. Therefore, the right of 
priority of the carrier by land will not survive the voluntary dispossession.115
If the carrier by sea keeps his security, at least during a certain time, in the
absence of any dispossession of the debtor whether, real or implied, that is 
because his right of priority has a very particular character. The idea expressed 
in this context applies, both to the shipowner and carrier, which is that the 
creditor who has a right of priority is not an ordinary pledgee; because he really 
has a pledge whether real or implied, i.e., if he could in a way or another, keep or 
retain the goods on his ship, he would naturally benefit from a right to follow or
114 Rodiere, Op. C it . , No 567.
115 Planiol, Ripert et Becque, op. cit., No 239.
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trace the chattel against any "third party ", and that is like any pledgee.1! 6
However, this is not the case, because, according to the rule which is confirmed
by article 23 of the law of June 18 th 1866, the right of priority would disappear
when the goods " have passed to third party's hands."117 In fact, the right of the
carrier by sea to maintain his right of priority over the goods between the hands 
of the consignee, despite of the voluntary dispossession of the creditor, gives to 
this security a very particular character. The goods will be at the disposal of the 
creditor of the freight, though for a limited period, and in the possession of the 
consignee, for the payment of his dept, independently of any direct or indirect 
ascendancy of the creditor. Therefore, the creditor's right unlike the right of the 
carrier by land, does not disappear when the thing is in the debtor's hands or on 
the way to be in the debtor's hands.
Moreover, he has not only, as would a simple contract creditor, a right on an 
estate subject to fluctuation. He keeps his prerogatives on the goods which are 
affected by the settlement of what is due to him.118 In this way, his right is of 
the same nature as the one given by the decree-law of the 30 th of September 
1953 to the buyer or the lender, to deny or to refuse to a buyer of a car on 
credit; here it is really a title of security : this security is a pledge, and this pledge 
is given without dispossession of the debtor, with a certain right to follow or to 
trace the thing and of preference which goes with it. However, and this another 
determining rule in resolving the problem raised by the nature of the right of 
priority of the carrier by sea; the right to trace therefore given for a limited time, 
does not go in principle beyond the estate of the deptor. This is stated in article 
23, which provides that the right of priority cannot be exercised where the
116 Mazeaud et de Juglart, op. cit. , No 80.
117 But the lessor of an immovable and particularly a carrier by land can, with different 
titles, use this right.
118  The nature of the right o f priority is therefore, on this point, is particular : the 
carrier by sea, because he has the right to follow, has therefore, a chattels real. ( cf. on this 
point, Mazeaud et de Juglart, Lecons, t. HI, vol. 1, 1974, No 141 ).
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goods have passed to a third party's hands, and that means, that the carrier has 
no right, even though for a limited time, to act against the third party who 
acquired in good faith. The reason for that is simple, it is because the lessor of a 
real, who seizes moveable which were moved without his consent is exercising 
an action by which he is claiming his detention. Conversely, the earner by sea, 
cannot, act like this, because he is not, at this stage of the performance of the 
contract, in a position to exercise a right of retention, because he cannot retain 
the goods aboard his vessel, which subject of delivery. The maritime carrier's 
right of tracing, very original in this context, cannot have any effect on third 
parties. As a consequence, the drafters of the code of commerce and the law of 
1966, have taken in this context a position which is quite similar to that taken by 
the Supreme Court of Appeals about the seller of moveable who has not been 
paid : the right of priority given to the creditor gives to this one the right to be 
paid by preference on the price of the chattel when he can seize it " in the 
possession of his debtor or to stop the price in the hands of the party ”, but does 
not authorize him to pursue the settlement of his dept against the party who 
acquired this chattel.119 The creditor of the freight exercises the right to trace 
only against his debtor. This right to trace is then reinforced with the right of 
preference. Exceptionally, the right of preference survives the right to trace 
when the goods have been delivered to their owner who is still creditor of the 
price which is owed to him by the purchaser to whom he sold them.
This comparison between the carrier by sea and the seller of moveable is 
very instructive on other points. In fact, as it has been said, the action which the 
preferred creditor has can be exercised against the estate of the debtor after 
delivery of the goods, i.e., after voluntary dispossession (which would not be the 
case, if the right of priority was founded on the classical notion of pledge). This 
action, will therefore, have two aspects; first of all, the aspect of ascendancy
119 Cass. civ. 19 fev. 1894, Rec. Sir. 1895, 1, 457, D. 1894, 1, 413;
Mazeaud et de Juglart, Lecons de Droit Civil, t. ID, Vol. 1, Lectures de la 8e lecon .
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exercised in the form of a seizure of the goods themselves, because they are still 
in the debtor's estate and, whether sold or not. This ascendancy by being 
exercised on a chattel considered as moveable, must be brought closer to the one 
which is given to the unpaid seller of moveable, from which the qualification of a 
special moveable privilege, which is most convenient to give to the carrier by 
sea. Conversely, when the goods have disappeared after they have been given 
to the consignee, the creditor of freight loses his right of priority, except if the 
thing was lost by the mistake of someone of if it was insured, here the situation 
would be different.
Always by reference to the substitution of things which is well known to 
the seller of moveable, the creditor of freight can exercise his right on the price 
which can still be owed by the third party to the one who took delivery of the 
goods and sold them; i.e., the debt of the price on which the creditor will have an 
attachment, will replace in the estate the goods which used to be since the 
delivery was made : it is substituted to these goods, and which represents the 
value in exchange,120 this is because of the impossibility of the maritime carrier 
to trace the goods, because they have passed to the hands of a third party.
Despite, the similarities and the common points made between the right of 
priority of the seller of moveable and the maritime carrier -(in point of view of 
the nature of the right of priority)- the two must be differentiated, in particular, 
the carrier,121 has the vitally important right to trace which affects the legal 
settlement and the liquidation of chattels of the consignee of the goods, debtor of 
the price of transport. The article 24 of the law of June the 18 th 1966 points out 
about this subject, that : "en cas de faillite ou d'amission au reglement judiciaire 
des chargeurs ou reclamateurs avant I'expiration de la quinzaine, le capitaine est 
privilegie sur tous les creanciers pour le paiement de son fret et les avaries qui 
lui sont dues." , i.e., "In the case of bankruptcy or admission to the legal 
settlement or liquidation of the shippers or claimers, before the fifteen days
120 Lauriol, op.cit. , No 190 et S.
121 For the shipowner, the legislator of 1966 did not give, any precision about this point.
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have expired, the captain is preferred on all the creditors for the payment of his 
freight and the damages which are due to him. " When we think that when the 
goods have been seized by the general body of the creditors, we can notice the 
long distance which separates the seller of moveable form the carrier during the 
fifteen days. The first one, i.e., the seller of moveable loses all his securities and 
and becomes a simple contract creditor (law of the 13 th of july 1967, article 62), 
and the second one , i.e., the carrier, will preserve his right to trace and his right 
of preference. Moreover, the severity with which the jurisprudence insures the 
protection of the group of creditors against the seller of the moveable, reinforce 
the distinction between the two categories of privileges or rights of priority. 122 A 
very important distinction can be found which is, that the " moveable " are goods 
exactly as those which are subject of the carriage.
Moreover, one of the aspects which characterises this right of priority in the 
French law, is that of the interdiction of retaining the goods aboard the ship by 
the captain, and that has been provided since the Order of 1681 and by the 
articles 3 and 48 of the decree, "Neither the captain nor the parties which 
represent him, have the right to retain the goods on his vessel."123
In the French maritime law, the interdiction of retaining the cargo inboard 
the ship, is synonymous to the suppression of the right of retention. For the 
jurisdictions which know the general theory of the right of retention, a similar 
assimilation reveales a confusion quite clear between the right of retention and, 
on the other hand its' exercise. This might be, because the French legislator has 
neither regulated nor defined the right of retention.124 It must be admitted that, 
if in itself, the interdiction of retaining the goods on the vessel does not exclude
122 From the moment the goods become an appearent element of solvency of the buyer, 
the right of priority of the seller does exist anymore. I t is this like this, for example, when the 
boxes have been unloaded and appear with a label with the name of the buyer, because then 
they are supposed to have entered the stores of the latter ( cf. , about these points, de Juglart et 
Ippolito, Traite precit. ; t ID, No 1241. ) .
123 Schertenleib Francis, op. cit, p. 63.
124 Popesco Georges, Le droit de retention en droit anglais, francais. allemend et suisse. 
Paris, 1930, p. 79.
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the existence of a right of retention, as it is known by the legislation which 
consider it as a chattel real; it is reasonably not possible to have any doubt about 
the French legislator. The right of retention has been excluded, without asking 
the question whether an intermediary solution was conceivable. An 
intermediary solution here, instead of, the right of retention, would have been 
accepted, provided the interdiction to retain the goods inboard the ship remains. 
The choice of the legislator is not argued by the doctrine, even if it does not 
approve the grounds, because according to Rippert:
"la consignation, ce n'est pas autre chose que la retention exercee par 
l'intermediaire d'un tiers.", i.e., " the deposit of the goods, is nothing 
but the retention, exercised by the intermediary of a third party."125
The institution of the right of priority cannot be confused with the notion of 
the right of retention. Some authors have asked themselves, if these provisions
were not applications to the maritime field of the general principles of the right
concerning the creditors who detain pledges.126 Therefore, one will be brought 
to consider this right of priority as a type of chattels real. However, this right of 
priority, as it has been previously considered, does not give to its' holder any
chattels real.
Thus, it must be concluded, that the right of priority which insures the
payment of freight, is of the same nature as a simple personal right of
preference (droit personnel de preference).127 This right of preference or 
priority, is not only a right to have the goods deposited and sold, but, it gives to
its' holder the right to be paid, in the case of bankruptcy or admission into the
legal liquidation of the shippers or claimants, and that before the other creditors. 
However, despite that the law does not expressly admit this deduction, it must
125 Rippert. G . , op. c i t . , note 1, p. 554.
126 Le Clere Julien. Du droit de retention de la careaison et de la «  lien clause »  dans les 
chartes-parties . le Droit Maritime Francais, Paris, 1966, p. 644.
127 Chauveau Paul, Traite de Droit Maritime. Paris, 1958, p. 136.
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be considered that the solution is identical in the case of the bankruptcy of the 
charterers.
After having considered the nature of the right of priority over the goods in 
the French law, it is as important to consider the nature of this right of priority or 
" privilege ", in the Algerian Maritime Code. The Algerian maritime code,128 
gives to the shipowner a " privilege ", i.e., a right of priority over the goods for the 
guarantee of payment of his freight and other charges provided by the contract 
of affreightment, "Le freteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le 
paiement de son fret et autres charges prevues au contrat d'affretement." This 
article, as it has been mentioned before, is quite similar to the French one about 
the same matter, and that is because of the historical reasons which link the two 
jurisdictions to each other. Moreover, the Algerian maritime code adapted the 
same distinction which the French law made between the shipowner and the 
carrier by sea. So, the Algerian maritime code in article 792 about the 
performance of the contract of carriage of goods by sea, that : "Le transporter 
peut refuser de livrer les marchandises et les faire consigner jusqu'a ce que le 
destinataire ait paye ou qu'il ait fourni caution de tout ce qui est due pour le 
transport de ses marchandises ainsi qu'a titre de contribution d'avarie commune 
et de remuneration d'assistance.", i.e., "The carrier can refuse to deliver the goods, 
and can have them deposited until the consignee has paid or given, a security for 
all what is due for the carriage of these goods, for general average and for the 
remuneration of salvage." Here, one might notice the Algerian legislator does not 
forbid, as the French does, (article 3), the shipowner to keep the goods aboard his 
ship, and ask for the payment of the freight. It is provided in article 680 of the 
Algerian maritime code that: "Le freteur peut refuser le dechargement de la 
cargaison si le fret et la remuneration a titre de surestaries ou d'autres retards ne 
lui ont pas ete payes par l'affreteur.", i.e., "The shipowner can refuse to unload 
the cargo if the freight and the remuneration for demurrage or other delays
128 See Supra, article 645, p. 428.
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have not been paid to him by the charterer." Here, it is quite clear that the 
shipowner in the Algerian maritime code, is given a right of retention, i.e., to 
retain the goods aboard the vessel until the freight has been paid, or to deposit 
them in a third party’s hands after unloading them (article 792).
Thus, what is the nature of the guarantee for payment of freight in the 
Algerian law? One might consider this guarantee as an implied pledge ; in the 
French law, it was not possible to consider it as an implied pledge because, the
captain was not allowed to retain the goods on the ship, but in the Algerian law
the captain is not forbidden from retaining the goods inboard his vessel, and this
what might draw our attention to the idea of pledge, because, the shipowner can
refuse to deliver the goods of his cargo to the consignee, unless the latter pays 
the freight and all the other charges due to the shipowner. Like the guarantee of 
the lessor (art.501 of the Algerian civil code), which provides that the lessor has 
a right of retention on all the goods in the premises, for the guarantee of his 
depts. However, the difference is that in the pledge, the voluntary dispossession 
will lead to the loss of the pledge (art. 964 of the Algerian civil code), because, so 
that the pledge can be opposed to the third party, the thing object of the pledge 
must be between the hands of the creditor, or a third party which both parties 
of the pledge agree about. However, the shipowner can maintain his guarantee 
and in the same time not having the direct possession of the goods and that, is 
by depositing them into a third party's hands he chooses.
Moreover, when the contract of affreightment has been made, it was not 
intended to give to the shipowner a pledge on the goods, whereas in the pledge 
it is agreed that the creditor has a pledge on the thing of the deptor. Thus, the 
nature of the shipowner's right of priority, might be considered as a right of 
retention, because the shipowner is expressly given the right to refuse to deliver 
the goods to the consignee unless the remuneration for freight has been paid to 
him (art. 680 and 792 of the Algerian maritime code.) This is what makes the
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Algerian maritime code different from the French law, which does not allow the 
captain to retain the goods on the ship.
However, this might appear clear in the case of voyage and time 
charterparty but, the situation is not quite clear in the situation of demise 
charterparty, where the ship and therefore the cargo are in the possession of the 
charterer then, how can the shipowner exercise his lien given to him by the 
express articles in the maritime law (art. 2 of the French law and 645 of the 
Algerian maritime code) ?
Here, one can say that, the shipowner finds himself without any protection 
or guarantee for the payment of his freight, because both the ship and the cargo 
are in the charterer's possession, and therefore, there is no means for detaining 
the cargo like in the case of time or voyage charterparty, where the possession of 
the ship and the goods remain in the shipowner's hands. However, we might be 
able to say that, the shipowner in a demise charterparty, has an equitable lien, 
because no one is allowed to benefit from the loss of another without the 
intention of donation and, this is the case of the unlawful or unjust enrichment, 
as it has been mentioned before in the Scots law.129
The French civil code does not give a specific text for the case where 
someone benefit from the act of another, but on the contrary the Algerian civil 
code does. The French civil code, talks about the unjust or unlawful enrichment 
in the case where someone looks after the business of another (gestion 
d'affaires) in article 1375, the case where someone receives something which is 
not due to him (art. 1376), and the case where someone thinks he is undepted to 
someone , and then, the former pays to the latter the alleged debt (art. 1377). 
However, the jurisprudence has widened the application of this principle, and 
that, was when it gave the application of this theory in the cases where the 
claimant has made a loss and the defender a profit, without the intention of 
donation. That was, when the Supreme Court (cour de cassation) has decided
129 See, p. 30, Supra.
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that this principle of equity should be applied, in all cases where someone makes 
profit from the loss of another without the intention of donation.130 This decision 
which we find in the judgements of 1914 and 1915,131 which give the action in 
rem verso which is founded on equity, everytime that there is an enrichment of 
the defender accompanied by a loss of the claimant. However, this action might 
not be applied where the claimant has another means of regaining his right, and 
that is, in the cases where there is a contract, or an implied contract and in the
case where there is an offense or a technical offense.
Therefore, the theory of unjust enrichment might not be of much help to
the shipowner in the case of a demise charterparty, because here he has a
contract in the form of a charterparty. Moreover, the Algerian civil code in art.
141 defines the unlawful enrichment as: "The one who in good faith gets a
benefit from the work or the thing of someone else, without a cause which 
justifies this benefit, he is bound (the one who got a benefit) to indemnify the
one whose work or thing was the source of this benefit to the extent of this
benefit."132..Thus, the Algerian civil law obliges the one who receives a benefit 
from the work or the thing of someone else without a cause which justifies this 
benefit to indemnify the one who made the work or to whom the thing belongs 
to in the extent of the benefit. Here, the shipowner in the case of a demise 
charterparty made a contract in the form of a charterparty by which he hired 
his vessel to the charterer to use it for carrying goods; here, the charterer had a 
reason which justifies his benefit which is that he had a contract with the 
shipowner for the use of this vessel. Therefore, this article too as its' predecessor 
the French civil code article, cannot be of much protection to the shipowner,
130 See ( not. : Civ. 15 juin 1892, D.P. 92. 1. 596; 12 mai 1914, s. 1918. 1. 41; 2 mars 1915, D.P. 
1920. 1. 102).
131 Civ. 12 mai 1914, S. 1918. 1. 41; Civ. 2 mars 1915, D.P. 1920. 1. 102.
132 «  Celui qui de bonne foi, a retire un profit du travail ou de la chose d'autrui sans une
cause qui justifie ce profit, est tenu d'indemniser celui aux depens duquel il s'est enrichi dans la
mesure ou il a profite de son fait ou de sa chose. »
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because he cannot rely on it.
However, we cannot leave the shipowner without any protection for the 
recovery of his freight, but we can consider this theory, i.e., the unjust 
enrichment, and allow the shipowner to rely on it to recover his freight. So, by 
way of analogy, we must consider that the shipowner has made a loss where his 
ship was being used to carry the goods of the demise charterer who made profit 
or benefited from the use of the ship, without paying any freight to the 
shipowner, which is a remuneration which is deserved by the shipowner who 
performed his part of the contract. Thus, he deserves to be protected and to be 
allowed to recover his remuneration from the demise charterer, and that 
because neither justice nor equity allow that, someone benefits from the work or 
the use of something which belongs to someone else, who made a loss by the 
work he rendered or by his thing being used, without any intention of donation, 
and because, the case of the claim of the shipowner in the case of demise 
charterparty, it is quite difficult for the shipowner to recover his freight from the 
charterer who has the possession of the ship and therefore, the cargo. Then, we 
should allow the shipowner to recover his freight and that, by relying on the 
theory of unlawful enrichment, because this contract, i.e., the charterparty, is not 
of much protection to him. Although, it gives him a lien on the cargo for 
guarantee of payment of freight, this lien has no effect, because how can we 
expect the shipowner to exercise his lien while the cargo is in the hands of the 
charterer who has the possession of the vessel too. Moreover, in the French civil 
code (art. 2102),133 and the article 995 of the Algerian civil code, gives a right of 
priority to the lessor of an immovable on all the moveable which are on the 
rented immovable for his rent. This right of priority gives to the lessor, a right to 
be preferred; a right which is quite similar to the right of retention and a real 
right to trace the moveable into whosoever hands they are.134 Therefore, the 
lessor who rented his immovable, is given a right which is quite similar to that of 
retention and that because he is given the right to be preferred and a right to
133 The rights of priority which concern some moveables.
134 Mazeaud. Henri et Leon. Mazeaud. Jean Lecons de Droit Civil. Tom e T ro is ie m e . 
Troisieme Edition, par, Michel de Juglart.
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trace the moveable into whosoever hands they might be.
Moreover, to preserve his right over the moveable which are occupying his 
immovable and which constitute the object of his right of priority, he can
prevent them to be removed and that by (une saisie gagerie), i.e., a writ of
execution on tenant's furniture and chattels (art. 819 of the French code of civil
procedure and art. 435 of the Algerian code of civil procedure).
However, if the lessor of an immovable is given this guarantee to protect 
him, this guarantee has been recognised by the legislator in the civil code, and 
the situation of the shipowner who chartered his ship under a demise 
charterparty is quite similar to that situation of the lessor of the immovable, but 
it is not simple and easy to apply this principle to the shipowner of a ship under
a demise charterparty, because there is no text which prescribes that.
However, by a way of analogy it would fair and logical to give the 
shipowner in a demise charterparty a right of priority which makes him able
enough to recover his freight, as in the case of unjust enrichment or the case of a 
lessor of an immovable, because the logic of the situation and the justice and
equity, will require some guarantee or right of priority to be given to the
shipowner, because most unfair to let the demise charterer away, without
paying the freight owed by him to the shipowner. Moreover, the stability and 
continuance of the shipping trade will cease to exist, if the shipowner in the 
demise charterparty does not get his share of the venture, and moreover,
because the trade in general and the shipping business in particular are founded 
on trust and, the different transactions are very fast to be concluded, and 
therefore, it requires a lot of guarantees.
Therefore, after having dealt with the English jurisdiction and the civil law 
jurisdictions, it would be best to try to compare the two jurisdictions to find out 
the similarities and the differences between the two about, the nature of the 
guarantee of the shipowner to recover his freight.
The nature of this lien whether, under the common law or by the express
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terms of the charterparty or in the civil law jurisdictions (namely the French and 
the Algerian jurisdictions), depends on the case in the different situations.
For the case where there is a time or a voyage charterparty, the ship and 
therefore, the cargo remain in the possession of the shipowner, and therefore it 
is a possessory lien because, the shipowner can retain the cargo on his ship until 
the freight is paid. Although, the French does not allow the captain to retain the 
goods inboard the ship but to warehouse them or deposit them with a third 
party who will retain them for the shipowner, this might be considered as no 
more than, another way to retain possession of the goods until freight is paid.
However, the situation is different in the case of a demise charterparty, 
where by the nature of this charter, the ship goes to the possession of the 
charterer and therefore, the goods will also pass to the possession of the 
charterer altogether with the possession of the ship. Here, although the 
charterparties might give a lien to the shipowner over the cargo for the 
guarantee of payment of freight, it is very difficult to consider the nature of this 
lien in these circumstances. However, we find ourselves obliged but to consider 
that this lien is an equitable lien, because equity and justice require that the 
shipowner gets paid what is due to him, i.e., his remuneration for the hire of his 
ship, otherwise, there might not be any other nature which can be given to this 
lien every time that there is a demise charterparty.
3 -2 -Lien on "Sub-F reigh t” :
It is generally agreed,135 that in order for a shipowner to have a lien on sub 
fre igh t,136 a lien which has been consistently recognised by English and United 
States courts and by the civil law jurisdictions, the lien must have been expressly 
reserved in the charterparty.137 The clause does not create the lien, however,
135 O 'Rourke, Kenneth R. A Shipowner's Lien on Sub-Sub-Freight in England and 
United States : New York Produce Exchange Time Charterparty Clause 18. Lovola O f Los 
Angeles International And Comparative J L. Year, 1984 _  Volume, 7 _  Part, 1 _  p, 73-91.
136 "Sub-Freight" means money payable by a sub-charterer to a charterer for the sub­
charter o f the ship; and "sub-sub-freight" means money payable by a sub-sub-charterer to a 
sub-charterer for the sub-sub-charter of the vessel.
137 Hall Corp. of Can, v. Cargo ex Steamer Mont Louis. 62 F. 2d 603, 605 (2d Cir. 1933); In re
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but simply provides the requisite notice to shippers that the shipowner has 
preserved his lien.138 Therefore, a lien upon "sub-freight" for charter freight, or 
hire, is often expressly given. This entitles the shipowner to require payment to 
himself of freights which may be due to the charterer. Therefore, the lien clause 
in the charterparty is needed in order to give the shipowner a lien in those cases 
where the sub-freight is due to the charterer and not to the shipowner, and
where the goods are carried on a sub-charter without any bill of lading. In such 
a csae the shipowner could only become entitled to the sub-freight by virtue of 
the lien clause,139 and therefore, most of the charterparties contain the following 
provision :
"The owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and all sub-freights
for any amount due under this charter. ..."
The different time charterparties, usually contain the above clause, giving > 
the shipowner a right to detain the cargo and sub-freight for the freight due to 
him which has remained unpaid. The clause gives the shipowner a lien upon all 
cargoes and upon all sub-freights; but the question is whether the words "all 
cargoes" in the clause mean all cargoes belonging to the charterer or all cargoes 
put on board the vessel whether by the charterers or other persons not parties 
to the charterparty.
In The "Agios Giogis".140 by the clause 18 of the New York Produce
Exchange form of time charterparty, "the owners were to have lien upon all
North Atl. & Gulf S.S. Co., 204 F. Supp. 899, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd  sub nom. Schilling v. A/S D/S 
D annehrog . 320 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1963). See also The Bird of Paradise. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)545, 554 
(1866) (in the simple two party case, a shipowner can exercise a lien on cargo belonging to 
the charterer in order to recover hire owed under the charterparty); R a y m o n d  v. Tvson. 58 
U.S. (17 How.)53,63 (1854) (a shipowner has a lien for freight unless the term s o f the 
charterparty are inconsistent with the exercise of the lien).
138 N.H. Shipping Corp. v. Freights of the S.S. Jackie Hause. 181 F. Supp. 165, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960). Cf. In re North Atl. & Gulf S.S. Co., 204 F. Supp. at 904, 906 (the shipowner's lien on sub­
freight arises out o f the provision in the charterparty).
139 See Molthes Rederi Akt. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line (19271 1 K. B 710, per Greer, J. at P.
717.
140 [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 192.
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cargoes and all sub-freights for any amount due under the charter". The 
charterer in making monthly payment deducted a sum in respect of breach of
speed warranty. The cargo, upon the instructions of the shipowners, was 
detained against the cargo owners who were not parties to the time charter.
Mocatta, J. decided that the shipowners could not rely upon the clause 18
because the cargo was not that of the charterer:
"The difficulty as I see it in the way of the owners is that they are
relying upon a contractual lien, not given at common law, as aginst
the cargo owners, who were not parties to the time charter. I was 
reminded that in the Baltime form of time charter there is a 
qualification in relation to the lien to the effect that the shipowner is 
only vested with it on cargo belonging to the time charterer.
Notwithstanding the omission of the qualification here, I am unable 
to see how clause 18 can give the owners the right to detain the 
cargo not belonging to the charterers and on which no freight was 
owing to the owners. There is no finding that the bills of lading 
contained any clause rendering the cargo shipped under them 
subject to this charterparty lien."141
However, in The "Aegnoussiotis".142 Mr Justice Donaldson came to a 
different conclusion, stating that:
"the clause 18 is to be construed as meaning what it says, namely, 
that the time charterers agree that the owners shall have a lien upon 
all cargoes. In so far as such cargoes are owned by third parties, the 
time charterers accept an obligation to procure the creation of a 
contractual lien in favours of the owners. If they do not do so and 
the owners assert a lien over such cargo, the third parties have a 
cuase of action against the owners. But the time charterers 
themselves are in a different position, they cannot assert and take 
advantage of their own breach of contract. As against them, the 
purported exercise of the lien is valid."
However, in The "Nanfri".143 the appeal of the owners to exercise their lien
141 Ibid. at P. 204.
142 [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268.
143 Federal Commerce and Navigation Ltd v. Molena Alpha Inc and Others. The Nanfri. 
The Benfri. The Lorfri. [1979] 1 All ER 307.
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over the goods of third party for sub-freight was dismissed. In this case, by
three time charterparties, in identical form, the respective owners of three 
vessels let them to charterers for a period of six years. The shippers would
therefore pay the freight for the carriage in advance and receive bills of lading 
marked 'freight pre-paid'. The charterparties provided: (i) by cl.9 that the
master was to be under the orders of the charterers as regards employment,
agency or other arrangements and that the charterers were to indemnify the
owners against all consequences or liability arising from the master signing the 
bills of lading; (ii) by cl. 11 that the charterers were entitled to make deductions 
from the hire, where time being lost or expenses incurred by slow steaming; and 
by (iii) cl. 18 that the owners to have a lien upon all cargoes and sub-freight
belonging to the time-charterers and any bill of lading freight.
for all claims under this charter. The charterers informed the owners that 
they intended to make a deduction from the hire of the vessel and the owners 
informed the charterers by telex that they will instruct the three masters of the 
vessels to withdraw all authority of the charterers and their agents to sign bills 
of lading, to refuse to sign any bill of lading endorsed by all the terms, conditions 
and exceptions of charterparties including the lien under cl. 18 on bill of lading 
freight as well as sub-freight belonging to the charterers.
The Court of Appeal held that, the charterers were entitled to make h 
deduction without the owners' consent. The owners appealed to the House of
Lords, contending, inter alia, that cl. 18 entitled them to instruct the masters to
refuse to sign bills of lading freight pre-paid and to clause them by a reference to 
the time charterers. The appeal was dismissed.
Lord Fraser denied the owners' right to have a lien over the sub-charterers 
cargo:
"Clause 18 does not give the owners any right to require that the
charterers shall procure that cargoes (not belonging to the
charterers) shall be carried on terms that give the owners a lien over 
them or that there shall be in existence sub-freights over which the 
owners can exercise their lien. The effect of clause 18 was simply
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that, if and when there were cargoes belonging to the charterers or 
sub-freights due to them, the owners were to have a lien over them, 
whatever the exact meaning of a ’lien' on sub-freights may be".144
Lord Russell of Killowen, describes this lien as an equitable charge on what 
is due from the shippers to the charterers:
"The fact that cl 18 refers expressly to bills of lading freightsappears 
to me to add nothing to the lien coferred by that clause on sub­
freights belonging to the charterers, and serves only to distract the 
mind from the true scope of the lien. The lien operates as equitable 
charge on what is due form the shippers to the charterers, and in 
order to be effective requires an ability to intercept the sub-freight 
(by notice of claim) before it is paid by shipper to charterer."145
Moreover, the owners' lien is denied by Mr. Justice Robert Goff in T h e  
"Lancaster".146 where the charterers were claiming to exercise their lien given to 
them by clause 18 of the charterparty in the New York Produce Exchange form, 
wher he held that:
"Now it is at once clear that the expression "lien" is not being used 
consistently in this clause. ... But it is obvious that neither the owners' 
lien for sub-freights, nor the charterers' lien on the ship, can be a 
possessory lien."
But in The "Cebu".147 the decision came to a different conclusion, where it
was held that, the owners had a lien over the hire payments payable by the
sub-sub-charterers for the following reasons:
(1) On its tue construction cl 18 of the charterparty gave the owners a lien
on any remuneration earned by the charterers from their employment of the
vessel, whether by way of voyage freight or time-charter hire and entitled the 
owners to intercept all sub-freight, whether or not due directly to the charterers,
144 Ibid. at P. 316.
145 Ibid. at P. 318.
146 The Lancaster [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 497.
147 The Cebu T19831 0  B 1005.
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including sub-freights due under any sub-sub-charter.
(2) The absence of privity between the owners and the sub-charterers did
not prevent the owners having a lien on payments due from the sub-sub­
charterers to the sub-charterers since the owners could claim as equitable
assignees not only hire due under the sub-charterparty, but also the rights 
which the charterers themselves held as equitable assignees of hire due under 
the sub-sub-charterparty.
Here in this case,148 the sub-charterers argued that in the present case,
what was due from Itex (the sub-sub-charterers) to Lamsco (sub-charterer) 
was not freight, but hire.
However, Lloyd J., did not quite agree with the argument,149, when he said:
"But it would be an odd consequence of the charterers opting to
enter into a sub-time charter trip that the owners should
inadvretently be deprived of their security on sub freights. I would 
hold following Lord Blackburn in Inman Steamship Co Ltd v. 
Bischoff, that the lien on sub-freights conferred by cl 18 includes a 
lien on any remuneration earned by the charterers from their
employment of the vessel, whether by way of voyage freight or
time-chartered hire.",
and he added, that:
"As I have already said, I can see no sense in a construction which 
would make the owners’ security depend on whether the sub­
charter is a voyage charter or a time charter trip. In my view the 
parties must be taken to have used the word 'sub-freight' in cl 18 to 
cover both. This the view expressed tentatively by the authors of
Wilford on Time Charters (1978) p 222. I accept and adopt that
view. I would therefore reject the first argument of counsel
LAMSCO."
For the counsel's second main argument for LAMSCO is that, there was no 
privity of contract between the owners and LAMSCO, the answer was that, the
meaning of sub-freights, includes all sub-freights, whether or not due to the
148 Supra, at (147).
149 Ibid. at P. 1124.
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head charterers direct. This view was supported by Donaldson J., in the 
A egnoussiotis,150 who held that "all cargoes1 in cl 18 'means what it says', i.e., all 
cargoes whether or not belonging to the charterers. Moreover, it is more in
accordance with the law as stated by Lord Hardwicke L C as long ago as 1743 in 
Paul v. B irch .151 where a vessel was chartered at the rate of £48 a month. The 
charterers arranged for certain merchants ship goods at the rate of £9 per ton. 
The charterers then went banrupt. It was held that the plaintiff had a specific 
lien on the goods even though they did not belong to the charterers.
First to be examined, is the factual context of a recent English case, which is 
the case of Care Shipping Corp. v. Latin American Shipping Corp..152 where the 
Queen's Bench Division addressed the issue as one of first impression.153
CARE SHIPPING CORP. v. LATIN AMERICAN SHIPPIONG CORP. The facts of 
the case are as follows:
On October 18, 1979, Care Shipping Corporation time chartered its vessel 
Cebu on an NYPE form to Naviera Tolteca, Inc., for a period of seventeen to 
twenty months followed by a second period of twenty to twenty four months, 
exercisable at the charterer's option.154 The charterer had an express right to 
sublet the vessel.155 On March 3, 1980, Naviera Tolteca sub-chartered the Cebu 
on an NYPE form to Latin American Shippig Corporation (LAMSCO).156 The 
terms of the sub-charterparty were essentially the same as those of the head- 
charter.157 Finally, On July 3, 1981, Lamsco sub-sub-chartered the ship to Itex
150 [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 268.
151 2 Atk 621, 26 ER 771.
152 [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 A11.ER. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982).
153 Id. at 836, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1127, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 307-08.
154 Id. at 831, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1123, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 304.
155 Id. The provision of the 1946 NYPE form concerning the right to sub-charter the 
vessel provides that the "[c]harterers . . . have [the] liberty to sublet the vessel for all or any 
part o f the time covered by this Charter, but [ch a rte re rs  rem ain [] responsible for the 
fulfillm ent o f this Charterparty."
156 [1983] 2 W.L.R. at 831, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1123, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 304.
157 Id.
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Itagrani Export S.A. (Itex) for the period of one time-chartered trip from
Portland, Oregon, to Bandar Abbas, Iran, with a cargo of grain.158 This
charterparty was also executed on an NYPE form.159 After a dispute arose 
under the head charter with hire,160 allegedly due Care Shipping, the shipowner,
from Naviera Tolteca, the original charterer, Care Shipping purported to exercise
a lien under Clause Eighteen of the head charterparty both on hire due Naviera
Tolteca from Lamsco under the sub-charterparty and on hire due Lamsco from
Itex under the sub-sub-charterparty.161 Faced with demands for hire by both 
Care Shipping and Lamsco, Itex interpleaded.162
The specific issue presented to the court was whether Care Shipping, the 
shipowner, was entitled to exercise a lien on the sub-sub-freight due Lamsco, 
the sub-charter, from Itex, the sub-sub-charterer, when hire was owed Care
Shipping under the head charterparty.163 Holding that Care Shipping was 
entitled to the lien, Mr. Justice Lloyd stated:
On the true construction of clause 18 I would hold that Naviera
Tolteca has assigned to the owners by way of equitable assignement, 
not only sub-freights due it as charterers, but also any [sub-] sub­
freights due under any sub-sub-charter of which it is equitable
assignee.164
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 In this com ment, "hire" and "freight" w ill be treated  as having synonymous 
m eanings. Technically  speaking, however, denote d ifferen t things. 3 T. Carver, B ritish 
Shipping Laws 922 (11 th ed. 1963).
The remuneration payable for the carriage of goods in a ship is called freight. Also, the 
same word is often used to denote a payment made for the use of a ship. It is applied in both
senses, though objection has frequently been made to its use in the latter sense. When a ship
has been chartered to go on a spesific voyage for a lump sum, or to be at the disposal o f the
charterer at so much a month, it is perhaps more accurate to call the paym ent the h ir e  of the
ship; but sometimes the word "freight" is used. And as the hire of the chartered shipis very 
commonly paid by freight in proportion to the goods carried under the charterparty, it would 
be difficult to say distincly when one word should be used, and when the other.
161 [1983] 2 W.L.R. at 831-32, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1123, [1983] 1 Lloyd’s L R .  at 304.
162 Id. at 832, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1123, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 304.
163 Id. at 838, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1129, [1983] lLloyd's L.R. at 309.
164 Id., [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1128, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 308-09. Mr Justice Lloyd did caution,
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First, it would be best to examine the issue in the English jurisdiction before 
the civil law jurisdictions, namely the French and Algerian law, so as to give a
better explanation to this lien. Thus, as early as 1743, in Paul v. B irch ,165 a court 
held that a shipowner could exercise a specific lien on goods belonging to a third
party shipped aboard the owner's vessel.166 In that case, Paul, the shipowner,
chartered his vessel to two persons at the rate of £48 per month.167 The
charterparty provided that goods put on board were liable to Paul to secure the 
charter h ire.168 The charterers then contracted with merchants in the West 
Indies for the carriage of goods at £9 per ton.169 Paul brought suit to recover 
from the merchants after the charterers went bankrupt with charter hire owed 
to Paul. The Chancery Division held that the merchants were liable to Paul to the 
extent that they were liable to the bankrupt charterers; that is, the merchants 
were liable for £9 per ton for cargo carried, not for the charterparty rate of £48
per month.170
A question left unanswered in Paul, however, was the legal basis for the 
shipowner's lien.171 In an attempt to resolve this issue, one hypothesis was set 
forh in W ehner v. Dene Steam Shipping Co..172 a case factually similar to C are 
Shipping.173 but which was decided on a different issue.174
however, that "[t]he legal analysis might be different if  the true nature of the lien on sub­
freight were that it takes effect as an equitable charge only . . .  and not as equitable 
assignement." Id., [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 309. This was an issue that the court did not have to 
decide since the parties stipulated that the legal basis for the shipowner's lien on sub-freight 
in a three party case is an equitable assignement. Id.
165 26 Eng. Rep. 771, 2 Atk. 621 (Ch. 1743).
166 Id. at 771-72, 2 Atk. at 622-23.
167 Id. at 771, 2 Atk. at 621.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 771-72, 2 Atk. at 622-23.
171 O'ROURKE, Kenneth R. A Shipowner's Lien on Sub-Sub-freight in England and
U.S.A. New York Produce Exchange Time Charterparty clause 18. Lovola o f Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Journal. 1984. Vol 7. Part n .l. at p. 78.
172 [1905] 2 K.B. 92, 21 T.L.R. at 339.
173 [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982).
174 [1905] 2 K .B.at 101, 21 T.L.R. at 340. The dis positive issue was whether hire was 
actually due Dene Shipping when it purported to exercise a lien on the bill o f lading freight.
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In Wehner, Dene Steam Shipping Company (Dene Shipping) time chartered
its vessel Ferndene to William Brauer Steamship Company for twelve 
m o n th s .175 The charterparty contained a clause almost identical to Clause 
Eighteen of the NYPE. William Brauer Steamship Company sub-chartered the 
vessel to Wehner for one transatlantic voyage.176 Wehner then arranged with a 
Mr. Gleichmann to carry a cargo of phosphate aboard the Ferndene from New
York to Hamburg, Germany.177 The bill of lading,178 was signed by the master of 
the vessel, given to Wehner, and indorsed by Gleichmann.179 By the time 
Ferndene reached Hamburg, William Brauer Steramshipping Company was
virtually insolvent and owed hire to Dene Shipping under the original
charterparty .180 To recover what was allegedly due it, Dene Shipping purported
to exercise a lien on the bill of lading freight due Wehner from Gleichmann for
the carriage of his cargo of phosphate.181 After Dene Shipping collected this sum, 
Wehner, claiming that only he was entitled to receive the freight, brought suit to 
recover the bill of lading freight from Dene Shipping.182 The King's Bench 
Division addressed the question of "with whom in law was the contract that was 
made by the bill of lading to carry Gleichmann's phosphate."183 Mr. Justice
The court held no hire was due when Dene Shipping purported to exercise the lien; thus, Dene 
Shipping was not entitled to a lien. Id.
175 Id. at 92-93, 21 T.L.R. at 340.
176 [1905] 2 K.B. at 97, 21 T.L.R. at 340.
177 Id.
178 A bill of aiding is a contract for the carriage of goods aboard a vessel. In this way, it is
sim ilar to a charterparty . O rdinarily, though, a b ill o f lading covers a sm aller and
indeterm inate portion o f the ship's carrying capacity, while a charterparty is for the whole 
or a large or specific part of the vessel. D rin k w a te r v. The Spartan. 7 F. Cas. 1085, 1088 (D. Me. 
1828) (No. 4085). In addition, a bill of lading is a receipt for, and sometimes denotes title to, the 
goods shipped.
See, Ibid at (171), at p. 79.
179 [1905] 2 O .  at 97, 21 T.L.R. at 340.
180 Id at 98, 21 T.L.R. at 340.
181 Id at 95, 21 T.L.R. at 340.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 98, 21 T.L.R. at 340. (Because the Times Law Reports (T.L.R.) only summarizes
245
Channell stated:
In ordinary cases, where the charterparty does not amount to a 
demise of the ship, and where possession of the ship is not given up 
to the charterer, the rule is that the contract contained in the bill of 
lading is made, not with the charterer, but with the owner, and that 
will, I think, explain away and account!] for all the difficulties which 
would otherwise arise as to the existence of the shipowner's lien. 
When there is a sub-charterparty there is no direct contract 
between the sub-charterer and the owner, and if the contract in the 
bill of lading were made, not with the owner, but with the sub­
charterer, how is the shipowner's lien to be accounted for as against 
the holder of the bill of lading? It would be very difficult to deal 
with the question upon any logical or intelligible footing unless one 
starts with the proposition that the bill of lading contract is made, as 
it appears upon its face to be made, with the shipowner.184
Although the case was decided on other grounds, it appears that, according 
to Justice Channell, the shipowner's ability to collect bill of lading freight directly 
from the shipper is based upon a contractual relationship.185 In Wehner, 
therefore, Dene Shipping, the shipowner, would have been entitled to the bill of 
lading freight due Wehner, the sub-charterer, from Gleichmann, the bill of lading 
holder, because Dene Shipping was in privity of contract with Gleichmann.186
The rule announced in Wehner, that the shipowner can collect freight 
directly from the shipper based upon a contractual relationship187, was modified 
a year later in Samuel. Samuel & Co. v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co.188
opinions, the quotation is from Law Reports (K.B.) at the page cited; the passage is merely 
paraphrased in T.L.R. at the page indicated.)
184 Id.
185 [1905] 2 O .  at 98, 21 T.L.R. at 340.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 11 Com. Cas. 115 (1906), modified, 12 Com. Cas. 203 (1907). In Samuel, a three-party 
case, the court held that based upon the charterparty, bill of lading, and other documents, no 
contractual relationship existed W est Hartlepool, the shipowner, and Standard Oil, the shipper 
and holder of the bill o f lading. Instead, the court found that the bill of lading was a contract 
between Standard Oil and Edward Perry & Co., the charterer. 11 Com. Cas. at 126. Nevertheless,
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The Samuel court stated that whether privity exists between the shipowner and 
the shipper is "a question of fact depending upon the documents and 
circumstances in each case ..."189
The Wehner rule was further questioned, and even criticized, by the King's 
Bench Division in Molthes Rederi Aktieselskabet v. Ellerman's Wilson Line. 
L td .190 There, Mothes Rederi time-chartered its ship Sproit to Maurice Ellif &
Company. The charterparty was for twelve months and contained a clause
similar to Clause Eighteen of the NYPE. The clause provided that the shipowner 
was to have a lien on all cargoes and all sub-freights for hire due under the 
charter.191 Maurice Elliff & Company then sub-chartered the vessel to carry a 
cargo of wood to Hull, England.192 Ellerman's Wilson Line was the charterer's 
agent to collect the sub-freight from the sub-charterer.193 When the agent, after 
collecting the sub-freight from the sub-charterer, refused to pay the shipowner 
as obligated under the original charterparty, Molthes Rederi, the shipowner, 
brought suit.194
Mr. Justice Geer held that the shipowner was entitled to collect the sub­
freight on the basis of the express lien in the charterparty, not on the contractual 
relationship with the sub-charterer:195
Though Channell J bases his judgment in Wehner v. Dene Steam 
Shipping Co. on the fact that the bill of lading contract is with the 
owner, and therefore the owner in claiming the freight was only 
claiming what was legally his, he still speaks of the owner's rights as
even w ithout a contractual relationship , the court concluded that W est H artlepool, the 
shipowner, had a lien on the bill of lading freight due Edward Perry & Co., the charterer, from 
Standard Oil, the shipper, since the lien was expressly reserved in the charterparty. Id. at 129.
189 11 Com. Cas. at 125.
190 [1927] 1 K.B. 710, 136 T .LR . (n.s.) 767 (1926).
191 [1927] 1 K.B. at 712,136 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 767.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 714, 136 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 768.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 716, 136 L .TR . (n.s.) at 768-69.
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arising out of his lien. It is difficult to understand how a shipowner
can be said to have a lien on that which, ex hypothesi, is his own 
property, and which he is entitled to because it is his own. . . .  It 
seems a misuse of words to say that a shipowner has a lien on the 
debt due to him under the contract made with him by the bill of
lading. The lien clause in the charterparty is needed to give the 
owner a lien in those cases where the sub-freight is due to the
charterer and not to the owner, as where goods are carried on a 
sub-charter without any bill of lading. In such a case the owner 
could only become entitled to the sub-freight by virtue of the lien 
clause. ... 196
Molthes suggests, therefore, that although the lien must be expressly 
reserved in the charterparty, the shipowner's lien on sub-freight is not based 
upon a contractual relationship.197
A lternatively, the Queen's Bench Division in Federal Commerce & 
Navigation Co. v. Molena Alpha. Inc.198 explained that the basis for the 
shipowner's lien on sub-freight is an equitable assignment.199 Mr. Justice Kerr,
construing a dause in the Baltime charterparty form that is somewhat similar to 
Clause Eighteen of the NYPE form, stated that:
"[a]s between the owners and charterers [the lien] operates as 
something in the nature of an equitable assignment which can be 
perfected by giving the proper notices if and when the charterers 
are in default in the payment of some sum due to the owners."2 00
196 Id at 716-17, 136 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 769.
197 Id. at 716, 136 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 769.
198 [1978] 1 Q.B. 927, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 309, rev'd on other grounds, 1979 A.C. 757, [1978] 3 
W.L.R. 991, [1979] 1 All E.R. 307 (1978).
199 [1978] 1 Q.B. at 942, [1978] 3 W.L.R. at 323 (kerr, J.).
200 Id. The Baltime charterparty is one of the more popular time charterparty forms. It 
has a reputation for being more favorable to shipowners in its wording than the NYPE form. 
The 1939 Baltime charterparty is reprinted in 2B Benedict on Admiralty 7-9 to 7-14 (7th ed. 
1983).
Clause 18 of 1939 Baltime form provides in full:
The owners to have a lien upon all cargoes and sub-freights belonging to the Time
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According to this view, the shipowner receives as equitable assignee the
charterer's contractual right to the sub freight.
When Molene Alpha reached the House of Lords, however, Lord Russell 
stated that:
"[t]he lien operates as an equitable charge upon what is due from the 
shipper to the charterer, and in order to be effective requires an 
ability to intercept the sub-freight (by notice of claim) before it is
paid by shipper to charterer."201
Nevertheless, Lord Russell did not explain the difference between basing 
the lien on an equitable charge or an equitable assignment theory.202
As discussed above, the court in Care Shipping.203 based the lien on sub­
freight on an equitable assignment theory.204 Mr. Justice Lloyd explained that, if
the shipowner's lien operates by way of a chain of equitable assignments, the 
lien could be extended to include a lien on sub-sub-freight as well.
Moreover, the lien of shipowner on sub-feights was considered to be an 
equitable assignment in a recent case, The "Attika Hope" case,205 where Mr. 
Justice Syteyn considered that this lien is an equitable assignment. Here, by a 
time charterparty on the New York Produce Exchange form the owners of the
Charterers and any Bill o f Lading freight for all claims under this Charter, and the Charterers 
to have a lien on the Vessel for all moneys paid in advance and not earned.
201 1979 A.C. at 784, [1978] 3 W.L.R. at 1004, [1979] 1 All E R . at 318 (Russell, LJ.).
202 M olena A lpha involved the alleged breach o f three charterparties pertaining to
three different vessels. The central issue in the case was whether certain actions by the 
shipowner am ounted to repudiation o f the cahrterparties. An argum ent advanced by the
shipowner in justification for its actions was that it merely exercising the lien that had been
reserved in the charterparties. The lower court held that the owner's actions did not amount
to a proper exercise of the lien, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 942-43, [1978] 3 W.L.R. at 323, and the House of
Lords agreed on this issue. 1979 A.C. at 779, [1978] 3 W.L.R. at 999, [1979] 1 All E.R. at 314
(W ilberforce, L .J.).
203 [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 All E.R. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982).
204 Id. at 838, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1128, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 309.
205 G. & N. Angelakis Shipping Co.S.A. v. Com pagnie National Algerienne De Navigation.
(The "Attika'1 Hopei. [1988] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports, at 439.
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vessel Attika Hope chartered their vessel to Ideomar. The charter provided 
inter alia: "18. That the owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and sub­
freights for amounts due under this charter." Ideomar was in difficulty in 
discharging debts to the plaitiffs and negotiations ensued to attempt to reduce 
Ideomar's total indebtedness to the plaintiffs. Telex exchanges took place with 
the plaintiffs alleged amounted to an assignment by Ideomar to them of freight 
under a voyage charter of Attike Hope. That charter was between Ideomar as 
disponent owners and the defendeants. The plaintiffs alleged that they
informed the defendants of the assignment, and the owners informed the 
defendants that they were exercising their lien on sub-freights. The plaintiffs 
requested the defendants to pay the freight to them, and the freight was in fact 
paid by the defendants to the owners of the vessel and the issue was whether 
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover against the defendants.
It was held by Q.B. (Com.Ct.) (Steyn J.), that: " the owners' claim was based 
on an equitable assignment."206
A fourth theory for the lien, subrogation, has been suggested by some 
American courts. The leading United States case concerning a shipowner's lien
on sub-freight is American Steel Barge Co. v. Chesapeake & O.Coal Agency.207 In 
American Steel Barge, the plaintiff time-chartered its vessel City of Everett to
Atlantic Transportation Company (Atlantic) for one year.208 Atlantic than
arranged to carry coal for Chesapeake & 0 . Coal Agency from Newport News to 
Boston aboard City of Everett.209 American Steel Barge Company (american) 
grought suit when Atlantic became insolvent with hire due American under 
their charterparty.210
206 Id. at P. 439.
207 115 F. 669 (1st Cir. 1902), rev'g American Steel Barge Co. v. Cargo of Coal ex Citv of 
Everett. 107 F. 964 (D Mass. 1901).
208 115 F. at 670.
209 American Steel Barge Co. v. Cargo of Coal ex Citv of Everett. 107 F. 964, 966 (D Mass. 
1901), rev'd sub nom. American Steel Barge Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Coal Agency. 115 F. 669 (1st 
Cir. 1902).
210 115 F. at 670.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that 
American had a lien on the sub-freight due Atlantic from Chesapeake & 0 . Coal 
Agency but not on the cargo of coal itself.211 Discussing the way in which the 
lien operates, Judge Putnam declared that a shipowner "holding a lien on sub­
freight becomes subrogated to all the remedies of the charterer ... ,"212 
Therefore, American, standing in the place of the charterer, could prceed in 
personam against Chesapeake & O.Coal Agency, the bill of lading holder, but was 
limited in its recovery to the amount owed under the bill of lading contract.213 If 
no bill of lading freight was due, then, like the charterer, American could not
recover.214
Although Judge Putnam stated that the shipowner was entitled to the lien
because it was expressly reserved in the charterparty,215 he did not discuss
whether any contractual relationship existed between the vessel owner and the
shipper. This issue was resolved a few years later, however, when the Second 
Circuit held that even when a sub-charter contains the same terms as the
original charterparty, no privity of contract exists between the shipowner and
sub-charterer.216 Therefore, the subrogation theory postulates that, when any
211 Id. at 674. The first sentence of the opinion explains that the case does not concern a 
lien on the cargo but a lien on the freight therefrom. Id. at 670. Subsequently, the court 
explained that:
The proper proceeding would have been to file a libel against the sub-freight alone, 
naming the party charged with the possession thereof, who in this case was the holder of the 
bill o f ladind, or the owner of the cargo, and asking process requiring him to bring into court 
what would be due from him on discharge of the vessel . . . .  Then, if the freight according to 
the bill o f lading had not been brought into court . . . summary process would have issued on a
supplemental libel or petition against the holder of the bill of lading, or against the cargo if
the lien for freight had not been lost.
Id. at 674.
212 Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
213 Id. at 672.
214 Id. at 674.
215 Id. at 671-72.
216 The Banes. 221 F. 416, 418 (2d Cir. 1915). Cf. J.M. Guffev Petroleum Co. v . Coastwise 
Transp. Co.. 180 F. 677 (2d Cir. 1910) (charterer assigned its charterparty to a third party, who 
then assigned it to a fourth party, who was treated as though it was the original charterer).
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sums become due and unpaid under the charterparty, the shipowner is 
immediately subrogated to the rights and remedies of the charterer.2 17 
However, this explanation is difficult to sustain in English law,218 where, apart 
from in the case of indemnity contracts, subrogation is a narrow concept limited 
to a few isolated situations.219
A further opinion was expressed in the case of The "Nanfri1*.220 Here, the 
shipowner under clause 18, is considered as having something in the nature of 
an equitable assignment. This view was expressed by Kerr J,221 when he stated:
"As between the owners and the charterers it still operates as
something in the nature of an equitable assignment which can be
perfected by giving the proper notices if and when the charterers
are in default in the payment of some sum due to the owners."
This lien was considered as an equitable charge on what is due from the 
shippers to the charterers, and that was supported by Lord Russell when the 
case reached the House of Lords:222
"The lien operates as an equitable charge on what is due from the 
shippers to the charterers, and in order to be effective requires an 
ability to intercept the sub-freight (by notice of claim) before it paid 
by shipper to charterer."
In addition there is the passage in Roskill L L's judgment in M a r e v a  
Compania Naviera SA. v. International SA.223 where he refers to the 'legal or 
perhaps equitable right which the shipowners may be entitled to have protected 
by the court.' Here Lloyd J .224 considered that, although, authority is slender, it
217 See the American case of American Steel Barge Co. v. Chesapeak & 0 .  Coal Agency Co. 
(1903) 115 F. 669, 674.
218 Oditah, Fidelis. "The Juridical Nature of a Lien on Sub-Freights." L loyd 's  Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly. 1989. at P. 192.
219 See, O rakpo v. Manson Investments Ltd. [1978] A.C. 95.
220 [1978] Q.B. 927 at 942.
221 Id.
222 [1979] 1 All E.R. 307 at 318, [1979] A.C. 757 at 784.
223 [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 at 216.
224 The "Cehu". Supra, at P. 1128.
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was, as he said, common ground that in a three-party case the so called lien on 
sub-freights gives the owners the right to claim to be paid sub-freights as 
equitable assignees. It would seem to me to follow (though this was not 
conceded) that the owners can, if necessary, enforce that claim by exercising a 
lien on the cargo itself.
A question which has always been asked is, whether in this case in
particular, or in any other case involving the shipowner's lien on sub-freight, is 
that, the shipowners always claim the benefit of a contractual lien agaist the 
sub-charterer with whom they have no contract. This is a difficulty which was 
foreseen by Channel J.,in wehner v. Dene Steam Shipping Co.225 where he said:
"In ordinary cases, where the charterparty does amount to a demise
of the ship, and where possession of the ship is not given up to the
charterer, the rule is that the contract contained in the bill of lading is 
made, not with the charterer, but with the owner,and that will, I
think, explain away and accounts for all the difficulties which would 
otherwise arise as to the existence of the shipowner’s lien. When 
there a sub-charterparty there is no direct contract between the 
sub-charterer and the owner, and if the contract in the bill of lading 
were made, not with the owner, but with the sub-charterer, how is
the shipowner's lien to be accounted for as against the holder of the 
bill of lading? It would be very difficult to deal with the question 
upon any logical or intelligible footing unless one starts with the
proposition that the bill of lading contract is made, with the
shipowner."
Thus, from the different theories and judgments which have been laid
down above, one can conclude that, the lien of the shipowners which is given to 
them by the different charterparties, is in the nature of an equitable assignment, 
by which or which entitles the shipowner to intercept the sub-freight before it is 
paid to the charterer, because according to the nature of this charge, the 
cahrterer has assigned the sub-freight which he is supposed to receive from the 
sub-charterers, to the shipowner, and that by inserting a clause in the
225 [1905] 2 0 . 9 2  at P. 98
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charterparty giving the shipowner, a lien on the sub-freight. To be sure, English 
courts are not in agreement as to the legal basis for the shipowner's lien on sub­
freight. Theories for the lien posited by English courts,226 include privity of
contract,227 equitable charge 228 and equitable assignment.229
However, if these are the views expressed in English law, it would be
worthwile comparing it with the views expressed in the Civil Law jurisdictions, 
namely the French and the Algerian law.
The French Maritime Law (which is included in the French Code of
Commerce), clearly gives to the shipowner a lien or what is called "privilege", on
the sub-freight. The French Code of Commerce provides in its article 14230 that: 
"Le freteur, dans la mesure de ce qui lui du par l'affreteur, peut agir contre le
sous-affreteur en paiement du fret encore du par celui-ci. Le sous-affretement
n'etablit pas d'autres relations directes entre le freteur et le sous-affreteur.", i.e., " 
The shipowner, in the limits of what is owed to him, can act against the sub­
charterer for the payment of freight which is still owed by this one. The sub-
charterparty does not create any other relationship between the shipowner and 
the sub-charterer."23l Thus, the French law allows the charterer to sub-charter 
the ship or to use it under bills of lading (Article 12 Of the French Code of 
Commerce), but in the same it protects the shipowner by allowing him to act
against the sub-charterer for the freight which is still owed by him, and 
therefore, this is the case in the French law. According to the wording of the Act 
of 1966, the shipowner has a "directe action" or (droit direct) against the
charterer or the shipper, for the payment of the sub-freight. The article 14,
226 See, infra at P.
227 Wehner v . DeSteam Shipping Co.. [1905] 2 K.B. 92. 21 T.L.R. 339.
228 F ed era l Commerce & Navigation Co. v . Molena Alpha. Inc.. 1979 A.C. 757, [1978] 3
W.L.R. 991, [1979] 1 All E.R. 307 (1978).
229 Care Shipping Corp. v. Latin Am. Shipping Corp.. [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 All E.R. 
1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B.1982).
230 Loi No. 66-420 du 18 Juin 1966, Sur les Contrats d'Affretem ent et de Transport 
M a ritim e s .
231 " My own translation. "
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section-1, gives the principle of a directe action for the payment of freight which
is due to the shipowner, for the benefit of the latter against the sub-charterer.
The purpose of direct action, is to give the shipowner a lien on the debt of freight 
of the charterer against the sub-charterer, this lien or "privilege" makes the 
shipowner be the first to be satisfied against the other creditors of the charterer
on the assets of this security.232 This disposition has a great importance, because
it allows the shipowner to claim for the payment of the sub-freight in execution 
of a contract to which he is a complete stranger. Article 12 allows the charterer 
to sub-charter the ship or to use it for carriage under bills of lading, the 
shipowner has also a directe action against the shippers, in the case of a contract 
of transport on a chartered ship. However, this action is subject to two 
limitations; the first one is that the shipowner cannot claim more what is due to 
him, and the second is that he cannot claim from the shipper more that what the 
shipper owes to the carrier.233 The present solution was recomanded by 
R ippert,234 who saw in the system of the direct action the solution which is most 
qualified to guarantee the rights of the shipowner. Before, this solution was a
little bit confused, because of the lack of legal texts, but the jurisprudence, very 
early, had to admit this direct action,235 as well as the doctrine.236 However, 
there was adifference of opinion about the nature of this action. Some agreed 
with the analogy with article 1753 of the Civil Code, which gives to the lessor a
232 Rodiere, Rene. Traite General de Droit Maritime. Tome I, Paris, 1967, at P.328.
233 See, arret de la Court d'appel de Paris, 13 Decembre 1961, Le Droit M aritime Francais. 
Paris, 1960, P.215 et ss., ainsi que la note de RODIERE., Le Droit Maritime Franyais. Paris, 1960, 
P.218 et ss.
234 RIPERT, Georges, Droit Maritime. 4-em 6d., Vol.2, Paris, 1952, P.546.
235 M arseille, 15 Novembre 1854, Journal de Jurisprudence Com mercial e t M aritim e. 
Marseilles 1854, P. 1321, droit du freteur contre le sous-affreteur, et arret de la Court d'appel de 
Rouen du 6 Juillet 1899, Revue International du Droit Maritime, 15 erne ann£e, 1899-1900, P.17, 
Paris, droit du freteur contre les chargeurs.
236 L6on. Denisse. Du frfo consid6r6 dans ses rapport avec l'abandon. l'affretem ent. la 
cotribution aux avaries communes et les assurances maritimes. Paris, 1891, P. 313. Bouvier, 
Paul, Etudes sur l'obligation de paver le fret en droit Franyais. Paris, 1904, P. 172 et P. 173.
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direct action against the sub-tenant for the payment of the rent which the latter
owes to the one he had a contract with (the original tenant), or, i.e., the tenant
sub-lessor. The others like Ripert, have always in denying this application of 
analogy, went for the same practical solution. Therefore, the French law, gives 
the shipowner a direct action against the sub-charterer for the payment of 
freight which is still due from the sub-charterer to the charterer, whereby the 
shipowner can act against the sub-charterer by all the means which are given to 
an ordinary creditor, because in this case the shipowner is considered as being 
the creditor of the sub-charterer for the sub-freight which puts him in a
stronger position than that of being a mere creditor of the charterer as the 
creditor of the sub-charterer. Here, the shipowner has a better position and a 
better guarantee and that is only for the case of payment of sub-freight.
In the Algerian Maritime Code, the legislator did not give a specific lien or
"privilege" to the shipowner against the sub-charterer. However, when the 
legislator was giving the general rules of the contract of affreightment, he gave 
the charterer the
right to sub-charter the ship with the condition that he (the charterer) 
remains responsible towards the shipowner for the obligations born out of the 
contract of affreightment. Article 644 of the Algerian Maritime Code reads as 
follows: "Sauf convention contraire des parties, l'affreteur peut sous-freter le 
navire, mais il demeure tenu envers le freteur des obligations resultant du 
contrat d'affretement.", i.e., "Except if there is a contrary agreement of the parties, 
the charterer can sub-charter the ship, but he remains responsible towards the
shipowner for the obligations born out of the contract of affreightment."237 Thus,
the Algerian Maritime Code clearly gives to the charterer the right to sub­
charter the ship, but the Algerian legislator added in the following article 
(art.645), that the shipowner has a lien on the goods for the payment of his 
freight and other charges provided in the contract of affreightment. Therefore, 
although art.644 of the Algerian Maritime Code makes the charterer the one to
237 H My own translation. "
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be responsible for all the calims and charges which arise under the contract of 
affreightment, one might conclude that, art.645 gives the shipowner a lien or
"privilege" on the goods which are on his ship whether they belong to the 
charterer or not, because the text of article 645 is general and does not specify
on which goods can the shipowner exercise his lien, and because the Algerian
legislator did not give a section regulating the sub-charterparty in the Maritime 
Code, it might be concluded that the intention of the legislator was to give the 
shipowner a lien on the sub-freight. The argument of this conclusion is that the 
Algerian legislator gave the charterer the right to sub-charter in article 644 in 
the first chapter of the contract of affreightment and that chapter is concerned
with the general rules concerning all the contracts of affreightment and, he 
followed in the same chapter by an article (art.645) giving the shipowner a lien
on all the goods for his freight and this article was just after the article which
allowed the charterer to sub-charter. Therefore, this article (645) did not come
as a coincidence, but it might have been the intention of the legislator to allow 
the shipowner to exercise a lien for sub-freight.
3-3- The Probelm s of Charges:
The problem of charges under Section 95 of the Companies Act 1948, does 
not constitute a problem for registration any more with the new Act of 1989. 
Although under the 1948 Act (Sect.95) and 1985 Act (Sect.395) a charge on
book debts requires registration, the lien on sub-freights was considered a
charge on book debts in The Ugland Trailer, and therefore, required registration 
under the above acts. Thus, the characterization of a lien on sub-freights as a 
charge on book debts had far reaching consequences.238
Under the new Companies Act 1989, Sect.93 (2) (g), a shipowner's lien on
sub-freights is not considered to be a charge on book debts nor a floating
charge.239
238 M.T.W.. Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Q uarterly. 1986. . at P. 1. on "Lien on 
Sub-Freights Registrable as a Charge".
239 Oditah. Fidelis. "The Juridical Nature of a Lien on Sub-Freights." L loyd 's  Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly. 1989. at P. 196.
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However, it would be worthwhile considering how the problem of charges 
arose and how this affected the legal nature of the lien. The question can only be 
answered by looking at the different cases which were concerned with this 
problem. The first case, was The "Ugland Trailer".240 where it was held that such 
a lien was equitable and had the characteristics of a charge. The substance of the 
decision is unchanged by the 1989 Act, leaving the disponent owner with two 
alternatives to justify the enforcement of the lien, namely charge and 
assignem ent.
Welsh Irish Ferries chartered the Ugland Trailer form Norwegian owners 
on the New York Produce Exchange form for a period for about six months. The 
charter contained the usual cl. 18 giving the owners a lien upon all sub-freights 
for any amounts due under the charter. During the currency of the charter, 
Welsh Irish Ferries executed a debenture in favour of a bank, under which, inter 
alia, "all book debts both present and future due or owing to the company and 
the benefit of all rights relating thereto..." were charged. The debenture, which 
further provided that the charge created should be a fixed first charge, was duly 
registered under s.95 of the Companies Act 1948. Section 95(1) of the 1948 Act 
(now s.395 of the 1985 Act) renders void against the liquidator and any creditor 
of a company to which the section applies, any charge created by the company 
unless it is registered within 21 days. By s.95(2) (now s.396 of the 1985 Act) the 
section applies, inter alia, to "a charge on book debts of the company". Cargo was 
carried during the period of the time charter under the terms of the 
consignment notes issued to shippers by the time charterers. No bills of lading 
were issued and hence there were no contracts to which the owners were a 
party under which freight was payable. The only rights the owners of the 
Ugland Trailer had in regard to freights were those given by the lien on sub­
freights under cl. 18 of the time charter. Following defaults in the payment of
240 Re Welsh Irish Ferries Ltd. (The Ugland Trailer). [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 372.
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hire by the time charterers, the owners terminated the charter and gave notice 
to shippers requiring them to pay all outstanding sums due in respect of freight
to them. Subsequently, the bank in exercise of its rights under the debenture
appointed receivers who, after an order was made for the winding-up of the
time charterers, applied to the court for directions whether to pay the freight
collected from the shippers to the owners or to the bank.
It was held by Nourse, J.,241 that the lien on sub-freights operated to create 
an equitable charge on Welsh Irish Ferries' book debts, including the sub­
freights; that on the clear wording of s.95, the lien was registrable as a charge;
and that, since the lien had not been registered, the bank's fixed charge took
priority over the claim of the owners of the "Ugland Trailer.'1
It was argued on behalf of the owners that although the New York Produce
Exchange form of time charter had been in use since before 1913, the rights
under cl. 18 had always been described as liens and it has never been suggested 
until recently that they took effect as equitable charges. Registration under s.95 
of the Companies Act 1948, it was said, it would be quite impracticable since 
charters were negotiated by commercial people, the 21-day period under 
s.95(l) would normally expire before the charter came to an end. It was 
therefore suggested that registration would have to be effected in almost all 
cases which would give rise to "profound inconvenience". The judge held,
however, that these considerations, powerful though they were, could not
outweigh the clear wording of the statute.
Thus, in reaching this decision Nourse J noted that it never been the 
practice to register a lien on sub-freight under section 95. It was stated that the 
court was most reluctant to disturb settled commercial practices needlessly, 
although such had happened in the case of Re Bound Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228, 
where Slade J had decided that a retention of title clause created a floating
charge on the property of the company within the meaning of section 95(2)(f)
241 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 372.
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(Companies Act 1985, Section 396(1 )(f).242
The Welsh Irish Ferries case was to some extent a special case in that cargo 
was carried throughout the time charter under consignment notes and not 
under bills of lading, the contracts of carriage evidenced by the bills will usually 
be contracts to which the shipowners themselves are party by virtue of the bills 
being signed by or on behalf of the master. Where the owners are parties to the 
bills of lading in this manner, the right to claim sub-freights from consignees and 
endorsees of the bills will arise not by virtue of the owners' contractual rights of 
lien, but by virtue of their right under the bills to require that sub-freights be 
paid to them (see the remarks of Greer, J., In Molthes R/A v. Ellerman's Wilson 
Line Ltd.1!243 In those circumstances the question of registration will not be 
relevant.
Nevertheless, there are many other cases, apart from the rather special 
circumstances of the Welsh Irish Ferries case, where the right to lien sub­
freights is a valuable remedy available to the shipowner: for example, where 
charterers' bills of lading are issued or where the ship is sub-chartered and sub­
charter freight or sub-time charter hire is payable to the time charterers. 
Registration of the time charter under s.395 of the 1985 Act would therefore be 
a wise precaution to take, if practicable, where are any doubts about the time 
charterers' present or future solvency and the company is one to which s.395 
applies. By virtue of s.409 of the 1985 Act (derived from s. 106 of the 
Companies Act 1948) s.395 applies not only to companies incorporated in 
England and Wales, but also to overseas companies with an established place of 
business here. It was held in N.V. Slavenburg's Bank v. Intercontinental Natural 
Resources Ltd..244 that a charge governed by foreign law which was created by a
242 Company Law Digest. Re Welsh Irrish Ferries Ltd [1985] BCLC 327. Whether a Charge 
Lien o f  Sub-Freights is Registrable Under Section 95, Companies A ct 1948. at P. 51-52. Year, 
1986. Volume.4, Part.(2).
243 [1927] 1. K.B. 710,717.
244 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1076.
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foreign company with a place of business in England, in favour of a foreign bank, 
was void in this country for want of registration under s.95 of the 1948 Act, 
even though the company which created the charge had not registered as an 
overseas company. It was held further that registration under s.95 would be 
required in the case of property not in England at the time the charge was 
created, but which subsequently came to England; and also that the section 
would continue to apply even if the company ceased to have a place of business 
in England after creation of the charge.
As a result of the decision in Slavenburg's case, it has become common for 
lenders in the shipping sector to register charges under s.395 of the 1985 Act 
where there is any possibility at all that the company creating the charge may 
have a place of business in England and Wales or might do so in the future or 
that assets subject to the charge might at some stage come within the 
jurisdiction.
Moreover, there has been other cases were this issue was considered and 
decided, and that was the case of the "A nnangel Glory".24  ^ where by a time 
charter in the New York Produce Exchange form dated Oct. 25, 1985 the plaintiff 
owners let their vessel Annangel Glory the the charterers (second defendants) 
who in turn by a voyage charter on the Sugar Charterparty 1969 form dated 
Nov. 7, 1985 sub-let the vessel to the first defendant sub-charterers. The head 
charter provided inter alia:
"18 ... That the Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes, and all 
sub-freights for any amount due under this Charter . . . ".
The owners claimed to be entitled to recover from the sub-charterers sums 
due from the latter to the charterers on the ground that these sums represented 
sub-freights which the owners could claim under cl.18 because the charterers
245 Annangel Glorv Compania Naviera S.A . v. M. Golodetz Ltd.. Middle East M arketing 
Corporation (UK1 Ltd and Clive Robert Hammond. (The "Annangel Glorv"L [1988] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 
45.
owed money to the owners under the head charter.
The charterers were now in liquidation and the issue for decision was 
whether by agreeing to cl. 18 the charterers created a charge registrable under 
s.395 of the Companies Act, 1985. If such a charge was created then it was 
common ground that any rights of the owners to the sums due from the sub­
charterers were void as against the third defendant, the liquidator of the 
charterers because the charge was not duly registered within 21 days of the 
date of the charter.
It was held by Mr. Justice Saville that,246 the relevant words of cl. 18 
constituted an agreement by the charterers to assign to the owners by way of 
floating security the right to payment of sub-freights falling due under contracts 
to be made by the charterers in respect of the vessel the subject of the head 
charter. He added that,247 whatever the true nature of the "lien", it seems to me 
to be obvious that the parties intended to give the owners a right which the 
owners could exercise on their own behalf-not on behalf of the charterers-if 
amounts became due under the charterparty. I can find nothing in the words of 
cl. 18 which could be read as giving the owners a right to act merely as agents for 
the charterers. Moreover, he agreed with Mr. Justice Nourse, in The Ugland 
T railer.248 that the only way in which that right can be vested in the owners is 
by way of assignment, i.e., by transfer of that right (that chose in action) from the 
charterers to the owners. Of course it is not intended that the owners should 
exercise that right unless sums are outstanding under the head charter; and until 
that state of affairs arises it is clearly implicit that the charterers are empowered 
to deal with the sub-freights as their own. He added, later on in the passage that, 
"In my view, therefore, the relevant words of cl. 18 do constitute an agreement 
by the charterers to assign (i.e., to transfer) to the owners by way of floating 
security the right to payment of sub-freights falling due under contracts to be
246 Id. at P. 45.
247 Id. at P. 47.
248 [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 372.
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made by the charterers in respect of the vessel the subject of the head
charter.249 Mr. Justice Saville,J., concluded his judgment by stating that:
"In my judgment, therefore, cl. 18 of the head charter does not 
contain a charge created by the charterers within the meaning of 
s.395(l) of the Companies Act, 1985, namely a floating charge on a 
specified part of that company's property (namely sub-freights to 
become due to the charterers in respect of the vessel) within the
meaning of s.396(l)(f) of that Act. Since neither the prescribed
particulars of that charge nor the instrument (the head charter)
creating that charge were registered within the period allowed, the 
security on that property conferred by that charge is void as against 
the liquidator of the charterers. Therefore, where the time charterer 
is a company registered in this country or has or may have a place 
of business in this country, non-registration of the time charter
under s.395 may render a lien on sub-freights innefective. The 
position in other countries having legislation similar to the
Companies Acts 1948 and 1985 may well be the same.250
If this is the situation under s.395 of the Companies Act, i.e., that charge 
should be registered within the period allowed, the case may differ with the 
new Companies Act of 1989.
This new Act has brought a lot of changes and that by considering the
shipowner's lien on sub-freight as a charge which does not require registration.
Section 93 of the Companies Act of 1989 which brought an amendment to 
section 395 and 396 of the previous act (the Companies Act 1985), provides in 
the paragraph which concerns the registration in the companies charges register, 
that the charges which require registration do not include the shipowner's lien 
on sub-freight. Therefore, sect.396 of the new act provides a that:
Section 396. 2. (g):
a shipowner's lien on subfreights shall not be treated as a charge on
249 The Annangel filnrv. [1988] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at P. 49.
250 Company Law Digest. Re Welsh Irrish Ferries Ltd [1985] BCLC 327. W hether a Charge 
Lien of Sub-Freights is Registrable Under Section 95, Companies Act 1948. at P. 51-52. Year, 
1986. Volume.4, Part.(2)
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book debts for the purposes of paragraph (c) (iii) or as a floating
charge for the purposes of paragraph (e).
3-4- The Nature of the Shipowner’s Lien on Sub-Sub-Freight:
As it has been stated above, the shipowner has an express lien for sub­
freight by the clauses of the charterparty, i.e., clause 18. However, if cl.18 gives 
to the shipowner a lien on all sub-freights, a question arises, as to what freight is
meant by this clause; is it the sub-freight or does it include the sub-sub-freight?
In this context many theories have been laid down as to the nature of this lien
on the sub-sub-freight, some of them rely on the the subrogation, some others
on the theory of equitable charge and some of them on the theory of equitable 
assignment and some others on other theories which will be examined in this
com m ent.
A- Privity of Contract as the Basis for the Lien:
Authorities in both England and the United States agree that although the 
lien on sub-freight must be expressly reserved in the charterparty,251 the legal 
basis for the shipowner's lien is not based upon a contractual relationship
between the shipowner and the sub-charterer.252 Therefore, a fortiori, no 
contractual relationship exists between a shipowner and a sub-sub-charterer, 
and a lien on sub-sub-freight does not require privity of contract.
251 O'Rourke, Kenneth R. A shipowner's Lien on Sub-Sub-Freight in England and the 
United States: New York Produce Exchange Time Charterparty Clause 18. Lovola o f Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Journal. 1984. Vol.7. Part.N 1. at P.73.
252 Molthes Rederi Aktieselskabet v. Ellerman's Wilson Line. Ltd.. [1927] 1 K.B. 710, 716, 
136 L.T.R. (n.s.) 767,769 (1926); accord The Banes. 221 F. 416, 418 (2d Cir. 1915). Cf. W eh n er v. 
Dene Shipping Co.. [1905] 2 K.B. 92, 98, 21 T.L.R. 339, 340; accord In re North Atl. & Gulf S.S. Co., 
204 F. Supp. 899, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd  sub nom. Schilling v. A/S D/S Dannebrog. 320 F. 2d 628 
(2d Cir. 1963).
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B- Subrogation as the Basis for the Lien;
United States courts base the shipowner's lien on sub-freight on a theory of
subrogation.253 Ordinarily, subrogation refers to a doctrine of (marine) insurance 
whereby the insurer indemnifies the insured for his loss and then succeeds the 
insured to all rights that the insured may have had against a third party.254 In 
the context of a shipowner's lien on sub-freight, the doctrine operates in much
the same way. According to the case of American Steel Barge Co. v. Chesapeake 
& Ohio Coal Agency Co.255 subrogation operates as follows: If the charterer 
defaults under his charterparty with the shipowner, the shipowner steps into
the place of the charterer with respects to any rights the charterer has to collect 
sub-freight from the sub-charterer.256 If freight is also due to the sub-charterer 
from a sub-sub-charterer, the shipowner could be subrogated to the sub­
charterer's right to collect that freight as well. As long as each charterer in the 
chain owes freight to the party from whom it chartered the vessel, the 
shipowner can proceed against the freight that is owed. The shipowner's 
recovery from the various charterers, however, is limited to the amount that 
each of the charterers owe under their respective charterparties.257 Moreover, 
the shipowner cannot successfully proceed against a charterer who has fulfilled 
its freight obligation, as long as the freight was paid before notice was received 
that the shipowner was exercising its lien.258 Thus, it appears if one of the 
charterers along the chain has fulfilled its freight obligation before the shipowner
253 See, e.g., American Steel Barge Co. v. Chesapeak & Coal Agency. 115 F. 669 (IS t Cir. 
1902), rev'g American Steel Barge Co. v. Cargo of Coal ex Citv of Everett 107 F. 964 (D. Mass.
1901); MCT Shipping Corp. v. Sabet. 497 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Larsen v. 150 Bales of 
Sisal Grass. 147 F. 783, 785 (S.D. Ala. 1906).
254 G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 91 (2d ed. 1975).
255 American Steel Barge Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Coal Agency Co. 115 F. 669 (1st Cir.
1902), rev'g American Steel Bree v. Cargo of Coal ex Citv of Everett. 107 F. 964 (D. Mass. 1901).
256 115 F. at 674.
257 Id. at 672; accord Paul v. Birch. 26 Eng. Rep. 771, 771-72, 2 Atk. 621, 622-623 (Ch.1743).
258 Cf. The Solhaug. 2 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (sub-charterer forced to pay sub- 
freight twice because it had at least constructive knowledge that the shipowner had exercised 
a lien when it paid the charterer the first time).
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exercises a lien, as was the case in Jebsen v. Cargo of Hemp.259 the chain would 
be effectively broken since there is no remedy against that charterer to which 
the shipowner could be subrogated.260
The subrogation line of reasoning, therefore, creates the potential for 
inconsistent results: If the sub-charterer owes sub-freight at the time the
shipowner exercises its lien, the shipowner could collect any sub-sub-freight 
owed to the sub-charterer. If the sub-charterer has fulfilled its sub-freight 
obligations, however, the shipowner would not be entitled to collect sub-sub­
freight owed to the sub-charterer since no remedy would exist against the sub- 
charterer. The charterer, in whose place the shipowner stands, cannot 
successfully proceed against a sub-charterer who does not owe freight. No 
reason is apparent for these differing results.261 Thus, subrogation should not be 
the proper basis for the shipowner's lien; if it was, the potential for inconsistent 
results would exist.
C- Equitable Charge as the Basis for the Lien:
Although the court in Care Shipping.262 cautioned that a shipowner may
not be entitled to a lien on sub-sub-freight if the legal basis for the lien is that it
operates as an equitable charge.263
Here by a time charterparty in the New York Produce Exchange form the
259 228 F. 143 (D. Mass. 1915).
260 In Jebsen, the sub-charterer had fu lfilled  its sub-freigh t ob liga tions to the 
charterers before the shipowner exercised its lien. Since the charterer could not succesfully 
proceed against the sub-charterer, the chain was effectively broken.
261 The effect to the sub-charterer is the same regardless of whether the sub-charterer
has fulfilled its sub-freight obligations when the shipowner exercises its lien on the sub-sub­
freight. In both situations, the shipowner, not the charterer, would be able to collect the sub­
sub-freight, w hile the sub-charterer would still have to fu lfill its sub-freight obligations 
either to the charterer before the lien is exercised, or to the shipowner after the lien is 
ex e rc ise d .
262 Care Shipping Corp v. Latin American Corp. The "Cebu1' . [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 
All E.R. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982).
263 Id. at 838, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1128, [1983] 1 Lloyd’s L.R. at 309.
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shipowners' vessel was chartered to charterers, sub-chartered to sub-charterers,
and sub-sub-chartered to sub-sub-charterers. Clause 18 of the charterparty 
provided that 'the Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes, and all sub-freights 
for any amounts due under this charter.' After a dispute arose between the 
owners and the charterers regarding the hire payable the owners sent a telex to 
the sub-sub-charterers purporting to exercise their right to a lien and requiring 
the sub-sub-charterers to pay to the owners direct any hire payable by them to 
the sub-charterers under the sub-sub-charter. The sub-sub-charterers issued a
summons seeking the court's determination of the question whether the hire 
due from them should be paid to the owners or to the sub-charterers, the sub- 
charterers contended (i) that cl. 18 was only intended to give a lien on sub­
freights earned by a voyage charter and did not apply to sub-hire under a time
charter, (ii) that cl.18 only created a lien over sub-freights and not over sub-sub­
freights and (iii) that in any event the lien could not be enforced by the owners
against the sub-charterers since it was a contractual lien and there was no
privity of contract between the owners and the sub-charterers.
It was held by Lloyd J., that:
"(1) On its true construction cl 18 gave the owners a lien on any
remuneration earned by the charterers from their employment of 
the vessel, whether by way of voyage freight or time-charter hire 
and entitled the owners to intercept all sub-freight, whether or not
due directly to the charterers, including sub-freights due under any
sub-sub-charter.
(2) The absence of privity between the owners and the sub­
charterers did not prevent the owners having a lien on payments
due from the sub-sub-charterers to the sub-charterers since the
owners could claim as equitable assignees not only hire due under
the sub-charterparty, but also the rights which the charterers
themselves held as equitable assignees of hire due under the sub- 
sub-charterparty. It was added that, if it is agreed for the purpose 
of these proceedings that, if anything is due from Naviera Tolteca 
(i.e., the charterers) to the owners, then an equivalent sum is due
from LAMSCO (i.e., the sub-charterers) to Naviera Tolteca, and since
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it is conceded (subject to counsel for LAMSCO's first point) that the 
owners can intercept hire between LAMSCO and Naviera Tolteca, it 
may be thought pointless to investigate whether hire can be 
intercepted higher up the chain."264
Lloyd J., answered the sub-charterers when they contended that the cl. 18 
intended to give a lien on sub-freights earned by a voyage charter and did not 
apply to sub-hire earned under a time charter by stating that:
"I would hold, following Lord Blackburn in Inman Steamship Co Ltd 
v. Bischoff, that the lien on sub-freights conferred by cl 18 includes a 
lien on any remuneration earned by the charterers from their 
employment of the vessel, whether by way of voyage freight or 
time-chartered hire."265
and he added
"I can see no sense in a construction which would make the owners' 
security depend on whether the sub-charter is a voyage charter or a 
time-charter trip. In my view the parties must be taken to have 
used the word 'sub-freight' in cl 18 to cover both,"266 and that "as for 
the meaning of sub-freights, I would hold that it includes all sub- 
freights, whether or not due to the head charterers direct. In 
Aegnoussiotis Shipping Corp of Monrovia v. A/S Kristian Jebsens 
Rederi of Bergen. The "Agenoussiotis".267 Donaldson J., held that 'all 
cargoes' in cl 18 'means what it says', i.e., all cargoes whether or not 
belonging to the charterers. True, he did not have in mind cargo 
carried under a sub-sub-charter. But if 'all cargoes means what it 
says' it seems to me that it must also, as a matter of language, 
include such cargoes. By the same token all sub-freights must 
include sub-freights due not only under the sub-charter, but also the 
sub-sub-charter.268 Moreover, counsel were agreed that in a simple 
three party case, where owners are given a lien on sub-freights, the
264 Id. at P. 1124.
265 Care Shipping Corp v. Latin  American Corp. The "Cehu”. [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1
All E.R. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982). at P. 1124.
266 Id. at P. 1125.
267 [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 268.
268 ICare Shipping Corp v. Latin American Corp. The "Cebu". [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1
All E.R. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982). at P. 1126.
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owners can give notice to the sub-charterers, thereby compelling the 
sub-charterers to pay freight to the owners, and not to the 
charterers. It was common ground that the mechanism which 
produces this result is an equitable assignment of freight due under 
the sub-charter.269
There appears to be very little authority in the maritime cases suggesting 
that the lien operates in this manner. Existing authority, including Lord Russell's 
statement in Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Molena Alpha. Inc.270 that:
"[t]he lien operates as an equitable charge,"271 is either dictum or not 
applicable to the present situation. For example, maritime cases 
concerning a lien that operates as an equitable charge and not as 
equitable assignment refer only to a charterer's lien on a ship272
The equitable charge is also discussed extensively in some non-maritime 
cases,273 but these cases are not easily adapted to the maritime context. This 
relative lack of authority appears to indicate that the shipowner's lien on sub­
freight is not based upon an equitable charge theory. On the other hand, there is 
a basic conflict between the characterization of a lien on sub-freights as a charge
and the proposition that the right is lost once paid. Moreover, it is submitted that
27 4the charge theory is misconceived.
"First, the argument that, since the lien was intended as a non- 
possessory security it necessarily took effect as an equitable charge,
269 Care Shipping Corp v. Latin  American Corp. The "Cebu". [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 
All E.R. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982). at P. 1127.
270 1979 A.C. 757, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 991, [1979] 1 All E.R. 307 (1978).
271 Id. at 784, [1978] 3 W.L.R. at 1004, [1979] 1 All E.R. at 318 (Russell, L.J.).
272 E.g.. Citibank N.A. v. Hohhs Savill & Co.. [1978] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 368, 371-72 (C.A. 1977)
(Denning, M.R. & Roskill, L.J.); Ellerman Lines. Ltd. v. Lancaster Maritime Co.. [1980] 2 Q.B. 497,
499-502 (whether a charterer's lien on a ship is based upon an equitable charge theory or an 
equitable assignm ent theory effects the charterer's ability to recover from the shipow ner's 
hull insurance policy for damages incurred by the charterer from the loss o f the ship).
273 E.g., Aluminium Industrie Vaasseen B.v. v . Romalpa Aluminium Ltd.. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 
676, [1976] 2 All E.R. 552, [1976] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 443 (C.A.); In re Bond Worth Ltd.. [1980] 1 Ch. 228, 
[1979] 3 W.L.R. 629, [1979] 3 All E.R. 919 (1979).
274 Oditah. Fidelis. "The Juridical Nature of a Lien on Sub-Freights." L loyd 's  M aritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly. 1989. at P. 194.
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is unsound.275 Not every agreement intended to operate as a 
security creates a security interest in law. The retention of the title 
clause in a simple sale of goods contract is a good example. The 
motive of the parties is irrelevant.276 English law recognizes a host 
of self-help remedies which behave like security but which, in truth, 
are not security interests at all. They are quasi-securities, so to 
speak, because, by guaranteeing priority, they produce some of the 
effects of real security. But they differ from real securities in that 
the priority which they guarantee is not an incident of an underlying
property right— an attribute of every true security interest. The 
contractual set-off is an example of a right which behaves like a 
security, but which is not. The right of an unpaid seller of goods to 
stop them in transit is another.277 Therefore, to argue that a lien on 
sub-freights is a charge because the motive is to secure the 
charterer's accrued obligations under the time charterer is not to the 
point.
A second argument often advanced in favour of the charge heresy is 
that the lien on sub-freights can only vest by an assignement and, 
since such an assignement is merely for security, it must necessarily 
be an equitable charge.278 This argument, however, misses its target 
by a wide margin. For one thing, the right conferred by a lien on 
sub-freights does not need the mechanisn of an assignment to vest 
in the shipowner. The right, like all other contractual rights, is vested 
once the contract of hire is made.279 It may not be immediatly
exercisable because the obligations secured have not accrued 
(contingent libilities are not due and all liens on sub-freights speak of 
"moneys due") or because, though they have accrued, there is in 
existence no sub-freights against which the lien could operate.
A more serious objection to the charge theory is that a lien on sub­
freights is a right to intecept the freights before they are paid. There 
is no tracing remedy for the lienee. In this respect the lien is a
275 Ibid.
276 See, Clough Mill Ltd. v. M artin  [1984] 1 W.L.R. 111, esp. at P. 125. See, Re George 
Inglefield Ltd. [1933] Ch 1; Olds Discount Co. Ltd v. John Plavfair Ltd. [1938] 3 All E.R.275; O lds 
Discount Co. Ltd v. Cohen [1938] 3 All E.R. 281n.
277 See, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, S.44.
278 T h e  Upland Trailer. [1986] Ch.471, at P. 478; The Annangel Glorv. [1988] 1 Lloyd's
Rep.45, at P.49.
279 Colonial Bank Ltd. v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd.(The Dom iniquel [1988] 3 W.L.R. 
60, 67-68. Difficulty may arise on account of privity o f contract, but the trust will offer a 
so lu tio n .
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charge of a kind unknown to equity jurisprudence because it lacks 
most of the ordinary incidents of a true charge."280
D- Equitable Assignment as the Basis for the Lien:
According to the Care Shipping.281 court, the manner in which the lien on
sub-freight operates under the equitable assignment theory is as follows: If the
sub-charterer owes sub-freight to the charterer and the charterer has defaulted 
on charter hire owed the shipowner, the charterer assigns its right to collect the 
sub-freight to the shipowner. Likewise, in a four party case, if the sub-sub­
charterer owes freight to the sub-charterer, the sub-charterer assigns its right to 
collect that freight to the charterer, who assigns that right to the shipowner. The 
court in Care Shipping referred to this as "a chain of equitable assignments."282 
It appears that this theory would apply to a situation with more than four
parties as well.
The major difference between the equitable assignment theory and the 
subrogation theory is that the equitable assignment theory avoids the 
potentially conflicting results inherent in the subrogation line of reasoning. The 
equitable assignment rationale works equally as well in the situation where the 
sub-charterer owes sub-freight, as it does in the situation where the sub­
charterer has fulfilled its sub-freight obligations to the charterer. Under the 
subrogation theory, the two situations produce differing results. Therefore, the 
shipowner's lien on sub-freight should be based upon an equitable assignment 
theory.283 Not only will this rationale entitle a shipowner to exercise a lien on 
sub-sub-freight, but it will produce consistent results in the exercise of the lien 
as well.
As a conclusion, one might conclude that the extension of the shipowner's 
lien on sub-freight to include a lien on sub-sub-freight is a benefit to shipowners
280 Oditah. Fidelis. op cit. at P. 194-195.
281 [1983] 2 W.L.R. 829, [1983] 1 All E.R. 1121, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 302 (Q.B. 1982).
282 Id. at 839, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1130, [1983] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 310.
283 See. Supra at note 239, at P. 89.
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is clear.284 In an industry where risk management and allocation is of primary 
concern, the risk to the shipowner as a result of a defaulting charterer is lessened 
if the shipowner is entitled to collect freight directly from the shipper-whether
sub-charterer, sub-sub-charterer or bill of lading holder. In addition, the 
shipowner is protected from the unscrupulous charterer who could otherwise 
set up a fictional sub-charter before sub-sub-chartering to a third party in order 
to avoid the possibility of the shipowner intercepting the sub-sub-freight.285 
Additional support for extending the lien the sub-freight to include a lien on
sub-sub-freight is the fact that the sub-charterer who desires to sub-sub- 
charter the vessel or ship goods belonging to others can protect itself by
requiring the sub-sub-charterer or shipper to pre-pay freight. Freight paid 
before notice is received that the shipowner has exercised a lien cannot be
followed "into the pockets of the person receiving it simply because that money 
has been received in respect of a debt which was due for freight",286 only freight 
due but unpaid is the proper subject of the shipowner's lien.287
Further justification for the lien on sub-sub-freight is the fact that the 
shipper paying freight is not burdened by it. The shipper does not care whether 
he pays freight to the sub-charterer or the shipowner.288 As long as the shipper 
has not received notice that the shipowner has exercised a lien, the shipper
284 The lien on sub-sub-freight provides additional security to the shipowner in case 
the charterer defaults under the original charterparty. See Note, Shipowner D inied Lien 
Against Third Party's Cargo for Unpaid Hire, 26 Lov. L. Rev. 416, 422 (1980).
285 Cf. R. Annin, Ocean Shipping 307-08 (1920) (discussing a charterparty form sim ilar 
to the NYPE form  and warning shippers that w ithout a particu lar clause unscrupulous 
charterers could collect freight money and then default on the charter h ire due under the 
h e a d - c h a r te r p a r ty ) .
286 Tagart. Beaton & Co. v. James Fisher & Sons. [1903] 1 K.B. 391, 395, 88 L.T.R. (n.s.) 451, 
455 (Lord Alverstone, C.J.); accord A ctieselskabet Dampsk. Thorhjorn v. Harrison & Co.. 260 F. 
287, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). Cf. In re Tnterocean Transp. Co. of Am.. 232 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
287 Union Industrielle et Maritime v. Nimnex Int'l. Inc.. 459 F.2d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 1972); 
A ctieselskabet Dampsk. Thorbiorn v. Harrison & Co.. 260 F. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); accord 
W ehner v. Dene Steam Shipping Co.. [1905] 2 K.B. 92, 101, 21 T.L.R. 339, 340.
288 Faith v. East India Co.. 106 Eng. Rep. 1067, 1071, 4 B. & Aid. 630, 641 (K.B. 1821).
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cannot be forced to pay twice, and in the situation where the shipowner has
exercised his lien, the shipper is obliged to pay more than he owes under its
charter agreement or bill of lading. As a conclusion one might say that, it
appears that extending the shipowner's lien to include a lien on sub-sub-freight
is warranted. It appears that the lien operates most effectively and judiciously 
when based on an equitable assignment rationale.289 This rationale not only 
allows a shipowner to exercise a lien on sub-freight, but it would allow a 
shipowner to exercise a lien when more than four parties are involved as well.
3-5- The C harterparty  Lien Against Bill of Lading Holder:
The general principle is that, where a ship is employed under a 
charterparty which gives the shipowner an absolute lien for recovery of his 
freight, then as long as the charterer himself is the holder of the bill of lading the 
lien for the charterparty freight will attach to the goods carried irrespective of
the terms of the bill of lading. The charterparty governs the relationship
between the charterer and the shipowner. The bill of lading is only considered 
as a receipt for the cargo, and cannot alter the charterer's obligation under the 
charterparty .290 If the ship, being under a charterparty, is sub-chartered or put 
up, by the charterer, as a general ship, carrying the goods of a third person; or if 
the charterer, having loaded the goods transfers the property and the bills of 
lading to the third persons for value, then the question of the extent of the 
shipowner's lien against such bill of lading arises. Therefore, the general 
principle, is that while the charterparty is the contract between the charterer 
and the shipowner, that contract is not to be read into the obligation of a receiver
of goods under the bill of lading who is not the charterer, except in so far as the
terms of the charterparty are incorporated in the bill of lading.291 The bill of
289  O 'Rourke, Kenneth R. A shipowner's Lien on Sub-Sub-Freight in England and the 
United States: New York Produce Exchange Time Charterparty Clause 18. Lovola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Journal. 1984. Vol.7. Part.N 1. at P. 91.
290 President of India v. M etcalfe (1970) 1 Q.B. 289.
291 See per Kennedy, L.J. in The Draupner (1909) P. 219-230.
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lading being the only evidence of contract between the shipowner and such 
holder of bill of lading, the former is bound by the terms of bill of lading as to 
freight, and his lien, therefore, is limited to the amount of the freight specified in 
the bill of lading.
The rule can be traced as far back as 1743, where in Paul v. B irch292 Lord 
Hardwick that a cargo owner, who had shipped goods under a contract with the 
charterer, not to be liable to satisfy the shipowner's charterparty freight. He said:
"The bankrupts, (the charterers) made an agreement with the 
master on their own account, and not on the part of the merchants, 
and therefore the merchants are not liable. Otherwise they would 
be in the hardest case imaginable, for they would be liable to any 
private agreement between the occupier of a ship, and the original 
owners of it."293
Pollock, C.B., in Foster v. Colbv 294 laid down that:
"A bona fide indorsee for value of the bill of lading, having no 
knowledge or notice of the charterparty or that the cargo was 
subject to lien for any freight except that mentioned in the bill of 
lading, not acting collusively, is entitled to the goods on payment of 
the freight stipulated for in the bill of lading, and is affected by the 
greater liability of the indorser, supposing such liability to exist."
The Incorporation of C hartenartv Terms into the Bill of Lading:
The terms of a charterparty may be introduced into the bills of lading by 
using the words of incorporation such as "paying freight for the said goods as per 
charterparty", or "paying freight and all other condition as per charterparty", and 
etc. The question to determine is how much of the terms of the charterparty, as 
regards payment of freight, is introduced into the bill of lading by such clauses?
292 (1743) 2 Atk. 621.
293 Ibid. at P. 623.
294 (1858) 3 H.N. 705-715; see also G ilkison v. M iddleton (18571 2 C.B. (N.S.) 134: Shand v. 
S a n d e rso n  (1859) 4 H. & N. 381; C h a p p e ll v. C o m fo r t ((1861) 10 C.B. 802-810; F rv  v . T h e  
Mercantile Bank (18661 L.R. 1 C.P. 689; G ardner v. Trechm ann (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 154.
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Whether the shipowner’s lien under the charterparty for all freight is brought 
into the bill of lading so as to make the bill of lading holder liable for the 
charterparty freight. The question is not material where the goods are shipped 
under one bill of lading, at the charterparty rate of freight but it becomes very 
important where the cargo is shipped at a different rate of freight to that in the 
charterparty, or in the case where the cargo is shipped under different bills of 
lading in the hands of different persons. Whether a particular clause in the 
charterparty is incorporated in the bill of lading depends upon the wordings of 
the incorporation clause in the bill of lading. Therefore, there are two cases of 
incorporation clauses, which will be examined in the foil wing situations:
(i)- Where the Bill of Lading Contains Stipulation as to Rate of Freight:
It is well established that a general reference to the charterparty does not 
introduce into the bill of lading from the charterparty those terms which are 
inconsistent with the express terms of the bill of lading. In a case where there 
was a clause "all other conditions as per charterparty", Lord Esher, M.R. said 
that:295
"the condition of the charterparty must be read verbatim into the 
bill of lading as though they were printed in extenso. Then if it was 
found that any of the conditions of the charterparty on being so read 
were inconsistent with the bill of lading they were insensible and 
must be disregarded."
Where the bill of lading expressly provides that the delivery of the goods is 
to be made on payment of certain specific rate of freight, then incorporating the 
terms of the charterparty as to the shipowner's right to detain the cargo for 
payment of a different rate of freight, seems to be inconsistent with the express 
provision of the bill of lading.
295 H am ilton v. M ackie (1889) 5 T.L.R. 677; see also Serraino v. Cam pbell (1891) 1 Q.B. 238, 
per Lord Esher, M.R. at pp. 289-290 G u llisch en  v. S tew art (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 317-319; F id e li ta s  
Shipping Co. v. V/O Exportchleb (1963) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 113, see per Pearson, L J . at pp. 124-125.
275
In G ardner v. T rechm ann.296 the charterparty provided for the payment of 
certain rate of freight and contained a clause giving the shipowner "an absolute 
lien on the cargo for freight, dead freight, and demmurage". By a further clause, 
the master was to sign bills of lading at any rate of freight, but in case of the bill
of lading freight being less then the amount estimated to be earned by the
charterparty, the master was to demand any difference in advance. Certain
goods were put on board, and the bill of lading signed by the master made them
deliverable to the plaintiffs (who were not the charterers) on paying freight at a 
rate lower than that stipulated by the charterparty, and a reference was made 
to the charterparty by using the phrase "other conditions as per charterparty". 
The difference not being paid in advance, the shipowner detained part of the 
cargo, against the plaintiffs, claiming freight mentioned in the charterparty. The 
plaintiffs, having paid freight at charterparty rate under protest, brought an 
action to recover the difference.
The Court of Appeal held that they were entitled to recover, on the ground 
that the charterparty gave no right of lien for that difference, the stipulation was 
a mere reservation of a right which the shipowner could not enforce by lien.297 
Secondly even if the right of lien did exist, it was inconsistent with the terms of 
the bill of lading, and therefore not incorporated into the bill of lading. Lindley, 
L.J. observed that:
"The bill of lading is a contract for conveyance of goods. It has been 
contended that the consignees of the cargo under the bill of lading 
must pay the whole of the freight due by the charterparty; is that a 
term inconsistent with the bill of lading? Certainly I am of opinion 
that it is not consistent: The two clauses as to payment of freight can 
not stand together. It is no answer to say that the bill of lading 
incorporates the conditions of the charterparty: only those conditions 
are incorporated which are consistent with the bill of lading."298
Even if the words of the incorporation clause are wide enough to produce a 
prima facie incorporation, they nevertheless have the effect of introducing in the
296 (1884) 15 QB.D. 154.
297 See per Brett, M.R. at P. 157.
298 Ibid. at pp. 158-159.
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bill of lading the terms which would be applicable to the bill of lading and
consistent with the express terms of the bill of lading.299 Very wide clauses used
in the bills of lading such as: “all terms, conditions, clauses and exception as per 
charterparty", or "all the terms, conditions, liabilities, and exceptions of the 
charterparty are herewith incorporated", seem to incorporate into the bill of 
lading every term of the charterparty, provided that the term makes sense if
read into the bill of lading, and is consistent with its express provisions.300
Where the bill of lading contains express stipulation as payment of freight 
then it seems that even a very wide incorporation clause in the bill of lading
would bring into the bill of lading the term of the charterparty giving the
shipowner a lien for freight stipulated by the charterparty.
Moreover, it was held in a recent case that the incorporation of the
charterparty terms into the bill of lading gives the shipowner the right to hold 
the cargo belonging to third party than the charterer. This case is namely T h e  
Constanza M.301 the facts of this case are as follows:302
On Jan. 18, 1979, the owners let their vessel Constanza M to Oceantrans for 
the carriage of wheat from the river Plate to China. The charter provided for the 
freight at the rate of $32 per tonne and, by cl.42, that in ter a lia :
"... 100% of the freight to be prepaid within 6 days of signing each
bill of lading ... Owners to release a non-negotiable Bill of Lading only 
and original Bills of Lading to be given upon Owners having received 
funds. ..."
Almost a month before the head charter was concluded, Oceantrans had 
entered into a sub-charter with the respondents. The sub-charter was similar in
299 See A ktieselskabet Ocean v. H arding (1928) 2 K.B. 371, per Scrutton, J. at P. 384; R e d  
"R "SS C o .v. Allatini (1909) 15 Com. Cas. 290.
300 See Phonizien (1966) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 150; The Merak (1964) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 527.
301 Com pania Comercial Y Naviera San Martin S.A. v. C hina T rade T ranspo rta tion  
Corporation. (THE CONSTANZA M). H9801 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505.
302 Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. 1980. at P. 484.
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all respect to the head charter except that the freight was at the rate of $28 per 
tonne, and 90% of the freight was to be pre-paid within seven working days of 
signing bills of lading.
In February, 1979, a quantity of wheat was shipped on board the vessel, 
and the shippers demanded bills of lading. The owners refused as they had not 
been paid any freight, but eventually issued bills of lading containing the 
following typed clause:
"Freight payable according to Terms/Conditions and Exceptions of 
C/P dated 18-1-79. All Terms and Conditions and Provisions of 
which are expressly incorporated herewith".
Meanwhile on Feb.9 or 10, the respondents paid U.S.$637,003.50 to a bank 
in Hong Kong for the credit of Oceantrans, being 90% of the freight due under the 
sub-charter. However, Oceantrans did not pay any freight to the owners, and on 
Feb. 16 the owners threatened to exercise a lien on the cargo if they did not 
receive payment of their freight. Eventually by agreement, which was reduced 
to writing in a document dated Apr. 6,1979, and made between the owners and 
the respondents who were described as consignees, it was agreed that the
respondents would pay a further U.S.$462,000 into a joint account to be released 
in full to the owners upon the arrival of the vessel, that the respondents would 
responsible for the coast of discharge, and that all disputes arising out of the bills 
of lading were to be referred to arbitration.
The owners claimed that balance of the sum due under the head charter.
The respondents claimed back the sum which they had paid under protest. It
was held by Lloyd.J., that:
In the light of the agreement of Apr.6, 1979, it would be the plainest 
injustice if the respondents were allowed to contend that they were 
not the proper parties to be sued. In entering into an agreement 
which ... , the respondents clearly represented to the owners that
although they were not accepting liability under the bills of lading,
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they were nevertheless the parties to be sued. The owners having 
acted on this representation, the respondents ought not to be 
allowed to assert that they never became parties to the bill of lading 
contract.303
The words in the typed clause in the bill of lading, on the face of it, 
were clear enough and wide enough to incorporate cl.42 of the head 
charter. The language of cl.42 was perfectly general, and although 
cl.42 provided for freight to be paid in advance, and this would 
normally have been paid by the shipper or the charterer, there was 
no reason for implying that such freight had to be paid by them and 
nobody else. Clause 42 made sense in the context of the bill of 
lading, and made equally good sense whether applied to the shipper 
or the consignee, and there was no ground for distinguishing 
between its application to the shipper and the consignee without 
reading words into cl.42.304
There were no findings in the award that Oceantrans were ever appointed 
the owners1 agents to receive the bill of lading freight. There was nothing in the 
authorities relied upon by the respondents which decided or even suggested
that it ought to be inferred as a fact or to be decided or held as a matter of law
that Oceantrans were agents to collect bill of lading freight on behalf of the
owners or that they had been held out in any way as having ostensible
authority to do so.305
(ii)- Where No Rate of Freight is Specified in the Bill of Lading:
Now, suppose that there is no provisions in the bill of lading as to the rate of 
freight, but instead a reference is made to the charterparty as to payment of
freight. Just how much of the charterparty terms can be brought into the bill of
lading by the usual incorporation clauses? There being no specific rate of freight 
in the bill of lading, could it be said that a reference to the charterparty as to
payment of freight incorporates into the bill of lading all clauses of the
charterparty relating to payment of freight including a lien clause, that is a right 
to detain the cargo until payment of charterparty freight? Could it be said that in
303 Ibid. at P. 513.
304 Ibid. at P. 514.
305 Ibid. at P. 414. 517.
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such a case there could be nothing inconsistent in introducing the charterparty 
lien into the bill of lading?
In Fry. v. Chartered Mercantile Bank306 the bill of lading instead of stating 
the freight payable in respect of the goods simply provided "freight for the said 
goods payable as per charterparty". The court held that the clause in the bill of 
lading reffered to the charterparty for the purpose of determining the rate of 
freight to be paid upon those only, and it did not introduce into the bill of lading, 
the shipowner's lien for charterparty freight, as against the bill of lading holder. 
The shipowners only had a lien for freight due for the goods included in the bill 
of lading at the rate specified in the charterparty.
"The true construction of the words", said Erie, C.J., "is that they refer to the
charterparty for the purpose of determining what the rate of freight is, and that 
it is to be that which is mentioned in the charterparty." He added that "if it is 
wished to include more of the terms of the charterparty, words ought to be 
introduced into the bill of lading which would show that intention more 
plainly."307 Montague Smith,J. said that the "condition means that the amount of 
freight payable for those packages shall be that which is mentioned in the 
charterparty payable for them, and for them only ... and it would require very 
strong words to render the defendants liable for freight payable under the 
charterparty, for the whole cargo."308
Even when no rate of freight is stipulated in the bill of lading, and the bill of
lading contains a wide clause incorporating "all terms, conditions, clauses and 
exceptions" of the charterparty, still in such a case introducing the charterparty 
lien into the bill of lading does not seem to be consistent with the character of the 
bill of lading. Suppose there are several bills of lading in the hands of different 
persons and each provides for delivery of that portion of the cargo to the
306 (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 689.
307 Ibid. at P. 692.
308 Ibid. at P. 692; see also Smith v. Sieveking (18551 24 LJ.Q.B. 257, (1856) 5 E. & B. 589.
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consignee on payment of freight for it, then it would destroy the bill of lading to 
introduce into it a condition that the consignee must pay freight on the whole
cargo under the charterparty lien of the shipowner.309
Carver states that if "the bill of lading incorporates the terms of the
charterparty, as by using comprehensive words as 'paying freight for the same
goods and all other conditions as per charterparty', the owner's lien on the goods
for the charterparty is preserved."310 The statement is made without any 
distinction being drawn between the case in which the bills of lading contain
provisions as to the rate of freight and those which do not so provide.
In Lamb v. Kaselack.311 which is a Scottish case, the shipowner having "an 
absolute lien on the cargo for all freight" under the charterparty, the master 
signed bills of lading for certain parts of the cargo shipped by the charterer, and 
transferred to different consignees, which provided that freight for the goods to 
be paid at certain specific rate, and "all conditions as per charterparty".
It was held that the shipowner was entitled as against the consignees to a 
lien over their portion of the cargo for the freight due on another portion for 
which no consignee appeared at the port of discharge, since the obligation of the 
charterer imported into the bill of lading was that every part of the cargo should 
be liable for the whole freight. It was contended, on behalf of the consignees, 
that the effect of the clause was that if the cargo belongs only to one person, all 
parts of it would be under lien for full freight; but if to several, the portion
belonging to each should be liable only for its proper share of freight. Lord 
Craighill rejected the view because "the clause", he said, "so far as freight is 
concerned, would be rendered insensible by that interpretation, and a reading 
which issues in such a result can seldom, if ever, be taken to be the true
construction. The purpose of the clause is obvious enough."
309 See Keogh (G.D.), "The Shipowner's Lien For Freight", The Law O uarterlev Review. 
(1898) Vol. LIV, P. 148.
310 12 th ed., P. 1350. and the 13 th edition, para.2022, at P. 1401.
311 (1882) 19 Sc.L.R.336.
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The case of Lamb v. Kaselack.312 has never been regarded by English courts 
as having stated the rule on the subject, on the contrary they have been very 
strict in interpreting such clause, and as we have seen even widest incorporation 
clause has not been construed in such a way as to put upon a bona fide indorsee 
of bill of lading for value or a shipper who is stranger to the charterparty which 
is inapplicable to the bill of lading.
The conclusion, therefore, seems to be that mere general reference to the 
charterparty will not bring into the bill of lading terms of the charterparty which
are inconsistent with the express terms or the nature and concept of the bill of
lading. Unless the bill of lading clearly and by plain words incorporates the
clause of the charterparty giving lien to the shipowner for the charter freight, 
which would bind the bill of lading holder.
The Effect of Notice of a Chartenartv:
The general rule being that no third person can be bound by a contract or 
an agreement to which he is not a party, then it seems that mere notice of the 
existence of such contract or even knowledge of its exact terms would make no
difference. It was, however, thought, for some time, that a holder of a bill of
lading who had notice of the charterparty, might be bound by the terms of the
charterparty as to the shipowner's lien. In K ern v. D eslands.313 the charterer
being the owner and the shipper of the goods consigned them to his agents, who 
had executed the charterparty on his behalf and to whom he was indebted, and 
indorsed to them a bill of lading at a rate below the chartered freight. The Court 
of Common Pleas held that they were liable to the shipowner for the 
charterparty freight. As they were "not only the agents of the charterer, but 
took the bill of lading with full notice of the terms of the chartereparty. They, 
therefore, stood on the charterer's title, both because they were charterer’s
312 Ibid.
313 (1861) 10 C.B. (N.S.) 205.
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agents and because they had notice of the terms of the charterparty."
The decision was disapproved of in Gray v. Carr.314 where Brett, J. said:
"Great stress was laid by the Court in that case on the fact that the 
consignees claiming under the bill of lading, were mere agents of the 
charterer. Unless the decision can be supported on that ground, I 
think it can not be supported at all."
The principle is now established that a bona fide indorsee of the bill of 
lading for value or a shipper who is not a party to the charterparty is entitled to 
have the goods delivered to him upon his fulfilling the terms mentioned in the 
bill of lading, and is not ordinarily bound to refer to the charterparty, even if he 
had notice of the terms of the charterparty.315
In Fry. v. The Chartered Merchantile Bank.316 a bona fide indorsee of the 
bill of lading for value who knew of existence of the charterparty, though not of 
its contents, was allowed to have the goods delivered to him on payment of
freight for the goods included in the bill of lading and not for the whole
charterparty freight, and knowledge of the existence of the charterparty did not
affect his right under the bill of lading.
In Shand  v.S an d e rso n .317 the charterer's agents, who had notice of the 
charterparty, purchased goods and shipped on board the vessel on account of 
the charterer, but detained the bill of lading as security for the price of the
goods, upon the charterer's failure to pay for the goods. They were held to be
entitled to have the goods on payment of the bill of lading freight which was a
nominal freight, since in such circumstances they were held to stand in the
position of third parties.
The fact that the holder of the bill of lading is also sub-charterer of the 
vessel, seem to be immaterial, for hisonly contractual relationship with the
314 (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 522-540.
315 See per W illesJ. in C happel v. C om fort (1861) 10 C.B. (N.S.) 802; and per Lidsey,J. in 
M anchester T rust v. Furness (1895) 2 Q.B. 545.
316 (1866) L.R.1 C.P. 689.
317 (1859) 4 H. & N. 381.
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shipowner is through the bill of lading. In Turner v. Haii G o o la m .3 18 where the 
shipper and holder of the bill of lading was also the sub-charterer of the ship
from the time charterer, who had notice of the terms of the head charterparty,
was held not to stand in the position of the charterer and therefore not bound by 
the shipowner's lien under the head charterparty for freight payable under it. 
The facts of the case were as follows:
By a time charterparty the master was to sign bills of lading at any rate of 
freight the charterers or their agents might direct without prejudice to the 
charterparty. The charterers were to have the option of sub-chartering the 
vessel, and the shipowners were to have a lien upon all cargoes for freight or 
charter money due under the charter. The vessel being under sub-charter 
arrived at the port of destination having a quantity of sugar put on board by the 
sub-charterer, for which he had received bill of lading at certain rate of freight 
which was prepaid by the sub-charterer, so, when she arrived there was 
nothing due in respect of the bill of lading freight. Hire being due to the 
shipowners under the head charterparty, they claimed to exercise a lien on sub­
charterer's cargo for the sum.
The Privy Council came to the conclusion that the bills of lading granted by 
the master to the sub-charterer, not being mere receipt for goods, but contracts 
which bound the shipowners, Lord Lindley stated that unless the fact that the 
sub-charterer had notice of the time charter makes a difference, the bills of 
lading entitled him to have his goods delivered to him on payment of the bills of 
lading freight. This he considered to have been decided in Fry v. C h arte red  
Merchant Bank which was followed in Gardner v. Trechm ann:
"In both of these cases the bill of lading expressly referred to the
charterparty, but not in such a way as to incorporate either the 
obligation to pay the charter freight or the lien for it. These cases, 
and others like them, show that notice by a shipper of a 
charterparty has not the effect of incorporation into the bill of lading
318 (1904) A.C. 826.
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any term which are inconsistent with it and which the captain was 
not bound to embody in the bill of lading."3^
After considering the shipowner's lien on the bill of lading holders for the 
payment of his freight in the common law jurisdiction, it is now necessary to 
consider this lien or what is called "privilege" in the civil law jurisdictions 
(namely the French and Algerian law which are mainly concerned in this work). 
The legislator recognised the right of the shipowner for his lien or "privilege" for 
the payment of his freight. Therefore, one finds that the French legislator in 
article 23 and 24 of the Code of Commerce (this code include the French 
Maritime Code),320 prefers or gives a right of preference to the captain for the 
payment of his freight on all the goods of his cargo during the fifteen days which 
follow their delivery if they did not pass to a third party's hands. This is 
provided in article 23 which states that: "Le capitaine est prefere, pour son fret, 
sur les marchandises de son chargement, pendant la quinzaine apres leur 
delivrance si elles n’ont passe en mains tierces.", and the French legislator added 
in art.24 that even in the case of bankruptcy or admission to the judicial 
settlement of the shippers or the claimants of the goods before the expiration of 
the fifteen days, the captain is preferred or he has a "privilege" against all the
other creditors for the payment of his freight and damages which are due to
him.32l
The Algerian legislator, however, gives a wider lien or "privilege" to the 
carrier by allowing him to retain or to refuse to deliver the cargo until the 
consignee has paid the freight or has given a sufficient guarantee for all what is 
due for the carriage of the goods, and this has been provided in article 792,322 of
319 Per Lindley,J. at P. 836.
320 Loi No. 66-420 du 18 Juin 1966. Affretement et Transport M aritim es. U n d er the title of
"Execution du Contrat de Transport de Marchandises”. at P. 215.
321 The article in french provides that: « E n  cas de failite ou d'dmission au regldment 
judiciaire des chargeurs ou rlclam ateurs avant l'expiration de la quinzaine, le capitaine est 
privil6gi£ sur tous les crdanci6rs pour le paiement de son fret et des avaries qui lui son d u e s » .
322 « L e  transporteur peut refuser de livrer les m archandises et les faire consigner
285
the Algerian maritime Code.323 Moreover, he recognises that the shipper has to 
pay the freight or the price for the carriage which methods of payment are 
stated or included in the agreement of the parties.
Before dealing with the nature of this lien in the civil law jurisdictions, it 
would be best to say that the master in the French and the Algerian maritime
law has a great authority because he is the representative of the shipowner, and 
therefore, he has the representative capacity to act as the shipowner in the limits 
of the representation, because he can personnally be liable for any breach of the 
representation. Therefore, the French and the Algerian laws allow the master of 
the ship as being the representative of the shipowner to retain the cargo until 
the freight is paid, because he is the one responsible for the commercial use of 
the ship, and therefore, the carrying on the business of carrying cargoes to their 
destination and earning freights. Thus, he is the one responsible for looking after 
the ship the cargo and making profit out of that by receiving freights.
To establish the nature of this lien or "privilege", it is worth going to the civil 
code where one might find a similar situation, because this situation is quite 
similar to that of the lessor who has a "privilege" against the tenant on all the 
movables which are in the or on the rented property. In the French Civil Code 
the tenant is obliged to furnish the immovable he rented, and that with enough
furniture to guarantee or which is enough to guarantee the sum of the rent. This 
"privilege" or lien is prescribed in article 1752 of the French Civil Code, which 
provides that: "The tenant who does not furnish the house with enough 
furniture , can be evicted , unless he gives enough guarantees able to meet the
ren t".324 This article of the French civil law, although, it gives to the lessor an
jusqu'a ce que le destinataire ait pay6 ou qu'il ait fourni cuation de tout ce qui est du pour le 
transport de ces m archandises ainsi qu 'a titre de contribution d 'avarie  com m une e t de 
rem uneration d 'a s s is ta n c e .» .
323 ORDONNANCE No. 76-80 Du 23 Octobre 1976, Portant "CODE M ARm M E".
324 " My Own Translation ". The article in french provides:
« L e  locataire qui ne garnit pas la maison de meubles suffisants, peut etre expulsd, i  
moins qu'il ne donne des suret6s capables de repondre du lo y e r .» .
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indirect privilege on the movables which are present on his property he rented, 
this article should have been more specific by giving to the lessor a direct 
"privilege" on all the movables present on his property which he rented out to 
the tenant. The Algerian Civil Code, however, learnt from the mistake or 
absence of the French civil law in this context, and gave a more specific lien or 
"privilege" to the lessor on all the movables which are on his property which he 
rented out, and without making any difference. It was provided in article 501 of 
the Algerian Civil Code that: "The lessor has to guarantee all his claims from the 
rent, a right of retention on all the movables which can be seized, which are 
furnishing the rented place, as long as they are under the privilege of the lessor, 
even if they do not belong to the tenant .,.".325
Therefore, the nature of the privilege of the lessor in the Algerian civil law 
is quite similar to that given to the shipowner on the goods on the bill of lading 
holders, because in both situations the goods are not the goods of the party to the 
contract with the shipowner. Thus, the nature of the shipowner's lien on the 
goods belonging the bills of lading holders in the civil law jurisdictions can be 
compared to that of the lessor who rented out his property to the tenant who 
furnished that property, and whose lien gives him a privilege on that furniture. 
However, the Algerian Civil Code was more specific and more beneficial to the 
shipowner in the case of the exercise of the lien against the bills of lading holders, 
than the French Civil Code, and that is because the Algerian Civil Code allows the 
lessor to exercise a right of retention on the furniture or movables, all which are 
still on the property rented, whether they belong to the tenant or to somebody 
else.
325 " My Own Translation The article in french provides:
« L e  bailleur a pour garantir toutes ses chances d6coulant du bail, un droit de retention 
sur tous les meubles saisissables garnissant les lieux lou6s, tant qu'ils sont grev6s du privilege 
du bailleur, alors meme qu'ils n'appartiennent pas au preneur. . . . » .
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Exercise and the Termination of the 
Shipowner’s Lien for the Payment of his Freight.
4-1- The Exercise Of the Shipowner’s Lien:
The main means of exercising and preserving the shipowner's lien on the
goods for the guarantee of payment of his freight, is by retaining the possession 
of the goods, therefore, possession is a very important element for the exercise of 
this lien. Because the civil law jurisdiction, gives the shipowner a way to exercise
his lien on the goods for the garantee of payment of his freight, and that by the
different articles which are provided in the French Code of Commerce and the
Algerian Maritime Code. Therefore, it would be best to explain, the English law 
point of view and the Civil law apart, so that they will be better understood.
A- The Exercise of the Lien in the English Law Jurisdiction:
It has been shown that the shipowner at common law, generally has a right 
to retain the goods in his possession until the freight upon them, and sometimes 
other charges also, have been paid.1 It does not give the shipowner any
property in the goods; nor does it enable him to sell them; even though the
retention of them may be attended with expense.2 This right simply gives the
shipowner, the right to keep possession, and to resist all claims to take them 
away, and it avails against the true owner of the goods, although he may not be
the person liable to pay freight.
However, if this right gives the shipowner to keep possession of the goods 
on board his ship, this right must not be performed on the goods wrongfully
1 Carver. Carriage bv Sea. Thirteen Edition, para 1991. at P. 1380.
2 M u llin er v. F lo ren ce  (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 484; T ham es Ironworks Co. V. Patent Derrick Co. 
(1860) 1 J. & H. 93.
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shipped on board his ship. Therefore, if the goods have been shipped without 
the authority of the owner, and has not in any way ratified the contract, it seems 
that the shipowner cannot as against him enforce the lien which the law, or the 
agreement, would otherwise have given, because it would be unfair and unjust 
on the behalf of that owner to hold him responsible for the consequences of a 
contract which he was not part of and where the goods where shipped without 
his authority.3 And if the goods were shipped in fraud of their owner, it 
seems that the shipowner although innocent of the fraud, cannot refuse to give 
them up.4 Therefore, if the shipowner's lien is a mere possessory lien, where 
the only means of preserving his lien is to retain the possession of the goods until 
his freight is paid, therefore, possession is a very important element in the 
exercise of this lien. Thus, in order to maintain his lien the shipowner must keep 
possession of the goods, either in his own hands or in the hands of his agents.5
Therefore, to maintain his lien, the shipowner might do what is reasonable 
to maintain that lien, e.g., he may bring the goods back from their destination, if 
the lien is not discharged there.6 Therefore, if the master is forbidden to land 
the goods by the port authorities, or cannot obtain warehouse accommodation, 
he may, and must, at their owner's expense,7 deal with them in the manner 
both most reasonable to preserve his lien.8
However, he will not lose his lien by consenting to hold as agent for the 
consignee, and Lord Blackburn, held in the case of Kemp v. Falk.9 that:
3 Waugh & Denham (1865) 16 Ir. C.L.R. 405. AS to the right to the exercise lien against a 
receiver, See Moss SS. Co. V. W hinnev [1912] A.C. 254.
4 Story, Bail, S. 588, citing R o b in so n  V. B a k e r  (1849) 5 Cush. 137; Parsons, Shipping, 
Vol.I, p. 180. But cf. the case of The Exeter Carrier (1701), cited in Y orke V. G re e n a u sh  (1701) 2 
Ld. Raym. 866 ; Johnson V. HUl (1822) 3 Stark. 172.
5 Carver. Carriage Bv Sea. Thirteenth Edition. Para. 2033. at P. 1408.
6 Scrutton On Charterparties And Bills Of Lading. Seventeenth Edition, at P. 375.
7 Edwards V. Southgate (1862) 10 W.R. 528; Cargo ex Argos (1873) L.R. 5. P.C. 134.
8 Scrutton On Charterparties And Bills Of Lading, at P. 300.
9 Kemp V. Fa]k (1882) 7 App. Cas. 573; AHan V. Grinper (1832) 2 C. & J. 218.
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" ... the shipowner in whose physical possession, in the hold of whose 
vessel, the goods lay, being changed from holding the goods as 
shipowner, not having delivered the goods, into a warehouseman 
who was very inconveniently holding those goods in his ship as a 
warehouse. I think that that is an arrangement which might be 
made although it is not a very convenient one. The freight was not 
paid; I think it is possible to make an arrangement by which, though 
the freight is not paid, the shipowner changes himself completely 
into a warehouseman instead of being a carrier or a shipowner; he 
alters his responsibilities altogether; and yet by arrangement or 
agreement retains a lien over the goods until the freight is paid. I 
think such a contract might made. ..."10
Moreover, the shipowner will not lose his lien by warehousing the goods 
ashore, in his own warehouse, or in a hired warehouse.11
However, if he parts with them to another who acts on his instructions, but 
in such a way as to give the right of possession to that other, as against himself, 
the lien will be terminated. Thus, it is competent to the master to land the goods, 
and preserve the lien, by placing them in warehouse over which he, or the agent 
of the ship, has exclusive control. But if he puts them in a warehouse of an 
independent person, who thereby acquires an independent lien for warehousing 
charges, it seems that the shipowner's lien is lost; even though the 
warehouseman undertakes not to deliver to the consignee without being paid 
the freight.12 In such a case, however, if the consignee demands delivery of the 
goods, the shipowner may be entitled to withhold delivery, notwithstanding that 
he has lost his lien, on the ground that delivery is conditional on the freight being 
paid concurrently with it.13
10 Ibid, at P. 584.
11 The Eneruie (1875) L.R. 6 P.C. 306; Mors Le Blanch V. W ilson (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 227. See 
also per Willes. J., M everste in  V. B arber (1866) L.R. 2 C.P. 38 at P. 54. In the latter case he will be 
able to recover warehouse charges as well as the priciple sum in dispute: A ng lo -P o lish  S.S. 
Line V. V ickers (1924) 19 Ll.L. Rep. 121 at P. 125.
12 See M ors-le-B lanch  V. W ilson  (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 227. But quaere. See per R ow lattJ. in 
Kokusai Kisen V. Cook (19221 13 Ll.L.R. 343, 345.
13 See D ennis V. Cork SS. Co. [1913] 2 K.B. 393,397,399. There freight was to be paid before 
delivery; therefore the shipowner was entitled to withhold delivery o f anything until all the 
freight has been paid.
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Therefore, the possession or the retention of goods being the main way by 
which the shipowner can exercise his lien to force the charterer or the cargo 
owner to pay the freight, the shipowner in the course of the exercise of his lien, 
might either warehouse the goods at the port of destination or, use other means 
to preserve his lien after the release of the goods or, he might withdraw the 
vessel from the service of the charterer.
(l)-Preservation of the Lien bv Landing and Warehousing the
Goods:
The possession of the goods need not to be necessarily be the direct and 
actual possession of the shipowner.14 Possession of his agents or servants may 
also be regarded as his own for the purpose of preserving the lien. It is, 
however, submitted that the possession must not be given to another person in 
such a way as to entitle him to an independent lien against the shipowner. It 
has been held by the Court of Appeal in New York that, where the shipowner 
warehouses the goods in the warehouse of a stranger,15 contrary to the
contract, he thereby puts an end to his lien for freight. But that, where the 
consignee is in default in not receiving the goods, the shipowner may store them, 
either in his own warehouse or in his own name in the warehouse of a stranger, 
without losing his lien. The creation of a further lien for warehouse charges, 
made necessary in such case by the default of the owner of the goods, was held 
not to affect the shipowner’s lien.16 However, where the shipowner is required 
by law to land and warehouse the goods in a particular place, the lien will 
continue while they are so deposited. As they are taken out of his hands by
operation of law, the law preserves the charge for him.17
14 See C ross. The Law of Lien. (1840) P. 39; W estern  Transportation Co. V. B aber (1874) 56
N.Y. 544.
15 C arver. Carriage Bv Sea. Thirteenth Edition. Para 2033. at P. 1409.
16 W estern Transn.Co. V. B arber (1874) 56 N.Y. 544.
17 W ilson V. Kvmer (1813) 1 M. & S. 157, 163.
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Moreover, the lien may be lost if the goods are deposited at a public 
warehouse, though under an order to the warehouseman not to part with their 
possession until the freight on them has been paid. As Brett, J., in M orse-L e- 
Blanch v. W ilson.18 pointed out:
"The difficulty which presents itself against the master's retaining his 
lien in such a case seems to be this, that then another and 
independent lien would exist; I very doubt whether, if the master 
were so to deposit the goods on shore as to give another person a 
lien upon them, he would not as a matter of course lose his lien, even 
though such other person should undertake to the master not to 
deliver the goods to the consignee without being paid the master's 
claim for freight."
This view, however, was criticised by Mr. Justice Rowlatt in Kokusai Kisen v. 
Cook C o .19 on the ground that, in such a case, the warehouseman becomes the 
agent of the master and therefore the goods remain in his own constructive 
p o sse ss io n .20 "The captain", he said, "put these goods into lighters whose 
owners received them as the captain's agent for the purpose of preserving the
lien of the ship. It is said that by doing that, the lien of the ship was lost because,
as I understand it, that would involve that the owners of the lighters would have 
a lien: and therefore an interest in the goods, subsequent to the ship's interest, 
attached: and therefore the goods were taken to have gone on shore out of the 
exclusive possession of the ship. I suppose that is the theory: but it strikes me as 
very unfortunate if that is so. Apparently apart from proceedings under T h e  
Merchant Shipping Act, a shipowner would have to have his own warehouse at 
every port to which his ship might go, or keep the goods on board his vessel all 
the time, or lose his own lien; and business could not be carried on if that were
so." He added that if the shipowner had his own warehouse, he might have
18 (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 227-239; See also M e v ers te in  V. B a rb e r (1866) L.R. 2 C.P. 38-54; 
Carver, 12th ed., P. 1361.
19 (1922) 12 Ll.L.Rep. 343-345.
20 See Cross, (1840) P. 290.
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acquired a lien as a warehouseman behind his lien for freight which would put 
him in the same position as an independent warehouseman if he had hired one.
The provisions of The Merchant Shipping Act. 1894 which replaced the one 
of 1862, removed the difficulty in respect of the goods which are imported into 
the U.K. Independently of the Act, the shipowners, usually, protect themselves 
by their express contract, by introducing into the charterparties or the bills of 
lading, clauses such as the following:
"... the master or agent of the said ship is hereby authorized to enter 
the said goods at the custom house, and land, warehouse, or place 
them in lighters, at the risk and expense of the consignee after they 
leave the deck of the said ship; and the owners of the said ship are to 
have a lien on the said goods until the payment of all costs and
charges so incurred."
Without reference to any lien, the shipowner may withhold delivery of the 
goods to the consignee, where the freight is to be paid on delivery of cargo. 
Payment of freight and delivery of the cargo being concurrent acts, delivery can 
be refused until the consignee is ready to pay the freight.21
(a ) -Power to Land the Goods:
The Act empowers the shipowner to enter and land the goods upon the
cargo owner's failure to do so, after the expiration of the agreed time for delivery
of the goods stipulated by the bill of lading or charterparty, or after the
expiration of seventy two hours, from the time of the report of the ship, if no 
time for delivery is expressly agreed.22 Therefore, Section 493 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act provides that:
"Where the owner of any goods imported in any ship from foreign 
parts into the United Kingdom fails to make entry thereof, or, having 
made entry thereof, to land the same or take delivery thereof, and
21 Dennis V. £ u rk  (1913) 2 K.B. 393-399.
22 See S. 493 of The Merchant Shipping Act. 1894.
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to proceed therewith with all convenient speed, by the times 
severally herein-after mentioned, the shipowner may make entry 
of and land or unship the goods at the following times 
(a.) If a time for delivery of the goods is expressed in the 
charterparty, bill of lading, or agreement, then at any time after the 
time so expressed:
(b.) If no time for the delivery is expressed in the charterparty, bill 
of lading, or agreement, then at any time after the expiration of 
seventy-two hours, exclusive of a Sunday or holiday, from the time 
of the report of the ship."
This procedure has the advantage of simplicity, but also has two 
drawbacks. First, the carrier becomes personally liable to pay the storage 
charges; this may conceivably become important if the goods are destroyed 
while in the warehouseman's possession so that the latter can no longer use his 
own lien to recoup himself. Secondly, warehousemen taking and storing on 
behalf of the carriers goods that they know belong to third parties are well 
advised to take indemnities from the carriers to cover their own possible liability 
to the true owners for failing to give up the goods. (Such liability is by no means 
impossible. It would arise, for instance, if the shipowner claimed a lien that did 
not in fact exist and, acting on his instructions, the warehouseman refused to 
give up the goods until the amount in question was paid. If for some reason the 
warehouseman failed to interplead, he would find himself liable in damages to 
the consignee).23 The prospect of having to give that sort of indemnity would 
clearly be unattractive to most carriers.
(b ) -Lien Preserved A fter Landing:
When the goods are landed and deposited with a warehouseman or 
wharfinger, the shipowner gives him a notice in writing that the goods are to 
remain subject to a lien for freight or other charges payable to the shipowner to 
an amount to be mentioned in the notice. The goods in the hands of the
23 Since, in such a case, the consignee would have an immediate right to possession.
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warehouseman will continue subject to the same lien as they were before being 
landed, and are to be retained until the lien is discharged. If the warehouseman 
fails to do so, he will be liable to make good any loss so caused by him.24
Unfortunately, s.494 too has its problems. The carriers presumably 
remains liable for warehousing charges. Moreover, there is some doubt as to 
precisely when carriers can invoke the section. Channell, J., in 1906,25 and
Scrutton, J., in 1913,26 thought they could do so only in the circumstances
provided for in section 393 of the same Act. Since these circumstances are
limited to where (a) the goods are imported from abroad, and (b) the consignee
is, at the time of landing, in default in failing to collect the goods and pay freight 
on them, it follows that, if s.494 is so limited, it does not really provide a 
complete enough pritection for carriers.
2 -P reserva tion  of the S hipow ner’s Lien A fter R elease of the 
G oods;
One might think, seeing that a shipowner has a lien for freight, demurrage 
and other charges over the goods he carries, that he had little to worry about if 
such charges were not paid. All he has to do is to put pressure on the goods 
owner by refusing to release the goods, and in the last resort by threatening to 
sell them to recoup himself.27
This however provides a misleading view of the situation. Ships are 
expensive; their owners' time is money; using them as floating warehouses for
24 Ibid. S. 494.
25 Sm ailes V. D essen (1906) 11 Com. Cas. 74, 79 et seq (varied on appeal on other grounds, 
(1906) 12 Com. Cas. 117).
26 Dennis & Sons. V. Cork SS. Co. [1913] 2 K.B. 393, 400. Carver, Carriage of Goods bv Sea. 13 
th edn., s. 1567 note 43, seems to accept this point of view. S cru tton  on Charterparties. 19th edn., 
302, leaves it open.
27 Section 497 (1) o f the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, provides that after the expiration 
of ninety days and if the lien is not discharged and no deposit is made, the w harfinger or 
warehouseman may, and, if  required by the shipowner, or if  the goods are o f a perishable 
nature, sell by public auction, either for home use or for exportation, the goods or so much 
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the charges for which the goods are retained.
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goods the carrier is exercising a lien over, rather than for profitable carriage of
other cargoes, simply does not make economic sense.28
Small wonder, then, that shipping lawyers have always been interested in 
finding ways of extending the carrier's lien so as to to cover goods even after 
they have been unloaded and the carrier's vessel thus freed for the use it was
intended for.
The chief obstacle to be overcome by carriers in this situation is, of course,
the well established doctrine that the carrier's lien over the goods he is carrying
is merely possessory. Like any other common law lien-or, for that matter, 
common law pleadge- it depends on the person seeking to exercise it remaining 
in the possession of the goods concerned; p rim a  f a c ie , once possession is 
voluntarily given up, the lien automatically disappears.
(a)-Attempt to Extend the Lien by the Contract of Carriage:
This is perhaps the most bare-faced and unsophisticated ploy by 
shipowners anxious to extend their rights. To take as a staightforward example 
cl.21 of the common Exxonvoy 1969 form of charter. This provides:
"The owners shall have an absolute lien on the cargo for all freight,
deadfreight, demurrage and costs ..., which lien shall continue after
delivery o f  the cargo into the possession o f  the Charterer, or o f  the 
holders o f  any B ill o f  Lading covering the sam e o r  o f  any  
s to ra g e m a n ".
(Italics supplied.)
The Exxononvoy form of charter, is American drafted, but what effect, if 
any, do the italisized words have in England? How justified, for instance, are the 
sceptical comments of Lord Scarman in a recent case 29 that such clauses ought 
perhaps to be looked at long and hard by the House of Lords?
28 Tettenborn, A.M., Shipowner's Lien - Preservation After Release of Goods. L lo y d 's  
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. (1985), at P. 376.
29 In The Miramar [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 129, 134.
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Perhaps one matter can be got out of the way fairly quickly; that is, where 
delivery is not to a consignee including a bill of lading holder) but to a 
storageman. Here, if the storageman agrees to hold the goods to the order of the 
carrier, the lien is preserved. If, by contrast, the goods were delivered to the 
storageman on terms that the consignee could take them away whenever he 
wanted, this would, it is suggested, amount to an implicit by the carrier of any 
lien he might have. There is one exception to this, where s.494 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act applies.
What, however, where the goods are released to the consignee himself? 
Can a term such as that appearing in the Exxonvoy charter effectively preserve 
the lien? One's first reaction is to say that it clearly cannot. If carrier's liens are as 
a matter of law possessory, how can any contract give a lien when there is no 
longer possession?30 Unfortunately this answer is inadequate,31 since it forgets 
that possession is a flexible concept and that the question whether someone 
possesses something in law often depends not so much on physical factors as on 
other, more intangible, arrangements; including, significantly, arrangements 
entered into in ter partes. In particular, two cases suggest it may be possible for 
a shipowner to hand over custody of goods to a consignee and nevertheless 
retain possession, and thus his lien, in himself.
First there is in Re Hamilton Young & Co.32 Exporters of cloth addressed a
document to their bank to their bank agreeing that, while their finished cloth
was in the hands of third parties being bleached, the bank should have what 
was referred to as a "lien" over it to cover advances. The bank never obtained
physical possession of the cloth at all. When the exporters went bankrupt, their
trustee claimed the cloth in the bleachers' hands, alleging that since the bank had 
never obtained possession of it they could not claim a valid lien over it. At best
30 Tettenborn, A.M., Shipowner's Lien - Preservation After Release of Goods. L lo y d 's  
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. (1985), at P. 377.
31 Ibid.
32 [1905] 2 K.B. 381.
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they had a non-possessory security that was void for non-registration under the 
Bills of Sale Acts. Bigham, J., however, found for the bank. On the possession
point he had this to say:
"No doubt the physical possession of the goods is in the bleachers, 
but for whom do they hold them? I think that by the intention of all
parties they hold them for the bank ... The document is, therefore,
one which is accompanied by a transfer of the goods and thus 
outside the Bills of Sale Acts".33
His decision was affirmed on appeal.34
Agreement may thus apparently fix possession, as between lienor and 
lienee, in the lienee even though the latter have not physical control-at least 
where the goods are in the custody of third parties. But what if the lienor 
himself is in possession, as he would be where the carrier released the goods to 
the consignee? The House of Lords' decision in North Western Bank Ltd. v. 
P o v n te r35 suggests that agreement may be effective to shift legal possession 
even here. Importers of ore pleadged a bill of lading relating to a cargo with the 
bank. Later the bank returned the bill of lading to the pledgor to enable the 
latter to sell the cargo, but did so on the terms of a "trust receipt". This provided 
that the pledgor was to hold the returned bill of lading as agent for the bank, the 
bank's interest as pledgee was to subsist, and all proceeds were to be paid over 
to the bank. The pledgors having sold having sold the cargo on credit to a third
party, a creditor of theirs tried to attach their right to sue the sub-buyer for the
price. The creditor failed. Physical control of the bill of lading might not have 
been in the bank; but the limitations on the pledgor's right to deal with it left the 
bank with sufficient control to retain its status as pledgee. Admittedly,
possession was not mentioned as such in that case; however, the Privy Council
33 Ibid., at 389.
34 Ibid., at 772.
35 [1895] A.C. 56. Cf. Re David Allester Ltd. [1922] 2 Ch. 211.
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40 years later in a similar decision not only followed Poynter's case but correctly 
explained its basis; where goods (or documents) were handed back by a pledgee 
under the terms of a trust receipt, the pledgee retained his interest because he 
remained in possession through the pledgor as agent.36
Can these authorities be used to give effect to contractual provisions, such 
as that in the Exxonvoy form already mentioned, extending the carrier's lien to 
cover goods in the consignee's hands; can it be argued, in other words, that the 
carrier in such a case remains in legal possession of the goods even though he 
has lost custody of them?37
It is submitted that, as at present drafted, the answer is almost certainly 
not. This is for three reasons.38
First, a simple contractual clause purporting to extend the lien is not explicit 
enough. Unlike the situation in Re Hamilton Young & Co..39 it does not say 
expressly that the consignee holds the goods as agent for, or on behalf of, the 
carrier. Nor, it is submitted, would the court be prepared to read in any such 
provision in order to give it effect; their dislike of secret charges adversley 
affecting creditors in such that they are disinclined to give their aid, in matters of 
construction, to creating them.
Secondly, the consigneen's right to deal with the goods, having got them, is 
too unrestricted. The trust receipt cases, including in particular North Western 
Bank Ltd. v. Povnter.40 concern goods given back to pledgors for stictly limited 
purposes: in that case, sale to a particular third party. Contrast the terms of the 
Exxonvoy form, where apparently the consignee can do what he likes with the 
goods once he has got them-provided he recognises that the carrier still has a
36 Official Assignee of Madras V. Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. [1935] A.C. 53, 63-64, per 
Lord W right.
37 Tettenborn, A.M., Shipowner's Lien - Preservation A fter Release of Goods. L lo y d 's  
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. (1985), at P. 378.
38 Ibid.
39 [1905] 2 0 . 3 8 1 ,7 7 2 .
40 [1895] A.C. 56.
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lien over them. It is submitted that such freedom is likely to be held
incompatible with any contention that the consignee only possesses the goods as 
agent for the real possessor, the carrier. (If one may take again the analogy of 
retention of title clauses, compare staughton, J.'s recent decision in Hendv Lennox 
(Industrial Engines) Ltd. v. Grahame Puttick Ltd..41 that freedom in the buyer to 
deal as he liked with the goods sold, and to mix them with his own, was 
inconsistent with the bailment or fiduciary relationship necessary to found a
claim in equity to the proceeds of resale.).
Thirdly, there is the rule encapsulated in cases such as British Eagle v. 
Compagnie Air France42 that one cannot contract out of the insolvency laws. A 
contractual provision, that if the consignee became insolvent, the carrier was to 
be a preferred creditor would clearly fall foul of that rule; but it is difficult to sees 
much difference between such a clause and the clause under discussion, that the
carrier should have a lien over goods in the hands of the consignee, that the
latter was otherwise free to do as he liked with. For these reasons, it is suggested 
that a simple contract to that effect is not enough to give a carrier a lien over 
goods once he has given them up to the consignee.43
( b ) - Other Means of Extending the Lien by Arrangement with the 
Consignee:
Is there any other way for the shipowner to achieve his objective by 
suitably drafted terms agreed between him and the consignee? It is suggested 
that there is.44 The key to the problem is to take advantage of the "trust 
receipt" cases and to find a formula that will persuade a sceptical commercial 
judge that, while custody may have been transferred to the consignee,
41 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 485.
42[1975] 1 W.L.R. 758.
43 Tettenborn, A.M., Shipowner's Lien - Preservation After Release o f Goods. L lo y d 's  
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. (1985), at P. 379.
44 Ibid.
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nevertheless the carrier retains possession so as to preserve his lien. This can be 
done, it seems, by making two things clear.
First, it should be agreed that not only the carrier is to preserve his lien 
over the goods, but also that the consignee, if allowed to take them, is to do so 
only as bailee for, and on behalf of, the carrier.
Secondly, in order to deal with suggestions that an attempt is being made
by private arrangement to oust the insolvency laws, contiuing control by the
carrier over the goods should be emphasized by the imposition of perceptible 
restrictions on the right of the consignee to deal with the goods as he thinks fit.
An obligation to store them separately from his own property is one possibility;
another is a provision that the carrier should have a right to have possession of 
the goods re-transferred to him on demand.
If these two things, that is, that the consignee is to hold the goods on behalf 
of the carrier, and that he is not free to deal with them as he likes, are made
clear in some document signed by the consignee at or before the time when the
goods are released to him, then it is suggested that the carrier will have little
difficulty in establishing his extended lien. It would not seem to matter in this 
connection, incidentally, which particular document the requisite terms were 
contained in: it could be either the contract of carriage,45 or a document
subsequently presented for signature at the time of collection or, of course, both.
If established, this lien would be exercisable against the creditors of the 
consignee in respect of goods still in the consignee's hands. It should be 
remembered, however, that it would not have effect against third parties buying 
the goods (or documents of title to them) in good faith. This rule is clearly 
established in the "trust receipt" cases concerning pledgees46 (the reasoning 
being that the pledgee giving goods back under a "trust receipt" is stopped from
45 Assuming it was binding on the consignee, either because the latter was a charterer 
under a charterparty, or because he was a holder of a bill of lading incorporating the terms of 
a charterparty including such a clause.
46 See, Babcock V. Lawson (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 284.
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denying, as against third parties, the power of the pledgor to deal with the 
goods); and there is no reason not to extend that principle to other possessory 
securities, such as liens.47
The Power of Transshipm ent of the Cargo:
If one suppose that upon the vessel being unable to complete her voyage,
the shipowner, or the master, employs another ship and tranship the cargo to
the port of destination, then the question which will arise in this case, is that,
whether the shipowner, when he parts with the possession of the goods, can also 
tranship his right of lien to the substituted shipowner. It may be that the same 
rule of law which empowers the original shipowner, under circumstances of 
necessity, to tranship the goods, and by sending them to the place of delivery in 
another ship, to retain his right to recover the freight as against the owner of the 
goods, gives also, at the same time, as incidental to this right, that of transferring 
also the lien which he would have had upon the goods for the freight, if he had
himself conveyed them to their destination.48 The original shipowner can
transfer to the other no greater right of lien than he himself possessed.
3- The Exercise of the Lien bv the W ithdrawal of the Vessel;
The right of withdrawal is usually determined by an express clause in most 
time charterparties.49 It provides that if the charterer fails to make a punctual 
payment of an instalment of hire, the shipowner will be entitled to withdraw the 
vessel from the service of the charterer. However, if there is no express right of 
withdrawal, the shipowner does not automatically have the said right, unless the 
late payment amounts to a repudiation of the charterparty.
Lord Denning, in his speech in "The Afovos". gives us an interesting
47 Tettenborn, A.M., Shipowner's Lien - Preservation A fter Release of Goods. L lo y d 's  
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly. (1985), at P. 380.
48 See per Cockburn, C.J. in Mattews V. Gibbs (1860) 3 E. & E. 282 at P. 304.
49 See. e.g. "Baltime 1939" Form, clause 6 .
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introduction commenting upon the interplay of interests between shipowners 
and charterers, helping us to understand this right of withdrawal:50
"In time charterparties there is very often a clause giving the
shipowners the right to withdraw the vessel from service in case the 
charterer fails to make regular and punctual payment of hire. This 
is called a "withdrawal clause". When market rates are raising 
shipowners look at the time of payment very keenly. If the 
charterer falls behind, even by a second or two by the slightest 
mischance, the shipowner will seize the opportunity and issue a 
notice of withdrawal.
As a rule, there is no actual withdrawal because of the difficulties 
which would arise for the cargo-owners, with the bills of lading, and 
the like. After the notice of withdrawal is given in nine cases out of 
ten the parties agree to go on just as before. If it turns out that 
notice of withdrawal was rightly given, the charterer will pay the
increased market rate. If it was wrongly given, then the rate 
remains the same."
The right of withdrawal in the Baltime and the N.Y.P.E. forms at first were 
interpreted in a different way because of their wording, and this brought some 
confusion.
The confusion began with The Georgios C.51 In this case the charterparty, 
under the Baltime form, provided for the right of withdrawal, "in default of 
payment". In the Court of Appeal Lord Denning M.R. held that these words 
meant "in default of payment and so long as default continues", so, the owners 
kept the option to withdraw the vessel so long as the charterers were in default. 
Once default had been remedied and provided notice of withdrawal had not
been given, payment or tendering of hire, makes the owners lose the right of
w ithdraw al.
Later in The Brimmes.52 it was left open, whether acceptance of hire paid 
late but before notice of withdrawal had been served, constitutes an irreparable 
breach.
50 The Afovos (1983) 1 All. E. R.
51 Empresa Cubana de Fletes V. Lagomisi Co. (The Giorgios Cl (1971) 1 L1.R. 7.
52 (1974) 2 LI. R. 241.
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The case that clarified all this confusion was The Laconia.53 The House of
Lords here were concerned with a charterparty on the N.Y.P.E. form. They held 
that the distinction which had earlier been drawn between the Baltime and the 
N.Y.P.E. forms was a literal and rigid interpretation, and that the words "in 
default of payment" in the Baltime form must be interpreted as in default of 
contractual payment, that is, within the time provided. Lord W ilberforce 
explained the decision in The Giorgios C.54 saying:55
"...The Court of Appeal have in effect construed the words in "default 
of payment", not as a meaning in default of payment in advance, but 
as meaning "in default of payment whether in advance or later, so
long as the vessel has not been withdrawn". This is a reconstruction
not a construction of the clause ... I think a provision requiring 
"punctual payment" must be strictly complied with (see The 
Brimmes) so also must a clause using the words "in advance". A 
payment one day late is not a payment in advance and I cannot see 
no difference in effect between the two phrases. ..."
As it has been pointed out before, today both provision have been clarified 
in the case of "The Laconia".56 and there is no difference between them if effect. 
If the charterer is late in paying the hire, then unless the shipowner is deemed
to have waived the breach, the shipowner may exercise the right to withdraw
upon notifying the charterer.
In this case Lord Salmon said:57
"In the Brimmes, the Georgios C, was distinguished since it could not 
be overruled. It is no doubt distinguishable in the sense that the 
clause dealing with the charterer's obligation to pay hire and the 
owner's right to withdraw the vessel in default of punctual payment
was differently worded in the two cases. But in my view the
difference in the wording makes no difference to the effect of the
53 (1977) 1 LI. R. 315.
54 (1971) 1 LI. R. 7.
55 Ibid. at P. 318.
56 (1977) 1 All E.R. 545.
57 The Laconia (1977) 1 All E.R. at p. 556.
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two clauses. I am afraid, that I am driven to the conclusion that the 
Georgios C was wrongly decided and should be overruled."
Thus, the decision held in The Georgios C 58 was over-ruled by this, and 
some uniformity was brought between the N.Y.P.E. and the Baltime forms.
There are some condition to exercise the right of withdrawal of the vessel. 
Threfore, the right of withdrawal must be exercised in a way leading to a final 
withdrawal of the vessel. This means that it cannot be exercised temporarily. 
Thus, in The Mihalios Xilas.59 it was decided by Mr. Justice Donaldson that the 
right of withdrawal must be final and not temporarily in the case where it it not 
provided in the charter that this right can be exercised temporarily. The facts of
the case were as follows: The owners let their vessel M ih a lios x ila s  to the
charterers for a period of three months, up to 15 days more at the charterers' 
option. The charter which was in the Baltime form provided inter alia for the 
payment of hire monthly in advance, with a right of withdrawal in default of 
payment. It also provided for the charterers to deposit a further 30 days hire 
referred to in the charter as "the escrow hire payment" which the owners would 
be entitled to collect if hire was due and unpaid for seven days. The charter 
further provided that:
13. The Owners only to be responsible for delay in delivery of the 
Vessel or for delay during the currency of the Charter ... if such
delay ... has been caused by want of due diligence on the part of the 
Owners ... in making the vessel seaworthy ... or any other personal 
act or omission or default of the Owners ...
18. The Owners to have a lien upon all cargoes and sub-freights
belonging to the Time Charterers and any Bill of Lading freight for all 
claims under this charter ...
The vessel was delivered on May 5 at Marseilles. Neither the advance hire 
nor the escrow which became payable were paid but the vessel was ordered to
58.(1971) 1 LI. R. 7.
59 In ternational Bulk C arriers (Beiruti S.A .R.L. V. Evlopia Shipping Co. S.A.. And 
Marathon Shipping Co. Ltd. (THE "MIHALIOS XILAS"V [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 186.
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Casablanca to load there arriving on May 7. On instructions from the Owners the 
master refused to load until hire had been paid. The charterers paid hire on
May 11, by which time the vessel had missed her turn and loading was
posponed from May 12 to May 18. The vessel then called at Augusta for
bunkers but as the escrow hire payment was still unpaid the owners insturcted 
the master not sail until receipt of further instructions thus delaying the vessel 
from May 23 to May 26. Eventually the vessel sailed from Augusta and the 
cargo was discharged at Constantza, Sulina and Braila. At Braila the vessel
remained from June 28 to July 13, when she was withdrawn by the owners for 
non-payment of July hire which was due on July 4. On July 11, the instalment
being unpaid for seven days, the owners obtained payment to them of the
escrow hire payment.
The dispute between the parties regarding the hire payments was referred 
to arbitration, the charterers claiming repayment of hire in respect of the delay 
to the vessel on May 12 to 18 and May 23 to may 26. The charterers conceded 
that the owners could retain part of the escrow payment equal to hire from July 
4 to July 13 but claimed repayment of the balance. The umpire found in favour
of the charterers but stated his opinion in the form of a special case for the
opinion of the Court.
Mr.Justice Donaldson held that the withdrawal must be final and not 
temporary unless it is otherwise provided in the charter, therefore, he provided 
that:60
"Temporary withdrawal of a vessel for non-payment of hire is a 
right which could only exist if specially conferred upon the owners 
by the terms of the time charter."
This condition for the exercise of the right of withdrawal, has also been 
cited in other cases, such as, The Agios Giorgis. and The Aegnoussiotis.
60 Ibid. at P. 191.
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Therefore, Mr Justice Mocatta, held in the case of The Agios Giorgis.61 that:
"...was that the owners were entitled, by reason of the withdrawal 
provisions in cl.5 of the charter, to withdraw the vessel; but were not 
entitled to effect a partial or temporary suspension or withdrawal,...".
This condition has also been repeated in the case of, The Aegnoussiotis.62 
where Mr.Justice Donaldson held that :
" ...there was no right to temporarily withdraw the vessel since (a) 
the performance of the owners’ obligation was not dependent upon 
payment of hire unless the contract so provided; (b) a failure to pay 
hire regularly and punctually was a breach of contract which could 
never be repaired; ..."
Moreover, in Langford (SS) Co. v. Canadian Forwarding Co.63 an instalment 
of hire became due on September 11, on October 1, while the ship was at sea, 
the owners gave notice that they withdrew the ship after outward cargo had 
been discharged: the following day the ship arrived at the port of discharge, and 
on the same the hire was paid: the discharge was completed and preparations to 
load the homeward cargo had been commenced. When on October 4 the master 
claimed to withdraw the ship on the owners' instructions. It was held that up to 
the last-named date there had been no absolute withdrawal, and that 
withdrawal could not then be justified, there being no hire in arrear.
There is another essential requirement in order to give a valid notice of 
withdrawal is that the intention must be communicated to the charterers.
Therefore, in The "Georgios C".64 it was held that notice to the ship’s master
was not sufficient. Lord Denning said of the owners:
"They did not give notice to the charterers, they only give notice to
61 Steelwood Carriers INC. Of Monrovia. Liberia. V. Evimeria Compania Naviera S.A Of 
P anam a. The "Agios Giorgis". [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep.192. at P. 202.
62 A egnoussiotis Shipping Corporation O f M onrovia. V. S Kristian Jebsens Rederi Of 
B ergen . The "Aegnoussiotis". [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268. at P.268.
63 (1907) 96. L.T. 559.
64 Empresa Cubana de Fletes. V. Lagomisi Co. (The Georgios Cl (1971) 1 LI. R. 7.
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their own master. That was I think, insufficient. In order to exercise 
a right to withdraw a ship, the shipowners must give notice to the 
charterers. The withdrawal only operates from the time notice is 
received by the charterers."
In "The Aegnoussiotis". Donaldson, J., said that:65
"No particular form of words or notice is required, but the charterers 
must be informed that the owner is treating the non-payment of 
hire as having terminated the charter-party."
More it was also maintained that the charterers must be informed in the 
case of "The Mihalios Xilas". where it was held by Donaldson. J., that:66
"Withdrawal and reinstatement required some action on the part of
the owners which would be sufficient to terminate the charter-party 
in the event of a repudiatory breach and since the owners had taken 
no such action, they could not justify the refusal to load by reference 
to the charterers' failure to pay the hire."
Also care has to be taken in order to avoid an unwanted manifestation
from the charterers claiming that the shipowner has waived his right to
w ithdraw .
In W ulfsberg v. W eardale 67 a month's hire, payable in advance, became 
due on August 8, 1914. On August 13, it being still unpaid, the owners gave 
notice to the charterers, under the terms of the charterparty, of withdrawal of
the ship, and a few hours later issued a writ against them for the hire due on
August 8. The notice reached the charterers a few hours before the issue of the
writ. It was held that the issue of the writ did not constitute a waiver of the
notice of withdrawal. Lush, J., said that the notice of August 13 having
determined the contract, "No subsequent recognition can possibly revive it; in 
fact there is no evidence of any such recognition."
65 (1977) 1 LI. R. 268.
66 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 186.
67 (1916) 85 L.J. K.B. 1717.
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Sometimes the owners may accept a late tender of hire as if it had been 
paid punctually. If they are found to have done so, they will be held to have 
waived their right to withdraw. In The Brimmes. Cairns, L.J., said:68
"I consider ... that if a month's hire in advance is tendered late, but 
before withdrawal, and is accepted without qualification, it must be 
taken to be accepted as hire for the month, which must amount to 
an election not to enforce the right of withdrawal, so constituting a 
waiver of that right."
Whether the owners have accepted a late tender in this way is a matter of 
fact and the Court will examine all the relevant circumstances to see which was 
the real intention of the owners.
In "The Laconia"69 one of the installments fell due on a Sunday, but it was 
only at about 15'00 hours on the Monday following that the charterer's bank
delivered to the owner's bank a "payment order" for the appropriate amount.
On the same day at 18'55 hours, the owners gave the charterers notice that they 
were withdrawing the ship, and the next morning the payment order was 
returned to the charterer's bank.
The House of Lords held that the owners were entitled to withdraw and
have done so effectively. The late tender of hire could only be relevant if the 
owners were held to have accepted it and thus waived their right to withdraw, 
but the receipt of the payment order by the owner's bank and the processing 
work that was began upon it did not amount to any such waiver. Lord 
Wilberforce said:
"... All that is needed to establish waiver in this sense, of the
committed breach of contract, is evidence clear and equivocal, that 
such acceptance has taken place, or, after the late payment has been 
tendered, such a delay in refusing it as might reasonably cause the 
charterers to believe that it has been accepted."
68 (1974) 2 LI. R. 241.
69 (1977) 1 LI. R. 315.
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Moreover, in the case of "The Chravsovalandou Dvo".70 the charterers 
contended for the exercise of the right of lien for hire due and not paid, that the 
owners should deny possession of the cargo to the charterers and that the vessel 
should be at a discharging point.
This is a case where by a time charter dated July 5, 1978, the owners let 
their vessel Chrysovalandou Dyo to the charterers for a "time charter trip" from 
the Philippines to the Persian Gulf. Hire was to be paid every 15 days in 
advance at the rate of $2,700 daily from the date of redelivery and failing the 
punctual and regular payment of the hire the owners were at liberty to 
withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers.
The charter was in the New York Produce Exchange form, the material
clauses of which provided inter a lia :
"8... The captain... (although appointed by the Owners) shall be under the 
orders and directions of the Charterers as regards employment and agency ...
"18. That the Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and all sub-freights 
for any amounts due under this Charter...".
The charterers nominated Dubai as the port of discharge and arranged a 
remittance of hire with a reduction from that hire in respect of a speed claim. 
The owners protested at the deductions and warned that unless there were
additional payments the vessel would not be ordered to Dubai. The charterers 
then ordered the vessel to Dubai and on the same day the owners advised the 
charterers that the vessel had been withdrawn and ordered the vessel to anchor 
off Dubai. The owners instructed the master to remain at the same anchorage 
since a lien was being exercised upon the cargo under cl. 18. The dispute being 
referred to arbitration, the arbitrator found in favour of the owners.
However, the charterers contended that for a lien to be exercised there had
to be a demand for possession and that the shipowner's lien could not be
70 Santiren Shipping LTD. V. U nim arine S .A . (THE CHRAYSOVALANDOIJ DvoL [1981] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 159.
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exercised unless the vessel was at a discharging spot whether wharf or buoy.
For this requirement, it was held by Mocatta. J., that:
"Whilst counsel for the charterers presented his argument very 
attractively, he failed to convince me that he was right on the facts of 
this case. The owners had been told go to Dubai to discharge, which 
differentiates the case from The Mihalios Xilas. No authority was 
cited for the proposition that a vessel had to be at a discharging spot 
in a port as a condition precedent to the exercise of the lien. To 
require this might involve unnecessary expense and in certain cases 
cause congestion in the port. I think counsel for the owners was 
right in his submission that the requirements for which counsel for 
the charterers argued before a lien could be exercised would 
seriously limit the commercial value of a lien on cargo granted by a 
clause in a charter. The argument that counsel for the charterers 
advanced that demand for possession was necessary before 
delivery could justifiably be refused on the basis of a lien was met 
by the fact that the master had been ordered to Dubai to discharge."
Moreover, the owners must give the notice of withdrawal within a 
reasonable time or they may find that an unreasonable delay may amount to a 
waiver of that right. In the case of "The Laconia". Lord Wilberforce said that:71
"The owners must within a reasonable time after the default give 
notice of withdrawal to the charterers. What is a reasonable time - 
essentially a matter for arbitrators to find - depends on the 
circumstances. In some, indeed many cases, it will be a short time - 
viz the shortest time reasonably necessary to ensure the shipowner 
to hear of the default and issue instructions."
Further, no hire is payable in respect of the period after the ship is
withdrawn, but the owner of the ship will be entitled to damages in respect of
the charterers failure to pay hire, if the failure amounted to a repudiation of the 
charterparty .72
After, the means of exercising the shipowner's lien in the English law
jurisdiction has been explained, it would be the turn of the view of the civil law
71 The Laconia (1977) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 315.
72 Leslie Shinning V. W elstead (1921) 3 K.B. 420.
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jurisdiction (namely the French and Algerian law) to be explained.
B- The Exercise of the Lien in the Civil Law Jurisdiction:
After the exercise of the shipowner's lien on carg0 for payment of his
freight has been explained above, it would be preferable to look at the view of 
the civil law jurisdictions about the exercise of this lien.
Before looking at the different ways or means by which this lien or
"privilege" is exercised, it would be worthwhile looking at the different situations 
where this lien or "privilege" is exercised.73
The first situation for the application of this lien is realised where at the 
port of destination no consignee or receiver of the goods comes to take delivery 
of the goods and pay the freight. In this situation the creditor of the freight will 
have possession of the goods which were carried to their destination, but which 
no-one came to take delivery. This is certainly, in point of view of the exercise of 
the guarantee, the most simple situation, but also the most unusual.
The second situation for the exercise of this guarantee, is where the
consignee or the receiver of the goods accepts to take delivery of them, but
refuses to pay the freight.
1- The Exercise of the Lien or "Privilege” Where the Goods Have
Not Been Received:
This situation is more or less simple, because whether the consignee is
unknown or whether he refuses to take delivery of the goods and pay freight,
the goods are in the possession of the shipowner or the carrier, either on his ship 
or on the wharf or in the shipowner’s warehouse. The important solution and 
which explains the uniformity of solutions in this case, is the fact that the creditor 
has possession of the goods.
This solution was provided in the French Code of Commerce, in article 305,
73 Schertenleib. Francis. Lc Frdt. (La Garantie De Son PaiementL at P.121.
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before the Act of 1966, which brought a different provision. The new Code of 
Commerce (which includes the French Maritime Law) of 1966, provides in its' 
article 2 that, the shipowner has a lien or "privilege" on the goods. The methods 
for the application of this right of priority, are provided in Article 3 of the Decree 
of 1966.74 This Decree in its' Article 3 provides that, "if the shipowner is not 
paid when discharging the goods, he cannot retain them on his ship, but he can
deposit or warehouse them in the hands of a third party and to sell them, unless
the charterer gives a security."75
However, article 53 of the same decree, although more precise, provides a 
different solution. Therefore, article 53 provides that:
"when no-one claims the delivery of the goods or in the case of a
claim contending the delivery or the payment of freight, the captain
can by authority of justice:
a- Sell some of the cargo for the payment of his freight, unless the
consignee gives a security.
b- Get an order for the deposit of the excess or the difference."7 6
If the rights of the shipowner and the carrier come clearly from these two 
dispositions, then it is regrettable that they had not been matched in their 
drafting to agree. In fact, we can have the impression that in a contract of
affreightment, the shipowner must first deposit, before asking for the sale of the
goods (article 3). However, in the case of a contract of transport, it would be a
. 74 Decret No.66-1078 du 31 Decembre 1966, sur les contrats d'affretement et de transport 
m a ritim e s .
75 "My Own Translation", the actual article in French provides that:
« S i  le freteur n'est point paye lors du d£chargement des marchandises, il ne peut les 
retenir dans son navire, mais il peut les consigner en mains tierces et les faire vendre, sauf i  
l'affr£teur i  fournir caution".
76 "My Own Translation", the actual article in French provides that:
"A defaut de reclam ation des marchandises ou en cas de contestation rela tive & la 
livraison ou au paiement du fret, le capitaine peut, par autorit£ de justice:
a) En faire vendre pour le paiement de son fret, si mieux n'aime le destinataire fournir 
c a u tio n ;
b) Faire ordonner le d£pot du surplus."
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diffirent solution which would be applied to the situation (article 53).77 As
under the old Code of Commerce, the procedure is different whether we are
asking for the deposit or the warehousing of the goods or whether we are asking
for their sale.78 In fact, if the right of the captain to ask for the deposit of the
goods in the hands of a third party is absolute, it is not, however, to be necessary 
the same for the right to ask for the sale of them. It is therefore, not excluded 
that the consignee will appear to present his reasons during the procedure for 
obtaining the authorisation to sell.79 In the present situation the shipowner or 
the carrier do nt risk to lose their lien on the goods not claimed or not
withdrawn, and that is because as soon as the ship arrives at the port of
unloading, they can act in front of the competent court to obtain execution.
2- The Exercise of the "Lien” or "Privilege” when there is Refusal to
Payment of Freight:
In this case, where the freight has not been paid, the shipowner has a lien 
or a right of priority according to article 2 of the French law of the 18 th of June,
1966. However, he cannot keep these goods on board his ship, but he can still
keep their possession by warehousing or depositing them in the hands of a third 
party and then ask for their sale. This solution is provided by article 3 of the 
Decree of December the 31 st, 1966, 80 where it is provided that:
"If the shipowner is not paid when discharging the goods, he cannot 
retain them on his ship, but he can deposit them in the hands of a 
third party and to sell them, unless the charterer gives a security".81
77 Schertenleib Francis, op cit. at P. 122.
78 Rodidre Rene, Traite General de Droit Maritime. Tome I, Paris, 1967, P. 195.
79 Bleinc Pidrre, De la Consignation en Mains Tidrces des M archandises A rrivant par 
M 6r. Marseille, 1933, at P. 19.
80 Under the title of, "Affreightment o f Ships", in Chapter I which includes the general 
rules of these kinds of contracts.
81 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french provides that:
« S i  le frdteur n'est point pay6 lors du ddchargement des marchandises, il ne peut les 
retenir dans son navire, mais il peut les consigner en mains tierces et les faire vendre, sauf i  
l'affrdteur d fournir c a u tio n » .
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Therefore, in the contract of affreightment, the shipowner is not allowed to 
retain the goods on board his ship, but he must unload it and deposit or 
warehouse it in the hands of a third party. Here, the legislator has always looked 
at the interests of the receiver of the goods, who has to obtain delivery before 
the payment of freight.82 However, this is the old view of the old law which 
was influenced by the doctrine. Therefore, the legislator used to confuse 
between the right of the captain to retain the goods on board his ship and the 
right of retention in general. However, some authors think that this form of 
deposit is nothing but a retention; among these authors, we find Ripert,83 who 
thinks that the way of depositing or warehousing the goods in the hands of a 
third party "is nothing but the retention exercised through a third party".84 
This measure keeps the interest of the captain who has the right to be paid 
before giving up his retention, and in the same time it also protects the interests 
of the consignee who, before paying the freight, has the right, to examine the 
state of the goods which are going to be delivered to him. Thus, a captain faced 
with a refusal of payment of his freight, will seek from the "tribunal de 
commerce", i.e., (the commercial court) the depositing of the goods in the hands 
of a third party's hands. As, he cannot keep the goods on board his ship, he must 
obtain the authorisation of the court to deposit the goods before the consignee 
has had the time to take them away. He must therefore, act very quickly 
according to the circumstances. The situation in a contract for the carriage of 
goods, is quite similar, because the captain cannot retain the goods on his ship if 
the freight has not been paid.85
Therefore, in both cases of the shipowner and the carrier in the French law, 
where their freight is not paid, the shipowner or the captain for the carrier
82 Schertenleib Francis, op cit, at P. 126.
83 Ripert Georges, Droit de Maritime.4 6me 6d.,Vol.2, Paris,1952, P.554.
84 "My Own Translation". The actual article in french is:
«  ... n'est autre chose que la retention exercde par l'intermddiaire d'un t i e r s » .
85 Article 48 o f the Decree of December the 31 st, 1966, which provides that: « L e  
capitaine neut peut retenir les marchandises dans son navire faute de paiement de son f r e t » .
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cannot retain the goods on board the ship, but they have to warehouse them or 
deposit them in the hands of a third party. This third party will have possession 
of the goods, and will be keeping these goods not in his name but he will be 
keeping possession for the shipowner or the carrier. Therefore, the possession of 
the goods by a third party is nothing else than the possession of the shipowner 
or the carrier, but exercised through the possession of someone else. This can be 
applied to the cases of affreightment where the charterparty is a voyage or a 
time charterparty, where the shipowner keeps possession of the ship (Article 7 
and Article 20 of the Decree of December the 31 st of 1966). That is because, by 
keeping possession of the ship, he is keeping the possession of the goods. 
However, the situation is different in the case of a demise charterparty, where 
the possession of the ship is given up to the charterer, and therefore, the 
possession of the cargo. Here, how can the shipowner exercise his lien on the 
cargo, without having possession of it? Here, because the goods are not in the
hands of the shipowner, he must then act by the means of an action for
execution for the sale of the debtor's chattels, i.e., "saisie-execution mobiliere". M. 
R od iere ,86 notices about this point, that there is a confusion about whether we 
apply the procedure of the action of sequester of property, "saisie-conservatoire" 
of the commercial law (Article 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure) or the general 
action of sequester of property, and that if we admit that the reform of Article 
48 and follows of the Civil Code of Procedure of the 12 th of November 1955 has 
absorbed the first one.
Therefore, the goods being out of the possession of the shipowner in the 
case of a demise charterparty, is not a problem any more in the French law, and 
that is because the shipowner can ask the court to sequester the goods of the 
charterer, and that according to Article 48 of the Civil Code of Procedure.
Therefore, the goods will be in the hands of the court, and then, the shipowner
86 Giverdon Claude, Saisie Conservatoire Com m erciale. dans Encyclop&lie Dalloz, Rep. de 
droit commercial, N o.l.
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will not have to fear for his debt to be satisfied.
However, in the case of a voyage or time charterparty, the shipowner has a 
lien or right of priority over the goods for the payment of his freight (Article 2 of 
the law of June the 18 th, 1966), but he cannot keep them aboard his vessel, but 
on the contrary has to deposit them with a third party (Article 3 of the decree of 
December the 31 st, 1966). Here, after the deposit of the goods in the hands of a 
third party, and his freight being still unpaid, he can then sell the goods to satisfy 
his "lien" or "privilege" over the goods for the payment of his freight (Article 3).
However, because this measure is quite dangerous for the rights of the 
charterer, the legislator makes the sale of the goods go through a very detailed 
procedure, so that the rights of the charterer will be respected and so that the 
shipowner does not abuse of this right. Therefore, the legislator requires in 
paragraph 2 of Article 3, that the order for sale must be acquired by a summary 
order, "ordonnance de ref ere", in this way the charterer will have the 
opportunity to present his case. In the case of carriage of goods, the captain is 
preferred for the payment of his freight, over the goods during the fifteen days 
which follow their delivery, providing that they did not pass to a third party's 
hands, this is provided by Article 23 of the law of the 18 of June 1966.87 The 
consequance of this, is that in many cases the goods will remain subject to the 
lien, and that is there has not been any exchange of bills of lading. Therefore, it is 
not important if the goods have not been unloaded, for example, on one part on 
the wharf which is under the control of the receiver of the goods or the 
consignee. In fact, an agent who is detaining the goods which he received from 
the carrier or his representative, cannot receive "delivery", in the legal or 
juridical meaning of the term. Because, in the absence of exchange of 
documents, and in waiting for this operation, he is only detaining on behalf of 
commissioning; this commissioning can therefore, still exercise the right of
87 Article 23 provides that:
« L e  capitaine est prdfdrS, pour son fret, sur les m archandises de son chargem ent, 
pendant la quinzaine aprds leur ddlivrance si elles n'ont passd en mains t ie r c e s » .
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detention on the goods, or on the documents which represent them, or on both 
the goods and the documents in the same time. No changes will occure unless 
the bills of lading have been exchanged, and it is that day, and only that day, that 
delivery will be effected, and the fifteen days will start for the exrcise of the lien 
or the right of priority, and the right of retention will disapear after the exchange 
of the bills of lading.88 However, it must be pointed out that the carrier cannot 
use his lien against the general body of the creditors, unless he has started the 
joint procedures against the body of the creditors which the consignee is the 
subject, before the fifteen days have expired. Here, the carrier will be preferred 
for his lien against all the other creditors of the shipper or the receiver, and this 
is provided in Article 24 of the law of the 18 th of June, 1966, which provides 
that, "In case of bankruptcy or admission into the juridical settlement of the 
shippers or receivers before the expiration of the fifteen days, the captain is 
preferred against all the other creditors for the payment of his freight and the 
charges which are due to him".89 Therefore, the right of the carrier is preserved 
after the real delivery according to the legal meaning of the term, providing that 
the carrier takes action before the period of fifteen days is over.
When it comes to the Algerian Maritime Code, which for historical reasons 
has been influenced by the French Matime Law, however, in the case of the 
shipowner's lien on the cargo for the garantee of payment of his freight, he has 
provided a much better protection to the shipowner. The Algerian legislator like 
the French has made a difference between the shipowner and the carrier.
Therefore, he gave the shipowner a lien or a right of priority over the goods 
for the garantee of payment of his freight.
He therefore, provided in Article 645 of the Algerian Maritime Code that:
88 Michdl De Juglart. Le Privilege du Transporteur M aritim e. Droit M artim e F rancais. 
1975. 27. 579-593. at P. 592.
89 Article 24 which provides that:
« E n  cas de faillite ou d'admission au rdglement judiciaire des chargeurs ou rdclamateurs 
avant l'expiration de la quinzaine, le capitaine est p riv ile g e  sur tous les crdanciers pour le 
paiement de son fret et des avaries qui lui sont d u e s » .
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"The shipowner has a lien on the goods for the payment of his freight and other 
charges provided in the contract of affreightment",90 this is the same provision 
as that provided by the French law in Article 2.
However, the Algerian legislator went further, by providing that the
shipowner can refuse to unload the cargo, if the freight and the remunerations
for demmurage or other delay have not been paid by the charterer,91 and he 
added that, in the case above, the shipowner can deposit the goods and after he 
has told the charterer sell the goods with the consent of the judicial authority, 
unless a security, which is secure enough to garantee the lien, has been
deposited by the charterer.92
This is a much better protection to the shipowner than that given to him by 
the French legislator, where he cannot keep the goods on board his ship, but in 
the Algerian law it is up to the shipowner, whether he wants to retain the goods 
on board his ship or to deposit them into the hands of a third party, which is
nothing else but retainaing the possession of the goods by the shipowner
through the possession of a third party.
In the case of a carrier of goods by sea, the Algerian legislator gave him the 
right not to deliver the goods and to deposit them until the consignee has paid
or given a security for all what is due for the carriage and other charges.93
Here, the Algerian legislator has made a difference between the shipowner
90 "My Own Translation", article 645 povides that:
« L e  freteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son fret et autres
charges prevues au contrat d 'a ffre tem e n t» .
91 Article 680 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« L e  freteur peut refuser le dechargement de la cargaison si le fret et la remuneration i  
titre de surestaries ou d'autres retards ne lui ont pas et6 pay6s par l 'a ffre teu r» .
92 Article 681 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« D a n s  le cas visd a l'article precedent, le freteur peut faire consigner les marchandises, 
et, aprds en avoir avisd prdalablem ent l'affrdteur, les faire vendre avec le consentem ent de 
l'autorite judiciaire, sauf si une caution suffisante a dtd fournie par l 'a f f re te u r» .
93 Article 792 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« L e  transporteur peut refuser de livrer les marchandises et les faire consigner jusqu'd 
ce que le ddstinataire ait payd ou qu'il ait foumit caution de tout ce qui est du pour le transport
de ses m archandises ainsi qu'd titre de contribution d 'avarie commune et de rem uneration
d 'assistance» .
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and the carrier, because in this case the carrier cannot retain the goods on his 
ship, but has to deposit them. On the other hand, the shipowner can either keep 
the goods on his ship or can deposit them. Moreover, the Algerian legislator has 
given the same provision as that one given by the French legislator in the case of 
the carrier’s lien.94
However, in the case of the cargo which has not been claimed or which not 
one came to take delivery of it, the carrier in this case will put the cargo in a 
warehouse, in a safe place at the risks and expenses of the consignee, and that 
with giving an immediate notice of the situation to the shipper and the 
consignee, if the latter is known.95
The Algerian legislator went further, and provided in Article 795 of the 
Maritime Code that:
"If after two months, starting from the day of the arrival of the ship 
at the port of discharge, and if the goods which were warehoused 
have not been retired, and if all the sums for the carriage have not 
been paid, the carrier can then sell these goods with the consent of 
the competent authority, unless a security has been given by the
one claiming the goods."96
94 Article 48 of the French Decree of Dcember the 31 st, 1966, which provides that: « L e  
capitaine neut peut retenir les marchandises dans son navire faute de paiement de son f r e t» .
95 Article 793 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« S i  le destinataire ne se presente pas ou refuse de prendre livraison des marchandises 
ou s'il n 'est pas connu, le tra n sp o r te r  m ettra les marchandises en depot, en lieu sur aux
risques e t frais du destinataire, en avisant de ces faits, im m ediatem ent le chargeur et le 
destinateur, si ce dernier est c o n n u » .
96 This is provided by article 795 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« S i ,  les dans les deux mois, i  partir du jour de l'arrivee du navire au port de
dechargement, les marchandises mises en depot n'ont pas etd retirees, et si toute les sommes
dues au tra n sp o r te r  par le destinataire en raison du transport n 'on t pas etd payees, le
t r a n s p o r te r  peut vendre les m archandises avec le consentem ent de l'au to ritd  jud ic ia ire
compdtente, sauf si une caution suffisante a 6 l6  fournie par l’ayant droit aux marchandises.
Les marchandises n 'ont rdclamees peuvent etre egalem ent vendues avant leur mise en
depot et avant l'expiration d'un delai de deux mois si elles sont perissables ou si les frais de depot 
exc6dent leur v a le u r» .
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These goods which are not claimed, can also be sold, if these goods are by 
their nature perishable, or if the sum of their warehousing exceeds their value, 
but their sale sould be made before depositing them.97
Moreover, the Algerian legislator has given the carrier another protection in 
the case where the money of the sale of the goods not claimed, is not enough to 
pay the carrier for the remuneration of his carriage and the expenses for 
warehousing them, in this case the Algerian legislator has made of the shipper
the one responsible for the payment of the difference.98 This is the case of the 
garantee of payment of freight in the Algerian law, however, the case of a
demise charterparty has not been discussed yet. So, the shipowner in the case of 
a demise charterparty, because he is deprived of the possession of the ship, and 
therefore, the cargo, in this case how can he exercise his lien? In this case, he has 
to use the protection given to the creditor in the civil code, which gives him some 
means of prevention to preserve his rights or his lien. That is like the French 
law, by giving the shipowner the right to have the goods stopped or seized and 
taken into the care of the court, so that the debtor cannot dispose of them before 
the freight is paid, and this means of protection will prevent them from passing 
into the hands of a third party who might acquire them in good faith (Article 
2279 of the French Civil Code and Article 835 of the Algerian Civil Code), and 
then the shipowner’s right will be lost, because he will not be able of exercising 
his lien over the goods which are no more the goods of the charterer but, of the 
third party who acquired them in good faith. The exercise of the lien in this 
situation, is by taking a measure of prevention, which will prevent the debtor 
from disposing of the goods to a third party. This measure is provided by Article
345 of the Algerian Code of Procedure,99 which provides that, in the case of
necessity, the creditor can obtain an order from the court to put the movable 
chattels of the debtor in the hands of justice and that is to prevent him from
97 Article 795, Section.2. Ibid.
98 Article, 796 of the Algerian Maritime Code.
99 Article 345 of "Le Code de Procedure Civil" Algerien. Ordonnance No.66-154 du 8 Juin 
1966 portant Code de Procedure Civil.
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disposing of them, to damage his creditor's rights. This article is quite similar in
its1 aim to that of the French law, as to the protection of the shipowner in the case
of demise charterparty.
To summurise this section, one can say that, the shipowner or carrier, might
have a better protection in the civil law jurisdiction. But, generelly, one might
say that they provide almost the same means of protection, and that is, that they 
must keep possession of the goods and warehouse them, with the only
difference that, in the Algerian Marime Code, the shipowner can either keep the 
goods himself by refusing to deliver them or, warehouse them. However, the 
difference between the english and the civil law jurisdiction, is that by
warehousing the goods, the shipowner or the carrier in the civil law jurisdiction, 
can apply for an order for the sale of the goods. Moreover, the lien is not lost in 
the civil law jurisdiction, if the goods have passed to the hands of the consignee 
during a period of fifteen days after delivery of the cargo, provided that the
cargo has not been disposed of to a third party who may acquire it in good faith, 
because in this case, the lien will be lost.
The Exercise of the Shipowner’s Lien on Sub-Freights:
The shipowner must exercise his lien on sub-freight or sub-sub-freight, 
before this freight is paid to the charterer, either by the sub-charterer or the 
shipper. Therefore, it was held in the case of The "Upland Trailer1'100 that: "a lien 
on sub-freight could only be enforced by the shipowner before the shipper had 
made payment to the charterer; it conferred no right to follow the money after it 
had been paid and the owner's right to payment of freight existed only under 
their lien."101 Therefore, the shipowner's lien can be lost if the money has been 
paid to the charterer. Moreover, the decision in The Attika Hope.102 exposes
100 Re Welsh Irish Ferries LTD. The "Ueland Trailer" [1985] 2 Lloyd's. L. Rep. 372.
101 Ibid. at P. 372.
102 G. & N. Angelakis Shipping Co. S.A. V. Com pagnie N ationale  A lgdrienne De 
Navigation. (The Attika Hope1) 15 October 1987; Lloyd's List, 28 November 1987., [1988] 1 Lloyd's. 
L. R. 439.
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another limitation on the owner's lien on sub-freights and show that a defaulting 
time charterer may defeat an owner's lien by assigning the sub-freights to 
another creditor. In fact, in the particular circumstances of the case, the sub­
charterers from whom the sub-freights were due were persuaded to pay the 
freight to the owners but, as it turned out, it was held that they were under no 
legal obligation to do so. The assignment to the other creditors of the time 
charterers was held to have priority over the owners' lien and the sub­
charterers had to pay the freight twice. Had the sub-charterers taken the usual 
course of interpleading, the owners' lien would have been ineffective.
On 16 November 1983, the owners of the Attika Hope entered into a time 
charter with Ideomar on the New York Produce Exchange Form. The charter 
provided, by cl. 18, that "the owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and all 
sub-freights for any amounts due under this charter ...". When the time 
charterers entered into that charter, they were having difficulties in discharging 
debts to a third party, Angelakis, the plaintiffs in the action. In order to reduce 
their indebtedness, the time charterers agreed to assign to Angelakis the freight 
which would become due to them under a sub-charter of the Attika Hope which 
they were negotiating. This sub-charter was eventually concluded on 15 
December 1983 with the defendants in the action, Compagnie Nationale 
Algerienne. It provided that 95% of the freight was payable within 20 days 
after releasing bills of lading and that the freight was to be paid to Angelakis. 
Notice of the assignment of the sub-freights to Angelakis, so the court held, was 
given to the sub-charterers in telexes to them and to their brokers between 15 
and 20 December 1983.
The report of this case does not disclose when the charterers defaulted in 
the payments that were due from them to the owners under the time charter 
but, on 13 January 1984, the owners notified the sub-charterers by telex that 
they were exercising their lien on sub-freights. Four days' later, Angelakis called 
on the sub-charterers to pay the assigned freight to them. The sub-charterers
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were eventually persuaded to pay the freight to the owners. Angelakis 
consequently sued the sub-charterers, the issue being whether the assignment 
of freights to Angelakis had priority over the owners' claim based upon their lien 
on sub-freights.103
Steyn, J., adopted the characterization of the lien on sub-freights advanced
by Lord Russell of Killowen in The Nanfri.104 where he said:
"The lien operates as an equitable charge upon what is due from the 
shipper to the charterer, and in order to be effective requires an 
ability to intercept the sub-freight (by notice of claim) before it is 
paid by the shipper to the charterer."
4-2- The Term ination of the Shipow ner's L ien:
The shipowner's lien for the garantee of payment of his freight is ended in 
different ways, depending whether the shipowner parts with the possession of
the cargo, or waive his lien, or the lien may be discharged. These are the
different ways by which the shipowner's lien might be ended, and which will be
examined next. However, it would be best to examine the end of this lien in the 
English law jurisdiction, before examinig it in the civil law jurisdictions, namely 
the French and the Algerian law.
(A)- The T e rm in a tio n  of the Shipow ner’s Lien in the English
Law Ju risd ic tio n :
The lien of the shipowner for the guarantee of payment of his freight, may 
end either, by the loss of possession, which is an essential element of this lien or,
by the waiver of this lien or, by the discharge of this lien.
1- Parting with Possession Defeats the Lien:
The shipowner's lien for freight depends upon possession, and its
103 W ilford, M.T., "Liens On Sub-Freights And Priorities", L loyd 's M aritim e and 
Commercial Law Quarterly (1988), at P.148-151.
104 Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. Ltd. V. Molena Alpha Inc. (The Nanfri) [1979] 
A.C.757, 784.
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preservation upon the continuance of possession.105 Thus, the lien is destroyed 
if the shipowner gives up his right to the possession of the goods, either by final 
delivery of the cargo to the consignees,106 or abandonment of the vessel and her 
cargo.107
In C raw shav  v. E a d e s108 the shipowner, after landing part of the cargo,' 
found out that the consignee had stpped payment, and there reloaded it and 
took the whole cargo to his own premises. It was held that there was no 
delivery of any part of the cargo as to divest the shipowner's lien upon the 
whole cargo. The freight not not having been tendered or paid, and the 
shipowner not having intended to part with the possession, without payment of 
the freight, his lien still continued.109
If the possession of the goods is voluntarily given up, then the lien is lost 
and cannot be revived on regaining possession.110 Thus, if the vessel, being 
wrecked on the voyage, is abandoned with her cargo then such abandonment of 
possession will put an end to the shipowner's lien,111 and the subsequent 
recovery of the possession of the vessel and her cargo will not revive it.
Abandonment of possession is equivalent to abandonment of the lien. 
Where the ship being disabled on her voyage is abandoned with her cargo to the 
underwriters, they may not claim to be subrogated to the shipowner's lien for 
the freight upon the cargo, such lien being lost by abandonment of the cargo.112
105 Portland Flouring Co. V. Portland SS. Co. (19061 145 Fed.Rep. 687-691.
106 N orth V. G urnev (1861) 1 John.& H. 509-529.
107 N e lso n  V. The Association For The Protection O f Commercial In terests (1874) 43 
L.J.C.P. 218.
108 (1823) 1 B. & C. 181.
109 See Ibid., Per Best, J. at P. 185.
110 Sw eet V. Pvm (1800) 1 East 4; H artley V. H itchcock (1816) 1 Stark.408.
111 N e lso n  V. The AssociatioN For The Protection O f Commercial Interests (1874) 43 
L .J.C.P. 218. The lien w ill also be term inated if the contract w ill becom e im possible of 
performance, but mere fact that performance has been prevented will not put an end to the 
shipowner's lien: The Teutonia (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 171, L.R. 3 A. & E. 394.
112 Portland Flouring Co V. Portland SS. Co. (19061 145 Fed. Rep. 687.
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Possession of the cargo must be given up voluntarily. If the possession is taken 
by fraud,113 or if the master and crew are forced to give up the possession of the 
vessel and her cargo,114 then the lien will revive upon resuming the possession.
In Ex Parte Cheesman. W elfitt115 the master, being turned out of 
possession, upon the vessel being captured, was held not to be deprived of his 
lien for the freight in case of her recapture. Lord Ellenborough, however, said 
that "if he had voluntarily quited possession of the ship, that would, indeed, have 
made a difference."
Sale of Goods bv W arehousem an:
If the lien is not discharged, and no deposit is made, the wharfinger or 
warehouseman may, and, if required by the shipowner must, at the expiration 
of ninty days from the time when the goods were placed in his custody, or, if the 
goods are pershable, at such earlier time as he might think proper, sell, by public 
auction, the goods or so much of them which may be necessary to satisfiy the 
charges. The auction must be advertised in two local newspapers, or in one daily 
newspaper published in London and in one local newspaper, and if the address 
of the cargo owners is known, a notice must be sent to them. But a bona fide 
puchaser of the goods shall not be effected by failure on the part of the 
warehouseman to give such notice.116
In D ennis v. C o rk .117 goods being shipped under a bill of lading which 
provided that upon the arrival of the vessel, the goods should be taken from 
alongside by the consignee as soon as the vessel was ready to discharge, 
otherwise they might be "landed, put into lighters, or stored by the steamer's 
agent ... at the expense of the consignee." The vessel arrived and was ready to
113 W allace V. W oodgate (1824) R.M. 193, 1 C.P. 575.
114 Bradley V. Newsom (1919) A.C. 16.
115 L gvx V-Barnard (1818) 8 Taun.149; G u m  V.Bolckow  (1875) L.R.10 Ch.491.
116 The Merchant Shipping Act. 1894, at s.497.
117 (1913)2 0 .  393.
326
discharge, but the consignee did not take delivery or pay the freight. The
shipowner landed the goods and stored them in a warehouse witha general
notice to the warehouseman not to deliver them to any one without instruction 
accompanied by their release for freight.
The indorsees of the bills of lading sent them to the warehouseman with 
the amount due for the freight and asked for delivery of the goods, pursuant to 
S. 495 of the Merchant Shipping Act. The Court of King's Bench Division held that 
the goods had not been placed by the shipowner in the warehouse under the 
provision of sections 493-496 of the Merchant Shipping Act. 1894, and 
therefore, the cargo owners, were not entitled to delivery upon depositing the
amount of the freight with the warehouseman under the provision of S.495. 
Scrutton,J., said that "S. 494 only applies to cases under S. 493; but, if that is not 
so, it only applies to cases where the goods are stored with a notice that they are 
to remain subject to a lien for freight to an amount mentioned in the notice. It 
appears to me not to apply to a case where they are stored with a
warehouseman with a notice not to deliver to anybody without instructions,
saying nothing about the amount of freight, but leaving the shipowner to settle 
all questions as to freight."118
2- W aiver of Lien:
The shipowner's lien on cargo for freight may be lost or waived in the
following cases:
a- Taking Bill of Exchange:
If a security is taken for a debt for which the party has a lien upon the 
property of the debtor, such security being payable at a distant day, the lien is 
lo st.119 Thus, if a shipowner having a lien on the cargo for his freight accepts a 
bill of exchange, payable at a future time, he will be held to have waived his lien.
118 Ibid. at P. 400.
119 See H ew ison V.G uthrie (1838) 2 Bing.(N.C.)755,per Tindal,C.J.at P.759.
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In H orncastle v. Farran.120 the shipowner, having a lien on the goods took a 
bill of exchange in payment, and though he objected to it at the time, afterwards 
negotiated it. It was held that such negociation amounted to an approval of the 
bill by him, and therefore, it was a relinquishment of his lien on the goods. 
Abbott,J., said that:
"The negociation of the bill was to be taken as against the party 
negociating it, as an approbation of the bill by him; and that the 
owners of the ship having, by this act, declared their approbation of
the bill in question, had lost their lien on the goods."121
b- Detention of Goods Upon Different Ground:
If a shipowner, when goods are demanded of him, rests his refusal upon
grounds other than that of a lien, he can not afterwards resort to his lien as a
justification for retaining them.122 A lien must be taken to have been waived if 
the party claims to detain the goods until payment of the debt due from a third 
person,123 or on the ground of a right of property in them.124
If the shipowner without mentioning to the charterer that he is exercising 
his lien on cargo, merely instructs the master not to discharge the cargo until 
payment of freight, this will not amount to waiver of the lien.125
3- Discharge of the Lien:
The lien for freight might be discharged by:
a- Paym ent:
Payment determines the lien, even if it is in the nature of a conditional 
payment, such as accepting a bill of exchange payable at a certain date which is
120 (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 497.
121 Ibid. at P. 500.
122 W hite V. G ainer (1824) 2 Bing. 23-24; Boardm an V. M I  (1809)Car.& M. 627 n.
123 Dirks. V. Richards (1842) Car. & M. 626.
124 Boardm an V. M  (1842) Car. & M. 627 n.
125 The "Agios Giorgis" (1976) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 192-203.
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as to lien a proper payment and has the effect of discharging the shipowner's 
lien. There will be no lien for freight while the bill is outstanding.
In Tam vaco v. S im pson .I26 by the charteparty, freight was to be paid "on 
unloading and right delivery of the cargo, less advances in cash", and "one half of 
the freight was to be advanced by the freighter's acceptance at three months, on 
signing bills of lading." Upon the arrival of the vessel at the port of destination, 
while the charterer's accpetance was still running, the master having received 
information that the charterer had become bankrupt, refused to deliver the 
goods unless the full freight was paid.
The Court of Exchequer Chamber held that the shipowner had no lien on 
the cargo for the half of the freight covered by the charterer's outstanding 
acceptance, the giving of the acceptance by the charterer being considered as 
prepayment of a moiety of the freight,127 therefore, the bill of lading holder was 
entitled to the cargo on payment of the other half, and the probability of the 
acceptance being dishonoured by reason of the charterer's insolvency was held 
not to make any difference.
It was contended for the shipowner that the lien was only suspended 
during the currency of the bill and upon the charterer's insolvency the 
shipowner's lien immediately revived; and he was, therefore, placed in the same 
position as if the bill had been dishonoured. The Court, however, did decide the 
question as to whether the shipowner's lien would revive if the voyage had 
been prolonged, so that the vessel arrived at the port of destination after the 
maturity and dishonour of the bill. The shipowner's argument was based upon 
the common contract for the sale of goods, where the right of the vendor to stop 
them in transit is suspended during the currency of the bill given for the price of 
the goods, but revives upon the bill being dishonoured.128 But Blackburn, J.,
126 (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 363.
127 See per Pollock, C J., at P. 371.
128 See also Gunn V. Bolckow (1875) L.R. 10 Ch. 491.
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considered this to be an exceptional rule and said:
"But if we extend the doctrine to such a case as this, we must also 
extend the exception in favour of the bona fide taker of a bill of 
lading. I think there is no foundation for the argument."129
It seems, however, where the bill has been dishonoured before the 
delivery of the goods to the consignee, Then there is no reason to deprive the 
shipowner from withholding the goods for his freight which has become due but 
not paid. To support the proposition, the case of Gilkison v. M iddleton 130 may 
be relied on. The charterparty giving a lien to the shipowner for all freight due 
under the charterparty, a portion of the charterparty freight, £900, was to be 
paid by the charterer's acceptance at three months, on sailing of the ship. On 
arrival of the ship at the port of discharge, the master hearing that the bills given 
for the £900 had been dishonoured, claimed a lien on the cargo against the bill of 
lading holders. Cockbum, J., said:
"The cargo being expressly made liable for all freight due under the 
charterparty, it follows, that on arrival of the ship at (the port of 
discharge) there was £900 due for freight, for which the cargo was 
liable. If the matters had so remained, the owners clearly would 
have a lien for that £900."131
As against the bona fide holders of the bill of lading they could have only a 
lien for the freight mentioned in the bill of lading which itself was to be paid in 
advance and had not been paid.132
h- Tender of Payment:
The consignee must tender the freight before the shipowner can be 
expected to give up the possession of the cargo unless the shipowner is held to
129 Tam vaco V. Simpson (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 363-372.
130 (1857) 2 C.B. (N.S.) 134.
131 Ibid. at P. 153.
132 But see K rchner V. Venus (1859) 12 Moo. P.C. 361; E m  V. K irchner (1856) 11 Moo. P.C.
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have dispensed with the tender of the amount due for freight. The mere fact 
that the shipowner demands a large sum in respect of freight, or wrongfully
claims a lien for two different causes, does not amount to waiver of tender,
therefore, the consignee is still bound to tender a reasonable sum, before he is
entitled to the possession of the goods.133
In Lvle Shipping Co. v. Corporation of Cardiff.134 after discharging a 
considerable part of the cargo, the shipowners exercised their lien for freight and 
loading port demmurage. The amount claimed being too large was not justified 
by the freight and demmurage actually due. Bigham, J., however, said that the 
shipowners were, "at the time they made this claim, entitled to exercise their
lien; nor did they distroy that right by putting forward a claim larger than what
was justified; for in putting it forward I do not think they seriously meant that
they would not give up the remainder of the cargo at all, until the whole of that 
amount was paid to them. They only intended to claim was really due; I do not 
think that their conduct was such as to releive the defendants from the 
obligation to tender such a sum as would be in fact sufficient to discharge the 
lien."135
The mere refusal to deliver the goods does not amount to a waiver of 
tender unless the shipowner's conduct is such as to show that it will be useless to 
tender anything less than the wrongfully large amount insisted on.136
In K erfo rd  v. M o n d e l.137 the cargo owners, when they demanded the 
goods, they were prepared to pay the freight for their carriage. The bil of lading
under which the delivery of the goods were demanded had made them
deliverable on payment of "freight as agreed”. But the shipowner refused to 
deliver the goods except on payment of the dead freight. It was held that freight
133 Jones V. T arleton (1842) 9 M. & W. 675-678; A llen  V. Sm ith (1862) 12 C.B. (N.S.) 638; 
Scarfe V. M organ (1838) 4 M. & W. 270. But see A shm ole V. W ainw right (1842) 2 Q.B. 837.
134 (1899) 5 Com. Cas. 87.
135 Ibid. at P. 97.
136 The "Norway" (1865) 3 Moo. P. C. (N.S.) 245.
137 (1859) 28 L.J. Ex. 303.
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for carriage alone was due, and that the refusal was a implied dispensation of 
tender of it. Bramwell, B., said:
"we conclude that the defendant here, in effect, said, I claim these 
goods in respect of the lien for two different items; you need not 
trouble yourself to tender one of them, because if you do so I shall 
not deliver them up: I shall keep them for the other. If that is so, it is 
a reasonable thing to show that he dispenses with what he owned 
would be a nugatory tender of the sum he was entitled to 
receive."138
In The "Norway".139 the master upon the arrival of the ship, at the port of
destination, claimed lump sum freight, larger than was really due, as well as a
sum for general average, and he insisted upon keeping in his possession a part of 
the cargo to cover his demand for freight he considered due. A tender was 
made by the assignee of the bill of lading of the amount considered by him due, 
and he undertook to give security for the remainder. This offer was refused by 
the master. It was held that the demand by the master of a larger sum than 
what was due, and the refusal by him to deliver the cargo was so made that it 
amounted to an announcement by him that it would be useless to tender any 
smaller sum, for if tendered it would be refused, and that such refusal
constituted a constructive waiver of any tender.140
Expenses of Preserving the Lien:
The case of Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co..141 is regarded as having 
laid down a general principle that a person having a lien upon a chattel for a 
debt cannot, if he keeps it to enforce payment, add, to the amount for which the 
lien exists, a charge for keeping the chattel till the debt is paid. The charge for 
keeping it being for his own benefit, and not for the benefit of the person whose 
chattel is in his possession.142
138 Ibid. at P. 306.
139 (1865) 3 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 245.
140 (1860) 8 H.L.C. 338.
141 See per Lord
142 See per Lord Wensleydale at P. 345, and per Lord Cranworth at P. 343. In that case the
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The rule, however, does not seem to be applicable to the cases where the 
goods are held in a place for the hire of which under the contract between the 
parties payment would have to be made, as for instance in a ship or a 
warehouse. The person who is exercising the lien is entitled to claim payment 
for the detention of his ship, if he holds the goods in the ship or, if less expensive, 
he clears them out of the ship and puts them into a warehouse, the expenses of 
keeping them in the warehouse.143
In H arlev v. G a rd n er.144 by a charterparty a lump sum freight was to be 
paid on completion of loading. The shipowners had a right of lien on the cargo 
for payment of "all freight, dead freight, demurrage and all other charges 
whatsoever." The charterer not having sufficient funds to pay the freight on 
completion of loading, an arrangement was made for payment on arrival of the 
ship at the port of destination. On arrival of the vessel as the charterer was still 
unable to perform the obligation to pay the freight, the shipowner could either 
hold the cargo in his ship, or could himself land the cargo provided he still kept it 
in his possession, which he was entitled to do by common law; and this course 
being one which would be more economical to the plaintiff he adopted it; and 
accordingly the cargo was unloaded remaining in his possession until the lien for 
the freight and expenses which he had necessarily to incur in the discharge of 
the cargo had been paid.145
Mr. Justice Macnaghten decided that the shipowner had a lien on the cargo 
for all charges necessarily and properly incurred by him in discharging and 
warehousing. The principle of the case of Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co.. 
he said not to have any application to this case, where it was admitted that the
claim was by a shipwright for the cost of the use of graving dock during the detention by him 
of the ship upon a lien for the cost o f repair.
143 See per Mr. Justice Bailhache in Anglo Polish SS. V. V ickers (1924) 19 LI. L. R 121-125; 
The Kins V. H um phrey (1825) M’Clel & Y. 173.
144 (1932) 43 LI. L. R. 104.
145 These facts are taken from the judgment o f Mr. Justice Macnaghten, at P. 106.
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shipowner was entitled to remove the goods from his ship and so stop all
charges for demurrage. He was entitled to remove the goods from his ship and
place them in a warehouse.
The Expenses Mav he Recovered as Damages:
Where the consignees fail to receive the goods within the time fixed by
their contract, or a reasonable time, after the arrival of the vessel at the port of
destination and satisfy the shipowner's claim for the freight, the shipowner may
land and warehouse the goods subject to his lien, and maintain a claim for
damages for their storage or other charges properly incurred in doing so.146 The 
landing and warehousing the cargo being made necessary as a result of the 
cargo owner's default in taking delivery of the cargo or paying the freight 
according to their agreement, then they will be liable to indemnify the
shipowner for the expenses so caused.
The bill of lading, however, generally contain a clause empowering the 
master or agent to land the cargo "at the risk and the expense of the owners of 
the goods", if the goods are not applied for within a certain time after arrival of 
the vessel at the port of destination; and "the master or agent to have a lien on 
the goods for freight and payments made (if any) or liabilities incurred in
respect of any charges stipulated to be borne by the owners of the goods." It has 
been held that such a power is only in aid of the shipowner, and that the master 
is not bound to exercise it.147
Therefore, this clause is held by Lindley, L.J.,148 to be inserted in the interest 
and for the benefit of the shipowner, so as to give him an additional remedy for 
the recovery of what is due to him, and not a remedy in substitution for any
which he would have apart from these clauses.
146 H oulder V. General S. N. Co. (1862) 3 F. & F. 170; Great Northern Co. V. Sw affield  (1874) 
L.R. 9 Ex. 132; The Asiatic Prince (1900) 103 Fed. Rep. 676.
147 Per Lindley L J . in Hick V. Rodocanachi [1891] 2 Q.B. 632.
148 Ibid.
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After the end of the shipowner’s lien in English law has been discussed, it 
would be necessary in the course of this study to explain how this lien ends in 
the civil law jurisdiction, and that will come next in this section.
(B l-  The Term ination of the Shipow ner's Lien in the Civil Law 
J u r is d ic t io n :
The "lien'' or "privilege", as guarantees, have a secondary character; their
aim is to protect the shipowner or the carrier, and they imply the existence of a
debt of freight to which they are linked and to which they insure the execution. 
Therefore, it is obvious that if the main obligation, i.e., the debt of freight, 
disappears then, these garantees will follow as well.
1- The Loss of Possession:
In the French and Algerian law, possession has not the effect as in the
legislation which knows the system of corporeal security (garantie reelle). In
fact, the lien which is linked to that system has for main characteristic, not to end 
by the delivery of the goods.149 However, possession is not neglected. It has a 
certain effect which is, that as long as the goods remain in the hands of the
shipowner, i.e., until the end of their unloading, the creditor can ask for their
warehouse or deposit and to put them in the warehouse designated by the
judge. On the other hand, if the goods are not in his possession any more, he 
must have seized in the hands of his debtor. The difference is that, in the second
case, the right to be preferred (le droit de preference) can be at any time
brought to an end, by a better right of a third party who is protected by Article 
2279 of the French Civil Code and Article 835 of the Algerian Civil Code. It must 
be added that the lien disappears, if the goods pass to the hands of a third party,
i.e., if the consignee or the receiver of the goods disposes of them.
149 R ipert. G eorges, D ro it M aritim e . 4 6me 6d, Vol.2, Paris, 1952, p .556. See,
Schertenteib.Francis, Le Fret (La Garantie de son Paiementl at P.171.
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Thus, the loss of possession, if it does not bring an end to the guarantee, it 
does not modify the rights of the shipowner. His lien (as long as he is in
possession of the goods), can with reservation of informing the court, be 
compared to a right of retention or to a possessory lien.
2- The Waiver of the "Lien" or "Privilege" :
The waiver of the guarantee, after the loss of the possession, is its1 usual 
cause of bringing it to an end. It is either express or implied. It is the implied 
waiver, which is evidently, difficult to establish. The agreements or conventions 
of the parties having force of the law, the express waiver is known as such in all 
the legislation and does not need any particular observation. It is real that the 
distinction between the express waiver and the implied waiver differs 
sometimes from one law to another. It is frequently150 only a question of 
te rm in o lo g y .151 The lien being given in the interest of the shipowner, then it
was normal to give the shipowner the power to the waiver of his lien, either in
advance or after.152
The lien can be said to have been waived, in the case of giving a security. 
In fact, Article 3, Sect.l of the French Law of June 1966 and Article 681 of the 
Algerian Maritime Code, authorise the exercise of the lien, "unless the charterer 
gives a security". If today, the effect of giving a security (cautionnement) does 
not give any doubt, a question arises as to whether, the acceptance of other 
securities other than that, will imply an implied waiver of the lien. It seems that 
it is not the case. In fact, before the reform of the French law of 1966, it was 
considered that the security could not oblige the judge to end the deposit or the 
warehouse of the goods. It had to be the express stipulation of Article 3 of the
150 Schertenleib. F., Op Cit, at P. 173.
151 Ripert. G., Op Cit, at P. 557. Denisse L6on, Du fret ConsidSre dans ses Rapport av lc 
l'Abondan. l'Affrdtement. la Contribution aux Avaries Communes et les Assurances Maritime^, 
Paris, 1891, At P. 5.
152 Rodiere R..Trait6 G6n6ral de Droit Maritime. Paris, 1968, note 3, at P. 207.
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Law of 1966 to bring it into effect. Moreover, will it be illogical to oblige the 
shipowner to accept other securities? First, we can, a contrario, maintain that 
the acceptance of other securities, either corporeal security or personal, does not 
necessarily imply a waiver of the lien. This kind of stipulations, do nothing but 
guarantee the shipowner against the insolvency of the debtor, and to insure him 
for the payment of his debt without ending it. Moreover, there is another way 
by which this lien or "privilege" can be ended, which is that of the prescription. 
In the case of affreightment, the action is prescribed after a year, and that is 
prescribed by Article 4 of the Law of June the 18 th, 1966 and Article 648 of the 
Algerian Maritime Code, starting from a certain date, depending on the different 
types of charterparties, Article 4 of the Decree of the 31 st of December, 1966. 
However, in the Algerian Maritime Code it is prescribed in Article 742, that the 
actions born out of the contract of carriage of goods are prescribed after two 
years, starting from the day the goods have been delivered or from the day they 
should have been delivered. On the other hand, in the contract of carriage of 
goods in the French law, the action is prescribed after one year, starting from the 
day of the delivery of the goods, and that is prescribed by Article 26 of the Law 
of the 18 th June, 1966. However, the lien is prescribed after fifteen days from 
the day of the delivery, after this period, i.e., (the fifteen days), this lien is not 
preferred on other creditors of the debtor.
This section can be summarised by saying that, the different ways for 
ending the shipowner's lien in the english law jurisdiction, are quite similar to 
those in the civil law jurisdiction. This lien can be ended in both jurisdiction 
either, by the loss of possession, because this latter is a very important element 
for preserving this lien, or, it might be ended by waiving this lien in different 
ways, like taking other means of security, such as taking a bill of exchange in the 
english law jurisdiction or, taking a security or deposit given by the charterer in 
the law jurisdiction. This last way of ending the shipowner's lien, is provided in 
both, the French and the Algerian maritime code. There is also, other means for
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end this lien, and that by tender of payment of the freight or the sale of the 
goods after a certain period.
However, it should be pointed out, that the expenses for preserving the lien, 
are incurred by the shipowner in the english law jurisdiction, i.e., the one who 
wants to preseve the lien must take in charge the expenses, but it is a different 
situation in the civil law jurisdiction, because in this jurisdiction, the expenses are 
paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the goods.
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CONCLUSION
The express terms of the charterparty give to the shipowner a lien on the 
cargo for the guarantee of payment of freight due to him for the hire of the 
vessel or for the services rendered to the cargo. Usually, charterparties give a 
lien to the shipowners on the cargo they are carrying for the payment of their 
freight. This lien given to the shipowner is considered as a possessory lien in the 
case of a voyage or a time charterparty and that is because possession of the 
goods remains with the shipowner who has possession of the ship. However, the 
situation would be different in the case of a demise charterparty where the 
control and possession of the ship along with the possession of the cargo has 
passed to the charterer by demise.
The shipowner's lien may be justified upon application of the general 
principal that, "where a bailee has expanded his labour and skill in the 
improvement of a chattel delivered to him, he has a lien for his charge in that 
re sp ec t."1 Thus, as goods are improved in value by their carriage, therefore, 
the carrier may detain them for the charge of such carriage. This is also the 
ground suggested in the United States, by Mr.Justice Jhonson in the case of Gracie 
v. Palmer.2
The master is the agent of the shipowner to receive and transport; the 
goods are improved in value by the cost and care of transportation. As the 
bailee of the shipper, the goods are in the custody and possession of the master, 
and therefore, the shipowner, and the law will not suffer that possession to be 
violated until the labourer had received his hire.
The lien recognised in favour of the shipowner by common law is a 
particular or specific lien, as opposed to general lien. This specific lien of a 
shipowner extends to all goods of a particular shipment, consigned to same
1 Scarfe v. M organ (1838) 4 M. & W. 270-283.
2 (1823) 8 W h e a t. 605-635.
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person on the same voyage, for the freight due on some or all of them.
The common law recognises a lien for the carrier on the cargo for the 
payment of his freight. This lien is in the nature of a possessory lien.
Therefore, where the shipowner performs his obligation by carrying the 
cargo, he is entiled to a lien because he rendered a service to the cargo and 
which increased its value by carrying it to its destination.
For the nature of this lien, it depends on the situation of every case. Thus, it 
seems clear that in a time or a voyage charterparty or bill of lading, this is a 
contractual creation of a possessory lien. In the case of a demise charter it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that, if anything, it would be an equitable lien. 
It would not be a lien akin to a possessory lien, as the owner would have no
power to prevent delivery and it is only as an equitable lien that such a clause
makes sense in the context of a demise charterparty.3 Thus, in English law 
liens may be granted by the common law, by equity, by statute or by contract.
In the case of voyage or time charterparty the shipowner has possession of 
the ship and therefore, of the cargo and he can exercise his lien by detainaing the 
cargo until his claims are satisfied, which are mainly and in most of the cases the 
payment of his freight. However, one might ask himself about the basis of the 
nature of this lien, and therefore, one might say that this lien can be described as 
an equitable lien given to the shipowner for the services he rendered to the 
cargo, because these services have increased the value of the cargo and that by 
carrying it from one place to another, therefore, its's merchantable value has
increased. Here, the case is treated in the French and Algerian Civil Codes,4
under the heading of the unlawful enrichment. However, English law does not 
consider the theory of unlawful enrichment to justify the case of recompense 
and therefore the lien, but, on the contrary, Scots law does recognise that theory.
3 Tetley, William. Enforcement Of Maritime Claims, at P. 280.
4  The French Civil Code, Article 1375, and Algerian Civil Code, Article 141.
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Erskine describes recompense as an obligation " by which a person who is made 
richer through the occasion, or by the act of another, without any purpose of 
donation, is bound to indemnify that other."5 The case of unlawful enrichment 
or recompense is a question of circumstances according to the circumstances of 
each case as to whether equity does or does not found the claim. The obligation 
is "founded on the consideration that the party making the demand has been 
put to some expense or some disadvantage there has been a benefit created to 
the party from whom he makes demand of such a kind that it cannot be 
undone."6
The one who benefitted from the act of the person who expended money 
or rendered services, must reimburse the latter to the extent of the expense or 
service which the claimant has made and, this theory is supported by the 
principles of justice and equity. However, if one looks back to the case of the 
shipowner whose ship was used to carry goods under a contract of carriage of 
goods by sea in the form of a demise charterparty, in this case the shipowner 
has not got the possession of his ship, and therefore not the possession of the 
cargo. Therefore, it is very difficult or almost impossible for him to exercise his 
lien, in this case, it would best for the interest of the shipping trade to give the 
shipowner an equitable lien on the basis of unlawful or unjust enrichment. 
Therefore, where there is general average or salvage, there is always a lien for 
saving the cargo. So, on the basis of this argument, everytime that work has 
been done affecting goods by a person lawfully in possession of them, he is 
entitled to a lien, and it is immaterial whether it is for general average or 
s a l v a g e . 7 However, the case of the shipowner in the case of a demise 
charterparty is different from that of the one who rendered services to the cargo 
like in the case of salvage or general average, bechause the shipowner in the first
5 Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland . vol. 12. 1931. p. 342.
6 Per Lord Pres. Inglis in S tew art V. S tew art. 1878, 6R. 145.
7 See, N icholson V. C hapm an. 2 H. Bl. 254. and, C astellain  V. T hom pson . 13 C.B. (N.S.) 105; 
32 L J. (C.P.) 79.
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case did not render any services, he has merely offered his ship to be used
against the payment of a remuneration. Moreover, even if he is given a lien on 
the cargo it is quite difficult or almost impossible for this shipowner to exercise 
his lien on the cargo, because it is a well known fact that the possession and 
control of the vessel and therefore, of the cargo pass altogether to the possession 
of the demise charterer. Therefore, the shipowner stays without any guarantee 
for the payment of his freight and, this is not accepted by the principles of justice 
nor by those of equity. Thus, it would be in the interest of the shipping trade 
and in the interest of the shipowner, to give the shipowner whose vessel has 
been demise chartered a preferred claim or right over the goods of the
charterer, and that by enabling him to have the cargo arrested into a third
party's hands until his freight is paid, and a right to trace the goods into
whosever hands they might fall, and that in the case where the charterer tries to 
defraud the shipowner by passing the goods into a third party's possession. 
However, this right must not be absolute, otherwise the shipowner might abuse 
of his right and that will cause an inconvenience to the demise charterer. This 
can be possible if the right of the shipowner is only exercised by the court 
everytime that the shipowner claims the payment of his freight. In the civil law 
jurisdictions namely, the French and Algerian maritime laws, the guarantee for 
payment of freight is guaranteed by a "privilege", which can be defined as, the 
right to be preferred for the payment of his freight on the goods. Therefore, 
from this principle comes the right of depositing the goods and therefore, their 
sale. However, the right to deposit the goods has for consequence the right to 
ask for the sale of the goods by authority of the law. This right however, has 
never been absolute. The sale cannot take place, unless it is judged necessary, 
and the presiding judge will have to consider the interests of both parties of the 
litigation.8 Therefore, just as the deposit or the consignation, the right to ask for
8 B leinc Pierre, De la consignation en main tierces des m archandises arrivant par 
m er. Marseille, 1933, p. 19.
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the sale is considered as a special means for the recovery of the freight.9
However, by a way of analogy it would fair and logical to give the 
shipowner in a demise charterparty a right of priority which makes him able 
enough to recover his freight, as in the case of unjust enrichment or the case of a 
lessor of an immovable, because the logic of the situation and the justice and 
equity, will require some guarantee or right of priority to be given to the 
shipowner, because it is most unfair to let the demise charterer away, without 
paying the freight owed by him to the shipowner. Moreover, the stability and 
continuance of the shipping trade will cease to exist, if the shipowner in the 
demise charterparty does not get his share of the venture, and moreover, 
because the trade in general and the shipping business in particular are founded 
on trust and, the different transactions are very fast to be concluded, and
therefore, it requires a lot of guarantees.
It has been shown that the shipowner at common law, generally has a right 
to retain the goods in his possession until the freight upon them, and sometimes 
other charges also, have been paid.10 It does not give the shipowner any
property in the goods; nor does it enable him to sell them; even though the 
retention of them may be attended with expense.11 This right simply gives the 
shipowner, the right to keep possession, and to resist all claims to take them
away, and it avails against the true owner of the goods, although he may not be
the person liable to pay freight.
Thus, in order to maintain his lien the shipowner must keep possession of 
the goods, either in his own hands or in the hands of his agents.12 Therefore, 
the possession or the retention of goods being the main way by which the
9 Denisse L6on, Du fr6t considere avec ses rapports avec l'abandon. l'affrdtem ent. la
contribution aux avaries communes et les assurances maritimes. Paris, 1891, p. 308.
10 Carver. Carriage bv Sea. Thirteen Edition, para 1991. at P. 1380.
11 M ulliner V. F lo rence (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 484; Thames Ironworks C o. V. Patent Derrick Co. 
(1860) 1 J. & H. 93.
12 C arver. Carriage Bv Sea. Thirteenth Edition. Para. 2033. at P. 1408.
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shipowner can exercise his lien to force the charterer or the cargo-owner to pay 
the freight, the shipowner in the course of the exercise of his lien, might either 
warehouse the goods at the port of destination or, use other means to preserve 
his lien after the release of the goods or, he might withdraw the vessel from the 
service of the charterer.
The exercise of the shipowner's "privilege" in the civil law jurisdictions 
namely the French and the Algerian laws, this exercise might occure in two 
different situations. The first situation is more or less simple, because whether 
the consignee is unknown or whether he refuses to take delivery of the goods 
and pay freight, the goods are in the possession of the shipowner or the carrier, 
either on his ship or on the wharf or in the shipowner's warehouse. The 
important solution and which explains the uniformity of solutions in this case, is 
the fact that the creditor has possession of the goods.
This solution was provided in the French Code of Commerce, in article 3 of 
the Decree of 1966.13 This Decree in its' article 3 provides that, "if the 
shipowner is not paid when discharging the goods, he cannot retain them on his
ship, but he can deposit or warehouse them in the hands of a third party and to
sell them, unless the charterer gives a security."14 The second situation is where 
the shipowner is faced with a refusal of payment of the freight, in this case, 
where the freight has not been paid, the shipowner has a lien or a right of 
priority according to article 2 of the French law of the 18 th of June, 1966. 
However, he cannot keep these goods on board his ship, but he can still keep 
their possession by warehousing or depositing them in the hands of a third 
party and then ask for their sale. This solution is provided by article 3 of the
Decree of December the 31 st, 1966.15 This measure keeps the interest of the
13 Decret No.66-1078 du 31 Decembre 1966, sur les contrats d'affretement et de transport 
m a ri tim e s .
14 "My Own Translation", the actual article in French provides that:
« S i  le fr£teur n'est point pay6 lors du d£chargement des marchandises, il ne peut les 
retenir dans son navire, mais il peut les consigner en mains tidrces et les faire vendre, sauf i  
l'affr£teur i  fournir caution".
15 Under the title of, "Affreightment of Ships", in Chapter I which includes the general 
rules o f these kinds of contracts.
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captain who has the right to be paid before giving up his retention, and in the 
same time it also protects the interests of the consignee who, before paying the 
freight, has the right, to examine the state of the goods which are going to be 
delivered to him.
However, the situation is different in the case of a demise charterparty,
where the possession of the ship is given up to the charterer, and therefore, the
possession of the cargo. Here, how can the shipowner exercise his lien on the
cargo, without having possession of it? Here, because the goods are not in the
hands of the shipowner, he must then act by the means of an action for
execution for the sale of the debtor's chattels, i.e., "saisie-execution mobiliere".
Therefore, the goods being out of the possession of the shipowner in the 
case of a demise charterparty, is not a problem any more in the French law, and 
that is because the shipowner can ask the court to sequester the goods of the
charterer, and that according to article 48 of the Civil Code of Procedure.
Therefore, the goods will be in the hands of the court, and then, the shipowner 
will not have to fear for his debt to be satisfied.
When it comes to the Algerian Maritime Code, which for historical reasons
has been influenced by the French Matime Law, however, in the case of the
shipowner's lien on the cargo for the garantee of payment of his freight, he has 
provided a much better protection to the shipowner. The Algerian legislator like 
the French has made a difference between the shipowner and the carrier.
Therefore, he gave the shipowner a lien or a right of priority over the goods for 
the garantee of payment of his freight.
He therefore, provided in article 645 of the Algerian Maritime Code that:
"The shipowner has a lien on the goods for the payment of his freight and other
charges provided in the contract of affreightment",16 this is the same provision
16 "My Own Translation", article 645 povides that:
« L e  frdteur a un privilege sur les marchandises pour le paiement de son fret e t autres 
charges prdvues au contrat d 'a ffrd te m en t» .
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as that provided by the French law in article 2.
However, the Algerian legislator went further, by providing that the 
shipowner can refuse to unload the cargo, if the freight and the remunerations 
for demmurage or other delay have not been paid by the charterer,17 and he 
added that, in the case above, the shipowner can deposit the goods and after he 
has told the charterer sell them with the consent of the judicial authority, unless 
a security, which is secure enough to garantee the lien, has been deposited by 
the charterer.18
This is a much better protection to the shipowner than that given to him by 
the French legislator, where he cannot keep the goods on board his ship, but in 
the Algerian law it is up to the shipowner, whether he wants to retain the goods 
on board his ship or to deposit them into the hands of a third party, which is 
nothing else but retainaing the possession of the goods by the shipowner
through the possession of a third party.
In the case of a carrier of goods by sea, the Algerian legislator gave him the 
right not to deliver the goods and to deposit them until the consignee has paid 
or given a security for all what is due for the carriage and other charges.19
Here, the Algerian legislator has made a difference between the shipowner 
and the carrier, because in this case the carrier cannot retain the goods on his
ship, but has to deposit them. These goods which are not claimed, can also be 
sold, if these goods are by their nature perishable, or if the sum of their
17 Article 680 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« L e  freteur peut refuser le ddchargement de la cargaison si le fret et la remuneration i  
titre de surestaries ou d'autres retards ne lui ont pas ete payes par l 'a ffre teu r» .
18 Article 681 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« D a n s  le cas visd i  l'article precedent, le frdteur peut faire consigner les marchandises, 
et, aprds en avoir avisd prealablem ent l'affrdteur, les faire vendre avec le consentem ent de 
l'autoritd judiciaire, sauf si une caution suffisante a dtd fournie par l'a ffrd te u r» .
19 Article 792 of the Algerian Maritime Code, which provides that:
« L e  tran sp o r te r  peut refuser de livrer les marchandises et les faire consigner jusqu'd 
ce que le ddstinataire ait payd ou qu'il ait fournit caution de tout ce qui est du pour le transport
de ses m archandises ainsi qu'd titre de contribution d 'avarie commune et de rem uneration
d 'assistance» .
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warehousing exceeds their value, but their sale sould be made before depositing 
them .20
Moreover, the Algerian legislator has given the carrier another protection in 
the case where the money of the sale of the goods not claimed, is not enough to 
pay the carrier for the remuneration of his carriage and the expenses for 
warehousing them, in this case the Algerian legislator has made of the shipper 
the one responsible for the payment of the difference.21 The shipowner in the
case of a demise charterparty, because he is deprived of the possession of the 
ship, and therefore, the cargo, in this case how can he exercise his lien? In this 
case, he has to use the protection given to the creditor in the civil code, which 
gives him some means of prevention to preserve his rights or his lien. That is 
like the French law, by giving the shipowner the right to have the goods stopped 
or seized and taken into the care of the court, so that the debtor cannot dispose
of them before the freight is paid, and this means of protection will prevent
them from passing into the hands of a third party who might acquire them in
good faith (article 2279 of the French civil code and article 835 of the Algerian 
civil code). The exercise of the lien in this situation, is by taking a measure of 
prevention, which will prevent the debtor from disposing of the goods to a third 
party. This measure is provided by article 345 of the Algerian Code of 
P rocedure.22 This article is quite similar in its1 aim to that of the French law, as
to the protection of the shipowner in the case of demise charterparty.
Moreover, a lien on sub-freight could only be enforced by the shipowner 
before the shipper had made payment to the charterer; it conferred no right to
follow the money after it had been paid and the owner's right to payment of
freight existed only under their lien."23
20 Article 795, Section.2. Ibid.
21 Article, 796 of the Algerian Maritime Code.
22 Article 345 of "Le Code de Procedure Civil" Algerien. Ordonnance No.66-154 du 8 Juin 
1966 portant Code de Procedure Civil.
23 Ibid. at P. 372.
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The shipowner's lien for the garantee of payment of his freight is ended in 
different ways, depending whether the shipowner parts with the possession of 
the cargo, or waive his lien, or the lien may be discharged. The different ways 
for ending the shipowner's lien in the english law jurisdiction, are quite similar to 
those in the civil law jurisdiction.
After having discussed both jurisdictions, namely the English jurisdiction 
which is part of the common law and the civil law jurisdictions (the French and 
the Algerian laws), it would be best to point out that the civil law jurisdictions 
have provided the shipowner with a better protection for the guarantee of 
payment of his freight. The French maritime law (which is included in the code 
of commerce), allows the shipowner or the carrier, in the case of a voyage or 
time charterparty to unload the cargo and to warehouse it without losing
possession of it and that it is because the shipowner or the carrier will give notice 
to the warehouseman to keep the cargo for the shipowner. In this case the
shipowner or carrier will be retaining possession of the cargo through a third 
person being the warehouseman; this case is nothing more but another means of 
exercising a right of retention. Moreover, the shipowner or the carrier in this 
situation is allowed to sell the goods and to satisfy his debt from the proceeds of 
the sale of the cargo. The Algerian maritime code, although being a civil law 
jurisdiction, has followed the same steps as the French law but, learnt from it 
and brought a better solution, where it allowed the shipowner, either to keep the 
goods onboard the ship which an exercise of the right of retention or warehouse
them and that is possessing through a third party as the French law did.
Moreover, one might have noticed that the shipowner in the English jurisdiction, 
has to suffer the expenses of preserving the lien, i.e., the expenses of keeping the 
cargo in a warehouse, but in the civil law jurisdictions, the shipowner will not 
suffer such expenses. However, these expenses will be satisfied from the 
proceeds of sale of the cargo.
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Moreover, the shipowner in the civil law jurisdictions has a right of priority 
or he is preferred for the guarrantee of payment of his freight, on the creditors 
of his debtor and that is in the case of bankruptcy or admission into the legal 
liquidation of the debtor of freight.
In the case of a demise charterparty, the shipowner in the civil law
jurisdictions has only one means from the civil law, because the goods in this
type of charterparty have gone out of his possession and are in fact in the 
charterer's possession. In this case, he can use the action for execution for the 
sale of the debtor's chattels, i.e., (saisie-execution mobiliere). In this case he can 
ask the court to sequester the goods of the charterer, and therefore, the goods 
will be in the hands of the court and the fear for the loss of the cargo and then 
the guarantee for payment of the freight will disappear.
These are basically, the main points which make of the civil law 
jurisdictions being more advantageous to the shipowner then the common law
jurisdictions, and that might be because every time that the particular law has
omitted to give a solution to a particular situation, the civil law which is the
general law will be referred to for solutions, and therefore, the civil law
jurisdictions have broader means to apply to the different situations.
The main purpose of this work was to try to define the nature of the 
shipowner's lien for freight, and therefore, it was concluded that this lien is a 
possessory lien in the case of voyage or time charterparty. However, the 
shipowner might face some difficulties in trying to exercise his lien especially in 
the case of demise charterparty or in the case of sub-freight or sub-sub-freight. 
Therefore, we would recommend that the shipowner should be given some legal 
means to preserve his right. This means would be, the right to have the goods 
warehoused and after a certain period of time to have the right to sell the goods 
and that by an order of the court after a certain time has elapsed so that the
charterer would have enough time to settle the question of freight with the
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shipowner and so that the shipowner will not find himself left with the burden 
of keeping mere possession of the cargo and then, he can proceed in the business
of carriage which is the main aspect of that type of business, because the
carriage of goods by sea relies mainly on time, the shorter time it takes the
shipowner to finish carrying a cargo to its' destination the more chances he has
to have another assignment.
Moreover, the rights of the charterer will not be affected because the 
shipowner cannot sell the goods unless he has the consent of the court after a 
certain time of retaining the cargo. This court will look at the circumstances of 
each case before allowing the shipowner to proceed with the sale of the goods if 
it thinks necessary.
In the case of a demise charterparty, the shipowner should be given the 
right to ask the court to sequester the goods of the charterer which still in the
possession of the charterer because of the nature of this type of charter. This
right will be based on the fact that the charterer by agreeing to give a lien to the
shipowner has accepted to assign his right of freight against the sub-charterer to 
the shipowner who will take the place of the charterer, and the same will apply 
to the case of a sub-sub-charterparty. This right however, although it seems in
favour of the shipowner more than the charterer, it protects the rights of the 
charterer, and that is because the goods pass to the hands of the court and not 
the hands of the shipowner. Moreover, the court will not order the sale of the 
goods unless it is convinced that the shipowner deserves to have his freight paid 
by the sale of those goods.
The expenses of preserving the goods should be at the expenses of the 
charterer because it is him who refused to pay the remuneration for the carriage 
of the cargo, namely the freight. However, this should not be an absolute rule 
otherwise, the charterer might suffer from the shipowners who might abuse of 
this right. In this case, the charterer should be allowed to claim those expenses 
back and this might not have to happen because, this measure should only be
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applied by the consent of the court which will look at the case thoroughly and 
then, give the consent to either the shipowner to sell the goods or to the 
charterer to have his goods back.
Thus, with this kind of measures the shipowner will have his right of lien 
for the guarantee of payment of his freight protected no matter what type of 
charterparty he part of, and it protects the charterer as the shipowner cannot 
take any action without the consent of the court which will be independent and 
which will look at each case and decide what appropriate action is needed and 
whose rights should be protected.
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